Food Sovereignity, Security dan Self Suffiency

The controversy surrounding the remarks made by President Prabowo Subianto needs to be understood within its full political and social context rather than through isolated clips circulating online. His statement—interpreted by many as “if you are unhappy, just leave, go to somewhere like Yemen”—emerged during a moment when pessimistic narratives were gaining traction on social media, particularly through hashtags such as #KaburAjaDulu and #IndonesiaGelap. These expressions were not merely casual trends; they reflected a deeper sense of frustration among segments of the public regarding economic pressures, job opportunities, and broader concerns about the country’s direction.

From the perspective of Political Communication, such a response can be interpreted as a form of confrontational rhetoric. This is a communication style in which a leader deliberately adopts a sharp or provocative tone to challenge a narrative they perceive as harmful—in this case, what may be seen as defeatism or excessive pessimism. Rather than offering reassurance in a conventional, empathetic manner, the leader positions themselves in opposition to the sentiment itself, attempting to reframe it as unproductive or even unpatriotic. To supporters, this can come across as firmness and resolve; to critics, it may appear dismissive or lacking in empathy.

It is also important to consider whether this was a calculated political manoeuvre or a spontaneous reaction. Within Political Science, there is a recognised concept known as agenda-setting, whereby political actors attempt to shift public attention away from certain issues by introducing more emotionally charged or controversial statements. While it is certainly possible that remarks like these can have the effect of redirecting public discourse, it would be analytically premature to conclude that this was definitively the intention without clearer evidence of a consistent or strategic pattern. In many cases, statements that later appear politically advantageous may initially arise from unscripted or emotionally driven responses.

Another layer to this situation lies in the mismatch between public expectations and the tone of the response. Many citizens expect national leaders to project reassurance, empathy, and a sense of collective encouragement, particularly during times of uncertainty. When a leader instead employs language that sounds dismissive or sarcastic, even if intended as motivational or corrective, it can easily be perceived as belittling. This gap between intention and reception is often what transforms a statement into a controversy.

Furthermore, the personal style of a leader plays a significant role. Prabowo Subianto has long been associated with a direct and assertive manner of speaking, influenced in part by his background and political positioning. Such a style may resonate strongly with certain audiences who value decisiveness, yet it can simultaneously alienate others who prioritise empathy and careful phrasing in public leadership.

In assessing whether this incident constitutes a strategic success or a communicative misstep, it is most accurate to view it as potentially both. On the one hand, it may reinforce the leader’s image among supporters who favour bluntness and resilience against pessimism. On the other hand, it risks deepening scepticism among those who feel their concerns are being dismissed rather than addressed. Political communication often operates in this dual space, where the same message strengthens one constituency while weakening trust with another.

Ultimately, a careful evaluation requires separating the emotional impact of the wording from the broader substance of governance. Public reactions are often shaped by tone and symbolism, whereas long-term judgement of leadership tends to rest more heavily on policies and outcomes. Recognising this distinction allows for a more balanced and less reactionary understanding of such moments.

If we step back from the immediate controversy, the episode reveals something deeper than a dispute over tone. It exposes a growing tension between public sentiment and the state’s ability to project confidence about the future. When citizens begin to express doubt—whether through hashtags or everyday conversation—the real question is not simply how leaders respond, but what underlying conditions give rise to that doubt. In this sense, debates about rhetoric naturally lead us into more substantive territory: the material foundations of national resilience. A nation’s credibility, after all, is not sustained by words alone, but by its capacity to secure the essentials of life for its people.

This is precisely where the discussion turns towards sovereignty, self-reliance, and food security. In the language of Political Economy, these are not abstract ideals but practical measures of whether a country can stand on its own feet in times of uncertainty. Food, in particular, sits at the centre of this triad. When a nation depends heavily on external supply chains, public anxiety can intensify during moments of global disruption. Conversely, when it demonstrates the ability to feed its population through stable and resilient systems, confidence—both domestically and internationally—tends to follow. Thus, the conversation shifts quite naturally: from how a leader speaks about resilience, to whether the nation itself is structurally resilient.

Imagine two farmers living side by side in a remote village in Central Java. Pak Marto, an elderly farmer who has cultivated rice for five decades, keeps his ancestral paddy seeds in a clay jar. He has never purchased seeds from outside — he selects them himself from the best harvest of each season. He decides on his own when to plant, how much to sell, and how much to store for his family. For Pak Marto, his paddy field is not merely a source of livelihood; it is his identity, his dignity, and his freedom.

Next to him, Pak Wardi — an ambitious young farmer — has switched to high-yielding hybrid rice varieties purchased from a multinational seed company. His productivity is indeed twice as high. Yet each season, he must buy fresh seeds because his crop cannot be replanted. He depends on government-subsidised chemical fertilisers and on grain prices set by middlemen. When a prolonged dry season strikes, when subsidies are withdrawn, or when fertiliser prices spike, Pak Wardi is on the verge of financial ruin.

The story of these two farmers is not merely a local tale. It encapsulates a global debate that has been unfolding for more than half a century: is it sufficient for a nation's food policy to ensure that its people do not go hungry (food security), or must it go further to ensure the nation is sovereign over its food sources and agricultural systems (food sovereignty), whilst simultaneously being capable of producing food domestically without excessive dependence on imports (food self-sufficiency)?

In 2022, when Russia invaded Ukraine, the world witnessed how fragile the global food system truly is. Ukraine and Russia together supplied more than 30 per cent of the world's wheat. Wheat prices surged by 60 per cent within just a few weeks (FAO, 2022). Nations that depended on wheat imports — including Egypt, Tunisia, and Lebanon—faced sudden food crises. Meanwhile, countries that had built strategic food reserves and diversified domestic production were able to weather the storm far better. The story of Pak Marto and Pak Wardi, it turns out, is the story of every nation confronting geopolitical and global climate upheaval.

 

DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTUAL DISTINCTIONS

Food Security

The concept of food security was first formally articulated at the 1974 World Food Conference. The most influential definition was put forward by the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) at the 1996 World Food Summit: food security exists 'when all people, at all times, have physical, social, and economic access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life' (FAO, 1996).

This definition rests upon four principal pillars. First, availability—the presence of food in adequate quantities through domestic production, imports, or food aid. Second, access—the ability of individuals and households to obtain sufficient food through purchasing power, entitlements, or social networks. Third, utilisation—the optimal use of food through sound dietary practices, clean water, sanitation, and healthcare. Fourth, stability—the ability to sustain the first three pillars consistently, even during crises, conflict, or climate disruptions (FAO, 2008).

It is important to note that food security is source-neutral. A country may be considered food-secure even if all its food is imported, provided access and availability are maintained. This is what fundamentally distinguishes it from the other two concepts.

Food Sovereignty

Food sovereignty transcends food security by placing the dimensions of rights, control, and justice at the centre of analysis. The concept was popularised by La Via Campesina — an international peasant movement network — at the 1996 World Food Summit in Rome, as a critical response to the agricultural liberalisation championed by the WTO through its 1994 Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) (Wittman et al., 2010).

The Nyeleni Declaration of 2007 — the outcome of the International Forum for Food Sovereignty held in Mali, attended by 500 delegates from 80 countries — defines food sovereignty as 'the right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food produced through ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and their right to define their own food and agriculture systems' (Nyeleni, 2007). This definition underscores that food is not merely a commodity, but a fundamental human right and a cultural heritage.

La Via Campesina articulates seven principles of food sovereignty: (1) food for people, not for profit; (2) valuing and supporting food providers; (3) localising food systems; (4) putting control locally; (5) building knowledge and skills; (6) working with nature; and (7) recognising the central role of women in agriculture (La Via Campesina, 2003).

 

Food Self-Sufficiency

Food self-sufficiency sits conceptually between food security and food sovereignty. It refers to a country's capacity to meet its food needs from domestic production, minimising dependence on imports. The degree of food self-sufficiency is typically measured through the Self-Sufficiency Ratio (SSR) — the proportion of domestic production relative to total national consumption (FAO, 2004).

