The opening of Surah Ar-Rum constitutes a remarkably compelling passage, not only for its linguistic elegance but also for its historical context and its profound indication of prophethood. Allah says,الۤمّۤ ۚAlif, Lām, Meem.غُلِبَتِ الرُّوْمُۙThe Byzantines have been defeatedفِيْٓ اَدْنَى الْاَرْضِ وَهُمْ مِّنْۢ بَعْدِ غَلَبِهِمْ سَيَغْلِبُوْنَۙIn the nearest land [meaning near the Arab lands, namely Syria and Palestine]. But they, after their defeat, will overcomeفِيْ بِضْعِ سِنِيْنَ ەۗ لِلّٰهِ الْاَمْرُ مِنْ قَبْلُ وَمِنْۢ بَعْدُ ۗوَيَوْمَىِٕذٍ يَّفْرَحُ الْمُؤْمِنُوْنَۙWithin three to nine years. To Allāh belongs the command [i.e., decree] before and after. And that day the believers will rejoice [The time between the defeat of the Romans (614-615) and their victory (622 AD) was about seven years]The first verses begin with the disjointed letters “Alif Lām Mīm,” followed by the statement “Ghulibatir-Rūm,” and continue with “Fī adnal-arḍi wa hum min ba‘di ghalabihim sayaghlibūn, fī biḍ‘i sinīn,” forming a concise yet deeply meaningful proclamation.In essence, these verses declare that the Romans have been defeated, as indicated by the phrase “Ghulibatir-Rūm.” The expression “Fī adnal-arḍ” is commonly understood to refer to a nearby land, or alternatively to a low-lying region, with some classical scholars associating it with the area surrounding the Dead Sea. The subsequent phrase, “Wa hum min ba‘di ghalabihim sayaghlibūn,” conveys that, after this defeat, they shall indeed overcome their adversaries. This is further qualified by “Fī biḍ‘i sinīn,” which denotes a period of a few years, generally interpreted as three to nine years.Historically, these verses refer to a major conflict between the Eastern Roman (Byzantine) Empire and the Sassanid Persian Empire. At the time of revelation, the Romans, who were regarded as People of the Book, had suffered a severe and humiliating defeat at the hands of the Persians. This development was met with satisfaction by the polytheists of Mecca, who perceived the Persians as being closer to their own religious disposition, since both rejected revealed monotheistic scripture. Conversely, the Muslims were disheartened, as they felt a theological affinity with the Romans on account of their adherence, albeit imperfect, to a monotheistic tradition.What renders this passage particularly extraordinary is its prophetic dimension. The Qur’an foretold that the Romans would regain victory within a limited span of years, even though, by all conventional measures of the time, such a recovery appeared highly improbable. The Byzantine defeat had been so devastating that any expectation of a swift resurgence would have seemed unrealistic. Nevertheless, history records that under the leadership of Heraclius, the Byzantine Empire not only recovered but also decisively defeated the Persians within the very timeframe indicated in the verses.From this account emerge several enduring lessons. It affirms the importance of maintaining faith in the divine decree, even when circumstances appear overwhelmingly unfavourable. It also instils a sense of optimism in the face of hardship, reminding believers that defeat does not necessarily signify a final end. Furthermore, it underscores the truthfulness of revelation, serving as a sign of the prophethood of the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ. Finally, it offers hope to the believers, suggesting that just as the Romans rose again after their defeat, so too may the faithful anticipate eventual relief and victory in accordance with divine wisdom.The relationship between the opening of Surah Ar-Rum and modern geopolitics should not be understood as a form of specific prediction; rather, it reflects enduring patterns, principles, and a way of interpreting the history of power. When approached with care and depth, these verses offer a framework of thought that remains strikingly relevant in the contemporary world.
The statement that the Romans would regain victory within a few years suggests that global power is never static and that defeat does not necessarily signify permanence. Instead, it indicates that nations or civilisational blocs that appear to have fallen may, under the right circumstances, rise again. In modern terms, one may observe how Amerika Serikat has endured various crises, including military setbacks and financial turmoil, yet continues to function as a dominant global force. Similarly, China, once weakened during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, has re-emerged as a principal rival to the West, while Rusia, following the collapse of the Uni Soviet, has once again asserted itself as a significant geopolitical actor. The broader lesson is that present defeat does not determine future destiny.
