The Satirist as a Democratic Barometer: From Aristophanes to Pandji Pragiwaksono

Imagine, if you will, a sun-drenched afternoon in the Great Theatre of Dionysus, where a high-ranking Athenian general is comfortably seated, expecting a dignified tribute to his military genius, only to find himself portrayed on stage as a flatulent, bumbling buffoon who takes advice from a sentient plate of sausages. This was the quintessentially perilous charm of Aristophanes, a man who possessed the extraordinary knack for making the most powerful men in Greece turn a rather vivid shade of crimson while the common folk doubled over in fits of laughter. In an era where a misplaced word could lead to a swift invitation to drink hemlock or an unpleasant stint in exile, Aristophanes decided that the best way to handle the pompous architects of war was not with a polite letter of complaint, but by suggesting that they were significantly less intelligent than a chorus of well-dressed frogs. He was the original purveyor of the "dangerous joke," proving centuries before the invention of the microphone that the most effective way to topple a tyrant’s ego is to simply point out that his toga is tucked into his undergarments.

In his masterpiece The Clouds, Aristophanes turned his satirical lens away from the battlefield and toward the intellectual elite, specifically targeting Socrates by portraying him as a ridiculous sophist floating in a basket to be closer to the air. By depicting the venerable philosopher as a man who taught students how to argue their way out of debts using "Unjust Logic," Aristophanes effectively suggested that the high-minded academics of Athens were little more than charlatans corrupting the youth with linguistic trickery. 

Sir Kenneth Dover’s definitive edition of Aristophanes' Clouds, first published by the Clarendon Press in 1968, provides an exhaustive philological and historical analysis of one of Ancient Greece's most celebrated comedies. The primary focus of the work is to contextualise the play’s scathing satire of the "New Learning" movement in fifth-century BC Athens, specifically targeting the philosopher Socrates. Dover’s extensive introduction examines the discrepancy between the historical Socrates and the buffoonish caricature presented on stage, while his commentary offers meticulous guidance on the nuances of Attic Greek, the mechanics of Aristophanic metre, and the complex staging requirements of the Great Dionysia. Furthermore, the volume explores the social tensions of the period, illustrating how the play reflects the generational conflict between traditional Athenian values and the perceived moral corruption introduced by Sophistic rhetoric.

Sir Kenneth Dover argues that Aristophanes selected Socrates as his primary target because the philosopher was a highly recognisable figure in Athens whose eccentricities made him an ideal "comic avatar" for the intellectual movements of the day. Dover posits that Socrates served as a convenient "composite character" or a "type" representing the wider Sophistic movement, despite the historical Socrates differing from the Sophists in critical ways, such as his refusal to charge fees for teaching. According to Dover, the Athenian audience would have perceived Socrates as the most prominent local intellectual, making him a more effective target for satire than visiting foreign Sophists who were less familiar to the average citizen. Furthermore, Dover suggests that the play exploits the public's general suspicion of intellectualism, using Socrates' well-known habit of public discussion to unfairly link him to the more subversive and "dangerous" scientific and rhetorical inquiries of the era.

Sir Kenneth Dover’s overarching thesis in his scholarly edition is that The Clouds serves as a profound historical document that illuminates the profound cultural anxieties and the "generation gap" prevalent in late fifth-century Athens. He suggests that the play’s primary message is not merely a personal attack on Socrates, but rather a reactionary critique of the perceived moral decay caused by the rise of Sophistic rhetoric and scientific rationalism. Dover emphasizes that Aristophanes intended to warn his fellow citizens that replacing traditional religious and civic education with clever, relativistic arguments would inevitably lead to the collapse of familial authority and social order. Ultimately, Dover concludes that the play reflects a tragic misunderstanding by the Athenian public, as it conflated intellectual curiosity with subversive atheism, a sentiment that would eventually contribute to the real-life trial and execution of Socrates decades later.