Food self-sufficiency does not, however, require complete autarky. A country may still import food for certain commodities that cannot be produced competitively at home, so long as the domestic production of staple food commodities is adequately met. In the Indonesian context, food self-sufficiency is frequently associated with the attainment of self-sufficiency in rice, maize, and soya — three strategic commodities forming the nutritional foundation of the population (Ministry of Agriculture of the Republic of Indonesia, 2020).

 

Comparing the Three Concepts

These three concepts are interrelated yet differ fundamentally in their orientation and scope. Food security focuses on outcomes: can everyone access sufficient, nutritious food? It does not question the origins of that food or who controls the system. Food self-sufficiency focuses on the source of production: can the country produce its own food? Food sovereignty, meanwhile, focuses on power and rights: who holds control over the food system, from seeds to policy?

It must be emphasised that these three concepts are not binary alternatives that mutually exclude one another. A country can be food-secure without being food self-sufficient (dependent on imports), food self-sufficient without being food-sovereign (dominated by multinational seed corporations), or may strive to achieve all three simultaneously. Indonesia, for instance, enshrines all three as complementary objectives of national food policy under Law No. 18 of 2012 on Food.

  

SCOPE

Scope of Food Security

The scope of food security encompasses the entire food chain from production to consumption. This includes agronomy (land productivity and farming), logistics (distribution, storage, and transportation of food), macroeconomics (prices, inflation, and purchasing power), public nutrition and health, and disaster and food crisis management. Geographically, food security operates at the global, regional, national, subnational, household, and individual levels (Maxwell & Slater, 2003).

Scope of Food Sovereignty

Food sovereignty encompasses a broader and more explicitly political scope. It touches upon international trade policy (tariffs, quotas, and WTO provisions), intellectual property rights over seeds and plant varieties, land tenure and agrarian reform, the rights of indigenous peoples over traditional agricultural knowledge, the role of women in food systems, and the environmental and ecological sustainability dimensions. At its core, food sovereignty is a human rights movement that happens to play out in the arena of agriculture (Patel, 2009).

Scope of Food Self-Sufficiency

Food self-sufficiency centres on the dimensions of production and food trade balances. Its scope includes agricultural investment policy, research and development of local varieties, irrigation and agricultural infrastructure, production incentives for domestic farmers, and import management. Food self-sufficiency is also closely tied to national security and geopolitics, given that food dependency can serve as a tool of political leverage wielded by food-exporting nations (Clapp, 2012).

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

The History of Food Security Thought

Thinking about food security has roots deep in the history of human civilisation. In the modern context, however, global attention towards food began in earnest after the Second World War, when mass famine in Europe and Asia drove the establishment of the FAO in 1945. The 1974 World Food Conference — convened amid a global food crisis triggered by soaring commodity prices — became the first milestone in formally conceptualising food security (Shaw, 2007).

The Green Revolution of the 1960s and 1970s, architected by Norman Borlaug and supported by the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations, represented the first technocratic response to the threat of global famine. Through high-yielding varieties (HYVs) of rice and wheat, intensive use of chemical fertilisers, and modern irrigation systems, global food production rose dramatically. South Asia and South-East Asia emerged from the shadow of mass starvation (Pinstrup-Andersen & Hazell, 1985).

Yet the Green Revolution also left a critical legacy: farmer dependence on external inputs, erosion of agricultural biodiversity, land and water degradation, and the marginalisation of smallholder farmers unable to access new technologies. It is precisely this critique of the Green Revolution that would later give birth to the concept of food sovereignty (Shiva, 1991).

 

The Emergence of Food Sovereignty

Food sovereignty emerged from the confluence of two streams of thought: the international peasant movement and a critique of agricultural trade liberalisation. The signing of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) in 1994 — which obliged developing countries to open their agricultural markets — was seen by La Via Campesina as an existential threat to smallholder farmers across the globe. Heavily subsidised agricultural produce from wealthy nations flooded the markets of developing countries, displacing local farmers who could not compete (McMichael, 2009).

La Via Campesina, founded in 1993 and now comprising 182 organisations in 81 countries representing approximately 200 million peasants, farmworkers, rural women, and indigenous peoples, proclaimed food sovereignty as an 'alternative to neoliberal policies' (Desmarais, 2007). The concept is not merely economic — it is a political manifesto about who has the right to determine the future of the global food system.

 

Theoretical Foundations

Theoretically, food security is rooted in neoclassical economics and utilitarianism: its aim is to maximise welfare through the efficient allocation of food resources. Amartya Sen, in his seminal work Poverty and Famines (1981), made a crucial theoretical contribution by demonstrating that famine is not simply a product of food shortage, but of the failure of 'entitlements' — the rights and capacities of individuals to access food. The 1943 Bengal Famine, for instance, occurred not because of an actual shortage of food, but because the poor lacked the means to purchase food that was available (Sen, 1981).

Food sovereignty, by contrast, is grounded in critical theory, political ecology, and radical agrarian thought. The thinking of Antonio Gramsci on hegemony, Karl Polanyi's writings on the 'embeddedness' of the economy in society, and the dependency theory of Andre Gunder Frank and Raul Prebisch all inform its analytical framework. Food sovereignty is, at its heart, a resistance to the 'decorporatisation of agriculture' — the process by which multinational corporations wrest control over food systems from the hands of communities and states (McMichael, 2014).

Food self-sufficiency, from a theoretical perspective, is closely associated with Ricardo's concept of comparative advantage, whilst simultaneously challenging it. Proponents of food self-sufficiency argue that for strategic commodities, considerations of national security and social stability must outweigh comparative efficiency. This accords with Hamilton and List's infant industry protection arguments, as well as the food regime theory developed by Friedmann and McMichael (Friedmann & McMichael, 1989).

 

POLICY: SUBSIDIES, ACTORS, AND OBJECTIVES

Global Food Security Policy

At the global level, food security policy is coordinated through the Committee on World Food Security (CFS), which operates under the FAO. The World Food Programme (WFP) provides emergency food assistance to 160 million people across 120 countries each year (WFP, 2023). The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) finances smallholder agricultural programmes in developing countries.

Food subsidies are the most contentious policy instrument. OECD countries spend an average of 708 billion US dollars per year on agricultural subsidies, encompassing direct payments to farmers, input subsidies, and price protection (OECD, 2022). Whilst benefiting farmers in wealthy nations, these subsidies are frequently accused of distorting global trade and disadvantaging farmers in developing countries who must compete against heavily subsidised foreign food products.

 

Food Sovereignty Policy

Policies grounded in the principles of food sovereignty include: protection of local varieties and farmers' seed rights through sui generis systems (as alternatives to TRIPS-WTO provisions); agrarian reform to distribute land to landless farmers; the prohibition or restriction of food imports that threaten local production; and the development of local markets and short food supply chains. Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela have at various points incorporated food sovereignty into their constitutions, recognising it as a constitutional right (Giunta, 2014).

 

Food Self-Sufficiency Policy

Food self-sufficiency policies typically encompass domestic production targets, protective import tariffs, agricultural input subsidies (seeds, fertilisers, pesticides), investment in irrigation infrastructure, research and development (R&D) of superior local varieties, and the maintenance of strategic food reserves. Japan, South Korea, and India are examples of countries that have consistently implemented food self-sufficiency policies despite facing pressure to liberalise trade from the WTO and their trading partners (Ramesh, 2011).

 

Food Subsidies: Arguments For and Against

Food subsidies exist in a variety of forms: producer subsidies (for farmers), consumer subsidies (for low-income populations), and input subsidies (for seeds, fertilisers, and water). From the perspective of social justice, consumer subsidies — such as food voucher programmes, subsidised rice schemes, or food stamps in the United States — are vital instruments for ensuring the food security of poor households. However, from the perspective of economic efficiency and fiscal sustainability, poorly targeted subsidies frequently create market distortions, waste, and dependency (World Bank, 2008).

