"If every man says all he can. If every man is true. Do I believe the sky above is Caribbean blue?
If all we told was turned to gold. If all we dreamed was new. Imagine sky high above in Caribbean blue."
Access to education refers to every individual's ability to obtain, participate in, and complete formal or non-formal education without significant barriers—whether geographical, economic, social, cultural, or physical. This definition encompasses far more than the mere existence of schools or educational institutions; it also requires affordable costs, ease of transport, the availability of qualified teachers, a relevant curriculum, and inclusivity for all sections of society.
UNESCO defines access to education within a broader framework comprising four dimensions: Availability, Accessibility, Acceptability, and Adaptability — collectively known as the 4-A framework. These four dimensions are interrelated and together constitute an educational system that is genuinely open to all.
Background to the Concept
The notion of access to education as a universal right gained significant momentum in the aftermath of the Second World War. Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, 1948) affirms that 'everyone has the right to education' and that 'elementary education shall be compulsory' and 'free.' This represented one of the first international recognitions that education is not a privilege but a fundamental human right.
Subsequent developments included the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), which reinforced the obligations of states to provide education for children. In 2000, the Dakar World Education Forum produced the Education for All (EFA) framework, setting six global education goals, including free and compulsory primary education for all. These goals were later updated within the Education 2030 Agenda as part of Sustainable Development Goal 4: inclusive and equitable quality education for all.
"Education is the most powerful weapon which you can use to change the world."
— Nelson Mandela
At the national level, many countries have incorporated the right to education into their constitutions. Indonesia itself enshrines in Article 31 of the 1945 Constitution that every citizen has the right to education and that the state is obliged to fund basic education.
The Importance of Access to Education
Broad and equitable access to education yields far-reaching benefits — at the individual, community, and national levels alike. The key dimensions are illustrated below:
ECONOMIC
DIMENSION
+10%
Each
additional year of schooling raises individual earnings by approximately
8–10% on average (World Bank, 2023)
SOCIAL
DIMENSION
↓
Inequality
Countries with
equitable educational access tend to record lower social inequality (lower
Gini coefficients)
DEMOGRAPHIC
DIMENSION
↓
Fertility
Female
education is strongly correlated with declining birth rates and improved
maternal and child health
DEMOCRATIC
DIMENSION
↑
Participation
Educated
populations participate more actively in democratic life and are more
discerning of information
Beyond these statistics, education holds an intrinsic value that is beyond measure: it enables individuals to develop their full human potential, think critically, and lead meaningful, autonomous lives. This is why educational philosophers such as John Dewey maintained that education is not merely preparation for life, but life itself.
Barriers to Access to Education
Despite universal acknowledgement of its importance, access to education continues to face a range of complex structural and contextual barriers:
A. Economic Barriers
• Direct schooling costs (tuition fees, uniforms, textbooks, stationery) that place a burden on low-income families
• Indirect costs: transport, accommodation, and living expenses during tertiary study
• Opportunity cost: for extremely poor families, a child's labour may be economically more valuable than attending school
• Absence of effective scholarship schemes or social assistance mechanisms
B. Geographical and Infrastructural Barriers
• Schools located excessively far from home, particularly in remote areas, archipelagic regions, and mountainous terrain
• Inadequate road conditions and transport links
• Lack of electricity and internet connectivity in many remote areas
• School facilities that are dilapidated or no longer fit for purpose
C. Social and Cultural Barriers
• Gender-based discrimination: In many regions, girls are still placed second in terms of access to education
• Early marriage, which interrupts girls' schooling
• The belief that higher education is unnecessary for children who will inherit the family farm or trade
• Stigma towards children with disabilities and members of minority groups
D. Quality and Relevance Barriers
• A shortage of qualified teachers, particularly in remote areas
• Curricula that are not relevant to local needs or the labour market
• Inadequate learning facilities (libraries, laboratories, internet access)
• High dropout rates even amongst those formally enrolled (nominal access without meaningful education)
Accessible Education and the Question of Free Schooling
Accessible education is far more than simply having a school nearby. It requires a combination of conditions: institutions that are geographically reachable, free of charge or genuinely affordable, of good quality, inclusive to all groups, relevant to the context and needs of learners, and supported by well-trained and highly motivated teachers.
The question of whether education should be free touches on the heart of global public policy debates. There are two principal strands of argument:
Arguments in Favour of Free Education
• Education is a human right; charging fees creates inequitable access
• Public investment in education is proven to yield large long-term economic and social returns
• The world's most advanced nations generally have free or heavily subsidised education systems
Arguments Against (Paid or Cost-Sharing Education)
• Fully free education demands enormous public expenditure
• Risk of quality decline if not accompanied by adequate funding
• A user-fee system with targeted subsidies may be more efficient
• Higher education confers predominantly private benefits, making it reasonable for individuals to bear some of the cost
The current international policy consensus tends towards the view that primary and secondary education must be free of charge, whilst higher education may carry costs, provided there are robust mechanisms—scholarships, subsidised student loans, and cross-subsidies—to ensure no one is excluded on economic grounds.