Drawing parallels between Aristophanes' The Clouds and contemporary Indonesian democracy, one might conclude that the play serves as a cautionary tale regarding the power of "post-truth" rhetoric and the dangers of extreme social polarization. In the context of Indonesia's vibrant but often volatile democratic landscape, the play highlights how sophisticated communication techniques can be weaponised to obscure objective truth, much like the "Wrong Argument" defeated the "Right Argument" through mere linguistic trickery rather than moral superiority. Furthermore, the drama reflects the tension between traditional communal values and the rapid influx of modern, liberal ideas, reminding Indonesian citizens that a democracy which loses its ethical foundation in favour of cynical political maneuvering risks societal fragmentation. Ultimately, the work suggests that for a democracy to remain healthy, it must balance intellectual freedom with a shared commitment to civic integrity, ensuring that education fosters genuine wisdom rather than just the ability to manipulate public opinion.

In his analysis, Dover highlights the debate between the Right Argument (traditional morality) and the Wrong Argument (sophistic relativism) as a pivotal moment that mirrors modern political disinformation. The "Wrong Argument" succeeds not by presenting a more accurate reality, but by using "alternative facts" and emotional manipulation to dismantle the very idea of absolute truth. In the context of contemporary democratic discourse, this reflects how digital campaigns often prioritise "virality" and rhetorical persuasion over factual integrity, allowing populist leaders or interest groups to legitimise unethical behaviour through clever linguistic reframing. Consequently, just as the "Wrong Argument" teaches Strepsiades how to evade debts through semantic loopholes, modern disinformation empowers individuals to bypass social and legal accountability by creating a fragmented information environment where no single truth is universally accepted.

According to Dover’s analysis, Aristophanes acts as a "comic conservative" who utilizes his theatrical platform to articulate the deep-seated anxieties of the Athenian citizenry towards rapid intellectual and social upheaval. Dover suggests that Aristophanes does not merely seek to entertain, but rather adopts the role of a self-appointed moral guardian who attempts to protect the traditional polis by weaponising ridicule against those he perceives as subversive influences. By framing Socrates as a dangerous charlatan, Aristophanes effectively bridges the gap between the elite world of philosophical inquiry and the common man's suspicion of "the ivory tower," thereby shaping public sentiment in a way that is both persuasive and potentially hazardous. Ultimately, Dover portrays the playwright as an influential cultural mediator who, while perhaps intending to save his society through laughter, inadvertently provided the rhetorical ammunition that would later justify the suppression of dissenting voices in the name of preserving public order.

Dover interprets the violent conclusion of the play—wherein the protagonist, Strepsiades, sets fire to Socrates' school—as a manifestation of the "irrational anger" that often arises when traditional society feels pushed to its breaking point by intellectual subversion. Dover argues that this act of arson represents a total breakdown of dialogue, suggesting that when complex philosophical ideas are perceived as threats to the fundamental sanctity of the family and the state, the public may resort to physical destruction as a desperate means of "purification." For a modern democracy, this serves as a stark warning that if the gap between the intellectual elite and the general populace becomes too wide, or if education is seen as a tool for deception rather than truth, the resulting resentment can easily ignite into anti-intellectual populism and mob violence. Ultimately, Dover illustrates that the burning of the Phrontisterion (The Thinkery) is a tragic admission of failure, showing that laughter has reached its limit and has been replaced by the very chaos it sought to prevent through satire.

In Plato’s Apology, which records Socrates’ legal defence during his trial in 399 BC, the philosopher explicitly identifies Aristophanes’ The Clouds as a primary source of the lifelong prejudice that eventually led to his prosecution. Socrates argues that the "older accusers"—the comic poets and the public rumours they fostered—were far more dangerous than his immediate prosecutors, Meletus and Anytus, because they had poisoned the minds of the jury since their childhood. He specifically mentions the "comedy of Aristophanes," mocking the play's depiction of him swinging in a basket and "walking on air" while professing to have secret knowledge of celestial and subterranean phenomena. Socrates categorically denies these charges, asserting that he has no interest in such "natural philosophy" and, crucially, that, unlike the Sophists portrayed in the play, he has never charged a fee for his conversation. Ultimately, Socrates views the play not as a harmless piece of theatre, but as a malicious slander that successfully conflated his ethical enquiries with subversive atheism in the public imagination. In his scholarly commentary, Dover addresses the intriguing paradox that while Aristophanes’ satire was devastatingly effective, historical evidence—most notably in Plato’s Symposium—suggests a surprisingly cordial relationship between the playwright and the philosopher