The debate over food subsidies grows increasingly complex when linked to climate change. Subsidies that encourage excessive use of chemical fertilisers contribute to greenhouse gas emissions and soil degradation. Meanwhile, subsidies for sustainable and agroecological farming remain woefully small compared with those for conventional agriculture (HLPE, 2019).

 

Key Actors

The global food system involves a complex and often competing web of actors. At the international level, the FAO, WFP, IFAD, and WHO represent the multilateral agenda. The WTO sets the global food trade rules that are binding on member states. The World Bank and IMF influence agricultural policy through loan conditionalities. Multinational corporations such as Cargill, ADM, Bunge, and Louis Dreyfus — collectively known as the 'ABCD' of global grain trading — control a large share of global commodity food trade. Monsanto (now Bayer), Syngenta, Corteva, and BASF dominate the global seed and agrochemical markets (Howard, 2016).

At the national level, ministries of agriculture, national food logistics agencies, and agricultural research institutions are key actors. At the local level, farmers, agricultural cooperatives, and farmers' associations are the frontline of food production. Civil society movements such as La Via Campesina, Friends of the Earth, and Oxfam play a vital role in policy advocacy and oversight.

 

CHALLENGES AND CONTEMPORARY CONSTRAINTS

Climate Change

Climate change is the gravest threat to global food security and self-sufficiency in the twenty-first century. IPCC projections indicate that by 2050, climate change could reduce the productivity of food crops by up to 25 per cent across many tropical and subtropical regions — precisely where the largest concentrations of the poor and food-insecure populations are found (IPCC, 2022). The increasing frequency and intensity of droughts, floods, heatwaves, and storms threaten agricultural infrastructure and food reserves.

 

Inequity in the Global Trading System

Whilst the WTO claims to create a 'level playing field', structural inequalities in global food trade persist. The massive agricultural subsidies of OECD countries allow their food products to be sold below the production costs of farmers in developing countries — a practice known as 'dumping' (Oxfam, 2002). While developing countries face pressure to open their agricultural markets, wealthy nations maintain various, more subtle yet equally effective protectionist instruments.

Corporate Concentration

The concentration of ownership in the seed, agrochemical, and food trading industries has reached alarming levels. Following the wave of mergers and acquisitions between 2015 and 2018, the four largest seed-agrochemical companies (Bayer-Monsanto, ChemChina-Syngenta, Dow-DuPont/Corteva, and BASF) control more than 60 per cent of the global commercial seed market and 70 per cent of the global agrochemical market (ETC Group, 2018). This concentration reduces farmers' choices, increases production costs, and undermines food sovereignty.

 

Urbanisation and Shifting Consumption Patterns

Rapid urbanisation in developing countries is fundamentally transforming food consumption patterns. The nutrition transition — from diets based on local grains towards diets high in meat, processed products, and fast food — increases pressure on food systems, raises food import dependence, and exacerbates the double burden of malnutrition, where undernutrition and obesity/non-communicable diseases coexist within the same society (Popkin et al., 2012).

 

MULTIDIMENSIONAL ANALYSIS

 

A Philosophical Perspective

Philosophically, the three concepts reflect a tension between two great traditions of moral and political philosophy. Liberalism — in the tradition of Locke, Smith, and Mill — emphasises individual freedom, property rights, and free markets. From this perspective, food security can be achieved most efficiently through global market mechanisms, comparative specialisation, and free trade. State intervention and protectionism are viewed as creating inefficiency and harming consumers.

Communitarianism — in the tradition of Aristotle, Rousseau, Gramsci, and contemporary thinkers such as Michael Walzer and Charles Taylor — emphasises the importance of community, shared identity, and collective values in the determination of policy. From this perspective, food sovereignty is a legitimate expression of the community's right to define its relationship with its land, seeds, and food culture (Wittman, 2011).

Within the tradition of food ethics, thinkers such as Paul Thompson stress the importance of considering the moral dimensions of food policy: not merely whether food is available, but how it is produced, by whom, and with what consequences for the environment and society. The concept of 'food justice' — which has grown rapidly in prominence over the past decade — unites analyses of race, class, gender, and environment within a single, comprehensive ethical framework (Alkon & Agyeman, 2011).

 

An Ideological Perspective

The debate over food security, sovereignty, and self-sufficiency cannot be separated from the context of ideology. The neoliberal perspective — dominant within the Bretton Woods institutions and WTO policy — regards the liberalisation of agricultural trade as the optimal prescription for global food security. Market forces are considered capable of allocating food resources efficiently, driving technological innovation, and lowering food prices for consumers.

The nationalist-developmentalist perspective — once dominant in East Asia (South Korea, Japan, Taiwan) and now resurging across many developing nations — emphasises the state's role in building food self-sufficiency as part of a broader national development project. From this perspective, agriculture is not merely an economic sector, but the foundation of social and political stability and national identity.

The eco-socialist and agroecological perspective — increasingly influential in global discourse — critiques both industrial capitalism and bureaucratic statism in food governance. Its proponents advocate a transition towards community-based food systems, agroecology, and solidarity economies that transcend the market-versus-state dichotomy (Altieri & Toledo, 2011).

 

A Political Perspective

Food is politics. History is replete with examples of food control being used as an instrument of power — from food blockade strategies in warfare, to Stalin's agricultural collectivisation policies that caused the Holodomor (artificial famine) in Ukraine in 1932-33, claiming millions of lives, to the United States grain embargo against the Soviet Union in 1980 in response to the invasion of Afghanistan (Patel, 2007).

In the contemporary geopolitical context, the 'weaponisation of food' is an increasingly real threat. Nations that depend on food imports from other countries become vulnerable to diplomatic and economic pressure. Conversely, major food-exporting nations — the United States, Brazil, Argentina, Australia, Ukraine, and Russia—wield significant 'food power' in international negotiations (Brown, 2012).

 

An Economic Perspective

From an economic perspective, food is a commodity with unique characteristics that distinguish it from others. Demand for food is inelastic — people must eat regardless of price — and thus food price volatility disproportionately affects the poor, who may spend 50-80 per cent of their income on food. The food price crises of 2007-2008 and 2010-2011, driven by a combination of harvest failures, financial speculation, and soaring energy costs, triggered food riots in more than 40 countries (von Braun, 2008).

Food subsidies create complex economic trade-offs. On the one hand, consumer subsidies (such as food assistance programmes) are important for protecting the food security of poor households and stimulating domestic demand. On the other hand, poorly targeted subsidies may create price distortions, reduce production incentives for farmers, and burden state finances. Indonesia, for example, spends trillions of rupiah annually on fertiliser subsidies, yet their effectiveness in improving the welfare of smallholder farmers remains a subject of ongoing debate (World Bank, 2019).

 

A Social and Cultural Perspective

Food is the language of culture. Every society possesses a food system laden with social meaning, religious ritual, ethnic identity, and collective memory. Rice is not merely carbohydrate for the Javanese — it is a symbol of prosperity, an agrarian identity, and a spiritual connection to nature. Sago is not merely food for the peoples of Papua and Maluku — it is an entire social, cultural, and ecological ecosystem that has shaped their civilisations for thousands of years.

Food liberalisation and the homogenisation of the global diet threaten the rich diversity of local foods, which constitute an inestimable cultural heritage. The FAO notes that of the 250,000 plant food species once known to humankind, only around 150 species are now commercially cultivated, and a mere 12 species account for 80 per cent of human caloric intake (FAO, 2019). This erosion of food diversity is not only a threat to ecological resilience, but to the cultural diversity of humanity itself.

The gender dimension of food systems is also profoundly important yet frequently overlooked. Women contribute 60-80 per cent of food production in developing countries, yet control only 10-20 per cent of land ownership. Gender inequality in access to agricultural resources is both a structural cause of food insecurity and one of the greatest obstacles to achieving food sovereignty (FAO, 2011).

