Twenty-eight years have elapsed since President Soeharto announced his resignation at nine o'clock on the morning of 21 May 1998, yet Indonesia continues to grapple with the same disquieting question: has Reformasi succeeded? This essay argues that, although many formal achievements are undeniable—direct presidential elections, decentralisation, and a freer press chief among them—Indonesia’s Reformasi has experienced a systemic failure in substance. Corruption has evolved rather than diminished; oligarchy has changed its garb rather than been uprooted; and institutions have proliferated without taking root. Taken together, these conditions reveal a country ensnared in the trap of partial reform. The essay examines the definition, history, and background of Reformasi; the principal arguments advanced by scholars and commentators who deem it a failure, together with supporting evidence and scholarly references; a measured account of its genuine achievements; and the consequences—in the short, medium, and long term—of failing to pursue meaningful correction.REFORM IN CHAINS:A Critical Analysis of Indonesia's Failed ReformasiI. INTRODUCTIONAt precisely five minutes past nine on the morning of Thursday, 21 May 1998, Indonesia’s second president, Soeharto, read out his letter of resignation in the Credential Room of the Merdeka Palace in Jakarta. The announcement was met with jubilation by millions of Indonesians who had sacrificed their lives, their liberty, and their futures in the service of a single word: Reformasi. Yet more than two decades on, a painful question continues to resonate in lecture halls and on street corners alike: where did the promises of Reformasi go?Reformasi, in its simplest sense, means reform. In the specific context of post-New Order Indonesia, however, it carries a far heavier freight of meaning: a social contract to build a democratic, clean, just, and dignified state. That contract, for the most part, remains dishonoured.This essay is written not as a lament over failure, but as a constructive contribution to the ongoing debate. Drawing on an extensive body of academic literature from both Indonesian and international scholars, it seeks to unravel the tangled threads of Indonesia’s reform journey—from the euphoria of 1998 to the anxieties of 2026.II. DEFINITION AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKA. Defining Reformasi in the Indonesian ContextThe word “reform” derives from the Latin reformare, meaning to reshape or to improve. In the political science tradition, reform refers to incremental institutional and structural change within an existing system, as distinct from revolution, which is sudden and total (Huntington, 1991).In the Indonesian context, “Reformasi”—capitalised to denote its specific historical referent—describes the movement and era of change triggered by the fall of Soeharto’s New Order regime in 1998. The Reformasi agenda, as articulated by the student movement and civil society, encompassed three broad domains.The first was a political agenda: the abolition of the dual function (dwifungsi) of the armed forces (ABRI), restrictions on the military’s role in civilian politics, free and fair elections, regional autonomy, and constitutional amendment. The second was an economic agenda: the eradication of corruption, collusion, and nepotism (korupsi, kolusi, dan nepotisme, or KKN); transparency in state financial management; and a more equitable distribution of wealth. The third was a legal and human rights agenda: the rule of law, accountability for human rights violations committed under the New Order, freedom of the press, and respect for civil liberties.Reformasi, as its architects understood it, was never merely about replacing one set of leaders with another. It was about transforming the very way in which the state operates, power is exercised, and justice is distributed.B. Criteria for Assessing the Success of ReformasiPolitical scientists employ various benchmarks to evaluate the success of democratic transitions. Larry Diamond (1999), in Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation, draws a crucial distinction between “electoral democracy” — which requires only free elections — and “liberal democracy”, which encompasses the rule of law, accountability, and the protection of civil rights. By the assessment of many scholars, Indonesia remains trapped at the former level.Andreas Schedler (2002) introduced the concept of “electoral authoritarianism” to describe systems that employ democratic procedures as a facade of legitimacy whilst preserving authoritarian practices within. That concept serves as an uncomfortably accurate mirror for post-Reformasi Indonesia.III. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF REFORMASIA. The Legacy of the New Order: Seeds of a Problem Never UprootedTo understand the failures of Reformasi, one must first appreciate the depth of the problems bequeathed by the New Order. Over thirty-two years (1966–1998), Soeharto constructed what Harold Crouch (1978) described as a “bureaucratic polity”: a system in which power was concentrated in the hands of a narrow bureaucratic-military elite whilst civil society was systematically enfeebled.The New Order left at least four toxic legacies that obstructed genuine transformation: first, a patron-client culture entrenched at every level of the bureaucracy; second, a network of crony businesses controlling strategically important economic sectors; third, a military and police apparatus accustomed to operating beyond the control of civilian authority; and fourth, a legal culture