During the time of the Prophet (ﷺ), the Muslims felt a degree of affinity with the Romans because both belonged, in different ways, to traditions connected to revealed scripture, whereas the Meccan polytheists inclined towards the Persians. This dynamic illustrates how alliances are often shaped not purely by material interests, but also by perceived proximity in belief, identity, or worldview. In the modern context, international alignments are frequently influenced by ideological divisions, such as those between democratic and authoritarian systems, as well as by economic interests and shared cultural or religious identities. Contemporary global arrangements, including the contrast between Western blocs and emerging alternative coalitions, demonstrate that political alignments are rarely grounded in moral considerations alone, but are instead driven by overlapping layers of identity and interest.
At the time these verses were revealed, the idea that the Romans could recover from their crushing defeat seemed highly improbable to most observers. Yet history records that they did indeed rise again under the leadership of Heraclius. This highlights the profound uncertainty inherent in geopolitical developments. In the modern era, similarly unexpected transformations have occurred, such as the sudden dissolution of the Uni Soviet, which many analysts failed to anticipate, and the rapid ascent of China, which has reshaped the global balance of power. Major conflicts, too, often evolve in ways that defy initial expectations. The implication is that geopolitical analysis frequently falters when it becomes overly fixated on present conditions while neglecting the roles of time, leadership, contingency, and, from a theological perspective, the will of God.
The verses also introduce a spiritual dimension to historical events, as indicated by the notion that, on the day of victory, the believers would rejoice. This suggests that geopolitical occurrences are not entirely neutral in a spiritual sense, but may carry meanings that resonate with faith and moral consciousness. In the modern world, many conflicts, particularly in regions such as the Middle East, continue to possess religious undertones, and Muslim communities often experience a sense of emotional and spiritual connection to these events. Consequently, a believer is encouraged not to perceive global affairs merely as political phenomena, but also as elements of a broader framework of trial, hope, and divine order.Furthermore, the passage reflects what may be understood as a manifestation of divine law operating within history, wherein cycles of decline, recovery, victory, and eventual decline recur over time. This pattern corresponds to the widely recognised concept of the rise and fall of civilisations. Historical examples, ranging from the Roman and Ottoman empires to the British Empire, illustrate that no worldly power remains permanent. The contemporary international system likewise appears to be in a state of continuous transition, moving towards new configurations of balance. The essential lesson here is that no global power is absolute or everlasting.
It is important, however, to approach these verses with caution and intellectual integrity. They should not be treated as a direct map of modern political realities, nor should they be invoked to justify particular conflicts without careful reflection. Likewise, it would be misguided to claim inevitable victory in any situation without due effort, wisdom, and ethical consideration.
The opening of Surah Ar-Rum should not be regarded merely as a historical account of a past conflict, but rather as a mirror reflecting the dynamics of global power, a source of hope amidst apparent defeat, and a reminder that the course of history ultimately unfolds under the sovereignty of the Divine will.