FOOD SOVEREIGNTY, SECURITY, AND SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN INDONESIA

 

Indonesia's Historical Context

Indonesia is a country of striking food paradoxes. As an agrarian nation with 190 million hectares of land, 17,000 islands, and the world's third-largest agricultural biodiversity, Indonesia ought to be a food-surplus country. Yet in reality, Indonesia is one of the world's largest food importers — importing rice, soya, sugar, salt, maize, meat, and various other food commodities in massive quantities each year (Statistics Indonesia/BPS, 2023).

The history of Indonesia's food policy reflects an ongoing struggle between these three concepts. During the Old Order era, Sukarno proclaimed the concept of 'Berdikari' (standing on one's own feet), which aligned with the spirit of food self-sufficiency. His marhaenism agricultural programme emphasised the importance of smallholder farmers as the backbone of national agriculture. However, economic chaos, hyperinflation, and political instability prevented meaningful implementation (Ricklefs, 2008).

The New Order era under Soeharto marked a major transformation in Indonesian food policy. The BIMAS (Mass Guidance) and INMAS (Mass Intensification) programmes adopted the Green Revolution approach on a massive scale: distributing high-yielding IR-36 and IR-64 paddy varieties, subsidising urea fertilisers, pesticides, and irrigation, and establishing the National Logistics Agency (Bulog) in 1967 to manage national rice stocks and distribution. The results were spectacular: Indonesia, which in 1966 had been the world's largest rice importer, achieved rice self-sufficiency by 1984 — an achievement recognised by the FAO (Timmer, 2004).

However, the 1984 rice self-sufficiency did not endure. Pressure from the IMF and World Bank following the 1997-1998 financial crisis forced Indonesia to reduce agricultural subsidies, open its rice import market, and weaken Bulog's role. Rice imports surged again. Dependence on imported agricultural inputs (fertilisers, pesticides, hybrid seeds) deepened. The conversion of productive paddy fields for industrial and residential use continued unabated — Indonesia loses approximately 100,000 hectares of paddy fields per year (Irawan, 2005).

 

Legal Framework

Indonesia has developed a reasonably comprehensive legal framework for all three food concepts. Law No. 18 of 2012 on Food defines all three concepts explicitly and establishes them as objectives of national food policy. The law clearly stipulates that food sovereignty, food self-sufficiency, and food security are three mutually reinforcing pillars. Law No. 19 of 2013 on the Protection and Empowerment of Farmers provides the legal foundation for protecting farmers from harmful import practices and promoting their economic empowerment. Presidential Regulation No. 66 of 2021 established the National Food Agency (Bapanas) as a new body replacing the food coordination functions previously dispersed across various ministries.

 

Contemporary Indonesian Food Policy

Contemporary Indonesian food policy encompasses a range of instruments. The fertiliser subsidy programme allocates approximately IDR 25-40 trillion per year to subsidise urea, SP-36, ZA, and NPK fertilisers for rice, maize, and soya farmers. The Non-Cash Food Assistance Programme (BPNT)/Sembako Programme distributes IDR 200,000 per month to 18-20 million recipient households to purchase rice, animal protein, and plant protein through designated outlets known as e-warung (Ministry of Social Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, 2023).

The Government Rice Reserve (CBP), managed by Bulog, serves as an instrument for price stabilisation and disaster relief. The Indonesian government also promotes food diversification through the B2SA programme (Diverse, Nutritionally Balanced, and Safe), which promotes non-rice local foods such as sago, cassava, sweet potato, maize, and sorghum as alternative sources of carbohydrate (Bapanas, 2022). The food estate programme — the development of large-scale agricultural areas in Central Kalimantan, North Sumatra, and Papua — was an ambitious initiative of the Jokowi administration to boost national food production, though it has attracted controversy regarding environmental impacts and indigenous peoples' rights (Mongabay, 2021).

 

Indonesia's Challenges

Indonesia faces some structural challenges in realising food security, self-sufficiency, and sovereignty. First, agricultural land fragmentation: the average land ownership of an Indonesian farmer is only 0.3 hectares — far too small to achieve efficient economies of scale. Second, an ageing farming population: the average age of an Indonesian farmer is 45-50 years, whilst younger generations are reluctant to enter an agricultural sector perceived as unprofitable and of low social standing. Third, conversion of paddy fields: the pressure of infrastructure development, industrial estates, and housing continues to erode productive agricultural land. Fourth, weak agricultural value chains: farmers receive only approximately 20-30 per cent of the retail price of their agricultural produce, with the majority of added value captured by traders, processors, and retailers (Ministry of Agriculture of the Republic of Indonesia, 2021).

Geographical inequality in Indonesia's food system is also striking. Java — covering just 7 per cent of Indonesia's land area — produces more than 55 per cent of national rice output, yet also faces the greatest pressure from land use change and urbanisation. The eastern regions of Indonesia — Papua, Maluku, East Nusa Tenggara—suffer chronic food insecurity despite their vast land potential. Price disparities for the same food commodities between Java and Papua can reach three to five times, reflecting the weakness of the national food logistics infrastructure (Bapanas, 2022).

 

Food Sovereignty and Indigenous Communities in Indonesia

A dimension frequently overlooked in discussions of Indonesian food policy is the role and rights of indigenous communities within the food system. Indonesia's indigenous peoples—numbering approximately 70 million people spread across the archipelago—have developed agricultural systems, ecological knowledge, and agricultural biodiversity over thousands of years. The sasi system in Maluku, the subak in Bali, and various other customary forest and land management systems are vivid examples of community-based food sovereignty that have proven to be sustainable.

Yet the rights of indigenous communities over their land and agricultural resources are continuously threatened by the expansion of oil palm plantations, mining, and infrastructure projects. Without recognition and protection of these rights, food sovereignty for Indonesia's indigenous communities will remain mere rhetoric (AMAN, 2020).

 

CRITICAL REFLECTIONS AND PROSPECTS

In concluding this essay, it is worth returning briefly to Pak Marto and Pak Wardi. The two are not antagonists — they represent two different pathways available to our food systems. Pak Marto embodies local wisdom, seed sovereignty, and adaptive resilience that has been tested by time. Pak Wardi embodies high productivity, market integration, and a deepening systemic dependency that is becoming increasingly worrying.

The greatest challenge for twenty-first century food policy is to find a creative synthesis between the two: a food system that is productive enough to feed 10 billion people by 2050, equitable enough to ensure no one goes hungry, sovereign enough to protect the rights of farmers and communities, self-sufficient enough to withstand geopolitical and climatic shocks, and sustainable enough not to destroy the ecosystems upon which all life depends.

Agroecology — the science that integrates ecology, agronomy, and the social sciences in the management of agricultural systems — offers a promising framework. Meta-analytical studies by Seufert et al. (2012) and Badgley et al. (2007) indicate that organic and agroecological farming can deliver productivity that is competitive with conventional agriculture in developing countries, whilst enhancing biodiversity, improving soil health, and increasing farmer incomes. The IPES-Food report (2016) concludes that a transition to diversified agroecological food systems is not only technically feasible, but also more resilient and equitable than the current industrial food system.

For Indonesia, the path forward must be built upon three foundations: first, strengthening domestic agricultural production through investment in agricultural research, irrigation infrastructure, and the empowerment of farmers — particularly young farmers and women. Second, building an efficient and equitable food distribution and logistics system that ensures no yawning price disparities exist between Java and Papua, between the city and the countryside. Third, recognising and protecting the food sovereignty of communities—both rural smallholder farmers and indigenous peoples — as a non-negotiable right, not merely an object of government programmes.

Ultimately, food security, self-sufficiency, and sovereignty are not merely technical policy concepts. They are a reflection of the most fundamental questions about who we are as a nation, how we wish to live, and what future we wish to bequeath to generations to come. The debate about food is a debate about values, power, identity, and justice — and that is precisely why it can never be resolved by economic formulae or technology alone.