Countries Where Education Is Free
Some countries have successfully implemented free education at various levels. The comparative overview below illustrates the range of approaches:
Country
Free Level
Notes
Status
Finland
Primary – Higher Education (Bachelor's/Master's)
Includes university; free school lunches and supplies; teachers
hold high professional status
Comprehensive
Germany
Primary – Higher Education
University free at public institutions, including for foreign
students; national tuition fees abolished in 2014
Comprehensive
Norway
Primary – Higher Education
Government scholarships widely available; system underpinned by
high taxation
Comprehensive
Denmark
Primary – Higher Education
Students receive a monthly state stipend (SU grant) to cover
living costs
Comprehensive
Sweden
Primary – Upper Secondary (compulsory); HE subsidised
Higher education free for EU/EEA citizens; comprehensive
facilities
Broad
Brazil
Primary – Upper Secondary (constitutional right)
Federal universities are free; quality gaps persist in remote
regions
Broad
Argentina
Primary – Higher Education
Public universities are free and open-access; quality disparities
between regions remain
Upper secondary heavily subsidised; public universities charge
modest fees with broad scholarships
Primary–Secondary
Singapore
Primary – Upper Secondary (heavily subsidised)
Not entirely free, but subsidies are substantial, making costs
very affordable; world-class quality
Heavily Subsidised
A consistent pattern emerges: the Nordic countries (Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark) represent the world's finest models, offering free education from primary school through to university. This is underpinned by progressive tax systems and a cross-party political commitment to public investment in education.
Access to Education in Indonesia: The Present Reality
Indonesia has recorded significant progress in expanding access to education over the past two decades. The Gross Enrolment Ratio (GER) at primary level is approaching 100 per cent, and a compulsory twelve-year education programme has been formally implemented. The Indonesia Pintar (Smart Indonesia) Programme (PIP) reaches millions of pupils from low-income families, whilst the School Operational Assistance Fund (BOS) enables state schools to operate without charging fees.
Yet behind these seemingly encouraging statistics, the reality on the ground reveals profound disparities. The gap in access between Java and the outer islands, between urban and rural areas, and between wealthy and poor families remains stark and deeply concerning.
UPPER
SECONDARY GER (2023)
~84%
Some 16% of
upper secondary-age adolescents are not accessing upper secondary education
HIGHER
EDUCATION GER
~37%
More than half
of upper secondary school leavers do not proceed to higher education
EDUCATION
BUDGET
20% APBN
Constitutionally
mandated; effectiveness of expenditure remains a subject of scrutiny
PISA
RANKING
Lower
Quartile
Indonesia
consistently ranks in the lower quartile of PISA assessments in literacy,
numeracy, and science
Persistent Critical Challenges
• Quality disparities between regions: schools in Papua, East Nusa Tenggara, and Maluku remain far behind those in Jakarta and Java
• Hidden costs: despite the BOS fund, informal levies and unofficial charges continue to burden low-income families
• Shortage of qualified teachers in remote areas: teacher distribution remains highly uneven
• School dropout rates: particularly at the transition from lower to upper secondary, many pupils leave due to economic pressures or early marriage
• The high cost of higher education: rising Single Tuition Fees (UKT) at public universities are increasingly placing access beyond the reach of lower-middle-income families
• Poor learning outcomes: many pupils attend school but fail to acquire basic competencies (learning poverty)
• Uneven digitalisation: the COVID-19 pandemic laid bare the profound digital divide across the country
Recommendations for Improving Educational Access in Indonesia
Improving access to education in Indonesia requires coordinated systemic reform, not piecemeal policy fixes. The following strategic recommendations are based on global best practice and an analysis of the Indonesian context:
1. Strengthen the Guarantee of Free Primary and Secondary Education
• Eliminate all hidden costs in state primary and lower secondary schools; strengthen enforcement against unofficial levies
• Increase the value and reach of PIP, ensuring funds genuinely reach their intended beneficiaries
• Make state upper secondary and vocational schooling genuinely free in practice, not merely in name
2. Reform Teacher Distribution and Welfare
• Provide significant financial and non-financial incentives for teachers willing to serve in remote and underserved areas (3T regions)
• Resolve the situation of contract teachers (guru honorer) by providing an appropriate status and fair remuneration
• Strengthen pre-service teacher education and training to meet modern pedagogical standards
3. Educational Infrastructure in Remote Areas
• Accelerate the construction and rehabilitation of school buildings outside Java, especially in Papua and East Nusa Tenggara
• Build student boarding facilities (asrama) in areas with severely limited transport access
• Expand rural internet programmes and provide digital devices to schools in remote locations
4. Address Social and Cultural Barriers
• Strengthen early marriage prevention programmes through education, law enforcement, and family empowerment
• Enhance inclusive education programmes for children with disabilities and special educational needs
• Engage community and customary leaders in campaigns on the importance of education in areas with strong cultural resistance
5. Reform Higher Education Funding
• Apply a genuinely progressive Single Tuition Fee (UKT) system based on the real economic capacity of students' families
• Expand affirmative scholarship programmes (KIP-Kuliah) and ensure they reach the right recipients
• Develop a low-interest student loan (income-contingent repayment) scheme as a safety net for those who fall outside scholarship coverage
6. Focus on Learning Quality, Not Merely Formal Access
• Reform the curriculum to be more relevant, competency-based, and adaptive to local needs
• Build a national assessment system that measures genuine competence rather than rote learning
• Invest more substantially in early literacy and early childhood education (PAUD) as the foundation for all subsequent learning
Analysis: Should Education Be Free Today?