Thursday, April 2, 2026
War : Survivors, Memory, and Moral Responsibility (26)
War : Survivors, Memory, and Moral Responsibility (25)
Based on the latest data as of 1 April 2026, Indonesian military casualties in Lebanon occurred across two separate incidents within a mere 24-hour window. On Sunday (29/3), Private First Class Farizal Rhomadhon was killed in action, whilst Privates Rico Pramudia, Bayu Prakoso, and Arif Kurniawan sustained serious and minor injuries respectively, following an attack on the UNIFIL base near Adchit Al Qusayr in southern Lebanon. The following day, two further Indonesian peacekeepers were killed when an explosion struck a UNIFIL logistics convoy, destroying their vehicle near Bani Hayyan in the Eastern Sector, whilst two others were wounded—one of them critically. The cumulative toll now stands at three killed and seven wounded. The Israeli military stated that it had launched an investigation into both incidents, though it maintained that it should not be assumed the injuries sustained by UNIFIL personnel were caused by the IDF. For its part, UNIFIL affirmed that attacks against peacekeeping forces constitute war crimes and are in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701.These consecutive tragedies have sharpened a question that has long been hanging in the air: ought Indonesia to withdraw from the Board of Peace (BoP)? The irony of the situation is difficult to overlook—Indonesia sits at the same table as Israel within the Trump-initiated forum, whilst simultaneously having its own soldiers shot at by Israeli forces in a UN operational theatre. This is no mere diplomatic contradiction on paper; it strikes directly at the lives and dignity of the nation. Analysts have assessed these events as concrete evidence that the two principal driving forces behind the BoP—the United States and Israel—are not genuinely pursuing peace, but rather geopolitical dominance across the Middle East.From a military risk standpoint, matters become even graver should Indonesia eventually deploy troops to Gaza under the BoP framework. BRIN researcher Mario Surya Ramadhan cautioned that TNI forces serving under UNIFIL operate beneath a clear and formal UN mandate, yet have still been targeted. Under the BoP, whose legal basis and legitimacy remain ambiguous, any deployment of Indonesian troops would therefore carry considerably greater danger. A further concern of no lesser gravity is the prospect of Indonesian forces being drawn into the disarmament of Hamas—a mission entirely at odds with Indonesia's longstanding position on the Palestinian conflict.Domestic pressure to withdraw has been mounting steadily. Deputy Chairman of House Commission I Dave Laksono called upon the government to consider a temporary suspension of troop deployments to Lebanon, arguing that if the situation cannot be declared safe, operations ought to be halted until the mission's mandate is clearly redefined. Before this, the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) had already declared that the BoP was rapidly losing its moral, political, and legal legitimacy, having demonstrably failed to bring about genuine peace.The government, nevertheless, appears to be weighing its options carefully. President Prabowo had previously affirmed that once Indonesia concluded its participation in the BoP to be hopeless and counterproductive, the country would withdraw—and would do so without needing to consult the other member states beforehand. Yet, no formal decision to withdraw has been made to date, with Foreign Minister Sugiono stating that Indonesia remains a member of the forum, even as discussions on the BoP's programme have been temporarily suspended.The question of BoP membership is undoubtedly significant in terms of principle; however, there is a matter considerably more pressing and immediate—the fate of some 800 Indonesian troops still serving in Lebanon under the UNIFIL mandate. Three soldiers killed within two consecutive days is a stark warning that the operational zone is no longer merely dangerous—it is lethal. A decision regarding their safety simply cannot be left to await the conclusion of a lengthy diplomatic review process.The deaths of three Indonesian peacekeepers in southern Lebanon within the span of two days are not merely a matter of foreign policy miscalculation or diplomatic incongruence—they are, at their core, a profound moral tragedy. Each fallen soldier was a son, a husband, a father; Praka Farizal Rhomadhon, for instance, left behind a wife and a child barely two years of age. Their deaths compel us to look beyond the cold calculus of geopolitical interest and ask a far older, far more uncomfortable question—one that has haunted philosophers, theologians, and statesmen alike across the centuries: when, if ever, is war truly justifiable, and who bears the weight of its human cost? It is within this broader ethical terrain that the following reflection situates itself, for the bloodshed in Lebanon is not an isolated incident but rather a single, tragic thread woven into the vast and unresolved moral fabric of armed conflict itself.Philosophical and EthicalReflections on WarJust War Theory, Pacifism, Realism, and the Question of JustificationWith an Islamic PerspectiveThis essay examines the principal philosophical and ethical frameworks through which war has been debated, justified, and condemned across centuries of moral philosophy. Beginning with the classical tenets of Just War Theory as elaborated by Cicero, Augustine, Aquinas, and their modern successors, the discussion proceeds to a rigorous comparison between the pacifist