What Semar told Sahadeva (2)

"Semar went on, 'Many wrongly use the term ‘nationalism’ as a synonym for ‘nation’. Nationalism refers to a set of beliefs about the nation. Any particular nation will contain differing views about its character; thus, for any nation, there will be different and competing beliefs about it that often manifest themselves as political differences. Some may view their nation as standing for individual liberty, while others may be willing to sacrifice that liberty for security. Some may welcome immigrants, and support policies that make it easy for them to become citizens; while others may be hostile to immigration. To take another example, consider disputes today in India. Some members of that nation have a narrow, intolerant view of their country by insisting that it should have only one religion, Hinduism; while others think that there should be freedom of religion such that Muslims, Sikhs, and Christians are rightly members of the nation.

Distinctive of nationalism is the belief that the nation is the only goal worthy of pursuit–an assertion that often leads to the belief that the nation demands unquestioned and uncompromising loyalty. When such a belief about the nation becomes predominant, it can threaten individual liberty. Moreover, nationalism often asserts that other nations are implacable enemies to one’s own nation; it injects hatred of what is perceived to be foreign, whether another nation, an immigrant, or a person who may practise another religion or speak a different language. Of course, one need not view one’s own nation and its relation to other nations in such a manner. In contrast to nationalism, the nation is a particular kind of society.

If there is one point on which there is agreement, it is that the term ‘nationalism’ is quite modern. Its earliest recorded use in anything like a recognizably social and political sense goes back to the German philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder and the French counter-revolutionary cleric, the Abbé Augustin de Barruel at the end of the eighteenth century. It was rarely used in the early nineteenth century; in English, its first use, in 1836, appears to be theological, the doctrine that certain nations are divinely elected. Thereafter, it tended to be equated with national egotism, but usually other terms, such as ‘nationality’ and ‘nationalness’, with the meanings of national fervour or national individuality, were preferred.

It was really only during the last century that the term nationalism acquired the range of meanings that we associate with it today. Of these usages, the most important are: (1) a process of formation, or growth, of nations; (2) a sentiment or consciousness of belonging to the nation; (3) a language and symbolism of the nation; (4) a social and political movement on behalf of the nation; (5) a doctrine and/or ideology of the nation, both general and particular.

No single political doctrine has played a more prominent role in shaping the face of the modern world than nationalism. Millions of people around the world, have willingly laid down their lives for their ‘fatherlands’ and this almost ritualistic mass self-sacrifice continues unabated. Obviously, not everybody displays extremism on the level of Salutati. But as Elshtain remarks, that sort of extremism has been ‘the norm in many of the great and horrible events of our century’

Despite this pervasive influence, however, nationalism was not taken seriously by the social scientists until relatively recently. For much of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, it was seen as a passing phase, by liberals and Marxists alike, hence as ‘intellectually unproblematic.' It was only in the 1920s and 1930s, with the pioneering works of historians like Carleton Hayes, Hans Kohn, Louis Snyder and E. H. Carr, that nationalism became a subject of sustained academic inquiry. Unlike their predecessors who were mainly interested in ethical issues, these historians took nationalism as a ‘discrete subject of investigation’ and made use of sociological factors in their accounts. The number and diversity of the studies of nationalism increased in the following decades under the impact of the experience of decolonization and the ‘proliferation’ of new states in Asia and Africa. Subscribing to some version of the then ascendant ‘nation-building’ model, most of these studies saw nationalism as a concomitant of the modernization processes. The 1980s, on the other hand, mark a turning point in many respects.

With tire publication of John Armstrong’s Nations Before Nationalism (1982), Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities (1983) , Ernest Gellner’s Nations and Nationalism (1983) , Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger’s The Invention of Tradition (1983) and Anthony D. Smith’s The Ethnic Origins of Nations (1986), among others, the debate on nationalism completed its ‘adolescence’. In this period, the theories grew more sophisticated and the ‘lines of battle’ became clearer. Nationalism, which had to wait until 1974 to have its first academic journal, finally had a stimulating, even polemical, literature.

Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent. Nationalism as a sentiment, or as a movement, can best be defined in terms of this principle. Nationalist sentiment is the feeling of anger aroused by the violationof the principle, or the feeling of satisfaction aroused by its fulfient. A nationalist movement is one actuated by a sentiment of this kind.

There is a variety of ways in which the nationalist principle can be violated.The political boundary of a given state can fail to include all the members of the appropriate nation; or it can include them all but alsoinclude some foreigners; or it can fail in both these ways at once, not incorporating all the nationals and yet also including some non nationals. Or again, a nation may live, unmixed with foreigners, in a multiplicity of states, SO that no single state can claim to be the national one.