 

REFERENCES

Alkon, A. H., & Agyeman, J. (Eds.). (2011). Cultivating food justice: Race, class, and sustainability. MIT Press.

Altieri, M. A., & Toledo, V. M. (2011). The agroecological revolution in Latin America: Rescuing nature, ensuring food sovereignty and empowering peasants. Journal of Peasant Studies, 38(3), 587-612.

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Bahasa

Energy Sovereignity and Energy Security

In the winter of 1973, millions of Western Europeans suddenly found themselves confronting a situation they had never imagined possible: petrol stations closed at weekends, home heating systems forcibly shut down, and the streets of major cities that had always blazed with light were plunged into an eerie darkness. The oil crisis of 1973—triggered by the Arab oil embargo against the United States, the Netherlands and their allies in retaliation for their support of Israel during the Yom Kippur War—proved one bitter truth: a nation incapable of controlling its own energy supply is a nation rendered fragile before the power of foreign interests [1].

On the other side of the globe, at roughly the same period, Indonesia was rejoicing. As a member of OPEC since 1962 and a net oil exporter, Indonesia revelled in the extraordinary surge in oil prices. State revenues soared dramatically, infrastructure projects were accelerated, and President Suharto was able to fund an ambitious development programme. Yet concealed behind this euphoria lay the seeds of vulnerability: dependence upon a single commodity, a single world price, and a policy regime that could not be guaranteed to endure [2].

These two narratives—one of panic among developed nations abruptly deprived of energy supplies, another of a developing country lulled into complacency by natural abundance — encapsulate the essence of the two concepts at the heart of this essay: energy sovereignty and energy security. Both were born of the realisation that energy is not merely an economic commodity, but the very foundation of human civilisation, an instrument of geopolitical power, and a mirror of the ideological choices a nation makes [3].

ENERGY SOVEREIGNTY AND ENERGY SECURITY:

A Multidimensional Perspective and an Overview of Indonesia

CHAPTER I DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTUAL DISTINCTIONS

1.1 Energy Sovereignty

Energy sovereignty refers to the right and capacity of a nation—or a community—to determine its own energy policies independently, encompassing: which energy sources are used, how energy is produced and distributed, who controls energy assets, and on what principles the energy sector is organised [4]. At its core, the concept is an extension of the idea of national sovereignty into the domain of energy.

According to Scholten et al. (2020), energy sovereignty comprises four principal dimensions: (1) control over natural energy resources within national territory; (2) the ability to formulate policy decisions free from external pressure; (3) ownership of strategic energy infrastructure; and (4) the technological capacity to exploit energy resources independently [5].

In a broader context, energy sovereignty also encompasses a community dimension. The food sovereignty movement, popularised by the organisation La Via Campesina in the 1990s, inspired the concept of community energy sovereignty: the right of grassroots communities to manage energy democratically in the public interest, rather than for corporate gain [6]. This includes the right to reject energy projects detrimental to local communities—a dimension of growing relevance in the era of the renewable energy transition.

1.2 Energy Security

Energy security is a more operational and pragmatic concept. The classic definition from the International Energy Agency (IEA) describes energy security as the "availability of uninterrupted energy sources at an affordable price" [7]. This definition, though straightforward, encompasses two fundamental dimensions: the physical reliability of supply and the affordability of price.

Boersma and Johnson (2018) expanded this definition into four dimensions known as the "4As": Availability (the availability of energy resources), Accessibility (the accessibility of infrastructure), Affordability (the affordability of price), and Acceptability (social and environmental acceptability) [8]. This 4A framework demonstrates that energy security is not solely a matter of physics and economics, but also of social acceptance—a dimension of ever-increasing importance in contemporary energy debates.

A more comprehensive definition was put forward by the World Energy Council (WEC), which developed the "Energy Trilemma" framework, balancing three objectives that are frequently in tension: energy security (security of supply), energy equity (equality of access and price), and environmental sustainability [9]. The tension among these three objectives constitutes the principal challenge for energy policy formulation worldwide.

1.3 Fundamental Differences Between Energy Sovereignty and Energy Security

Although frequently used interchangeably, the two concepts are fundamentally distinct in several respects [10]:

First, normative versus technical dimensions: Energy sovereignty is a normative and political concept—it asks "who has the right to decide" and "in whose interest". Energy security is a technical and managerial concept—it asks "how to guarantee supply" without addressing the question of how power is distributed.

Second, internal versus external orientation: Energy sovereignty is inwardly oriented—it emphasises domestic autonomy over energy decisions. Energy security is outwardly oriented—it emphasises protection against external disruptions, whether geopolitical or market-driven.

Third, the collective subject: Energy sovereignty may be held by a local community, a nation, or even an individual (in the context of decentralised energy). Energy security is typically conceptualised at the level of the state or a large energy system.

Fourth, the relationship with capitalism: Energy sovereignty frequently contains a critique of the corporatisation and commodification of energy. Energy security is generally ideologically neutral — it may be achieved through market mechanisms or through state intervention alike.

CHAPTER II HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND THE EMERGENCE OF THESE CONCEPTS

2.1 The Pre-Industrial Era: Energy as Local Power

Before the Industrial Revolution, the question of energy was essentially a local matter. Energy derived from firewood, wind, water, and animal power—all sourced from the immediate environment of communities. There was no "energy dependency" in the modern sense, as there were no long-distance distribution networks. Consequently, the modern concepts of energy sovereignty and energy security did not yet exist [11].

Nevertheless, the seeds of the problem were already present: the Roman Empire confronted a crisis of deforestation driven by its massive consumption of firewood. Mesopotamian civilisation partly collapsed as a result of soil erosion that diminished agricultural productivity — and with it, the biomass-based "energy security" of those societies [12]. This demonstrates that energy dependency and supply vulnerability are perennial problems of human civilisation.

2.2 The Industrial Revolution and the Emergence of the "Coal Question"

The British Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth century transformed energy from a local commodity into a foundation of national power. Coal became the "lifeblood" of the industrial economy, and control over coal mines became a matter of state strategy. W. Stanley Jevons, in his work "The Coal Question" (1865), was the first to pose the question of the sustainability of fossil energy supply: if Britain's coal reserves were exhausted, would the nation's prosperity collapse? [13]

Jevons's question contained a premise that was to become central to modern energy security: that the prosperity and power of a nation depends upon the continuity of its access to its principal energy source. This was the first clear formulation of what we now call energy security.

2.3 The Age of Petroleum: Twentieth-Century Energy Geopolitics

The twentieth century was the century of petroleum, and with it was born modern energy geopolitics. Winston Churchill, when he decided to convert the Royal Navy from coal to oil in 1911, articulated a dilemma of energy security that was to become classic: oil conferred operational superiority (speed and range), but created dependency upon overseas supply. "Safety and certainty in oil lie in variety and variety alone," Churchill declared—a principle of diversification that remains as relevant today as it was then [14].

The San Remo Agreement (1920) and the subsequent Sykes-Picot arrangements demonstrated how European imperial powers restructured the Middle East largely to secure access to its oil reserves. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company (the forerunner of BP) and the oil cartel subsequently known as the "Seven Sisters" dominated global oil production and distribution for several decades, representing a form of transnational energy control that challenged the sovereignty of producing nations [15].

2.4 The 1973 Oil Crisis and the Awakening of Collective Consciousness

The most dramatic episode in the history of modern energy security was the 1973 Oil Crisis. When the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) announced an embargo against nations supporting Israel, the price of oil rose by almost 400 per cent within a matter of months [16]. The impact upon the global economy was devastating: inflation soared, economic growth stalled, and long queues at petrol stations became a symbol of the vulnerability of industrial civilisation.