tradition and political realism. The essay then grapples with the enduring question of whether war can ever be morally justified. Throughout, an Islamic perspective is woven in—drawing upon Qur'anic injunctions, prophetic traditions (Hadith), and the rich jurisprudential tradition of classical and contemporary Muslim scholars. The analysis concludes that while no single framework offers a complete moral solution, a synthesis of principled constraint, political prudence, and spiritual accountability provides the most defensible approach to the ethics of armed conflict.War is among the oldest and most consequential of human activities. From the siege of Troy to the trenches of the Somme, from Hiroshima to the streets of contemporary conflict zones, the organised violence of war has shaped civilisations, toppled empires, and generated profound moral disquiet. Philosophy has never been far from the battlefield: thinkers in every tradition have been compelled to ask whether the taking of human life on a collective scale can ever be rendered legitimate, and if so, under what conditions.The stakes of such inquiry are not merely academic. Decisions about when to go to war (jus ad bellum), how to conduct it (jus in bello), and how to conclude it justly (jus post bellum) are live questions that shape international law, political leadership, and individual conscience. In a world where states possess weapons of mass destruction, where non-state actors employ asymmetric violence, and where humanitarian intervention raises new dilemmas, the ancient questions have acquired fresh urgency.This essay examines three interlocking themes: the principles of Just War Theory; the debate between pacifism and political realism; and the broader question of whether war can ever be ethically justified. A sustained Islamic perspective enriches each section, demonstrating that Muslim intellectual tradition has produced sophisticated answers that both converge with and diverge from their Western counterparts.Just War Theory
Historical OriginsThe intellectual lineage of Just War Theory stretches back to antiquity. The Roman orator and statesman Cicero (106–43 BCE) articulated an early version in De Officiis, insisting that war is permissible only when waged in self-defence or to honour a treaty obligation, that it must be preceded by a formal declaration, and that its conduct must avoid cruelty (Cicero, 44 BCE/1991, I.xi–xiii). This Stoic-inflected vision of war as an instrument of justice rather than passion laid the groundwork for subsequent Christian elaborations.Saint Augustine of Hippo (354–430 CE) is widely regarded as the founding father of the Christian just war tradition. Writing in the shadow of Rome's decline and confronting the challenge of Christian pacifism, Augustine argued in The City of God and elsewhere that war could be a reluctant instrument of love—a means of restraining evil and defending the innocent. For Augustine, a just war required a just cause (iusta causa), right intention (recta intentio), and legitimate authority (legitima auctoritas) (Augustine, 413–426/1984). Crucially, the end of war must be peace, not conquest or glory.Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) systematised these insights in the Summa Theologica, setting out three necessary conditions: sovereign authority, just cause, and right intention (Aquinas, 1265–1274/1981, II-II, Q.40). His formulation became canonical for medieval Christendom and was subsequently elaborated by the Spanish scholastics Francisco de Vitoria (1480–1546) and Francisco Suárez (1548–1617), who extended just war reasoning to cover the wars of conquest in the New World and introduced nuanced discussions of proportionality and non-combatant immunity.The Modern FrameworkThe modern framework of Just War Theory, as codified by Michael Walzer in his seminal Just and Unjust Wars (1977), distinguishes two largely independent moral domains: jus ad bellum (the justice of going to war) and jus in bello (justice in the conduct of war). Walzer argues that these domains are separable—a state may wage a just war unjustly, or an unjust war justly—an insight with profound implications for the moral responsibility of individual soldiers (Walzer, 1977, pp. 21–47).Contemporary just war scholarship has added a third category: jus post bellum, or justice after war. Brian Orend argues that the principles governing post-conflict reconstruction, occupation, and reparations are as morally significant as those governing the decision to fight (Orend, 2006, pp. 160–192). This extension reflects the lessons of the twentieth century's failed peace settlements and the difficulties of stabilising post-conflict societies.The standard criteria of jus ad bellum, as summarised by the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops and widely adopted in international relations scholarship, include: (1) just cause; (2) competent authority; (3) comparative justice; (4) right intention; (5) last resort; (6) probability of success; and (7) proportionality (National Conference of Catholic Bishops, 1983). Each criterion is contestable, and real-world applications inevitably involve trade-offs and uncertainties.Critiques of Just War TheoryJust War Theory has attracted criticism from multiple directions. Realists argue that its moral categories are naïve, that states invariably pursue self-interest, and that the attempt to impose ethical constraints on war undermines strategic effectiveness (Morgenthau, 1948, p. 9). Pacifists contend that the theory provides a sophisticated rationalisation for violence, lending moral respectability to enterprises