Buzzer Politics in Indonesia (2)

The case of buzzers spreading false accusations of blasphemy against former Vice President Jusuf Kalla illustrates just how pernicious and destructive digital disinformation can be when religion is instrumentalised for political purposes. The cruelty lies not only in the personal defamation of a respected statesman but also in the way such fabricated narratives exploit religious sensitivities to inflame public anger. Because blasphemy is an issue that touches deeply held beliefs, false claims of this nature are particularly potent in mobilising outrage, and buzzers deliberately weaponise that emotional resonance to destabilise political opponents or delegitimise figures who are otherwise seen as moderate and conciliatory.

The impact of these campaigns is twofold. On the one hand, they corrode trust in democratic institutions by making citizens doubt the integrity of leaders and the fairness of political competition. On the other, they fracture social cohesion by sowing suspicion and hostility among communities, turning religion into a divisive rather than unifying force. Scholars such as Marcus Mietzner have shown that the use of buzzers in Indonesia has normalised toxic practices in political communication, while Fossati and Kawamura highlight how digital disinformation—often infused with religious rhetoric—functions as an “authoritarian innovation” that undermines pluralism. In this context, the false accusations against Jusuf Kalla are emblematic of a broader trend: the deliberate manipulation of religious sentiment through digital channels to achieve short‑term political gains at the expense of long‑term democratic health.

The cruelty, therefore, is not only in the personal harm inflicted on Jusuf Kalla’s reputation but also in the collective damage done to Indonesia’s democratic fabric. By exploiting religion in this way, buzzers erode both the moral integrity of politics and the trust that citizens place in democratic processes.

4.2 The 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election and SARA-Based Polarisation

The 2017 Jakarta Pilkada stands as one of the most dramatic episodes in the history of buzzer deployment in Indonesia. The contest between Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) and Anies Baswedan was marked by the mass dissemination of content laden with SARA (ethnicity, religion, race, and inter-group relations) sensitivities across social media, with the suspected involvement of organised buzzer networks.

Research by Mietzner (2020), in Populist Azariah: Jokowi's Long Decade in Power and the Threat to Democracy and related articles, analyses how the blasphemy allegations brought against Ahok were artificially amplified by digital networks exploiting religious sentiment as a political weapon. Mietzner argues that this was not spontaneous organic mobilisation, but a structured and premeditated operation.

These findings are corroborated by Fossati and Kawamura (2020), in their article Islam, Partisan Identity and Electoral Behaviour in Indonesia, which demonstrates how religious narratives were instrumentalised through digital channels—including buzzers and messaging applications such as WhatsApp—to influence electoral choices. This process not only shaped the outcome of the Pilkada but left deep and lasting scars upon the social fabric of Jakarta and, more broadly, of Indonesian society.

4.3 Buzzers in the 2019 General Election: Scalability and Institutionalisation

If the 2017 Pilkada represented a large-scale experimental deployment, the 2019 simultaneous general elections (Presidential and Legislative) constituted the arena in which the use of buzzers became institutionalised. The contest between Joko Widodo and Prabowo Subianto was accompanied by massive and organised cyber operations from both camps.

A study by DW Akademie (2020), Media Use and Information Literacy in Indonesia, found that more than 60 per cent of respondents across various Indonesian cities reported having received information that subsequently proved to be false, the great majority of it via WhatsApp and Facebook—the two platforms that served as the primary theatre of buzzer activity.

Research by Juditha (2020), published in the journal Pekommas, analysed patterns of disinformation dissemination during the 2019 elections and identified patterns consistent with coordinated buzzer activity: high posting volumes within short timeframes, coordinated hashtag usage, and inorganic interaction patterns. These findings accord with the detection methodology developed by Ferrara et al. (2016) in their influential paper, The Rise of Social Bots published in Communications of the ACM.

 

4.4 Industrial Context: The Buzzer Ecosystem in Indonesia

One of the most alarming aspects of the buzzer phenomenon in Indonesia is the degree to which it has become institutionalised. Drone Emprit, the social media analytics platform founded by Ismail Fahmi, has extensively documented how buzzer operations in Indonesia function as a structured industry. Fahmi (2019), in various Drone Emprit reports, demonstrates the existence of networks of accounts operating in a coordinated fashion, exhibiting behaviour indicative of centralised management.

Drone Emprit's findings are corroborated by the Oxford Internet Institute. Bradshaw, Neudert, and Howard (2019), in Government Troops and Political Operatives, classify Indonesia as one of the countries with a high level of computational influence operation capacity, with the active involvement of both state and private actors.