The 1973 crisis had several profound historical consequences. First, it prompted the formation of the International Energy Agency (IEA) in 1974 as a collective response by OECD nations to energy pressures. Second, it triggered substantial investment in energy efficiency and the development of alternative energy sources. Third, and perhaps most significantly, it transformed energy from a technical matter into the highest-order political concern — energy security entered the strategic agendas of governments worldwide [17].

2.5 The Emergence of Energy Sovereignty: From OPEC to Popular Movements

Whereas energy security was born from the perspective of the consumer (importing nations), energy sovereignty emerged from the perspective of producers and communities. The nationalisation of the oil industry in developing countries—from Mexico (1938), Iran (1951), Libya (1969), to Saudi Arabia (1980)—represented early expressions of energy sovereignty: efforts by producing nations to reclaim control over their natural resources from the hands of transnational corporations [18].

In the early twenty-first century, the concept of energy sovereignty acquired new dimensions through social movements. Environmental activists, indigenous communities, and climate justice movements began employing the language of "sovereignty" to assert the rights of local communities over energy decisions. Reports on "Energy Sovereignty" from Food and Water Watch (2013) and the Transnational Institute (2018) formulated the concept as a democratic alternative to energy regimes controlled by large corporations [19].

CHAPTER III THEORY AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS

3.1 Dependency Theory and World-Systems Analysis

Dependency Theory, developed by Raul Prebisch, Andre Gunder Frank, and Cardoso & Faletto, provides an important framework for understanding global energy dynamics [20]. From this perspective, the relationship between industrialised nations (the "core") and developing countries (the "periphery") within the global energy system is structurally unequal: developing nations sell cheap raw fuels whilst purchasing expensive energy technology from advanced economies — an unjust exchange that perpetuates dependency.

Immanuel Wallerstein, in his World-Systems Theory, extended this analysis: the global energy system is an integral component of the world capitalist system that reproduces the hierarchy amongst nations. Control over energy resources and energy technology is one of the principal mechanisms by which the hegemonic position of core nations is maintained [21]. This perspective explains why the transition to renewable energy also has the potential to become a new arena of geopolitical competition—whoever commands the technology of solar panels, wind turbines, and batteries will determine the power hierarchy of the energy future.

3.2 Realism and Neo-Realism in Energy Security Studies

Within the Realist tradition of International Relations, energy is an instrument of state power. Nations compete to secure access to energy resources within an anarchic international system—one without a binding supranational authority. Hans Morgenthau and subsequently Kenneth Waltz constructed frameworks that explain state behaviour in the context of resource competition [22].

The most tangible application of the Realist perspective in energy policy was the Carter Doctrine (1980), which stated that the United States would employ military force to protect its interests in the Persian Gulf — including the security of oil supply. This doctrine explicitly integrated energy considerations into national security strategy, a logic subsequently adopted by many major powers [23].

3.3 Liberal Institutionalism and Interdependence

The Liberal perspective offers a contrasting view: economic interdependence, including in the domain of energy, creates incentives for co-operation rather than conflict. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, in "Power and Interdependence" (1977), argued that non-state actors (multinational corporations, international organisations) play a crucial role in shaping the global energy regime, and that shared interests in market stability encourage states to coordinate their behaviour [24].

The formation of the IEA, mechanisms for sharing strategic oil reserves, and various bilateral energy agreements are manifestations of this Liberal perspective. Critics of this view, however, point out that interdependence is frequently asymmetrical—creating vulnerability for the more dependent party.

3.4 Energy Transition Theory

Frank Geels developed a highly influential "Socio-Technical Transitions Theory" in the study of energy system change [25]. Within this framework, an energy transition (for example, from coal to oil, or from fossil fuels to renewables) is not merely a technological change, but a transformation of a complex socio-technical system involving infrastructure, institutions, user habits, regulation, and knowledge. The implication is that an energy transition requires systemic change, not merely technological substitution.

Germany's Energiewende ("energy transformation") is a real-world test of this theory. Germany's ambitious policy to abandon nuclear energy and fossil fuels demonstrates the extraordinary complexity of an energy transition when it collides with the realities of existing systems: ageing electricity grids, coal industry interests, concerns about costs, and social tensions in communities dependent upon the fossil fuel industry [26].

CHAPTER IV ENERGY POLICIES: INSTRUMENTS, ACTORS AND OBJECTIVES

4.1 A Typology of Energy Policies

Energy policies may be classified according to several dimensions. In terms of instruments, there are three broad categories: (1) regulatory instruments (licensing, efficiency standards, prohibitions on certain technologies); (2) economic instruments (carbon taxes, subsidies, investment incentives, feed-in tariffs); and (3) information and education instruments (energy labelling, public awareness campaigns) [27]. In terms of objectives, energy policies generally pursue three goals frequently referred to as the "energy policy trilemma": security of supply, affordability of price, and environmental sustainability.

4.2 Energy Subsidies: Concept, Typology and Controversy

Energy subsidies are among the most widely employed and simultaneously most controversial instruments of energy policy. The IMF defines energy subsidies broadly (as "post-tax subsidies") as the gap between the efficient market price plus optimal taxation and the price actually paid by consumers — a definition that encompasses not only direct price subsidies but also the failure to internalise environmental and health externalities [28].

According to an IMF report (2023), global energy subsidies reach a staggering figure: approximately USD 7 trillion per annum, or around 7 per cent of global GDP. This figure is dominated by "implicit subsidies" — the failure to internalise the costs of carbon emissions and air pollution — but explicit subsidies remain very substantial, particularly in oil-producing nations across the Middle East and Asia [29].

The typology of energy subsidies encompasses: (1) production subsidies, which support energy producers (for example, tax concessions for oil companies); (2) consumption subsidies, which suppress prices for end consumers (subsidised petrol, low electricity tariffs); (3) feed-in tariffs and premiums for renewable energy; and (4) cross-subsidies between industrial and household users [30].

Fossil fuel energy subsidies face dual criticism: from a fiscal perspective, they burden the state budget; from an environmental perspective, they distort prices and encourage excessive consumption; from an equity perspective, they frequently benefit wealthier groups (vehicle owners) more than the poor. Yet subsidy reform faces powerful political resistance because of its direct impact upon the cost of living [31].

On the other hand, subsidies for renewable energy are regarded as a legitimate instrument for correcting market failure: since the price of fossil fuels does not reflect their environmental externalities, renewables — which are socially more efficient—cannot compete on price alone. Germany's feed-in tariff, introduced in 2000 through the Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz (EEG), is an example of how renewable subsidies can dramatically accelerate the diffusion of solar and wind technology [32].

4.3 Strategic Reserves and Supply Diversification

One of the most direct energy security policies is the building of strategic energy reserves. The IEA requires its members to maintain oil reserves equivalent to 90 days of net imports—a "buffer" against sudden supply disruptions. The United States Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), established in the aftermath of the 1973 crisis, was once the largest strategic oil reserve in the world, with a capacity of up to 727 million barrels [33].

Supply diversification is another fundamental strategy. Churchill's principle of "variety" is applied by reducing dependence upon a single source or a single transport route. The European Union, which was heavily reliant upon Russian gas before the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, has accelerated diversification through new LNG terminals, gas network interconnections between member states, and large-scale energy efficiency programmes [34].

4.4 Renewable Energy Policies and the Energy Transition

The transition to renewable energy has now become the central energy policy of many nations, driven simultaneously by two imperatives: energy security (reducing dependence upon imported fossil fuels) and climate change mitigation. The International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) reports that renewables have become the cheapest source of electricity in most parts of the world, opening opportunities for developing nations to build clean and self-sufficient energy systems [35].

The Paris Agreement (2015) and subsequently the Glasgow Climate Pact (2021) established an international framework that encourages national energy transitions. Yet the path to a complete transition is fraught with challenges: the substantial cost of infrastructure, the intermittency problem of solar and wind energy, the need for smart batteries and grids, and the social impact upon communities dependent upon the fossil fuel industry [36].