that are fundamentally incompatible with human dignity (Holmes, 1989, p. 63). Feminist theorists, notably Jean Bethke Elshtain, have examined how just war discourse has historically excluded women from its categories and reinforced gendered structures of violence (Elshtain, 1987).More recently, Jeff McMahan has challenged the so-called 'independence thesis'—the claim that jus ad bellum and jus in bello are morally separable. McMahan argues that soldiers fighting for an unjust cause lack the moral justification to kill even combatants on the opposing side, because liability to be killed depends on the justice of the cause, not merely on the wearing of a uniform (McMahan, 2009, pp. 3–35). This 'revisionist' account has profound implications for the legal framework of the Geneva Conventions and the widely shared moral intuition that soldiers deserve equal moral standing regardless of the justice of their cause.Pacifism versus Realism
The Pacifist TraditionPacifism—the principled rejection of war and organised violence—has ancient roots and takes many forms. In the Western tradition, Christian pacifism drew on the Sermon on the Mount ('Blessed are the peacemakers'; Matthew 5:9) and the example of the early Church, which widely prohibited Christians from military service before Constantine. Tolstoy's late writings, including The Kingdom of God Is Within You (1894), articulated a thoroughgoing Christian anarcho-pacifism that influenced Mohandas Gandhi and, through him, the broader tradition of nonviolent resistance.Philosophical pacifism ranges from absolute pacifism, which holds that violence is never morally permissible, to conditional or contingent pacifism, which holds that while violence might be permissible in extremis, contemporary wars almost never satisfy the relevant conditions. Jenny Teichman's Pacifism and the Just War (1986) identifies several distinct pacifist positions, noting that even critics must engage seriously with the claim that no actual war has ever met the stringent conditions required for moral justification.The twentieth century provided pacifism with both its greatest moral arguments and its most severe tests. The Holocaust demonstrated the catastrophic costs of insufficient resistance to systematic state violence, while Hiroshima and Nagasaki demonstrated that modern warfare could cause suffering on a previously unimaginable scale. Bertrand Russell, initially a committed pacifist during the First World War, modified his position in the 1940s to permit war against Nazism—a revision that illustrated the tension between principled pacifism and the practical demands of confronting radical evil (Russell, 1943).Political RealismPolitical realism, in its classical and structural variants, rejects the applicability of individual moral categories to the behaviour of states. Thucydides' Melian Dialogue—in which Athenian envoys inform the Melians that 'the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must'—is often cited as the founding text of realist thought (Thucydides, c. 400 BCE/1972, 5.89). For realists, war is not a moral phenomenon but a political one: an instrument of state interest in an anarchic international system.Hans Morgenthau, in Politics Among Nations (1948), argued that statecraft operates by its own logic of power and interest, and that the injection of moral language into international affairs is not merely misguided but dangerous—it inflates minor conflicts into crusades and makes compromise impossible (Morgenthau, 1948, pp. 3–17). Kenneth Waltz's structural realism (1979) further reduced states to self-interested units responding to systemic incentives, leaving little room for moral evaluation.Realism has the virtue of explanatory power: it describes, with considerable accuracy, how states actually behave. Its limitation is normative: even if states typically act as realists describe, it does not follow that they ought to do so. As Chris Brown argues, the realist conflation of descriptive and normative claims involves a logical leap that cannot be sustained (Brown, 2002, pp. 27–54). Furthermore, the empirical record of the post-1945 period—in which international norms, multilateral institutions, and the laws of war have significantly constrained state behaviour—suggests that realism underestimates the causal power of moral ideas.Towards a SynthesisThe most influential contemporary approaches seek to preserve the moral seriousness of just war reasoning while acknowledging the structural constraints that political realists identify. Walzer himself acknowledges that real wars are conducted by political communities under conditions of uncertainty and pressure, and that 'supreme emergency'—situations in which the very existence of a community is threatened—may justify overriding ordinary moral constraints as a tragic necessity (Walzer, 1977, pp. 251–283). This concession to realist intuitions within a fundamentally normative framework illustrates the productive tension between the two traditions.The English School of International Relations, represented by scholars such as Hedley Bull, Martin Wight, and Nicholas Wheeler, offers another synthesis. Bull's concept of an 'anarchical society' (1977) holds that states share enough common interests and common values to sustain an international order governed by norms, even in the absence of a world government. Wheeler's Saving Strangers (2000) applies this framework to humanitarian intervention, arguing that states may be justified in using force to prevent mass atrocity crimes, even without UN authorisation, provided stringent conditions are met.Can War Ever Be Justified?