that regarded rules as instruments of power rather than as protectors of justice.Richard Robison and Vedi Hadiz (2004), in Reorganising Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of Markets, argue convincingly that the social classes that had dominated the New Order were not destroyed by Reformasi; rather, they adapted and reproduced themselves in new formats. The oligarchs of the New Order did not die — they metamorphosed.B. The Dynamics of the 1997–1998 Crisis and the Eruption of ReformasiThe Asian financial crisis that struck Indonesia in 1997–1998 served as the catalyst that accelerated the collapse of the Soeharto regime. The rupiah’s precipitous fall—from some Rp2,600 to the dollar to more than Rp14,800 to the dollar—caused mass bankruptcy, a surge in unemployment, and a food crisis. Against this backdrop, the Indonesian public watched as Soeharto’s cronies continued to live in conspicuous luxury; social fury, long suppressed, finally erupted.The killing of four Trisakti University students by security forces on 12 May 1998, followed by the May Riots that engulfed Jakarta and other cities on 13–14 May, represented a boiling point that could no longer be contained. On 21 May 1998, Soeharto resigned. Vice-President B.J. Habibie, his protege and a creature of the New Order, assumed the presidency and declared himself the leader of the Reformasi era.Herein lies the first great irony of Reformasi: an era of transformative change was inaugurated not by reformist figures but by an insider of the very system that was meant to be changed. Habibie, though he subsequently took several important liberalising steps, was at once a product and a part of the system he was now called upon to dismantle.C. The Phases of Reformasi: From Euphoria to PragmatismIndonesia’s reform journey may be divided into several distinct phases. The first (1998–2002) was a phase of transition and euphoria, marked by constitutional amendments, the release of political prisoners, the enactment of regional autonomy legislation, and the 1999 general election — widely praised as the most democratic in Indonesian history.The second phase (2002–2014) was one of flawed consolidation. New institutions—the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), the Constitutional Court, and various oversight bodies—were established, but did so amid fierce resistance from entrenched interest groups. Direct regional elections were held, yet they frequently produced local political dynasties no less corrupt than their predecessors.The third phase (2014 to the present) is one of democratic regression. Several key indicators have moved in a deeply troubling direction: the KPK has been weakened through legislative revision; military and police intervention in civilian affairs has increased; civic space has been narrowed through the weaponisation of law; and a political pragmatism that prizes stability of power above the principles of Reformasi has become dominant.IV. WHY SCHOLARS AND COMMENTATORS REGARD REFORMASI AS HAVING FAILEDThere is no single scholarly consensus on the precise measure of Reformasi’s failure. There are, however, several major themes that recur persistently throughout the academic literature and research reports.A. Corruption: Evolved Rather Than EradicatedThe eradication of corruption was the central promise of Reformasi, and it has proved to be the most conspicuous failure. Indonesia did indeed establish the KPK in 2002, a step that merits recognition. But corruption in Indonesia has not disappeared; it has evolved. From the centralised corruption of the New Order era, it has mutated into a decentralised form that permeates every layer of governance, from central government to the village level.Edward Aspinall and Gerry van Klinken (2011), in The State and Illegality in Indonesia, document in meticulous detail how post-Reformasi decentralisation, far from bringing services closer to the people, created thousands of new corruption hotspots at the regional level. They term this phenomenon “predatory localism” — the manner in which local strongmen exploited autonomy for personal enrichment.Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) has consistently reported the absence of any significant downward trend in corruption. Its annual reports record thousands of corruption cases each year involving regional heads, legislators, and judges. The Committee for the Monitoring of Regional Autonomy Implementation (KPPOD) has likewise identified licensing corruption as a persistent and serious obstacle to investment.The most damaging blow to the spirit of reform came in 2019, when the House of Representatives revised the KPK Law in a manner that drastically curtailed the body’s independence and authority. The KPK Employees’ Association described the revision as “the institutional assassination of the KPK”. Tom Power (2018), in his analysis of Indonesia’s anti-corruption backsliding, concludes that the assault on the KPK was systematic and premeditated by political elites.