The buzzer industry in Indonesia does not operate in a vacuum. It is connected to an ecosystem of digital consultants, opinion research firms, and even mainstream PR agencies offering 'digital reputation management' services as a euphemism for buzzword operations. This indicates that the problem in Indonesia is not merely one of rogue individuals, but of the institutionalisation of opinion manipulation as a practice deeply embedded within the political communications industry.

 

4.5 Buzzer Attacks on Press Freedom and Critical Voices

One of the most dangerous manifestations of the buzzer phenomenon in Indonesia is its deployment against journalists, activists, and academics. The Koalisi Lawan Buzzer (Anti-Buzzer Coalition), formed by various civil society organisations, has documented hundreds of cases in which individuals were subjected to coordinated attacks on social media following the publication of critical reporting or commentary directed at those in power.

Reporters Without Borders ranked Indonesia 108th out of 180 countries in its 2022 World Press Freedom Index, citing organised digital intimidation as one of the primary contributing factors. Research by Wahyudi (2021), in his doctoral thesis at the University of Melbourne, analyses how buzzer attacks against investigative journalists in Indonesia produce a demonstrable chilling effect: editorial boards engage in self-censorship, sources become reluctant to speak on record, and journalists contemplate abandoning the profession.

The most egregious cases include coordinated attacks against journalists covering corruption at the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and in independent media, environmental activists opposing large infrastructure projects, and minority religious figures advocating for peace amidst sectarian polarisation. The consistent patterns observed across these cases—coordinated hashtag campaigns, rapid amplification, and suspicious account profiles—point unmistakably to planned buzzer operations.

4.6 Regulation and Law Enforcement: A Troubling Lacuna

Indonesia possesses several legal instruments that could, in principle, be deployed to address buzzer activity, including the Electronic Information and Transactions Law (UU ITE, Law No. 11 of 2008, as amended) and various regulations concerning the dissemination of hoaxes. However, Sukma Ridwan (2020), in his analysis published in Jurnal Hukum dan Peradilan, finds that the implementation of these instruments has been profoundly selective: they have been used far more frequently to criminalise criticism of the government than to prosecute buzzers who disseminate pro-establishment disinformation.

This paradox reflects precisely what Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018), in their seminal work How Democracies Die, identify as a hallmark of contemporary democratic backsliding: the employment of legitimate legal instruments for anti-democratic ends. When the UU ITE is more commonly wielded to silence dissent than to protect the public information sphere, buzzer activity goes increasingly unchecked, deprived of any meaningful legal disincentive.

V. ETHICAL DIMENSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR DEMOCRACY

 

5.1 Buzzers as a Violation of Public Epistemic Autonomy

From a philosophical standpoint, the deployment of buzzers constitutes a violation of the epistemic autonomy of the public—the right of individuals to form beliefs and preferences based on unmanipulated information. Christiano (2008), in The Constitution of Equality: Democratic Authority and Its Limits, argues that democratic legitimacy is contingent upon the capacity of citizens to participate in genuine public deliberation. Buzzers, by manipulating the informational landscape, systematically undermine the prerequisite conditions for such legitimacy.

Habermas (1984), in the theory of communicative action and the conception of the public sphere elaborated in The Theory of Communicative Action and The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, stipulates that legitimate deliberation must be free from strategic domination and manipulation. Buzzers are the antithesis of this ideal: they introduce a strategic logic (the achievement of ends through manipulation) into a sphere that ought to be governed by communicative rationality (the achievement of consensus through honest argumentation).

 

5.2 Systemic Implications for the Quality of Democracy

Diamond (2015), in his influential article in the Journal of Democracy, warned of a global 'democratic recession' in which various democracies experience an erosion of quality even whilst formally retaining electoral procedures. The buzzer phenomenon is precisely one of the mechanisms of such erosion: it enables democracy to appear normal at the surface—elections are held, speech ostensibly remains free—whilst the quality of public deliberation that constitutes the core of substantive democracy has been gravely compromised.

Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018), in How Democracies Die identify attacks upon independent media and the manipulation of public information as two of the four principal indicators of democratic backsliding. In the Indonesian context, both indicators are present in the buzzer phenomenon: buzzers erode the credibility of independent journalism by disseminating unfounded allegations of bias, and they actively manipulate public information through organised disinformation campaigns.