This is a question that appears simple yet conceals considerable complexity. The answer cannot be uniform across all levels of education; it must account for the fiscal, social, and philosophical context, as well as the very purpose of education itself.
Primary and Secondary Education: Yes, It Should Be Free
There is no sufficiently compelling argument for charging fees at the primary and secondary levels. This stage of education is the foundation of human development, a prerequisite for participation in modern society, and a constitutional obligation of the state. Any charge at this level—whether direct or indirect—is statistically proven to increase dropout rates, particularly amongst the poorest families. Every country that ranks among the world's most advanced and economically competitive guarantees this level of education free of charge. Indonesia is constitutionally mandated to do the same; what requires improvement is the implementation and oversight of this commitment.
Higher Education: Free, With Important Caveats
Higher education does confer benefits that are more private in nature, lending some weight to the cost-sharing argument. However, in the Indonesian context—where economic inequality is severe and upward social mobility through education is critically important—excessively costly higher education is tantamount to closing the door on the majority of citizens. The best solution is not 'entirely free for all,' but rather: free or very low-cost for those in genuine need (the bottom 60–70 per cent economically), subsidised for the middle class, and proportionate for those who can afford to pay. This model has been applied successfully in Germany and the Nordic countries.
"The question is not whether free education is expensive—the question is: how great a price do we pay when people are left uneducated?"
From a public economics standpoint, investment in education is among the highest-yielding social investments available. Every pound—or rupiah—invested in quality education returns manifold, in the form of productivity, improved health, social cohesion, and national capacity for innovation. A state that is parsimonious in its investment in education ultimately pays a far higher price, in the form of poverty, crime, social dependency, and economic stagnation.
One crucial condition must be met: free education is only meaningful if quality is maintained. Free but poor-quality education is a double tragedy—it squanders public resources whilst simultaneously closing off opportunity for learners. This is the most important lesson from the failure of many free education programmes in developing countries: quantity without quality yields no progress.
Summary of Analysis
• Primary and secondary education: must be entirely free, including indirect costs that continue to burden low-income families
• Higher education: free or heavily subsidised for those in need; proportionate for those who can afford it; accompanied by robust scholarship and student loan mechanisms
• The key to success lies not in the 'free versus paid' debate, but in quality, equitable access, and the effective use of the education budget
• Indonesia requires stronger political will, more rigorous oversight, and structural reform — not merely increased expenditure without clear direction
References and Sources
This essay draws upon UNESCO education policy frameworks, World Bank reports, Indonesian Central Statistics Agency (BPS) data, and comparative analysis of global education systems. Primary references: UNESCO Education for All Global Monitoring Report; World Bank Human Capital Index 2023; OECD Education at a Glance 2023; Indonesian Constitution (UUD 1945), Article 31; Law No. 20 of 2003 on the National Education System. Statistical figures are indicative and may differ from the most recent official data.
The co-operative is one of the oldest forms of economic organisation in the history of human civilisation. Long before modern nation-states defined it in juridical terms, the spirit of co-operation—working together, sharing risk, and distributing the fruits of labour equitably—had already become a collective instinct of human communities. From farming communes in Europe to fishing villages in South-East Asia, the principle of mutual assistance has sustained those most vulnerable to the pressures of market forces.
In Indonesia, this concept is deeply rooted in indigenous cultural values: gotong royong (communal co-operation), tepo seliro (empathy for others), and mufakat (deliberation and consensus). When the founding fathers of the nation set out to define the economic foundations of independent Indonesia, the co-operative was accorded a privileged place even in the constitution itself—Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution explicitly states that the national economy shall be organised on the basis of collective endeavour founded upon the principle of kinship.
This essay traces the long journey of the co-operative—from its origins in Europe and across the globe, to its establishment on Indonesian soil, the vicissitudes of the New Order era, and finally to the fresh vision of President Prabowo Subianto through the Koperasi Desa/Kelurahan Merah Putih (Red and White Village and Urban Ward Co-operative) programme. The essay also analyses two controversial issues that have accompanied the implementation of that programme: the procurement of imported vehicles from India, and the purchase of electric motorcycles for the Nutrition Service Units (SPPG).
THE CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT
From Global Roots to Indonesia’s Koperasi Merah Putih:
History, Challenges, and the Prospects for Indonesia’s Future
I. THE CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT WORLDWIDE
A. Origins and the Birth of the Modern Co-operative Movement
The modern co-operative movement was born from the suffering of workers and farmers under the Industrial Revolution in early nineteenth-century Britain. Harsh social conditions—low wages, long working hours, and the monopoly of distribution by large traders—drove a group of textile workers in Rochdale, Lancashire, to seek a collective remedy.