But there is one particular form of the violation of the nationalist principle to which nationalist sentiment is quite particularly sensitive: if the rulers of the political unit belong to a nation other than that of the majority of the ruled, this, for nationalists, constitutes a quite outstandingly intolerable breech of political propriety. This can occur either through the incorporation of the national territory in a larger empire, or by the local domination of an alien group.

In brief, nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones, and, in parricular, that ethnic boundaries within a given state—a contingency already formallyexcluded by the principlein its general formulation—should not separate the power-holders from the rest.

The nationalist principle can be asserted in an ethical, 'universalistic' spirit. There could be, and on occasion there have been, nationalists-in-the-abstract, unbiassed in favour of any special nationality of their own, and generously preaching the doctrine for all nations alike: let all nations have their own political roofs, and let all of them also refrain from including non-nationals under it. There is no formal contradiction in asserting such non-egoistic nationalism. As a doctrineit can be supported by some good arguments, such as the desirability of preserving cultural diversity, of a pluralistic international political system, and of the diminution of internal strains within states.

In fact, however, nationalism has often not been so sweetly reasonable, nor so rationally symmetrical. It may be that, as Immanuel Kant believed, partiality, the tendency to make exceptions on one's own behalf or one's own case, is the central human weakness from which all others flow; and that it infects national sentiment as it does all else, engendering what the Italians under Mussolini called the sacro egoismo of nationalism. It may also be that the political effectiveness of national sentiment would be much impaired if nationalists had as fine a sensibility to the wrongs committed by their nation as they have to those committed against it.

The recognition by the individual that he or she is a member of a nation is but one among a number of the parts of the image that one has of oneself. It is but one layer of a multilayered self-consciousness. The layer that represents the recognition of being a part of a territorial kinship may or may not coincide with the recognition that one is a citizen of the political and legal relation of the STATE. Discussion of the state may begin with Max Weber's celebrated definition of it. Weber defined the modern state as a community that successfully claims a monopoly over violence within a geographical area, which required it to have legitimate and legal authority. The concepts of violence, territoriality, and legitimacy are the definitive factors of Weber's modern state.

The STATE may be loosely defined as a structure that, through institutions, exercises sovereignty over a territory using laws that relate the individuals within that territory to one another as members of the state.

The legal and political relation of the state is analytically distinct from the cultural community of the territorial relation of kinship, the nation. For example, the imperial states of the AustroHungarian Empire and the Soviet Union contained many different nations. Furthermore, nations have existed in the absence of a state, as did Poland during the 19th century and as does Kurdistan today.

The necessity for distinguishing nation from state does not imply that there does not exist a complex connection between these two forms of social relation. On the one hand, nations have been consolidated through a state’s exercise and extension of sovereignty over time; for example, the expansion of what was becoming the French nation during the 12th through 16th centuries from the Capetian Île de France to encompass today the territory of France from the Atlantic Ocean, on its western border, to the Pyrenees, on the southern border, with the northern and eastern borders fluctuating over the years depending upon the outcome of war, the latter being often an important factor in the formation of both a nation and a state.

The nation seeks a state out of the necessity to protect and preserve the lives of its members; that is, so that the nation, through its representatives and institutions, can act to secure its protection and preservation in the world. If the national state fails to fulfil this purpose (through military defeat or other means), then it risks the possibility of breaking up, because the attachments of the members of the nation to that nation may be withdrawn. New loyalties may then emerge, thereby undermining the existence of the nation. Be that as it may, the determination as to whether the nation forms the state or the state forms the nation is beside the point, as, to varying degrees, depending upon the nation in question, both complicated processes are involved.'

Semar ended his explanation because Batari Durga had arrived. Batari Durga asked Sahadeva to restore herself, back into the previous beautiful Uma as she was before. However, Sahadeva did not accept it. This refusal made her angry and will prey on Sahadeva.

Batara Narada, who witnessed all these events, immediately reported the matter to Batara Guru. They rushed to meet Sahadeva. Batara Guru asked Sahadeva to restore Batari Durga. He assured Sahadeva that he would soon infiltrate Sadewa's body so that Sang Hyang Wenang would help him.

Finally, Sahadeva managed to restore Batari Durga so that she returned back to normal, transformed into the beautiful Uma. And as an expression of gratitude, Uma gave the title Sudamala to Sahadeva. In addition, Batari Uma also helped Sahadeva, slew Kalantaka and Kalanjaya. 

Seeing all this, Semar and the Panakawan, singing,

Sudikah dirimu membuka hatimu?

[Are you willing to open your heart?]