VI. CONCLUSION: SAFEGUARDING DEMOCRACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE

The foregoing analysis demonstrates that political buzzers are not merely an irritant in the communicative landscape—they are a systemic threat to the very foundations of democracy. From a global perspective, buzzers corrupt the public information ecology, intensify polarisation, endanger electoral integrity, and silence critical voices. In the specific context of Indonesia, the phenomenon has reached a degree of institutionalisation that is deeply troubling, with roots embedded in the broader structures of political-business oligarchy.

Addressing the buzzer threat effectively requires a multi-layered approach engaging a range of stakeholders. First, the regulation of digital platforms must be substantially strengthened, so that technology companies are held accountable for manipulation that occurs on their platforms, following the model currently being developed by the European Union through the Digital Services Act. Second, transparency in political advertising and influence operations must be mandated, enabling the public to identify when the narratives they consume are the product of manufactured campaigns.

Third, substantial investment in digital and media literacy education is required at every level of schooling. This responsibility cannot be delegated to markets or platforms alone—it is a duty of the state and of civil society. Fourth, the legal protection of journalists, activists, and critical voices from buzzer attacks must be consistently enforced, supported by a clear and impartially applied legal framework.

Finally, following the argument of Cohen (2019) in Democracy and Other Neoliberal Fantasies: Communicative Capitalism & Left Politics, we must acknowledge that the problem of buzzers cannot be disentangled from deeper questions concerning the political economy of digital media, the distribution of power within society, and the collective commitment to democratic values. To resist buzzers is, in the end, to participate in a broader and more fundamental struggle to defend and deepen democracy itself.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Beder, S. (1998). Global Spin: The Corporate Assault on Environmentalism. Dartington: Green Books.

Bradshaw, S., & Howard, P. N. (2019). The Global Disinformation Order: 2019 Global Inventory of Organised Social Media Manipulation. Oxford: Oxford Internet Institute.

Bradshaw, S., Neudert, L. M., & Howard, P. N. (2019). Government Troops and Political Operatives: Assessing Organized Social Media Manipulation in Democracies. Oxford: Oxford Internet Institute.

Christiano, T. (2008). The Constitution of Equality: Democratic Authority and Its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cohen, J. (2019). Democracy and Other Neoliberal Fantasies: Communicative Capitalism & Left Politics. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Diamond, L. (2015). Facing Up to the Democratic Recession. Journal of Democracy, 26(1), 141–155.

DW Akademie. (2020). Media Use and Information Literacy in Indonesia. Bonn: Deutsche Welle.

Edelman. (2022). 2022 Edelman Trust Barometer: The Cycle of Distrust. Chicago: Edelman.

Fahmi, I. (2019). Laporan Analisis Drone Emprit: Pola Operasi Buzzer di Media Sosial Indonesia [Drone Emprit Analysis Report: Buzzer Operation Patterns in Indonesian Social Media]. Jakarta: Drone Emprit.

Ferrara, E., Varol, O., Davis, C., Menczer, F., & Flammini, A. (2016). The Rise of Social Bots. Communications of the ACM, 59(7), 96–104.

Floridi, L. (2014). The Fourth Revolution: How the Infosphere Is Reshaping Human Reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Fossati, D., & Kawamura, K. (2020). Islam, Partisan Identity and Electoral Behaviour in Indonesia. Journal of East Asian Studies, 20(3), 309–330.

Freedom House. (2021). Freedom on the Net 2021: The Global Drive to Control Big Tech. Washington, DC: Freedom House.

Habermas, J. (1984). The Theory of Communicative Action (Vol. 1). (T. McCarthy, Trans.). Boston: Beacon Press.

Habermas, J. (1989). The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. (T. Burger, Trans.). Cambridge: Polity Press.

Idris, I., & Rohmaniyah, I. (2021). Buzzer sebagai Tentara Siber: Ekosistem Komunikasi Politik Digital di Indonesia [Buzzers as Cyber Troops: The Digital Political Communication Ecosystem in Indonesia]. Jurnal Komunikasi Indonesia, 10(2), 85–101.

Juditha, C. (2020). Disinformasi dalam Pemilihan Presiden Indonesia 2019 [Disinformation in the 2019 Indonesian Presidential Election]. Jurnal Pekommas, 5(1), 13–24.

Levitsky, S., & Ziblatt, D. (2018). How Democracies Die. New York: Crown Publishing Group.

Lim, M. (2017). Freedom to Hate: Social Media, Algorithmic Enclaves, and the Rise of Tribal Nationalism in Indonesia. Critical Asian Studies, 49(3), 411–427.