Turning to The Frogs, he took the audacity a step further by sending the god Dionysus himself down to the Underworld to judge a "poetry slam" between the playwrights Aeschylus and Euripides. This play served as a biting commentary on the intellectual and moral decay of Athens, as the god eventually decides to bring back the traditionalist Aeschylus to save the city, implying that contemporary Athenian leaders and artists were so inept that they were essentially driving the empire toward ruin.

In his 2013 commentary on Aristophanes' Frogs (Oxford University Press), Mark Griffith provides a comprehensive and scholarly examination of this complex comedic masterpiece, situating it firmly within its historical and theatrical context. He explores the play’s unique blend of traditional slapstick and high-stakes intellectual debate, particularly focusing on the legendary contest between Aeschylus and Euripides as a reflection of the cultural and political crisis facing Athens at the end of the Peloponnesian War. Griffith pays meticulous attention to the role of Dionysus as both a comic figure and a symbol of civic renewal, while also offering detailed philological analysis of the Greek text, including its linguistic nuances and metrical structures. Ultimately, he argues that the play serves as a profound meditation on the power of poetry and theatre to provide moral and political guidance to a city in decline.

Griffith provides a comprehensive and scholarly examination of this complex comedic masterpiece, placing it firmly within its historical and theatrical context. He explores the play’s unique blend of traditional slapstick and high-stakes intellectual debate, particularly focusing on the legendary contest between Aeschylus and Euripides as a reflection of the cultural and political crisis facing Athens at the end of the Peloponnesian War. Griffith pays meticulous attention to the role of Dionysus as both a comic figure and a symbol of civic renewal, while also offering detailed philological analysis of the Greek text, including its linguistic nuances and metrical structures. Ultimately, he argues that the play serves as a profound meditation on the power of poetry and theatre to provide moral and political guidance to a city in decline.

Griffith argues that the literary competition between Aeschylus and Euripides serves as a sophisticated mechanism for exploring the ideological divide within Athenian society. He examines how Aeschylus is portrayed as the representative of the "Marathon generation," embodying traditional civic virtues, grandiloquent language, and a belief that poetry should inspire heroic morality. Conversely, Griffith demonstrates that Euripides is presented as the voice of modern intellectualism and realism, utilising everyday language and critical inquiry to challenge established norms, which Dionysus initially finds appealing but ultimately deems insufficient for saving the city.

The author suggests that this agon is not merely a critique of style, but a profound debate over the social responsibility of the artist, where Aeschylus’s weightier, more stable verse eventually triumphs over Euripides’s clever but fragmented innovation. By analysing the technical aspects of their parodies, Griffith highlights how the play uses the "scales" of justice to weigh their verses literally, symbolising the difficult choice Athens faced between nostalgic traditionalism and a potentially destabilising modernity.

Griffith argues that the primary message revolves around the indispensable role of the "poet-educator" as a source of political salvation, asserting that for a community to survive, it must reconnect with the moral weight and collective stability found in its traditional artistic heritage. Griffith emphasizes that Dionysus’s ultimate decision to bring Aeschylus back to the world of the living represents a rejection of clever but socially corrosive intellectualism in favour of a more robust, civic-minded poetry that can restore the fractured identity of Athens. Furthermore, he posits that the book highlights the necessity of theatre as a public forum where the most difficult choices regarding tradition, innovation, and national survival can be collectively processed through the medium of laughter.