In 1844, twenty-eight factory workers in Rochdale founded what would become known as the Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers. They set aside one pound sterling each week to build a collectively owned shop selling everyday necessities at fair prices. Their endeavour gave rise to seven foundational principles that remain the universal reference point of the co-operative movement to this day: open membership; democratic governance (one member, one vote); distribution of surplus according to participation; provision of education for members; and political neutrality.
The Rochdale model spread rapidly. In Germany, Friedrich Wilhelm Raiffeisen founded rural credit co-operatives in 1864, which became the global template for savings-and-loan co-operatives. Hermann Schulze-Delitzsch had earlier established urban credit co-operatives in 1849. In France, Charles Gide developed the theory and practice of consumer co-operatives. In Denmark and the Scandinavian countries, agricultural co-operatives flourished and became the backbone of national economies.
In Scandinavia, agricultural and consumer co-operatives dominate national economies. Denmark exports dairy and pork products on a vast scale through farmers’ co-operatives. Finland’s consumer co-operative network (S Group) commands over forty per cent of the national retail market.
Japan possesses an exceptionally robust agricultural co-operative system through JA (Japan Agricultural Co-operatives), which serves virtually all Japanese farmers in the marketing of produce, the procurement of inputs, and the provision of financial services. South Korea and Taiwan similarly developed strong agricultural co-operatives that served as vital instruments of rural modernisation after the Second World War.
In South Asia, Bangladesh is renowned for the Grameen Bank founded by Muhammad Yunus—a group-based financial institution imbued with the co-operative spirit, serving millions of impoverished women through unsecured micro-credit. This model inspired inclusive finance movements worldwide and earned Yunus the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006.
C. International Co-operative Organisations
The International Co-operative Alliance (ICA), established in 1895, serves as the global umbrella body for the co-operative movement. Headquartered in Brussels, the ICA brings together more than 310 member organisations from 110 countries, representing over one billion co-operative members worldwide. The ICA also formulates and periodically revises the Co-operative Principles that serve as the universal benchmark. In 2012, the United Nations designated it the International Year of Co-operatives, in recognition of the co-operative movement’s contribution to sustainable development.
II. THE CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT IN INDONESIA
A. Historical Background and Indigenous Roots
The seeds of the co-operative in Indonesia had in truth already been sown long before independence. The values of gotong royong, the arisan (rotating savings circle), and the communal lumbung desa (village grain barn) had long constituted a system of communal economy alive in virtually every ethnic community across the archipelago. The sasi system of Maluku, the subak irrigation co-operatives of Bali, the lumbung pitih nagari of Minangkabau, and the julo-julo of various other regions were all indigenous proto-co-operatives of Indonesia.
In the colonial era, the modern co-operative was introduced by Raden Aria Wiriatmadja, a regent’s deputy (patih) in Purwokerto, who in 1896 established a Hulp en Spaarbank (‘Bank of Mutual Aid and Savings’) to assist civil servants ensnared by moneylenders. This initiative is regarded as the founding milestone of the co-operative movement in Indonesia. A Dutch official, Dr Wolff van Westerrode, subsequently developed the institution into the Hulp-Spaar-en Landbouwkredietbanken (Bank of Mutual Aid, Savings, and Agricultural Credit).
During the nationalist movement, organisations such as Sarekat Islam and Budi Utomo established co-operatives as part of their economic struggle against colonial capitalism. The movement’s leaders saw the co-operative not merely as an economic tool but as a medium for democratic education and the empowerment of a colonised people.
B. The Conceptual Framework of Indonesian Co-operatives
Bung Hatta—widely revered as the Father of the Indonesian Co-operative—formulated the conception of the co-operative in a manner more profound and contextually attuned to Indonesian realities. For Hatta, the co-operative was not simply an economic institution but a socio-economic movement rooted in the communal and mutually supportive character of the Indonesian people. He envisaged the co-operative as the chief pillar (soko guru) of the national economy—an alternative to both exploitative liberal capitalism and communism that denied individual freedom.
Hatta distinguished the Indonesian co-operative from its Western counterparts. He emphasised that a co-operative must spring from the genuine needs of the community, not from abstract ideology. ‘The co-operative is a joint enterprise to improve economic livelihoods on the basis of mutual assistance,’ he wrote. It is that spirit of mutual assistance which motivates people to join together, not the profit motive alone.
Article 33(1) of the 1945 Constitution affirms that ‘the economy shall be organised as a collective endeavour based on the principle of kinship.’ According to Hatta, this formulation is the constitutional expression of the co-operative ideal. The state does not merely permit co-operatives; it is constitutionally obliged to construct an economy that is co-operative in nature.
C. The Objectives of Co-operative Development in Indonesia
The objectives of co-operative development in Indonesia—as enshrined in successive legislation from the first Co-operatives Act (Law No. 79 of 1958) through to Law No. 25 of 1992—have been consistently directed towards several core aims. First, to improve the welfare of members in particular and society at large. Second, to contribute to the construction of a national economic order in furtherance of an advanced, just, and prosperous society founded upon Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. Third, to strengthen the bargaining position of small-scale producers—farmers, fishermen, artisans, and petty traders—who are individually weak, so that they may compete collectively in the marketplace. Fourth, to broaden community access to capital, technology, markets, and information that have hitherto been monopolised by large capital interests.