Mietzner, M. (2020). Populist Azariah: Jokowi's Long Decade in Power and the Threat to Democracy. In T. Power & E. Warburton (Eds.), Democracy in Indonesia: From Stagnation to Regression? (pp. 49–72). Singapore: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute.

Mueller, R. S. (2019). Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election. Washington, DC: United States Department of Justice.

Norris, P. (2014). Why Electoral Integrity Matters. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pariser, E. (2011). The Filter Bubble: What the Internet Is Hiding from You. London: Penguin Press.

Reporters Without Borders. (2020). The Chilling Effect: Online Abuse and Self-Censorship of UK Journalists. Paris: RSF.

Reporters Without Borders. (2022). World Press Freedom Index 2022. Paris: RSF.

Runciman, D. (2018). How Democracy Ends. London: Profile Books.

Sukma Ridwan, A. (2020). Implementasi UU ITE dalam Kasus Penyebaran Hoaks: Analisis Kritis [Implementation of the ITE Law in Hoax Dissemination Cases: A Critical Analysis]. Jurnal Hukum dan Peradilan, 9(2), 201–225.

Sunstein, C. R. (2017). #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Tapsell, R. (2017). Media Power in Indonesia: Oligarchs, Citizens and the Digital Revolution. London: Rowman & Littlefield.

Vosoughi, S., Roy, D., & Aral, S. (2018). The Spread of True and False News Online. Science, 359(6380), 1146–1151.

Wahyudi, M. (2021). Chilling Effect: Buzzer Attacks on Investigative Journalists in Indonesia [Doctoral thesis, University of Melbourne]. Melbourne: University of Melbourne.

Wardle, C., & Derakhshan, H. (2017). Information Disorder: Toward an Interdisciplinary Framework for Research and Policy Making. Strasbourg: Council of Europe.

We Are Social & Hootsuite. (2023). Digital 2023: Indonesia Country Report. London: We Are Social.

Woolley, S., & Howard, P. N. (Eds.). (2019). Computational Propaganda: Political Parties, Politicians, and Political Manipulation on Social Media. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Note: This essay has been written as an academic analysis drawing upon verifiable scholarly sources. All references cited are published works accessible through academic libraries or international journal databases. Indonesian-language sources are cited in their original titles with English translations provided in brackets.

[Part 1]

Bahasa

Buzzer Politics in Indonesia (1)

The phenomenon of political buzzers has emerged as one of the most significant threats to democratic integrity in the digital age. Buzzers—individuals or networks paid to disseminate particular political narratives on a mass scale across social media—operate by exploiting the architecture of digital platforms in order to manipulate public opinion. This essay analyses the dangers of buzzers in politics from two principal perspectives: first, a global perspective grounded in comparative and theoretical research findings; and second, the particular case of Indonesia, which has become one of the foremost epicentres of this phenomenon in South-East Asia. Drawing upon a body of peer-reviewed scholarship, this essay argues that buzzers are not merely a communicative nuisance but a systemic threat that corrupts public epistemology, deepens social polarisation, and undermines the foundational institutions of democratic governance.

THE PERILS OF POLITICAL BUZZERS:

THREATS TO DEMOCRACY AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE

A Global Perspective and the Particular Case of Indonesia

I. INTRODUCTION

Amidst the transformation of political communication accelerated by the digital platform revolution, a new class of actors has emerged whose principal function is to shape public perception on behalf of particular interests. Amongst the most controversial of these actors is the political buzzer—an organised network of accounts and individuals deployed to amplify, distort, or drown out specific narratives in digital public spaces. This is no longer a marginal concern; it has become a strategic instrument in the contest for power across numerous countries, not least Indonesia.

In the context of Indonesian political life, the term 'buzzer' refers to individuals or groups—whether real persons or automated accounts (bots)—who operate in a coordinated, remunerated fashion to propagate political messages on behalf of a given client. The term carries strongly pejorative connotations precisely because it involves the manipulation of public opinion through inorganic, non-transparent means, frequently accompanied by the deliberate spread of disinformation.

Research conducted by the Oxford Internet Institute found that organised computational influence operations had been detected in more than 81 countries by 2020, a dramatic increase from 28 countries in 2017. Indonesia featured prominently on this list, particularly in the period surrounding electoral cycles. This finding confirms that buzzers are not an isolated local peculiarity but a global phenomenon following recognisable patterns across diverse political contexts.