The Chorus of Initiates (the mystai), according to Griffith, plays a pivotal role in reinforcing the play's message of civic unity by bridging the gap between the divine world and the political reality of Athens. He explains that their hymns, which blend religious solemnity with satirical attacks on divisive political figures, serve to create a sense of shared community and ritual purification that was desperately needed during the city's wartime exhaustion. Griffith suggests that by invoking the Eleusinian Mysteries, the Chorus transforms the theatre into a sacred space where the audience is encouraged to set aside factionalism and embrace a collective identity rooted in shared traditions. Ultimately, he posits that the Chorus provides the moral heartbeat of the play, offering a vision of a restored and harmonious Athens that transcends the immediate chaos of the Peloponnesian War.

The parallels between Aristophanes' caricature of Socrates in The Clouds and the modern "roasting" of intellectuals or influencers by figures like Pandji Pragiwaksono are quite profound, as both eras grapple with the perceived gap between elitist rhetoric and common-sense reality. In The Clouds, Socrates is lampooned for his "Thinkery," a place where abstract ideas are treated as more important than practical morality, much like how modern comedians often target "ivory tower" academics or out-of-touch social media influencers who propagate complex but ultimately hollow ideologies. Pandji, for instance, often deconstructs the language of political experts and "thought leaders," exposing the absurdity behind their sophisticated jargon to reveal the messy, often contradictory truths of Indonesian life. Both satirists employ the technique of "reductio ad absurdum"—taking a high-minded concept to its most ridiculous extreme—to remind their audience that those who claim to possess superior wisdom are frequently just as flawed and confused as the citizens they seek to lead.

The presence of political satirists such as Pandji Pragiwaksono in Indonesia is arguably vital because they serve as an essential democratic check on power that operates outside the formal constraints of traditional journalism or institutional opposition. By utilising humour to bypass the cognitive defences of the public, satire fosters a unique form of civic literacy, encouraging citizens to engage with complex political issues that might otherwise feel inaccessible or disheartening. Furthermore, in a society where cultural norms often prioritise harmony and "politeness," the satirist acts as a necessary provocateur who can speak uncomfortable truths to authority under the protected guise of performance, thereby expanding the boundaries of free speech. Ultimately, an environment that can tolerate and even celebrate such biting critique is a hallmark of a robust and mature democracy, as it proves that the state is resilient enough to endure ridicule without resorting to censorship.

In the contemporary Indonesian landscape, the primary legal hurdle for satirists like Pandji Pragiwaksono is the Electronic Information and Transactions Law (UU ITE), particularly the articles concerning defamation and hate speech. Unlike the United States, where the "Actual Malice" standard established in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan provides a formidable shield for satirists attacking public figures, Indonesian law often struggles to distinguish between a "punchline" intended for social critique and a deliberate attempt to sully a person's reputation. This legal ambiguity creates a "chilling effect," where the threat of criminal prosecution—rather than civil litigation—hangs over the head of any comedian who dares to mention specific names or state institutions. Furthermore, the concept of "religious or cultural blasphemy" remains a potent legal and social weapon, as seen in the backlash to Pandji's material on Toraja, illustrating that in a pluralistic democracy like Indonesia, the satirist must navigate not only the formal statutes of the state but also the informal, yet equally dangerous, "laws" of public sensitivity and traditional custom.

Political satire is more than mere entertainment; it is a form of Public Pedagogy. According to Message Elaboration Theory, humour acts as a "sugar coating" that lowers an audience's cognitive resistance, allowing controversial ideas to be processed without immediate defensiveness. While Pandji operates as the "Grand Philosopher" of Indonesian comedy, contemporaries like Kiky Saputri and Bintang Emon provide rapid-fire, accessible strikes. Together, they form a diverse satirical front that fosters civic literacy.

To the skeptic, satire might seem like a regional anomaly or mere "symbolic commodity." However, international democratic history suggests otherwise. In the United States, Jon Stewart famously shamed Congress into passing the James Zadroga 9/11 Health Act, proving a comedian could achieve what lobbyists could not. Similarly, the "John Oliver Effect" has seen satirical segments lead to direct changes in federal regulations. These instances demonstrate that satire is a surgical instrument capable of cutting through bureaucratic apathy to deliver tangible justice.