In practical terms, co-operatives are expected to shorten distribution chains, reduce production costs, improve prices received by members’ produce, and provide goods and services at more affordable prices. In short, the co-operative serves as a mechanism for the fairer redistribution of added value than the free market, which tends to favour large capital.
III. CO-OPERATIVES IN THE NEW ORDER ERA
A. New Order Government Policy Towards Co-operatives
The New Order era (1966–1998) was a deeply paradoxical period for the Indonesian co-operative movement. On the one hand, the Soeharto government formally designated the co-operative as one of the pillars of the national economy, disbursing various development programmes and financial assistance. On the other hand, the policies it pursued systematically undermined the spirit and independence of the co-operative.
In 1967, the New Order government enacted Law No. 12 of 1967 on the Fundamentals of Co-operativism. In 1978, a Department of Co-operatives was established and later elevated to a full ministry. Various programmes were launched: the Co-operative Business Credit (KUK), the Village Unit Enterprise (BUUD), and subsequently the Village Unit Co-operative (KUD).
The KUD—conceived in 1973 and strengthened through Presidential Instruction No. 2 of 1978—became the most ambitious co-operative programme of the New Order. A single KUD was established in every sub-district (kecamatan), intended to serve as the distribution centre for agricultural inputs, the collection point for harvests, and the provider of credit for farmers. The government allocated substantial funds and granted KUDs various monopoly rights: the exclusive right to distribute subsidised fertiliser, the right to procure rice for the National Logistics Board (Bulog), and the right to distribute other basic necessities.
B. Factors Behind the Failure of New Order Co-operatives
Despite appearing impressive on paper, New Order co-operatives—particularly the KUDs—ultimately suffered widespread failure. The causes were multidimensional and interwoven.
1. Excessive Political Interference
Co-operatives under the New Order lost their autonomy by becoming instruments of government policy. Management committees were often appointed by local officials rather than elected democratically by members. Co-operative activities were directed to support government programmes—particularly the Bimas (Mass Guidance) agricultural intensification and food self-sufficiency drives—so that members’ interests became secondary. The co-operative was transformed from a democratic economic organisation into an extension of the bureaucracy.
2. Corruption and Mismanagement
The flood of government funds channelled into co-operatives, unaccompanied by adequate oversight mechanisms, created fertile ground for corruption. Unaccountable committee members used co-operative funds for private gain. Non-performing loans accumulated because of lax credit appraisal and politically motivated disbursements. Many KUDs ultimately existed only on paper.
3. Dependence on Subsidies and Monopolies
A healthy co-operative ought to grow through its ability to serve members competitively. Yet New Order KUDs subsisted on government subsidies and monopoly rights. When those monopolies were rescinded—particularly under pressure from the International Monetary Fund following the 1997 financial crisis—KUDs lost their source of sustenance and collapsed. This dependency fostered a culture of reliance that was diametrically opposed to the spirit of self-reliance that should have constituted the co-operative’s soul.
4. Inadequate Human Resource Capacity
Co-operative management positions were generally filled by individuals appointed on grounds of political proximity rather than competence. The absence of training and co-operative education resulted in amateurish governance. Members were never educated to understand their rights and obligations, so that democratic control from below—the very heart of co-operative democracy—never functioned effectively.
5. Rigid and Bureaucratic Regulation
New Order co-operative regulation was top-down, rigid, and heavily bureaucratic. Establishing a co-operative required navigating a long series of procedures involving numerous government agencies. Innovation and member initiative were stifled by uniform rules that took no account of the diversity of local conditions. As a result, co-operatives were unable to adapt to the ever-changing genuine needs of the communities they were meant to serve.
6. The Legacy of Stigma Following Widespread Failure
The mass failure of New Order co-operatives left a deep stigma in public consciousness. The word ‘co-operative’ became synonymous with an institution that was inefficient, corrupt, and of benefit only to its committee members. This stigma became a serious psychological barrier to co-operative development in the reformasi era. Changing public perception proved as difficult as reforming the institutions themselves.
C. Post-New Order Co-operatives: A Faltering Reform
Post-New Order governments endeavoured to rebuild the co-operative ecosystem with renewed vigour. Law No. 25 of 1992, replacing its predecessor, sought to grant greater autonomy to co-operatives and to reduce government interference. Various revitalisation programmes were launched, yet the results remained disappointing. Co-operatives continued to lag behind state enterprises and private companies in their contribution to the national GDP.
One fundamental problem was that co-operative reform proceeded without a comprehensive ecosystem strategy. Regulation changes were not matched by adequate investment in human resource capacity, improved access to capital, or the development of business networks among co-operatives. As a result, successful co-operatives emerged sporadically here and there, but were unable to coalesce into a meaningful national movement.