4.5 Actors in Energy Governance

Energy governance involves a complex and frequently contentious network of actors. At the international level, there is the IEA (representing the interests of consumer nations), OPEC+ (representing the interests of producer nations), IRENA, and UNFCCC (in the context of climate change). The tension between the IEA and OPEC reflects the fundamental asymmetry of interests that underlies the global energy system [37].

At the national level, energy ministries, state-owned energy enterprises, sector regulators, and parliaments are the principal actors of energy policy. In the neoliberal model, energy markets are liberalised, and the private sector is dominant; in the statist model, the state retains direct control through state-owned energy companies. A mixed model is the most common arrangement in practice [38].

Multinational energy corporations (ExxonMobil, Shell, BP, TotalEnergies) remain key players in the global energy system despite facing mounting transition pressures. Meanwhile, new actors such as clean energy technology companies (Tesla, Vestas, First Solar) and renewable energy communities are increasingly reshaping the balance of power in the sector [39].

CHAPTER V A MULTIDIMENSIONAL REVIEW

5.1 A Philosophical Perspective

From the perspective of political philosophy, energy sovereignty raises fundamental questions about freedom, autonomy, and justice. John Rawls, in "A Theory of Justice" (1971), argued that the principles of justice require a distribution of resources that benefits those who are least well off [40]. Applied to energy, this principle demands that energy policy ensures universal access to basic energy services—electricity, heating, cooking fuel—irrespective of economic capacity.

Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, through their "Capabilities Approach", offer a highly pertinent framework: energy is not merely a commodity, but an enabler of fundamental human capabilities — health, education, mobility, and social participation [41]. "Energy poverty" from this perspective constitutes a violation of basic human capabilities, not merely an economic deficiency.

Ecological philosophy—particularly the "Deep Ecology" perspective of Arne Naess and the "Environmental Ethics" of Holmes Rolston III—challenges the extractivist paradigm that underpins the fossil-fuel-based energy system [42]. From this standpoint, energy is not merely a "resource" to be extracted and consumed, but part of the web of life that possesses intrinsic value beyond its utility to human beings. The energy transition, in this perspective, is not simply a matter of efficiency or security, but of building a more ethical relationship between humanity and the natural world.

5.2 An Ideological Perspective

Energy policy is an arena in which the great ideologies compete in concrete terms. Economic liberalism supports the liberalisation of energy markets, competition among suppliers, and the minimisation of state intervention—arguing that the price mechanism is the most efficient means of allocating energy resources [43]. Conservatism prioritises stability and security of supply, frequently supporting established national energy industries, even where that means retaining fossil fuels longer than progressives would wish.

Socialism and social democracy emphasise public control over the energy sector as a "vital interest" too important to be surrendered entirely to the market. The nationalisation of oil companies—such as Mexico's PEMEX or Venezuela's PDVSA—is the expression of this ideology in actual policy [44]. Eco-socialism—a fusion of socialism and ecology—proposes a radical transformation of the energy system as part of a broader transformation of capitalism itself.

Resource nationalism is an ideology that asserts natural resources—including energy—belong to the nation and must be controlled in the interests of the people, not of foreign corporations. The waves of nationalisation across the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America in the twentieth century were its manifestations. In the twenty-first century, "green nationalism" or "energy for sovereignty" is becoming an increasingly popular narrative in countries that seek to reduce dependence upon imported energy through the development of domestic renewables [45].

5.3 A Political Perspective

In political terms, energy is the most tangible instrument of power in international relations. The "resource curse" — or the "paradox of plenty"—the phenomenon whereby resource-rich nations tend to possess weaker democratic institutions and more volatile economic growth, demonstrates how energy wealth can distort domestic politics [46]. Michael Ross, in his study "Oil, Islam, and Women" (2008), showed a negative correlation between oil export dependence and women's representation in politics—indicating that the economic structure of energy profoundly shapes social and political structures.

At the geopolitical level, energy has become an increasingly explicit "weapon". Russia has employed natural gas as an instrument of political pressure against Ukraine and Western Europe. China uses infrastructure investment in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as an instrument of influence in developing countries. The United States deploys energy sanctions against Iran, Venezuela, and Russia as instruments of international leverage [47].

The renewable energy transition is generating new geopolitical dynamics. China has positioned itself as the global leader in the manufacture of solar panels, wind turbines, and EV batteries — replicating the dominance that Western nations exercised in the oil industry during the twentieth century. Nations that possess critical mineral reserves (lithium, cobalt, nickel, copper) for clean energy technology—such as the DRC, Chile, and Indonesia—now find themselves at the centre of a new geopolitical competition [48].

5.4 An Economic Perspective

From an economic standpoint, energy is a fundamental input for virtually all productive activity. Rises in energy prices are inflationary, as they increase production costs across the supply chain. Investment in energy efficiency and the diversification of energy sources is, at its core, an investment in long-term economic resilience [49].

The concept of "energy intensity"—the amount of energy consumed per unit of GDP—is an important indicator of a country's economic efficiency. Advanced economies have succeeded in significantly reducing their energy intensity through technological efficiency improvements and a structural shift towards less energy-intensive service sectors. Developing nations, with their dominance of heavy industrial sectors, generally exhibit higher energy intensity [50].

The theories of the "green economy" and the "circular economy" offer a new paradigm: energy efficiency is not only a means of cutting costs, but of opening up new industrial opportunities and employment. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) estimates that a well-managed energy transition could create 24 million new jobs globally by 2030, surpassing the 7.7 million jobs that may be lost in the fossil fuel sector [51].

5.5 A Social and Cultural Perspective

Energy possesses social and cultural dimensions that are frequently overlooked in policy analysis. Access to modern energy is a prerequisite for full participation in contemporary society: without electricity, there is no technology-based education, no modern healthcare, and no access to the internet or information [52]. "Energy justice" is a movement that demands a fair distribution of the burdens and benefits of energy systems, including the right of vulnerable communities not to bear the negative impacts of large energy infrastructure disproportionately.

The gender dimension of energy is an area of growing attention. In many developing nations, women and girls bear the greatest burden of "energy poverty": they spend hours collecting firewood, cook in smoky kitchens that damage their health, and lose time that could be devoted to education and economic productivity [53]. Electrification and access to clean cookstoves have the greatest impact upon rural women—a fact that ought to place gender justice at the heart of energy policy.

In cultural terms, energy also shapes identity and ways of life. The "car culture" that grew alongside the oil industry in the United States is an example of how energy dependence becomes embedded in cultural identity—such that energy reform (such as restrictions on fossil-fuelled vehicles) faces resistance that is not only economic but also cultural in nature [54].

CHAPTER VI ENERGY SOVEREIGNTY AND SECURITY IN INDONESIA

6.1 Indonesia's Energy Profile: A Paradox of Wealth and Vulnerability

Indonesia is a living energy paradox. On the one hand, it is one of the world's largest producers and exporters of coal, possesses substantial natural gas reserves, holds the fourth-largest renewable energy potential in the world (estimated at 3,687 GW from various sources), and has a history as a member of OPEC [55]. On the other hand, Indonesia has been running an oil deficit since the early 2000s, depends upon fuel imports, has millions of citizens without access to electricity, and its energy system is heavily dominated by coal and fossil fuels.

Indonesia's primary energy consumption is still dominated by fossil fuels: petroleum (34%), coal (30%), and natural gas (19%), with only around 17% derived from new and renewable energy (principally geothermal and hydropower) [56]. The government's target in the National Energy General Plan (RUEN) is to achieve a 23% renewable energy mix by 2025 — a target that, according to numerous analyses, will be difficult to attain at the current pace of investment.

6.2 A History of Indonesian Energy Policy

The history of Indonesian energy policy may be divided into several phases. The first phase (1945–1965) was the era of nationalisation and the establishment of national energy institutions. Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution laid the constitutional foundation: "land and water and the natural resources contained therein shall be controlled by the state and shall be exploited for the greatest possible welfare of the people." The establishment of PERTAMINA (1971) as the state oil company was a concrete expression of the energy sovereignty mandated by the constitution [57].