Untuk sang perindu

[For the Longing]

Yang s'lalu ingin kehadiranmu

[Who always wants your presence]

'Tuk melindungi hati *)

[To protect this heart]

Laluna wrapped up the story by saying, "In Javadvipa, there is a division of territory where Wayang Golek is placed in the West, Wayang Wong in the Central, and Wayang Kulit in the East. However, they are still regarded as one world, the Wayang Universe. Likewise, human beings who formed nations to distinguish 'us' from 'them,' will be able to remove the differences, if each of them, realizes that they are part of Humanity. And Allah knows best."

Citations & References:
- Steven Grosby, Nationalism - A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press
- Antony D. Smith, Nationalism, Polity
- Umut Ozkirimli, Theories of Nationalism, Macmillan Press
- Drs. H. Solichin, Dr. Suyanto, S.Kar. MA, dan Sumari, S.Sn MM, Ensiklopedi Wayang Indonesia, Mitra Sarana Edukasi
- Ir. Sri Mulyono, Apa dan Siapa Semar, CV Haji Masagung

*) "Kembali" written by Muhammad Devirzha

[Part 1]

Bahasa

What Semar told Sahadeva (1)

"When news spread in the Wayang Universe that two giants, Kalantaka and Kalanjaya—actually two Gandarvas, the cursed Citrasena and Citrangganda—joined the Kauravas, Kuntidevi pleaded with Batari Durga to remove them. Kuntidevi's request would be granted on the condition that she must sacrifice Sahadeva. At first, Kuntidevi refused, but Kali—the ten-armed goddess and her tongue was lolling like the tongue and lips logo of band The Rolling Stones, at the behest of Batari Durga, entered her body, and agreed to the conditions," said Laluna after saying Ta'awudz, Basmalah and Salaam.

At Gandamayusethra, Sahadeva—described to be skilled in swordsmanship and astrology. He is the twin brother of Nakula, son of Pandu from Madri and during the Kurukshetra War, he slew many warriors including Shakuni.—was tied to a kapok tree. He was accompanied by a man of short stature, fat, potbellied, and big butt, named Lurah Janggan Smarasanta, also known as Kyai Semar. While waiting for what would happen next, Sahadewa asked him, 'Kyai, what is a Nation?' Kyai Semar—not from India and there is no trace of him in the original Mahabharata, he is the noble values inherited by Walisongo—a genius who knew thing before it happen and was feared in the wayang world because of his incredible farts, able to destroy a giant army, replied, 'Throughout history, humans have formed groups of various kinds around criteria that are used to distinguish ‘us’ from ‘them’.

One such group is the Nation. Evidence of humans forming large territorially distinct societies can be observed from the first written records. Writings from the Sumerian civilization of the area of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers from approximately 2500 BCE record beliefs that distinguished the ‘brothers of the sons of Sumer’, those of Sumerian ‘seed’, from foreigners. During the 16th century BCE, Egyptians thought themselves to be distinct from both the ‘Asiatics’ to their east and the Nubians to their south. In the early Chinese writings from the period of the Warring States (481–221 BCE) to the Qin and Han Periods (221 BCE to 220 CE), distinctions were drawn between the self-described superior Chinese and those who were viewed by them to be less than human aliens, the Di and the Rohn. In the tenth chapter of the book of Genesis, there is recognition of territorial and linguistic divisions of humanity into what the ancient Israelites called gôyim. Plato and Aristotle divided humanity between Hellenes and bárbaroi, the barbarian peoples from Asia Minor.

Human beings exhibit another tendency, when they engage in activities in which it seems not to matter who were their parents, where they where born, or what language they speak. These activities, rather than asserting divisions within humanity, bring people together. For example, scientists are concerned with understanding the physical facts of the universe, such as the nature of light. Light itself is not English, French, or German; and there is no English, French, or German scientific method. There is only science. To speak of a supposedly racial or national scientific method, as when the Nazis insisted that there was an ‘Aryan science’, is to betray the character of science by introducing considerations that have no place in understanding the physical aspects of the universe. Other notable examples of activities and their corresponding conceptions that bring humans together are the monotheistic religions and commerce. Furthermore, throughout history, empires, such as the Roman and Ottoman, have sought to unify their peoples as a political alternative to nations. Thus, while an individual often understands himself or herself as a member of a particular nation, one may also recognize oneself as a part of Humanity.

Nations emerge over time as a result of numerous historical processes. As a consequence, it is a pointless undertaking to attempt to locate a precise moment when any particular nation came into existence, as if it were a manufactured product designed by an engineer. All nations have historical antecedents, whether tribe, city-state, or kingdom. These historically earlier societies are important components in the formation of nations. For example, the English nation emerged out of the historically earlier societies of the Saxons, Angles, and Normans. However, these historical antecedents are never merely just facts, because key to the existence of the nation are memories that are shared among each of those many individuals who are members of the nation about the past of their nation, including about those earlier societies.These memories also form a part of the conception that one has of oneself. As the mind of the individual develops within various contexts, such as the family or different educational institutions, it seeks out those various and fluctuating traditions that are ‘at hand’. The child learns, for example, to speak the language of his or her nation and what it means to be a member of that nation as expressed through its customs and laws. These traditions become incorporated into the individual’s understanding of the self. When those traditions that make up part of one’s self-conception are shared by other individuals as part of their self-conception, one is then both related to those other individuals, and aware of the relation. The relation itself, for example living in the same geographical area or speaking a common language, is what is meant by the term ‘collective consciousness.'