“Reformasi in Indonesia produced the democratisation of corruption, not its eradication. What changed was its scale and distribution, not its substance.” — Vedi Hadiz, in an interview with New Mandala, 2016B. Oligarchy: Changed its Costume, Never UprootedOne of the most influential arguments about the failure of Reformasi comes from Jeffrey Winters (2011) in his book Oligarchy. Winters contends that Reformasi never posed a genuine threat to the power of oligarchs—individuals or groups possessing extraordinary material wealth and deploying it to shape politics in defence of their interests.The data bear this out: wealth concentration in Indonesia actually increased during the Reformasi era. Oxfam Indonesia (2017) reported that the four wealthiest Indonesians hold wealth equivalent to that of the poorest 100 million combined. The Gini coefficient—a standard measure of economic inequality—rose from around 0.30 in the early 1990s to above 0.40 by the mid-2010s.Robison and Hadiz (2004) describe how the oligarchs of the New Order—including Soeharto’s cronies—managed to preserve, and indeed expand, their economic power in the democratic era by more sophisticated means: becoming donors to political parties, financing regional election campaigns, and building family political dynasties. Democracy, rather than serving as a vehicle for popular emancipation, became a mechanism for the reproduction of oligarchy.C. Civil Liberties and the Shrinking Democratic Space
One of Reformasi’s most important achievements was greater freedom of the press and expression. Yet over the past decade, Freedom House has consistently downgraded Indonesia in its Press Freedom and Democracy indices. By 2023, Freedom House classified Indonesia as only “partly free”—a significant decline from its former reputation as a model democratic transition in South-East Asia.Andreas Harsono of Human Rights Watch has documented how the Electronic Information and Transactions Law (UU ITE) has been systematically misused to silence criticism of the government and public officials. Since coming into force, the law has been deployed against hundreds of activists, journalists, and social media users who dared to criticise government policy.Imparsial and the National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) regularly report on the increasing involvement of the military and police in operations that ought properly to be civilian in nature. The dual function of ABRI may have been formally abolished, yet Jun Honna (2003), in Military Politics and Democratisation in Indonesia, argues that the Indonesian military has never fully relinquished its influence over the political and economic spheres.D. Political Dynasties and the Personalisation of Power
Reformasi envisioned a democracy that would produce leaders on the basis of competence and integrity. What has emerged instead is a proliferation of political dynasties. Surveys conducted by the Independent Election Monitoring Committee (KIPP) and various research institutions show a steady increase in the proportion of public offices at the regional level held by relatives of incumbent officials.Marcus Mietzner (2013), in Money, Power, and Ideology: Political Parties in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia, documents how political parties have failed in their function as instruments of popular representation. Rather than serving as schools of democracy, parties have become vehicles for group and individual interests, relying on “money politics” as the engine of voter recruitment and mobilisation.The phenomenon that several analysts have described as “Jokowification” is perhaps the most troubling symptom of this malaise: a populist leader initially celebrated as a symbol of change subsequently practising modes of governance not substantially different from his predecessors—including the consolidation of family power, the use of state apparatus to suppress criticism, and the manipulation of institutions in the service of dynastic ambition.Jokowi’s Legacy and the Crisis of ReformThe Reformasi of 1998 opened the path for Indonesia to build a healthier democracy, with the hope that each president would strengthen institutions, eradicate corruption, and safeguard the freedoms of the people. Yet, among the presidents of the Reformasi era, Joko Widodo’s leadership is widely regarded as having left the deepest scars upon democracy and governance.
Institutions underminedThe Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), once a symbol of public hope, lost its independence after legislative revisions weakened its authority. Other supervisory bodies have not escaped political interference, eroding public trust in the state.
Entrenched corruptionAlthough Jokowi projected the image of a modest and clean leader, corruption remained rampant. Major cases implicated senior officials and those close to power, revealing that oversight mechanisms were ineffective. Transparency, once promised, became little more than rhetoric.
Dynastic politicsThe candidacy of Gibran Rakabuming Raka as vice president sparked accusations that Jokowi was constructing a political dynasty. The criticism lies not merely in familial ties but in the absence of proven competence. A democracy that should have fostered meritocracy instead fell into nepotism, undermining public faith in the political process.
Oligarchy ascendantEconomic and resource policies disproportionately favoured business elites and major investors. Mining concessions, infrastructure projects, and energy policies were frequently linked to oligarchic interests, leaving ordinary citizens increasingly marginalised.Democracy erodedFreedom of expression was curtailed, critics of the government were often criminalised, and public space was narrowed. Procedural democracy continued, but its substance was hollowed out, placing Indonesia at risk of sliding towards authoritarianism.Manipulated imagePolitical buzzers and media were deployed to polish Jokowi’s image whilst attacking opponents. Tempo magazine highlighted the “Nawadosa Jokowi” as emblematic of the failure of his Nawacita, while image management campaigns sought to conceal policy weaknesses.