The second phase (1966–1997) was the New Order era, in which the energy sector was integrated into the strategy of economic development. Oil revenues became the engine of infrastructure development, family planning programmes, and education. However, dependence upon oil revenues also created a vulnerability that proved fatal when oil prices collapsed in the 1980s and 1990s [58].

The third phase (1998–present) is the era of reform, liberalisation, and the energy transition. The Oil and Gas Law No. 22/2001 opened the oil and gas sector to foreign and private investment — a dramatic departure from the previous model. The Electricity Law No. 20/2002 sought to liberalise the electricity sector, although it was subsequently struck down by the Constitutional Court for being inconsistent with Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution. This demonstrates the fundamental constitutional tension between market-based development ideology and the energy sovereignty mandate enshrined in the constitution [59].

6.3 Indonesia's Energy Subsidies: A Fiscal and Social Dilemma

Fuel subsidies in Indonesia are among the most politically sensitive and fiscally significant of all policy issues. At their peak (2012–2014), fuel subsidies consumed up to IDR 246 trillion per annum — more than the combined budgets for education and healthcare [60]. The administration of Joko Widodo in 2014–2015 undertook a bold reform: abolishing subsidies on Premium and Solar fuels (with limited exceptions) and redirecting the fiscal savings towards infrastructure.

However, when global oil prices surged (particularly in 2021–2022 following Russia's invasion of Ukraine), energy subsidies ballooned dramatically once again. In 2022, energy subsidies and compensation reached IDR 551 trillion—a record high in the nation's history [61]. This demonstrates that sustainable fuel subsidy reform requires more than mere political courage in a single moment; it demands a structural transformation of the energy system that reduces dependence upon imported fossil fuels.

The debate over energy subsidies in Indonesia is a debate about deeper values: social justice (is cheap energy a right of the citizenry?), economic efficiency (do subsidies distort resource allocation?), and energy sovereignty (do subsidies fund the consumption of imports or encourage domestic production?). There are no easy answers—which is precisely why the issue continues to provoke fierce debate in every budget cycle [62].

6.4 The Challenges of Indonesia's Energy Transition

Indonesia faces unique and complex challenges in its energy transition. First, economic dependence upon coal runs very deep: Indonesia is the world's largest coal exporter, and revenues from coal exports reached USD 47 billion in 2022—a contribution that cannot be relinquished without a well-considered substitution strategy [63].

Second, the geographical challenges Indonesia faces as an archipelago nation make the equalisation of energy access extremely costly. PLN (the state electricity company) must serve more than 17,000 islands under widely varying geographical conditions — from densely populated metropolitan cities to remote villages in the interior of Papua. A nationally integrated transmission network is prohibitively expensive to construct, with the result that Indonesia's electricity system remains highly fragmented between islands [64].

Third, Indonesia possesses extraordinary renewable energy potential that has yet to be optimally exploited. Indonesia's geothermal potential is the largest in the world (accounting for 40% of global reserves), yet only around 9% has been developed. Solar potential reaches 207 GWp, wind 60 GW, hydropower 75 GW, and biomass is abundant — none of which has been significantly exploited due to various regulatory, financial, and infrastructure barriers [65].

In a global context, Indonesia faces a dual pressure: pressure from developed nations to abandon coal more swiftly (through the Just Energy Transition Partnership/JETP, valued at USD 20 billion and pledged at COP26), whilst maintaining access to affordable energy that is needed for economic development and poverty reduction. This tension reflects a structural injustice in the global energy transition: developing nations are asked to bear the costs of a transition that is, in fact, the consequence of the historical emissions of the advanced economies [66].

6.5 Energy Sovereignty and Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution

The constitutional basis of Indonesia's energy sovereignty is Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution, which mandates state control over natural resources for the welfare of the people. The Constitutional Court, through its various rulings, has clarified that "controlled by the state" does not necessarily mean direct ownership, but that the state must maintain "effective control" through a range of mechanisms — regulation, licensing, oversight, and shareholding [67].

The debate over the meaning of Article 33 in the context of the energy sector is an ideological debate that remains unresolved. At one pole, resource nationalists argue that PERTAMINA, PLN, and other state-owned energy enterprises must dominate the energy sector to guarantee sovereignty and benefits for the people. At the other pole, liberals argue that the efficiency and investment required can only come from market competition that attracts domestic and foreign private capital [68].

In practice, Indonesia follows a middle path that is not always consistent: PERTAMINA and PLN remain dominant but are opened to private partnerships; energy prices are subsidised but not fully; the upstream oil and gas sector is opened to International Oil Companies (IOCs) but with increasingly stringent terms. This middle path reflects the political reality of post-reform Indonesia: no single ideology is sufficiently dominant to impose a unilateral solution [69].

CHAPTER VII SYNTHESIS AND PROJECTIONS

7.1 Energy at a Historical Crossroads

We are living through a rare moment in history: a fundamental transition of the global energy system. The combination of three great pressures—climate change that poses an existential threat, the dramatic fall in the cost of renewable energy, and the geopolitical volatility accelerated by the Russia-Ukraine war—is driving the transformation of energy systems at a pace without precedent [72].

In this context, energy sovereignty and energy security are no longer merely academic concepts—they are strategic imperatives. Nations that succeed in building energy sovereignty grounded in domestic renewable resources will hold a dual strategic advantage: independence from the volatility of global fossil fuel markets, and a stronger position in the post-fossil geopolitical order that is now taking shape.

7.2 An Agenda for Indonesia

For Indonesia, the policy recommendations that emerge from this study span several dimensions. First, energy subsidy reform must continue, but be accompanied by adequate social protection for vulnerable groups—ensuring that the reallocation of subsidies does not become a burden on poor households. Second, large-scale investment in renewable energy infrastructure is necessary, with a focus on geothermal energy (Indonesia's unique comparative advantage), rooftop solar, and mini-grids for remote areas [73].

Third, the development of a domestic renewable energy manufacturing industry—solar panels, wind turbines, batteries, EV components—must become an industrial priority to ensure that the energy transition also creates domestic value added, rather than merely replacing imported fuel with imported solar panels. Fourth, reform of energy sector governance that increases transparency, accountability, and public participation—particularly for communities affected by large energy projects [74].

Fifth, and perhaps most fundamentally, Indonesia needs to build a national consensus on the long-term vision for its energy system. The debate between "coal for development" and "renewables for sustainability" will not be resolved without a shared vision that transcends the electoral cycle. This requires an inclusive national dialogue, engaging not only the government and corporations, but also local communities, academics, and civil society [75].

CONCLUSION

Energy sovereignty and energy security are two concepts that complement one another without being identical: the former addresses the question of power and the right to make energy decisions, the latter the reliability and continuity of supply. Both were born of historical experience that demonstrated how fragile societies and nations become when they do not command their own energy destiny.

From a philosophical perspective, both concepts challenge us to reconsider the relationship between humanity, technology, power, and nature. From an ideological perspective, they reflect the unresolved tensions between state and market, nationalism and globalisation, development and sustainability. From a political perspective, they remind us that energy is power—and that the distribution of energy power is the distribution of power itself. From an economic perspective, they affirm that investment in energy independence is investment in long-term resilience. From a social and cultural perspective, they remind us that behind every energy policy lies a choice about the kind of society we wish to build.

Indonesia, with its unique paradox of resource wealth and structural vulnerability, stands at a decisive crossroads. The choices made in this decade—regarding coal, subsidies, investment in renewables, and the governance of the energy sector—will determine not only the nation's energy security, but also the character of the civilisation it is building. It is hoped that those choices are made with the wisdom to transcend short-term interests, and with a vision of an Indonesia that is sovereign, prosperous, and sustainable.

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