IV. THE PROSPECTS FOR THE MERAH PUTIH CO-OPERATIVE
A. Background and Conception
President Prabowo Subianto responded to the challenges facing the co-operative movement with an act of considerable boldness and ambition. At a retreat for regional heads at the Military Academy in Magelang in February 2025, Prabowo first articulated the idea of establishing village co-operatives as an instrument of food security. This idea was crystallised at a Cabinet meeting at the State Palace on 3 March 2025, where the launch of 80,000 village and urban ward co-operatives under the name Koperasi Desa/Kelurahan Merah Putih (‘Red and White Village and Ward Co-operatives’) was announced.
Prabowo employed a powerful analogy to explain the philosophy of his programme. ‘A co-operative is like a palm leaf rib,’ he said in his address at the launch on 21 July 2025 in Klaten, Central Java. ‘A single rib has no strength worth speaking of, but if hundreds are gathered and bound together, they become a formidable force capable of sweeping away the economic problems of the people.’ He also declared that ‘the co-operative is a great home for the small, so that they may stand as tall and sit as low as anyone else.’
B. Structure and Mechanisms of the Programme
The legal foundations of the programme are formally robust. The government issued Presidential Instruction No. 9 of 2025 on the Acceleration of the Formation of the Merah Putih Co-operative on 27 March 2025, subsequently reinforced by Presidential Instruction No. 17 of 2025 on the Acceleration of the Physical Construction of Retail Outlets, Warehousing, and Equipment for the Merah Putih Co-operative, issued on 22 October 2025.
Each Merah Putih Co-operative is designed to operate six business units: a basic necessities shop, a savings-and-loan unit, a village pharmacy, a village clinic, a storage warehouse, and a logistics fleet. The concept is highly ambitious—the co-operative is not merely a collective shop but a complete service ecosystem at the village level. In addition, the co-operative is designed to process payments for PLN electricity bills and various other community needs.
In terms of financing, each co-operative is allocated approximately Rp 3 billion, channelled through PT Agrinas Pangan Nusantara—a state enterprise appointed by the government as the implementing body. The budget is drawn from multiple sources: the state budget (APBN), General Allocation Funds, Revenue-Sharing Funds, Village Funds, and loans from state-owned banks (Himbara) with a tenor of six years. The Ministry of Finance estimates annual loan repayments of approximately Rp 40 trillion over the ensuing six years.
On 21 July 2025—coinciding with the 78th National Co-operative Day—President Prabowo formally launched the institutional framework of 80,081 Koperasi Desa/Kelurahan Merah Putih simultaneously across the whole of Indonesia. The launch, centred on the village of Bentangan in Wonosari Sub-district, Klaten Regency, Central Java, was attended virtually by all regional heads throughout the archipelago.
C. Potential and Grounds for Optimism
If properly managed, the Merah Putih Co-operative has the potential to become a major breakthrough in the development of the Indonesian rural economy. Several reasons for optimism merit consideration.
First, the sheer scale of the programme— 80,000 units reaching virtually every village and ward across Indonesia—creates a distribution network of a kind never previously established. This network has the potential to break the distribution chains that have long been exploited by middlemen and large retailers, allowing farmers to receive better prices whilst consumers pay less.
Second, the integrated business model encompassing six units gives each co-operative the capacity to serve the comprehensive needs of village communities. Village pharmacies and clinics, for instance, address the demand for basic healthcare that has long been beyond the reach of many rural communities.
Third, the programme is aligned with the constitutional aspiration of Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution and with the sixth pillar of the Asta Cita vision of the Prabowo-Gibran administration, namely to strengthen equitable and inclusive economic growth and to alleviate poverty through the strengthening of rural economic institutions.
D. Challenges and Risks That Must Be Anticipated
Behind this optimism, some serious risks warrant careful attention lest the programme repeat the failures of co-operatives past.
First, managerial risk. The success of a co-operative depends critically upon the quality of its management and committee members. With 80,000 co-operative units required to become operational in a short space of time, the availability of competent human resources poses a formidable question. Intensive and sustained training and mentoring programmes are absolutely essential.
Second, governance risk and corruption. The very large sums of money involved—estimated at over Rp 240 trillion spread across 80,000 locations—present a serious risk of corruption and misappropriation. Various public policy observers have estimated that potential budgetary leakage could amount to trillions of rupiah. Transparent reporting systems, regular independent audits, and effective public complaint mechanisms must be built in from the outset.
Third, risk of overlap with existing village programmes. The Village Fund, which has flowed to villages since 2015, has its own governance framework and mechanisms. Reports that a portion of the Merah Putih Co-operative budget was drawn from cuts to Village Fund allocations of as much as seventy per cent have provoked protests from village heads. Synchronisation with existing systems constitutes a formidable task.
Fourth, sustainability risk. Co-operatives constructed with externally supplied ‘top-down’ capital are prone to becoming unsustainable once the flow of government funds ceases. A healthy co-operative must grow from the genuine ownership and active participation of its members. The programme must ensure that, in the long run, management of the co-operative is genuinely transferred into the hands of the village community.
V. THE PROCUREMENT CONTROVERSIES
A. Importing Pick-Up Trucks from India: Between Efficiency and the ‘Buy Indonesian’ Principle
One of the most contentious issues accompanying the implementation of the Merah Putih Co-operative programme has been the decision by PT Agrinas Pangan Nusantara to import pick-up trucks from India. The matter first came to light through an announcement by the Indian automotive company Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. on 4 February 2026, stating that it would supply 35,000 units of the Scorpio Pick-Up to Agrinas for the Koperasi Desa/Kelurahan Merah Putih project.