Social inequalityDespite massive infrastructure development, the gulf between rich and poor widened. Economic growth was not fully inclusive, fuelling social unrest and exacerbating political polarisation.Consequences for President PrabowoJokowi’s legacy is a heavy burden for President Prabowo. He must:
- Restore institutions by reinstating the independence of legal bodies.
- Confront oligarchy by reshaping economic policy to serve the people rather than elites.
- Heal polarisation left behind by divisive politics.
- Build legitimacy as a leader capable of reviving democracy.
- Criticism of Jokowi is not confined to policy shortcomings but extends to a moral and institutional crisis. The weakening of democracy, entrenched corruption, dynastic politics, oligarchy, and social inequality illustrate that his legacy is a profound challenge for Indonesia. That challenge now rests upon Prabowo, who must prove himself able to steer Reformasi back onto its rightful course.
Hope in President PrabowoIndonesia enters a new chapter following Joko Widodo’s controversial leadership. The legacy of weakened institutions, entrenched corruption, dynastic politics, and rampant oligarchy is indeed a heavy burden. Yet amidst this complexity, there remains space for President Prabowo to rekindle the spirit of Reformasi and prove himself as a leader capable of restoring public trust.
Restoring institutionsThe greatest hope lies in Prabowo’s courage to revive the independence of state institutions. Should the KPK, Constitutional Court, and other supervisory bodies be returned to their rightful standing, the foundations of democracy will once again be solid.
Eradicating corruptionThe people yearn for a leader who dares to act decisively against corruption. Through tangible measures, Prabowo can build strong moral legitimacy and demonstrate that his leadership is distinct from the old patterns.Confronting oligarchyThe oligarchy that has long gripped Indonesia’s economy must be challenged. If Prabowo succeeds in reshaping policy to favour ordinary citizens rather than elites, he will be remembered as the president who restored economic sovereignty to the nation.Healing polarisationThe divisive politics left behind by Jokowi can be mended through inclusive communication. Prabowo has the opportunity to become a unifier of the nation, not merely a ruler.Building meritocracyBy ending dynastic practices and prioritising competence, Prabowo can pave the way for a new generation of leaders of higher quality. This is a crucial step towards improving the calibre of democracy.Hope in President Prabowo is not an empty dream. He holds a genuine opportunity to rewrite the course of Reformasi: to restore institutions, eradicate corruption, confront oligarchy, heal polarisation, and build meritocracy. If these steps are pursued with courage and resolve, history will record Prabowo as the leader who transformed crisis into renewal.
E. A Judiciary That Has Yet to Win Its IndependenceAn independent judiciary is one of the foundational pillars of a democratic rule of law. In Indonesia, that aspiration remains some distance from reality. The Judicial Commission and the Supreme Court regularly uncover bribery cases involving judges at various levels, and the KPK itself has arrested scores of judges and court officials for accepting bribes.Sebastiaan Pompe (2005), in The Indonesian Supreme Court: A Study of Institutional Collapse, presents a sobering portrait of Indonesia’s highest court, which he characterises as having undergone institutional collapse as a result of systemic corruption, weak management, and an absence of a culture of professional integrity.Major cases involving members of the elite frequently remain unresolved or conclude with verdicts that invite serious questioning. Meanwhile, poor Indonesians continue to face a legal system that is not oriented towards their interests. The old saying — that “the law is sharp at the bottom and blunt at the top” — retains its painful currency in everyday life.F. The Failure to Reckon with Past Human Rights AbusesOne of the most solemn promises of Reformasi was the resolution of the grave human rights violations that occurred under the New Order: from the events of 1965–66, the disappearances of activists in 1997–98, and the Semanggi tragedies, to the various episodes of violence in Aceh, Papua, and East Timor. The overwhelming majority of those promises have never been honoured.Kontras (the Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence) documents that barely a single perpetrator of the New Order’s grave human rights abuses has been effectively prosecuted. Several figures associated with those violations have gone on to enjoy distinguished political careers in the Reformasi era, even occupying the highest offices of state.John Roosa (2006), in Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement and Suharto’s Coup d’état in Indonesia, reveals how successive post-Reformasi governments have chosen not to correct the official historical narrative of the 1965 events, because doing so would mean contesting the legitimacy of groups that remain very much in power.V. THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF REFORMASI: A RECORD