The parallels between classical and modern satire are profound. In his play The Clouds, Aristophanes lampooned Socrates for his "Thinkery," depicting him as an out-of-touch intellectual. This mirrors how Pandji deconstructs the sophisticated jargon of modern "thought leaders" and political experts to reveal messy, contradictory truths. This lineage continues through Mort Sahl, who revolutionised American stand-up by riffing on current events with a newspaper in hand, much like Pandji uses his "World Tour" specials to scrutinise systemic government failings.

The negative reactions Pandji often faces from partisan supporters mirror the backlash experienced by Mort Sahl or the legal threats against Aristophanes. Yet, an environment that can celebrate such critique is the hallmark of a robust democracy. When a society allows its comedians to speak, it is not merely laughing at the powerful; it is actively participating in the solemn duty of self-governance. Pandji’s journey, therefore, serves as a vital barometer for the health and vitality of the Indonesian democratic experiment.

In conclusion, the trajectory of political satire—stretching from the biting theatrical masks of Aristophanes to the modern television studios of Jon Stewart—illustrates that a comedian’s voice is often the most potent weapon against institutional inertia. By viewing Pandji Pragiwaksono through this international lens, it becomes evident that his work is not merely a collection of jests, but a vital democratic exercise that holds the potential to mirror the "John Oliver Effect" within the Indonesian context. As Indonesia continues to navigate its complex democratic journey, the ability of satirists to translate dry legislative failures into relatable human narratives ensures that the citizenry remains vigilant and informed. Ultimately, if the history of global democracy has taught us anything, it is that when a society allows its comedians to speak, it is not just laughing at the powerful—it is actively participating in the solemn duty of self-governance.

Should a figure like Pandji Pragiwaksono be imprisoned for his satirical contributions, it would signify a catastrophic plummet in the barometer of Indonesian democracy, indicating that the state has regressed from a vibrant marketplace of ideas into a fragile regime of enforced silence. Such an outcome would suggest that the "democratic safety valve"—which allows for the peaceful release of societal frustration through laughter—has been weld shut, thereby increasing the risk of more volatile and non-discursive forms of dissent. In the eyes of the international community, the incarceration of a satirist serves as a definitive "red flag," signalling that the rule of law is being weaponised to protect the egos of the powerful rather than the fundamental rights of the citizenry. Ultimately, a democracy that cannot withstand the sting of a comedian’s wit reveals itself to be profoundly insecure, as the true strength of any free nation is measured not by its ability to punish critics but by its capacity to endure and evolve through their scrutiny.

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Critical Thinking: Not About Arguing, but About Managing Meaning (3)

Robert H. Thouless once invited his readers to imagine two civil servants faced with the same public report that questioned the success of a widely praised government programme. The first civil servant read the report with discomfort, because it challenged a policy he had publicly defended, yet he examined the data carefully, checked the sources, and acknowledged the weaknesses revealed by the findings. Although doing so risked criticism from his colleagues and superiors, he revised his position and argued that the programme required correction rather than celebration. Thouless would describe this response as straight thinking, because the man allowed evidence to guide his judgment, even when the conclusion was personally inconvenient.

The second civil servant reacted differently to the same report. Before reading it in full, he decided that the programme must be successful, because admitting failure would threaten his reputation and political alliances. He focused only on passages that could be interpreted favourably, dismissed critical sections as biased or hostile, and repeated slogans about national progress to reassure both himself and others. His reasoning appeared confident and persuasive, yet it was driven not by a search for truth, but by a desire to protect an image. According to Thouless, this was crooked thinking because the conclusion came first, and reasoning was bent afterwards to defend it.

Thouless used examples like this to show that the difference between straight and crooked thinking does not lie in intelligence, education, or rhetorical skill, but in honesty of motive. Both individuals were capable of reasoning, but only one was willing to submit his beliefs to reality rather than force reality to submit to his beliefs.