This essay is structured as follows: first, a theoretical framework concerning buzzers and the manipulation of public opinion; second, the dangers of buzzers from a global perspective; third, an in-depth analysis of the Indonesian case; and fourth, implications for policy and democracy. Each argument is supported by references to relevant scholarly literature, including Computational Propaganda by Samuel Woolley and Philip N. Howard, Voxpol research, and the work of Indonesian and Indonesia-focused scholars such as Ross Tapsell and others.

II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: BUZZERS, COMPUTATIONAL PROPAGANDA, AND THE MANIPULATION OF OPINION

2.1 Defining the Political Buzzer

In the academic literature, the political buzzer is intimately related to the broader concept of 'astroturfing'—the practice of fabricating the appearance of organic public support for a political position, when that support is in reality manufactured and contrived. This concept was first brought to wider scholarly attention by Beder (1998) in her work on the public relations industry and corporate propaganda.

Woolley and Howard (2019), in their edited volume Computational Propaganda: Political Parties, Politicians, and Political Manipulation on Social Media, define computational propaganda as the use of algorithms, automation, and big data to manipulate public opinion. Buzzers represent the human-centred component of this ecosystem, operating alongside bots (automated accounts) to produce a more convincing effect, since human interaction is considerably harder for platforms to detect.

In Indonesia, research by Ika Idris and Inayah Rohmaniyah (2021) conceptualises buzzers as 'cyber troops' operating within a structured ecosystem of political communication: there are clients (politicians or parties), brokers (digital consultants), and operational foot soldiers (the buzzers themselves). This structure reflects what Bradshaw and Howard (2019) term 'organised social media manipulation' in their annual report, The Global Disinformation Order: 2019 Global Inventory of Organised Social Media Manipulation.

The distinction between a digital consultant and a political consultant lies primarily in their focus and expertise. A digital consultant is concerned with guiding organisations through the complexities of digital transformation, which may involve advising on IT infrastructure, cybersecurity, online marketing, and the integration of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence. Their role is to ensure that businesses remain competitive and resilient in an increasingly digital economy. By contrast, a political consultant is dedicated to shaping electoral strategies, managing campaigns, crafting political messaging, and influencing public opinion. Their expertise is rooted in political science, communications, and the psychology of voter behaviour rather than in technological systems.

It is certainly possible for a political consultant to assume the role of a digital consultant, particularly in the context of digital campaigning. Modern politics is inseparable from digital platforms, and consultants who specialise in elections often employ social media analytics, targeted advertising, and online reputation management as part of their toolkit. However, while there is overlap, the breadth of digital consultancy in corporate or governmental contexts extends far beyond electoral politics, requiring technical and business acumen that not all political consultants possess.

On the international stage, firms such as Accenture, Deloitte, and McKinsey are widely recognised for their digital consulting services, offering comprehensive strategies for digital transformation across industries. In the realm of political consulting, Precision Strategies in the United States and Eurasia Group, which operates globally, are prominent examples, known for their sophisticated campaign management and geopolitical risk analysis. Within Indonesia, companies such as BINAR Tech Consulting and Arfadia have established themselves as leaders in digital consultancy, focusing on AI-driven solutions and digital marketing. Meanwhile, political consultancy in Indonesia is represented by firms such as Wamesa Consulting and Aristoteles Consults, which provide campaign strategy, public policy advice, and media management tailored to the local political landscape.

Political consultants today cannot afford to ignore the digital sphere, and many have integrated digital strategies into the very heart of their practice. In electoral contexts, this often means using social media platforms not merely as channels of communication but as tools for micro‑targeting specific voter groups. Consultants employ data analytics to identify voter preferences, track sentiment, and adjust messaging in real time. Online advertising, influencer partnerships, and coordinated digital campaigns are now as central to political consultancy as traditional canvassing or television appearances once were. In addition, consultants increasingly manage candidates’ online reputations, ensuring that narratives circulating on Twitter, TikTok, or Instagram align with broader campaign goals. In short, digital strategies have transformed political consultancy into a hybrid discipline that blends political science with digital marketing and technological expertise.