When those individuals not only participate in the same tradition but also understand themselves as being different from those who do not, then there exists a self-designating shared belief, which is called a ‘collective self-consciousness’, that is, a distinctive culture. Properties or qualities of a tradition are recognized which distinguish it from any other; they are the boundaries of the social relation that allow us to distinguish ‘us’ from ‘them’. Those who accept, and by doing so participate in, for example, the tradition of the Israelite exodus from Egypt distinguish themselves from those who do not. Those who worship the Japanese sun goddess Amaterasu distinguish themselves from those who do not. Those who speak one language understand themselves to be different from those who speak a different language. So, the NATION is a SOCIAL RELATION OF COLLECTIVE SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS.

The nation is formed around shared, self-designating beliefs that have such a structure. However, the nation is formed around shared traditions that are not merely about a distinctive past, but a spatially situated past. The nation is a social relation with both temporal depth and bounded territory. If one is an adherent to a monotheistic world religion such as Christianity or Islam, then one may understand oneself in terms of universal brotherhood. However, central to the existence of the nation is the tendency of humanity to form territorially distinct societies, each of which is formed around its own cultural traditions of continuity. The nation is a territorial relation of collective self-consciousness of actual and imagined duration.

The nation also is a community of kinship, specifically a bounded, territorially extensive, temporally deep community of nativity. Kinship refers to recognized traceable lines or relations of biological descent, for example a child is related to his or her parents because the child is recognized as being descended from them through birth. Broader relations of descent are also perceived, resulting in, for example, the acknowledgement of aunts, uncles, and cousins. The term ‘community’ refers to a level of self-consciousness of the individual such that one recognizes oneself to be necessarily and continually related to others, as occurs, for example, through birth.

Humans draw a distinction between their own children and those of another. One usually does not love another’s children as if they were one’s own. And one does not usually love another nation as if it were one’s own. Such a limitation on the recognition of, and the love for, what is understood to be one’s own is a consequence of the preoccupation with the continuation of the self, both its biological and cultural components. The love that one has for one’s nation is designated by the term ‘PATRIOTISM.'

The widely used term ‘love’ as an expression of the attachments that the individual has to his or her nation is not altogether satisfactory because we also employ the same term to describe the attachments one has to one’s paramour, children, friends, and god. Indeed, some individuals have genuinely loved all of humanity. What such a wide use of the term indicates is that, in each of these instances, the individual puts aside, or ‘transcends’, his or her own self-interest for the sake of others. However, understanding properly the character of such attachments should take into account not only the act of self-transcendence common to all of these attachments, but also the different objects of those attachments. Thus, it may be more helpful to distinguish the love for one’s paramour or children from the ‘love’ for one’s nation by understanding patriotism as signifying attachments of loyalty to a territorial community. There are often different aspects to the patriotic attachments that one forms to one’s nation, as a consequence of the different factors involved in the historical formation of a particular nation. One may, for example, be loyal to one’s nation because of its laws, or its customs, or its religion. There are usually many and differing, even conflicting, views of the nation that correspond to these different factors. However, inescapable is the fact that the individual often shows a preference for his or her fellow nationals.

This preference need not take the form of a prejudice against, or hatred of, those who are not members of one’s nation. Patriotism need not deny varying and different pursuits by the members of the nation. It need not reject differing conceptions of the nation held by members of the nation, as nationalism often does. Indeed, in so far as patriotism implies a commitment to the well-being of one’s country, it provides the basis for working out the differences, involving reasonable compromise, between the individual members of the nation and their differing conceptions of what the nation should be out of a concern for promoting that well-being. The process of working out these differences through compromise is politics. The concern for the well-being of the nation that includes the willingness to compromise is central to the civility between the members of the nation that makes politics possible.

When one divides the world into two irreconcilable and warring camps–one’s own nation in opposition to all other nations–where the latter are viewed as one’s implacable enemies, then, in contrast to patriotism, there is the ideology of nationalism. Nationalism repudiates civility and the differences that it tolerates by attempting to eliminate all differing views and interests for the sake of one vision of what the nation has been and should be. For example, a French nationalism might consist of the belief that to be a good member of the French nation, one must hate everything English and German; and anyone who does not, isn’t ‘truly’ French.

[Part 2]

Bahasa