In Straight and Crooked Thinking (1930, Hodder & Stoughton), Robert H. Thouless explains that straight thinking is the disciplined and honest process of reasoning in which a person seeks truth rather than personal comfort, social approval, or emotional satisfaction. Straight thinking requires an individual to examine evidence carefully, to distinguish facts from opinions, and to remain willing to revise conclusions when new and stronger evidence appears. According to Thouless, this form of thinking demands intellectual humility, because it recognises that one’s own beliefs may be mistaken, and intellectual courage, because it resists pressure from authority, tradition, or popular sentiment. Straight thinking, therefore, is not merely logical correctness, but a moral attitude toward truth that prioritises clarity, fairness, and responsibility in judgment.

Thouless contrasts straight thinking with crooked thinking, which he describes as reasoning that is distorted by emotion, desire, prejudice, or self-interest. In crooked thinking, the individual does not begin with a sincere search for truth, but with a conclusion already desired, and then selectively uses arguments, evidence, or rhetoric to justify that conclusion. Thouless emphasises that crooked thinking often appears intelligent and persuasive, because it may employ sophisticated language or partial logic, yet it is fundamentally dishonest, as it avoids inconvenient facts and suppresses opposing viewpoints. For Thouless, crooked thinking is especially dangerous because it can deceive not only others but also the thinker himself, creating an illusion of rationality while reinforcing error and bias.

In modern politics, crooked thinking frequently appears when political actors begin with a predetermined narrative or ideological goal and then manipulate facts to support it. Rather than allowing evidence to guide policy conclusions, politicians may cherry-pick statistics, exaggerate selective successes, or reframe failures as external conspiracies. Thouless’s concept is clearly illustrated when emotional appeals such as fear, pride, or resentment are deliberately used to override rational evaluation, encouraging citizens to accept claims not because they are true, but because they feel reassuring or validating. In such cases, political debate becomes a contest of persuasion rather than a shared inquiry into reality, and crooked thinking thrives by rewarding loyalty over accuracy.

In modern media environments, crooked thinking is often amplified by algorithms, sensationalism, and the economics of attention. Media outlets and digital platforms may prioritise emotionally charged headlines, simplified narratives, or polarising frames that confirm audience biases, rather than presenting complex and nuanced realities. From Thouless’s perspective, this constitutes crooked thinking because information is arranged not to illuminate truth, but to provoke reactions such as outrage, fear, or tribal identification. When audiences consume media primarily to reinforce their existing beliefs, they may unknowingly participate in crooked thinking themselves, mistaking repetition and popularity for evidence and confusing virality with validity.

Thouless’s analysis suggests that crooked thinking in politics and media is sustained not only by those who produce misleading narratives, but also by audiences who prefer comfort over truth. The responsibility for straight thinking, therefore, lies both with institutions and with individuals who must actively resist emotional manipulation and cultivate intellectual discipline in an age of information excess.

Thouless’s distinction between straight and crooked thinking provides a moral-psychological foundation for understanding why reasoning often goes astray, whereas John Dewey and Richard Paul develop systematic frameworks for how thinking should be disciplined and improved. Although their approaches differ in emphasis, all three thinkers converge on the idea that genuine thinking must resist habit, authority, and emotional comfort to serve truth.

For Thouless, crooked thinking arises primarily from the corruption of motive, because the thinker begins with a desired conclusion and then bends reasoning to justify it. John Dewey, in contrast, frames the problem as a failure of reflective thinking, which he defines as the active, persistent, and careful consideration of beliefs in light of their grounds and consequences. Where Thouless diagnoses dishonesty in reasoning, Dewey diagnoses intellectual passivity, arguing that many people accept beliefs uncritically because they have never been trained to suspend judgement, question assumptions, or trace implications. In this sense, crooked thinking corresponds to what Dewey would call unreflective or routine thought, shaped by custom and impulse rather than inquiry.