The total number of vehicles to be imported subsequently proved far larger. PT Agrinas confirmed the procurement of 160,000 vehicles from various countries—approximately 24,500 units from Japan and China, whilst the remainder, roughly 135,500 units, originated from India. On 30 March 2026, Minister of Co-operatives Ferry Juliantono confirmed that 105,000 vehicles imported from India had already begun to be distributed incrementally to co-operative units that had completed their physical construction. The total procurement cost was estimated at Rp 24.66 trillion.
The choice of imported Indian vehicles provoked widespread controversy. The national automotive industry association GAIKINDO maintained that the domestic industry was in fact capable of meeting the demand for pick-up trucks in question. Wuling Motors, for instance, announced its readiness to offer light commercial vehicles manufactured locally in Indonesia.
The Government’s Case
PT Agrinas President Director Joao Angelo De Sousa Mota offered two principal justifications for the decision to import. First, a technical argument: four-wheel-drive pick-up trucks were considered more suitable for the challenging road conditions found in many of Indonesia’s rural areas. Second, an availability argument: total national vehicle production at the time was only approximately 70,000 units per year, far short of what would be needed to equip 80,000 co-operatives simultaneously. ‘If we were to add to that and buy 70,000 from the market, there simply would not be the stock,’ Joao explained. The government also stated that, going forward, the procurement of operational vehicles would prioritise the domestic automotive industry.
Criticism and Controversy
Many observers nonetheless considered the decision to be contradictory. Whilst President Prabowo had been vigorously championing the use of domestic products—he had even inaugurated the VKTR electric bus and truck factory in Magelang—his own flagship programme was choosing to import on a massive scale. This was viewed as an ambiguous signal that undermined public confidence in his economic nationalism policy.
From a macroeconomic perspective, the import of vehicles worth tens of trillions of rupiah risked exacerbating the national budget deficit, which in 2025 had already reached Rp 695.1 trillion, or 2.92 per cent of GDP—approaching the statutory ceiling of three per cent. Economists warned that if large-scale programmes such as the Free Nutritious Meals (MBG), the Merah Putih Co-operative, and the People’s Schools continued to be executed without adequate efficiency measures, the deficit could breach the limit, compelling the government to seek financing that might trigger inflation and interest rate increases.
A further criticism concerned the appropriateness of the procurement: a number of co-operatives already operating independently—such as Kopdes Penfui Timur in East Nusa Tenggara, which was named as a national model co-operative—stated that what they most needed was additional working capital and strengthened human resources, not operational vehicles.
The controversy deepened when it emerged that the procurement process employed direct appointment mechanisms opened by the Presidential Instruction, rather than a competitive tender. The transparency of the procurement process remained an unanswered question.
B. The Procurement of Electric Motorcycles for SPPG Heads: Between Regulatory Obligation and Budgetary Efficiency
Almost simultaneously with the controversy over the Indian vehicle imports, the public was exercised by reports of the procurement of electric motorcycles for the heads of the Nutrition Service Units (SPPG)—the technical implementing units of the Free Nutritious Meals (MBG) programme at the grassroots level. Early reports circulating in social media cited a figure of 70,000 units, which immediately provoked widespread outrage.
The National Nutrition Agency (BGN) subsequently issued an official clarification. BGN Chief Dadan Hindayana stated that the figure of 70,000 units was inaccurate. Actual procurement amounted to 21,801 units out of a total of 25,000 units planned under the 2025 procurement programme. The chosen vehicle was the Emmo JVX GT—an adventure-style electric motorcycle manufactured domestically by PT Yasa Artha Trimanunggal, with a Local Content Level (TKDN) of 48.5 per cent and a ground clearance of 320 mm.
The price of Rp 42 million per unit attracted debate—all the more so given that this was far removed from the affordable electric motorcycles familiar to the general public. However, the BGN explained that this price was in fact below the market price of Rp 52 million, had been negotiated through the government’s e-catalogue procurement system (LKPP), and was grounded in Presidential Instruction No. 7 of 2022, which mandates the use of electric vehicles as official government transportation.
Clarification from the Ministry of Finance
Finance Minister Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa had stated that the budget application for the motorcycles had in fact been rejected the previous year, since the government wished to focus expenditure directly on food provision rather than on supporting operational vehicles. ‘Our focus is on how funds reach the children’s plates,’ said Purbaya. This statement revealed a significant internal lack of synchronisation between government ministries and agencies—a matter that deserves serious attention with regard to inter-agency budget co-ordination.
Policy Analysis
The SPPG electric motorcycle controversy in reality reflects a deeper tension in the governance of the government’s priority programmes. At least three aspects merit particular scrutiny.
First, transparency and accountability. Large-scale procurement processes that are not proactively communicated to the public generate information readily susceptible to misinterpretation, thereby eroding trust. Better public communication could prevent the unnecessary escalation of controversies.