When comparing international practices with those in Indonesia, several differences emerge. Internationally, particularly in the United States and Europe, political consultancy has become highly professionalised, with firms such as Precision Strategies or GMMB offering sophisticated services that combine polling, media strategy, and digital campaigning. These firms often operate with large teams of specialists, including data scientists, behavioural psychologists, and digital marketers, reflecting the scale and resources of global campaigns. In Indonesia, by contrast, political consultancy tends to be more personalised and closely tied to local networks. Firms such as Wamesa Consulting or Aristoteles Consults focus on building grassroots connections, navigating local political cultures, and managing relationships with media outlets. While digital strategies are increasingly important in Indonesia—especially given the country’s high social media usage—the approach often blends modern digital tools with traditional methods of persuasion, such as community engagement and patronage networks. This hybrid model reflects Indonesia’s unique political landscape, where digital campaigning must resonate with both urban, tech‑savvy voters and rural communities with different expectations of political communication.

2.2 Information Ecology Theory and Epistemic Pollution

The dangers posed by buzzers may be usefully apprehended through the lens of information ecology theory. Floridi (2014), in The Fourth Revolution: How the Infosphere Is Reshaping Human Reality, argues that we inhabit an 'infosphere'—an informational environment that fundamentally shapes how we understand reality. When the infosphere is contaminated by false narratives and deliberate manipulation, the capacity of human beings to make rational decisions—including political decisions—is gravely degraded.

This argument is reinforced by Wardle and Derakhshan (2017), who, in their influential report for the Council of Europe, Information Disorder: Toward an Interdisciplinary Framework for Research and Policy Making, distinguish between three categories of information disorder: misinformation (error without malicious intent), disinformation (error with malicious intent), and malinformation (accurate information deployed to cause harm). Buzzers operate across all three categories simultaneously, rendering them potent agents of epistemic disorder.

III. THE DANGERS OF BUZZERS: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

3.1 The Erosion of Public Trust in Institutions

One of the most fundamental dangers posed by buzzers is the erosion of public trust in democratic institutions: the media, electoral bodies, government, and even the scientific community. The Edelman Trust Barometer (2022) reported that trust in the mainstream media had fallen to the lowest point in the survey's history, with only 42 per cent of global respondents expressing confidence in media organisations. Researchers have attributed this decline in significant part to the proliferation of disinformation propagated by actors such as buzzers.

Vosoughi, Roy, and Aral (2018), in a landmark study published in the journal Science, demonstrated that false news spreads six times faster than accurate reporting on Twitter. Their study encompassed the analysis of more than 126,000 rumours disseminated by three million users between 2006 and 2017. These findings are directly pertinent to the modus operandi of buzzers: they exploit the algorithmic tendency of platforms to prioritise emotionally provocative content, and deliberately fabricated stories more readily satisfy this criterion.

 

3.2 Polarisation and Social Fragmentation

Buzzers actively exacerbate political polarisation by exploiting and deepening existing ideological divisions within society. Sunstein (2017), in #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media, argues that social media creates 'echo chambers'—spaces in which individuals are exposed only to views consonant with their pre-existing beliefs. Buzzers intensify this effect by actively pushing divisive content into these filter bubbles.

Pariser (2011), in The Filter Bubble: What the Internet Is Hiding from You, had already cautioned that the algorithmic personalisation of digital platforms produces epistemic isolation. Buzzers exploit and compound this dynamic: by targeting specific population segments with tailored messaging (microtargeting), they do not merely deepen existing divisions but actively manufacture new fault lines within the body politic.

The case study of the United States in the 2016 Presidential Election, and the role of Russia's Internet Research Agency (IRA) in the coordinated dissemination of divisive content, has been extensively documented by the Mueller Report (2019) and the Senate Intelligence Committee. This operation demonstrated how buzzers and foreign influence operations can exploit pre-existing social vulnerabilities to maximise polarisation—not necessarily to support any particular candidate, but to corrode social cohesion as an end in itself.

 

3.3 Threats to Free and Fair Elections

The phrase free and fair elections refers to a democratic process in which citizens are able to cast their votes without intimidation, coercion, or manipulation, and where the procedures of the election are transparent, impartial, and equitable. It embodies the principle that every individual has an equal right to participate in choosing their representatives, and that the counting and reporting of votes must be conducted honestly so that the outcome reflects the genuine will of the people. In essence, it is the guarantee that democracy is not merely symbolic but operational, ensuring legitimacy for those who govern.

Historically, the idea of free and fair elections emerged from struggles against authoritarianism and exclusion. In the nineteenth century, movements for universal suffrage in Europe and North America laid the groundwork for the principle that elections should be open to all citizens rather than restricted to elites. Following the devastation of the Second World War, the concept was enshrined in international law through the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, which declared that the authority of government must derive from the will of the people expressed in genuine elections. During the wave of decolonisation in Asia and Africa, the United Nations often supervised referenda and elections to ensure that newly independent states were founded on legitimate democratic processes. Later, in the late twentieth century, the collapse of authoritarian regimes in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and parts of Asia reinforced the global expectation that elections must be conducted freely and fairly.