Richard Paul extends and formalises these concerns by defining critical thinking as disciplined, self-directed reasoning governed by intellectual standards such as clarity, accuracy, relevance, depth, and fairness. Unlike Thouless, who emphasises moral integrity, and Dewey, who emphasises reflective inquiry, Paul focuses on the structural elements of reasoning itself, including purpose, assumptions, evidence, inferences, and point of view. Crooked thinking, from Paul’s perspective, is not merely emotionally driven or unreflective, but systematically flawed because it violates these intellectual standards while often masquerading as rational argument.

The three thinkers also differ in how they assign responsibility for intellectual error. Thouless warns that crooked thinking is especially dangerous because it deceives the thinker into believing he is being reasonable, thereby creating moral self-deception. Dewey sees the root of the problem in educational and social conditions that discourage questioning and reward conformity, suggesting that reflective thinking must be cultivated through democratic habits and experiential learning. Paul, meanwhile, argues that critical thinking requires conscious self-regulation and the deliberate identification of bias, egocentrism, and sociocentrism, making intellectual discipline an ongoing ethical obligation.

Taken together, Thouless explains why people want to think crookedly, Dewey explains why they fail to think reflectively, and Paul explains how they can learn to think critically. Their combined insights reveal that the struggle for sound thinking is not merely technical, but moral, educational, and cultural, especially in modern societies saturated with political messaging and media persuasion.

Robert H. Thouless’s concept of crooked thinking offers a powerful lens through which contemporary practices of image-building, populism, and digital propaganda in Indonesia can be critically understood. In the context of political pencitraan, crooked thinking manifests when public figures prioritise the construction of a favourable image over honest engagement with reality, policy substance, or accountability. Rather than allowing facts to shape public narratives, carefully curated visuals, slogans, and symbolic gestures are deployed to produce emotional resonance, encouraging citizens to respond to appearances rather than evidence.

In Indonesian populism, crooked thinking operates by simplifying complex social and economic problems into emotionally appealing stories of “the people” versus vaguely defined elites or external enemies. This form of reasoning aligns closely with Thouless’s description of starting from a desired conclusion, namely the moral purity of one group and the moral corruption of another, and then selectively assembling facts to support that narrative. Emotional identification replaces critical evaluation, and loyalty to a leader or movement becomes a substitute for rational assessment of policies and outcomes.

Digital propaganda further intensifies crooked thinking by exploiting the architecture of social media platforms. Algorithms reward content that provokes outrage, fear, or admiration, while nuanced analysis is often marginalised due to its lower emotional impact. In such an environment, repetition, virality, and influencer endorsement are easily mistaken for truth, creating what Thouless would recognise as an illusion of rational consensus. Citizens may feel informed and engaged, while in reality their reasoning has been subtly steered by emotionally engineered information flows rather than by careful examination of evidence.

From Thouless’s perspective, the danger of these practices lies not only in misleading the public, but in cultivating a culture where crooked thinking becomes normalised and even rewarded. When political success is measured by visibility, emotional mobilisation, and digital dominance rather than by coherence and honesty, the moral discipline required for straight thinking is gradually eroded. The result is a public sphere in which critical reflection is replaced by performative belief, and political judgement is shaped more by affect than by reason.

The intellectual struggle undertaken by Dr. Roy Suryo, Dr. Rismon Sianipar, and Dr. Tifa in critically questioning the authenticity of President Jokowi’s academic credentials can be appreciated not primarily in terms of the final correctness of their claims, but in terms of the reflective and moral stance they embody, when viewed through the frameworks of John Dewey and Robert H. Thouless. From this perspective, the value of their actions lies in the willingness to subject an authoritative public narrative to scrutiny rather than to accept it passively.

In John Dewey’s conception of reflective thinking, genuine inquiry begins when a belief that is commonly accepted is treated as a problem to be examined rather than as a settled truth. Dewey emphasises that democratic intelligence depends on the courage to suspend judgement, to ask inconvenient questions, and to demand grounds and consequences for claims made by those in power. Seen in this light, the efforts of these figures can be understood as an exercise in reflective thinking, insofar as they refuse to treat institutional authority or official statements as immune from examination, and instead insist that public trust must be earned through transparency and evidence.