The Case for Qualified JustificationThe dominant position in contemporary moral philosophy and international law holds that war can be justified, but only under highly restrictive conditions. The UN Charter (1945) permits the use of force in two circumstances: self-defence against armed attack (Article 51) and collective security action authorised by the Security Council (Article 42). This framework reflects a qualified just war approach: it does not prohibit war absolutely, but it subjects it to stringent multilateral oversight.The philosophical case for qualified justification rests on several premises. First, there are genuine moral obligations—to protect the innocent, to resist aggression, to uphold the conditions of a just international order—that cannot always be discharged by non-violent means. Second, the failure to use force in certain circumstances (the international community's inaction during the Rwandan genocide of 1994 being the paradigm case) can itself constitute a profound moral failure. Third, the development of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS, 2001) represents an attempt to institutionalise the moral obligation to protect civilians from mass atrocities.Norman Geras, reflecting on the moral aftermath of the Holocaust, argues that the international community bears a positive obligation to prevent genocide, and that this obligation may, in extremis, require the use of force (Geras, 1998, pp. 25–57). This is not a celebration of war but a recognition that a pacifism that stands aside from genocide is morally complicit in the outcome.The Absolutist Case AgainstAbsolute pacifists deny that war can ever be morally justified, regardless of the circumstances. The strongest philosophical version of this argument, developed by Jan Narveson (1965) and others, draws on the deontological claim that persons have rights that cannot be violated even for beneficial ends. If war involves the intentional killing of persons, and if persons possess inviolable rights to life, then war is impermissible regardless of its consequences.A related argument focuses on the epistemic limitations of belligerents. Given the notorious uncertainty of military operations—the 'fog of war'—and the historical record of wars undertaken on false pretexts (the 2003 invasion of Iraq being a prominent recent example), the conditions required for just war justification will virtually never be reliably known to be satisfied in advance. This epistemic argument does not establish the impossibility of a just war in principle, but it provides powerful grounds for extreme caution in practice (Luban, 2004, pp. 208–237).The Problem of Weapons of Mass DestructionThe development of nuclear weapons, chemical agents, and other weapons capable of indiscriminate mass destruction poses a distinctive challenge to just war reasoning. The principle of discrimination—which requires that combatants distinguish between combatants and non-combatants, and direct violence only against the former—appears to be categorically violated by weapons whose effects cannot be so directed. Walzer acknowledges that nuclear deterrence occupies a unique 'moral position'—'a supreme emergency that never ends'—and that the very possession of such weapons involves a standing moral dilemma that cannot be dissolved by just war criteria (Walzer, 1977, pp. 269–283).Jeff McMahan, examining this problem in Killing in War (2009), concludes that the use of nuclear weapons in virtually any plausible scenario would be unjust, and that this conclusion should inform disarmament policy. This is a significant concession: it suggests that just war theory, properly applied, does not merely constrain the conduct of war but provides grounds for radical limitations on the weapons that states may legitimately possess.An Islamic Perspective on War and Its Ethics
Foundational SourcesIslamic ethical reflection on war draws upon the Qur'an, the Sunnah (prophetic practice), and the accumulated judgements of classical jurisprudence (fiqh). The Qur'an addresses the question of fighting with considerable nuance: it does not present a single, uniform position but reflects a developing ethical and legal tradition. The foundational verse, Qur'an 2:190, establishes a principle of proportionality and restraint: 'Fight in the way of God those who fight you but do not transgress limits; verily, God does not love those who transgress.' This verse is widely understood to permit defensive warfare while prohibiting aggression and excess.The concept of jihad is central to Islamic discourse on war, yet its meaning is frequently misunderstood in Western public debate. Classical Muslim jurists distinguished between jihad