In contemporary practice, however, the phrase remains aspirational as much as descriptive. While many countries hold regular elections, not all meet the standards of freedom and fairness. Issues such as voter suppression, gerrymandering, disinformation campaigns, and manipulation of electoral commissions continue to challenge the integrity of democratic processes. Nevertheless, the principle of free and fair elections remains central to international norms and is upheld by organisations such as the United Nations and the Organisation for Security and Co‑operation in Europe, which monitor elections to safeguard their legitimacy.

The international phrase free and fair elections carries a meaning that is very close to the Indonesian expression pemilu yang jujur dan adil. Both emphasise the principle that elections must take place without intimidation, manipulation, or fraud, and that procedures must be transparent and equitable for all citizens. Their ultimate purpose is the same: to ensure the legitimacy of government through a democratic process that genuinely reflects the will of the people.

Nevertheless, there is a subtle difference in emphasis between the two terms. Free and fair elections usually highlight the broader dimension of political freedom: freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom of the press, and equal access for all candidates. In other words, “free” stresses the openness of the political space, while “fair” underscores procedural justice. In Indonesia, the phrase pemilu yang jujur dan adil places greater weight on the integrity of the voting and counting process, as well as the honesty of electoral officials. The word “jujur” points to morality and integrity, whereas “adil” stresses equality of treatment among participants.

The consequence of this difference in emphasis lies in how elections are monitored and evaluated. If the focus is solely on “honest and fair” in the procedural sense, then broader political freedoms—such as press liberty or the right to organise—may receive less attention. Conversely, if the focus is only on “free and fair” without stressing moral integrity, then technical manipulation or administrative fraud may escape scrutiny. For this reason, combining both perspectives is essential to ensure that elections are not only procedurally valid but also substantively democratic. The difference in emphasis between the international phrase free and fair elections and the Indonesian expression pemilu yang jujur dan adil lies in the nuances of language and the priorities each seeks to highlight.

In the phrase free and fair elections, the word free underscores the broader political freedoms that must exist for an election to be meaningful. This includes freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom of the press, and equal access for all candidates to compete. The word fair then stresses procedural justice, ensuring that the rules are applied impartially, transparently, and without discrimination. Taken together, the phrase points to an open democratic ecosystem in which both rights and procedures are safeguarded.

By contrast, the Indonesian term pemilu yang jujur dan adil places greater emphasis on the integrity and morality of the electoral process. The word jujur highlights honesty in the conduct of elections, particularly in the counting of votes and the sincerity of officials in applying the rules. The word adil stresses equality of treatment for participants, such as equal access to media coverage and impartial behaviour from state institutions. The focus here is more on the ethical and procedural integrity of the election itself, rather than on the wider political freedoms that surround it.

The consequence of this difference in emphasis is that evaluation of elections may vary. If the focus is solely on “honest and fair” procedures, broader freedoms such as press liberty or the right to organise politically may receive less attention. Conversely, if the focus is only on “free and fair” conditions, the moral integrity of election officials and the honesty of vote counting may be overlooked. For this reason, combining both perspectives is essential to ensure that elections are not only procedurally valid but also substantively democratic.

Buzzers represent a direct threat to the integrity of electoral processes. Norris (2014), in Why Electoral Integrity Matters, insists that free and fair elections require, amongst other conditions, an informational environment that is not manipulated—one in which voters can form preferences based on accurate information. Buzzers systematically undermine this precondition.

The Freedom House report Freedom on the Net 2021 found that the online manipulation of content by paid or state-organised actors had occurred in 56 of the 70 countries surveyed. This reflects the phenomenon which Runciman (2018), in How Democracy Ends, identifies as one of the greatest threats to contemporary democracy: no longer the military coup, but the hollowing out of democracy from within through the manipulation of information and the corruption of its institutions.

 

3.4 Digital Violence and the Silencing of Critical Voices

The dangers posed by buzzers are not confined to the epistemic and electoral dimensions; they also manifest in the form of digital violence. Buzzers are frequently deployed to conduct coordinated attacks against critical voices—journalists, activists, academics, and political opponents—through campaigns of online intimidation, doxxing (the forcible disclosure of personal data), and mass harassment.