Robert H. Thouless’s distinction between straight and crooked thinking further sharpens this appreciation by focusing on the moral orientation of reasoning. Straight thinking, for Thouless, requires honesty of motive, a readiness to follow evidence wherever it leads, and resistance to social pressure that discourages dissent. To the extent that these critics frame their arguments as appeals to evidence, documentation, and rational examination, rather than mere character attacks or emotional mobilisation, their actions can be seen as an attempt to resist crooked thinking, especially in a political culture where image-building and reputational immunity often replace substantive accountability.

At the same time, both Dewey and Thouless implicitly remind us that the ethical standard of such criticism lies not in loyalty to a cause or hostility to a person, but in fidelity to method. Appreciation, therefore, does not require agreement with every conclusion drawn, but recognition of the civic and intellectual risk involved in questioning dominant narratives. In societies shaped by media saturation and political polarisation, the act of questioning itself becomes a form of democratic discipline, provided it remains open to correction and governed by intellectual integrity.

In contemporary Indonesia, the controversy surrounding the questioning of Joko Widodo's (the 7th President of Indonesia) academic credentials can be more fruitfully understood through the concepts of image-building and symbolic immunity of power than through a narrow focus on documentary authenticity alone. Image-building, or pencitraan, operates as a political strategy in which legitimacy is maintained through carefully managed symbols, narratives, and emotional identification, rather than through continuous public scrutiny of evidence. Within such a framework, the leader’s image gradually acquires a protective aura that discourages questioning, not because the questions are inherently unreasonable, but because they are perceived as socially or morally inappropriate.

From John Dewey’s perspective, this condition represents a weakening of reflective thinking within democratic life. Dewey warned that when public opinion is shaped more by habit, admiration, and emotional attachment than by inquiry, authority becomes insulated from criticism. Symbolic immunity of power emerges when official narratives are accepted as settled truth, and when questioning them is framed as an attack on stability, unity, or national dignity. In this environment, reflective inquiry is replaced by what Dewey would describe as routine acceptance, where citizens are encouraged to trust appearances rather than examine grounds and consequences.

Robert H. Thouless’s concept of crooked thinking sharpens this analysis by revealing how image-building and symbolic immunity rely on distorted reasoning rather than open evaluation. Crooked thinking flourishes when a favourable conclusion about those in power is assumed from the outset, and all subsequent information is filtered to protect that conclusion. In the Indonesian context, symbolic immunity allows political images to function as substitutes for evidence, making scepticism appear immoral and compliance appear rational. The result is not the absence of reasoning, but the presence of reasoning that serves emotional comfort and social conformity rather than truth.

When critics challenge such immunity, the resistance they face often illustrates Thouless’s warning that crooked thinking is defended not through argument, but through social pressure, ridicule, or moral accusation. The controversy thus becomes less about facts and more about boundaries: who is permitted to ask questions, and which symbols are exempt from scrutiny. Appreciated through Dewey and Thouless, these moments expose a deeper democratic tension between the need for stability and the obligation of continuous critical examination.

In this sense, the struggle is not merely about a single document, but about whether political authority in Indonesia remains accountable to evidence or gradually retreats into symbolic untouchability. Dewey and Thouless would both suggest that a healthy democracy is not one in which leaders are endlessly admired, but one in which even the most powerful images remain open to reflective and honest questioning.

Thouless might have ended the discussion with a simple irony. When a report arrived showing cracks in a celebrated policy, one official sighed and said, “Let us read it carefully, even if it embarrasses us.” Another smiled calmly and replied, “No need to read it; we already know it is wrong.” The first was accused of being troublesome, while the second was praised for being loyal. Thus, straight thinking was treated as disloyalty, and crooked thinking was rewarded as wisdom.

[Part 4]
[Part 2]

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