Second, expenditure priorities. In an era of tight fiscal pressure, every item of government expenditure must pass a rigorous test of relevance and effectiveness. Does the head of an SPPG unit genuinely require a Rp 42 million electric motorcycle, or would a far less expensive conventional motorcycle suffice? This question needs to be answered through a transparent feasibility study.
Third, policy consistency. Both controversies—the Indian vehicle imports and the SPPG electric motorcycles—exhibit the same pattern: large-scale procurement by flagship government programmes that raises questions about process, value for money, and consistency with professed principles. This pattern must be urgently addressed if public trust in the Prabowo administration’s ambitious programmes is not to be gradually eroded.
VI. CRITICAL OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Lessons from History
The history of Indonesian co-operatives is a mirror that must always be consulted before taking the next step. The failure of the KUDs of the New Order era was not because the co-operative as a concept was inherently flawed; it was because co-operatives were made to serve as political and administrative instruments rather than autonomous and democratic economic organisations. To repeat the same pattern—establishing co-operatives en masse from the top down, making success contingent upon a flow of government funds, without building the capacity of members—would be to repeat the same tragedy.
B. Ensuring Internal Co-operative Democracy
A healthy co-operative is one in which its members are sovereign. The election of management committees must be genuinely democratic, free from interference by local officials. The Annual General Meeting must function as a real forum for accountability, not a mere formality. Mechanisms for removing corrupt or incompetent managers must be readily available to members. Without robust internal democracy, the co-operative will simply become a petty oligarchy at the village level.
C. Substantial Investment in Human Resources
The quality of human resources is the single most important determinant of whether a co-operative succeeds or fails. The government must allocate a budget of comparable magnitude to the physical investment—for management training, financial literacy education for members, and the cultivation of the co-operative entrepreneurial spirit. Without competent people, a magnificent co-operative building will be nothing more than a monument to failure.
D. Multi-Layered Oversight
With total expenditure exceeding Rp 240 trillion dispersed across 80,000 locations, the risk of corruption and misappropriation is very high. The oversight system must be multi-layered: internal oversight by a strengthened supervisory board within each co-operative; external oversight by independent auditors; community oversight through accessible reporting platforms; and oversight by the Audit Board (BPK), the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), and law enforcement agencies. Blockchain technology or real-time information systems could be harnessed to ensure transparency of fund flows.
E. Long-Term Sustainability
The Merah Putih Co-operative programme must be designed from the outset with a clear government exit strategy. Substantial government support at the start is indeed necessary as a kick-off mechanism, but there must be a clear roadmap for how co-operatives will gradually achieve financial independence. Measurable performance targets—turnover, numbers of active members, growth in surplus distribution, and loan repayment rates—must be set and evaluated on a regular basis.
F. Synchronisation with the Existing Ecosystem
The Merah Putih Co-operative must not operate in isolation. It must be integrated with existing programmes: the Village Fund, BUMDes (Village-Owned Enterprises), KUR (People’s Business Credit), and the distribution networks of state-owned agri-food enterprises. Such synchronisation demands serious and consistent cross-ministerial co-ordination—a persistent weakness of Indonesian bureaucracy that must be addressed.
VII. CONCLUSION
The co-operative is not an antiquated idea from the past. It is an answer that is relevant—indeed, increasingly relevant—to the challenges of global economic inequality in the twenty-first century. Mondragon in Spain demonstrates that a co-operative can compete in global markets. The Grameen Bank in Bangladesh demonstrates that a co-operative can lift millions out of poverty. The dairy co-operatives of Denmark demonstrate that a co-operative can dominate international food value chains.
Indonesia, with its 80,000 villages and wards, its deeply rooted tradition of gotong royong, and the largest domestic market in South-East Asia, possesses all the prerequisites for making the co-operative a genuinely effective pillar of its economy. President Prabowo’s vision, expressed through the Koperasi Desa/Kelurahan Merah Putih, points in the right direction. It responds to market failure in distributing prosperity to rural areas, and it responds to the constitutional mandate of Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution—which has for too long remained mere rhetoric.
Yet the success of this programme cannot be determined by the speed of its formation or the grandeur of its physical infrastructure. It will be determined by whether the co-operatives that are established are genuinely democratic, genuinely managed by and for their members, genuinely transparent and accountable, and genuinely sustainable beyond the tenure of the government that founded them.
The controversies surrounding the Indian vehicle imports and the SPPG electric motorcycles ought to serve as a lesson that large-scale programmes require careful planning, meticulous co-ordination, and proactive public communication. When public trust is eroded by controversies that could have been avoided, the energy and political capital needed to sustain a long-term programme are dissipated to no good purpose.
Bung Hatta once wrote: ‘The co-operative is not only about economics. It is a school of democracy.’ If the Merah Putih Co-operative succeeds in becoming a school of democracy in 80,000 villages and wards—a place where citizens learn to lead, manage, and exercise oversight collectively—then it will leave a legacy that far transcends economic statistics. It will strengthen the foundations of democracy from below, from the village, from the people.
May the history of the Indonesian co-operative record not only figures and programmes, but also the genuine empowerment of its most ordinary citizens.
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