The report The Chilling Effect: Online Abuse and Self-Censorship of UK Journalists by Reporters Without Borders (2020) demonstrated how organised online intimidation produces a pervasive chilling effect: victims tend to engage in self-censorship in order to forestall further attacks. When buzzers are employed systematically to silence critical voices, the space for democratic deliberation—which requires the free exchange of ideas—contracts significantly.

IV. THE INDONESIAN CASE: BUZZERS AS A STRUCTURAL PHENOMENON

4.1 Context and the Historical Development of Buzzers in Indonesia

Indonesia is the country with the fourth-largest social media user base in the world, with more than 167 million active users (We Are Social, 2023). This mass penetration of digital platforms, combined with uneven levels of media literacy and weak regulatory frameworks, has created conditions exceptionally conducive to buzzer activity.

Tapsell (2017), in Media Power in Indonesia: Oligarchs, Citizens and the Digital Revolution, charts how Indonesia's media oligarchy not only dominates mainstream media but has also invested in the digital media ecosystem, including buzzer networks. This creates a situation in which information manipulation operates simultaneously at two levels: through the editorial biases of mass media outlets owned by powerful interests, and through the covert operations of buzzers on social media.

Research by Lim (2017), in her article Freedom to Hate: Social Media, Algorithmic Enclaves, and the Rise of Tribal Nationalism in Indonesia published in the journal Critical Asian Studies, demonstrates how Indonesian social media has become an arena of cultural conflict and sectarian nationalism, greatly exacerbated by the presence of buzzers. Lim identifies the 2016–2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election (Pilkada DKI) as an inflexion point at which the use of buzzers and the spread of hoaxes reached an unprecedented scale.

This finding is reinforced by Fossati and Kawamura (2020), who show how religious narratives are instrumentalised through digital channels—including buzzers and messaging apps like WhatsApp—to influence electoral choices. This process not only impacts the outcome of the regional elections but also leaves a deep imprint on the social cohesion of Jakarta and, more broadly, Indonesian society.

Religion in Indonesia has increasingly been instrumentalised through digital channels, with social media buzzers and messaging apps such as WhatsApp amplifying religious narratives for political ends. Scholars such as Fossati, Kawamura, and Mietzner highlight how these practices deepen polarisation, manipulate identity politics, and erode democratic trust.

The digital era has transformed how religion is communicated and politicised in Indonesia. Platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp have become fertile ground for the mobilisation of religious identity. Buzzers—paid or coordinated online accounts—play a central role in amplifying religiously charged messages, often framing political competition in moral or theological terms. This instrumentalisation is not merely spontaneous but systematically organised to shape public opinion and delegitimise opponents.

Messaging apps like WhatsApp are particularly powerful because of their closed, intimate networks, which make content appear more trustworthy. Religious narratives, whether sermons, memes, or doctored news, circulate rapidly in these groups, reinforcing communal identities and creating echo chambers. Fossati and Kawamura argue that this dynamic has allowed political actors to exploit religious sentiment, embedding it into everyday digital interactions.

Scholarly Perspectives

Fossati and Kawamura describe how political elites deploy “authoritarian innovations” by harnessing social media campaigns, including religious rhetoric, to suppress critics and justify policies. This often involves mobilising conservative religious discourses to delegitimise pluralist voices.

Mietzner emphasises that under Jokowi’s presidency, the state both resisted and co‑opted religious mobilisation. While pluralism was promoted, the government also relied on digital campaigns—sometimes infused with religious narratives—to consolidate authority, contributing to democratic backsliding.

Research on buzzer culture shows that religion is instrumentalised as part of identity politics, creating polarisation and normalising toxic practices. Buzzers construct false consensus around religious issues, shaping perceptions of legitimacy and morality in politics.

Consequences

The instrumentalisation of religion through digital channels has several profound effects:

• Polarisation: Religious narratives sharpen divisions between communities, often framing politics as a struggle between “true believers” and “enemies of faith.”
• Manipulation of Identity: Digital campaigns construct and reinforce religious identities, making them central to political loyalty.
• Erosion of Trust: When religion is used as a political weapon, democratic institutions lose credibility, and citizens become more susceptible to misinformation.
• Social Conflict: Amplification of religious issues online contributes to horizontal tensions, threatening social harmony and pluralism.

In short, the work of Fossati, Kawamura, and Mietzner demonstrates that religion in Indonesia’s digital sphere is not merely a matter of faith but a political instrument, wielded through buzzers and messaging apps to consolidate power and shape democratic discourse.

[Part 2]

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