al-nafs (the struggle against one's own soul), jihad al-qalb (struggle of the heart against temptation), and jihad al-sayf (struggle of the sword). The latter—armed jihad—was subject to strict conditions, and many classical scholars insisted that the greater jihad (al-jihad al-akbar) was the inner spiritual struggle (Hadith, reported by al-Bayhaqi). The reduction of jihad to its martial dimension alone is a distortion of the classical tradition (Esposito, 2002, pp. 25–43).Conditions for Legitimate Warfare: The Islamic Jus Ad BellumClassical Islamic jurisprudence elaborated detailed conditions for the legitimate use of force that bear significant resemblance to the Western just war tradition. Ibn Rushd (Averroes, 1126–1198), in Bidayat al-Mujtahid, systematically reviewed the disagreements among the major schools (madhahib) on the conditions and conduct of war. He identified the following general requirements: legitimate authority (typically the Imam or ruler of the Muslim community), a just cause (broadly understood as the defence of Muslim lives, lands, and religion or the removal of oppression), and proportionate means (Ibn Rushd, c. 1165/1994).The Prophet Muhammad's (ﷺ) farewell address and various instructions to his commanders explicitly prohibited the killing of non-combatants. Abu Bakr al-Siddiq, the first Caliph, instructed his general Usama ibn Zayd: 'Do not kill a woman, do not kill a child, do not kill an elderly person, do not cut down a fruit-bearing tree, do not demolish a building, do not slaughter a sheep or a cow except for food, do not burn date palms and do not inundate them' (cited in Al-Tabari, d. 923/1987). This instruction anticipates the principle of non-combatant immunity by over a millennium and demonstrates that proportionality and discrimination were embedded in early Islamic practice.The concept of sulh (peace treaty or truce) and the institution of aman (safe conduct) further illustrate the Islamic tradition's preference for peaceful resolution of conflict. The Qur'an enjoins: 'If the enemy inclines towards peace, do thou also incline towards peace, and trust in Allah' (Qur'an 8:61). Classical scholars such as al-Mawardi (972–1058) in al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyya and al-Shaybani (749–805) in the Siyar al-Kabir developed these principles into sophisticated frameworks for regulating interstate relations (Khadduri, 1966, pp. 53–82).Pacifism and Realism in Islamic ThoughtIslamic thought has produced its own tensions analogous to those between pacifism and realism. The Sufi tradition, with its emphasis on the inner dimensions of jihad and its cultivation of spiritual peace (salam), tends towards a pacifist sensibility. Jalal al-Din Rumi's Masnavi abounds with meditations on the futility of external conflict and the priority of inner transformation. The philosopher-mystic Ibn Arabi (1165–1240) developed a cosmological framework in which divine love (mahabbah) is the animating principle of creation, and war—however necessary in worldly terms—represents a deviation from the harmony intended by God.Islamic realism, by contrast, is represented by thinkers such as Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406), whose Muqaddimah offered a sociological analysis of political power remarkably anticipating modern realist theory. Ibn Khaldun argued that 'asabiyya (group solidarity or social cohesion) is the engine of political life and that states rise and fall according to the cycle of their collective vitality—a view that leaves little room for moralistic naïveté about international relations (Ibn Khaldun, 1377/1958, pp. 107–126).The contemporary scholar Tariq Ramadan argues for a 'reformed' understanding of jihad that emphasises social justice, non-violence, and dialogue as the primary means of Islamic engagement in the modern world, while preserving the right to defensive armed resistance under exceptional circumstances (Ramadan, 2004, pp. 81–110). This position parallels the 'conditional pacifism' of its Western counterparts and represents a creative retrieval of classical Islamic principles in response to contemporary realities.Contemporary Islamic Perspectives on Just WarContemporary Muslim scholars have engaged extensively with the question of war's justification in light of modern international law and the specific challenges of terrorism, asymmetric warfare, and the nuclear age. Khaled Abou El Fadl, in The Great Theft (2005), argues that a 'moderate' Islamic position on war must affirm non-combatant immunity as an absolute prohibition, reject the targeting of civilians under any circumstances, and support international institutions designed to prevent armed conflict (Abou El Fadl, 2005, pp. 220–250).The Declaration of Muslim Scholars on International Humanitarian Law (2005), endorsed by prominent juristic bodies including the International Islamic Fiqh Academy, affirmed the compatibility of Islamic principles with the Geneva Conventions and called upon Muslim states and non-state actors to comply with international humanitarian law. This represents a significant development in Muslim engagement with global normative frameworks and demonstrates the capacity of the Islamic tradition to contribute constructively to the international ethics of war.On the specific question of nuclear weapons, a broad consensus has emerged among Muslim scholars that their use—given the catastrophic and indiscriminate nature of their effects—cannot be reconciled with the Islamic prohibition on the killing of non-combatants (Al-Qaradawi, 2001). This position converges with Walzer's and McMahan's conclusions from within the Western just war tradition, illustrating the potential for cross-traditional moral consensus on specific issues even in the absence of agreement on foundations.6. Synthesis and ConclusionThe foregoing analysis demonstrates both the depth and the complexity of philosophical reflection on war. Just War Theory, in its classical and contemporary forms, provides a rigorous framework for moral evaluation—one that affirms the possibility of justified war while subjecting it to demanding constraints. The pacifist tradition serves as an indispensable critical voice, challenging the tendency of just war reasoning to legitimate violence too readily and reminding us that the burden of justification falls on those who advocate war, not those who oppose it. Political realism contributes the salutary recognition that moral idealism divorced from political reality is not merely impractical but potentially dangerous.The Islamic tradition enriches this conversation in several significant ways. Its detailed jurisprudential elaboration of conditions for legitimate war—developed independently of the Western just war tradition but arriving at strikingly similar conclusions—suggests that the core principles of restraint, discrimination, and proportionality are not culturally parochial but reflect a broader human moral wisdom. The Sufi emphasis on inner peace and the Ibn Khaldunian analysis of political power add dimensions absent from mainstream Western discourse. Contemporary Muslim scholars' engagement with international humanitarian law demonstrates the living vitality of this tradition and its capacity for self-renewal.Can war ever be justified? The answer, for most serious moral thinkers across traditions, is a qualified and reluctant yes—but only under conditions that are demanding, rarely satisfied, and never to be invoked without the deepest moral gravity. The existence of a theoretical justification for war in extreme circumstances does not soften the horror of its actuality. As Augustine insisted, even a just war is a tragedy: 'it is the iniquity of the opposing side that lays upon the wise man the duty of waging wars' (Augustine, as cited in Deane, 1963, p. 159). This tragic sensibility—the sense that even justified war represents a failure of the human community—should be the beginning, not the end, of ethical reflection on armed conflict.In a world of persisting injustice, residual anarchy, and catastrophic weaponry, the philosophical task is not to make peace with war but to think clearly about its conditions, its limits, and its costs—and to work persistently for the political and institutional arrangements that make resort to it less necessary. Both the Western just war tradition and the Islamic ethics of jihad, at their best, point in this direction."Fields of Gold" by Sting, as rendered by Ellie Goulding, is not a song about war—yet therein lies its particular power when considered alongside the philosophy of armed conflict. It calls us to reflect upon what is truly at stake: not territory or ideology, but the fragile and irreplaceable moments of human experience. In the words of Augustine, the song serves as a reminder that even a just war is a tragedy, for it tears asunder the golden fields of life that ought to have been left to flourish in peace.The song speaks of time, loss, and memory as the only things that endure. In both the Islamic and Western traditions, the act of remembering those lost to war is a moral obligation. This tender ballad teaches us, in its quiet and unhurried way, that memory is a form of fidelity to the departed—a notion that bears profound ethical relevance to how societies ought to honour and commemorate those who have perished in conflict.
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