THAT CANNOT BE OVERLOOKEDIt would be dishonest for a critical analysis of this kind to disregard the accomplishments of Reformasi entirely. Genuine progress has been made in several areas, though its scale has not been commensurate with the magnitude of the problems that remain.The constitutional amendments of 1999–2002 produced substantive changes in the institutional design of the state: term limits on the presidency, direct presidential elections, the establishment of the Constitutional Court as guardian of the constitution, and the removal of appointed functional group representatives from the People’s Consultative Assembly (Horowitz, 2013). The elections of 1999 and thereafter, notwithstanding their imperfections, nonetheless represented mechanisms for the transfer of power that were vastly more open than anything seen under the New Order.Decentralisation, for all the problems it has introduced, has created spaces for local political participation that never previously existed. Freedom of the press, though now under threat, once reached levels that allowed genuinely critical coverage of power. The KPK, before it was weakened, succeeded in imprisoning hundreds of corrupt politicians and officials from across the political spectrum (Butt, 2011).Progress in health and education as well as relatively stable economic growth, represents an achievement that should not be minimised. Yet, as Aspinall (2010) observes, these gains owe more to fiscal pressures and the dynamics of global markets than they do to any fundamental transformation of governance.VI. THE CONSEQUENCES OF FAILING TO PURSUE REFORMA. Short Term (1–3 Years): Erosion of Trust and Instability
In the short term, a failure to correct the course of Reformasi will continue to erode public confidence in democratic institutions. Opinion surveys conducted by Indikator Politik Indonesia and SMRC consistently show declining trust in the House of Representatives, political parties, and the judiciary.Low public trust correlates directly with political apathy and with the growth of anti-establishment sentiment. In such conditions, populism — whether in the guise of religious nationalism or of nostalgia for authoritarianism — finds extraordinarily fertile ground. The symptoms are already visible in growing support for figures who offer tough solutions without democratic foundations.The weakening of the KPK and the increasing impunity enjoyed by corrupt actors will, in the short term, further damage the investment climate. Transparency International (2023) notes that high corruption perception directly increases the cost of doing business and undermines the confidence of foreign investors.B. Medium Term (4–10 Years): Structural Poverty and a Crisis of LegitimacyOver the medium term, the failure of structural reform will consolidate poverty as a permanent condition for tens of millions of Indonesians. High inequality, sustained by oligarchy and corruption, creates a social mobility trap in which education and hard work alone are insufficient to escape poverty without access to patron-client networks.Mancur Olson (2000), in Power and Prosperity, argues that stable oligarchy — powerful but narrow interest groups — tends to retard long-term economic growth, because such groups are more concerned with protecting existing rents than with promoting innovation and healthy competition. Indonesia, with its entrenched oligarchic structures, risks becoming indefinitely mired in the middle-income trap.At the political level, the crisis of governmental legitimacy will deepen. If elections continue to be won through money politics rather than through a substantive contest of policy ideas, the results of those elections will be challenged with increasing frequency, and trust in the democratic process will continue to decline. In the worst-case scenario, such disillusionment may give rise to serious political instability.C. Long Term (10 or More Years): New Authoritarianism and Social FragmentationFrom a long-term perspective, the failure to consolidate democracy opens the way for what Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way (2010), in Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War, describe as “competitive authoritarianism”: a system that maintains the outward forms of democratic procedure whilst hollowing out its substance. Indonesia displays a number of the warning signs of such a trajectory.Beyond that, the failure of the state to resolve historical and structural injustices may sow the seeds of serious social conflict. Papua is the clearest example: when the hopes vested in Reformasi for meaningful autonomy were disappointed, they became fuel for separatist sentiment and a protracted armed conflict that remains unresolved to this day.From a generational perspective, young Indonesians born after 1998 — who have no memory of the New Order — now face a difficult set of choices: to accept a corrupt status quo, to emigrate (a brain drain of growing concern), or to demand change through channels that are progressively narrowing. If the system fails to respond adequately, the frustration of this generation may take forms that are difficult to predict.VII. MATTERS DESERVING OF SERIOUS REFLECTIONA. Reformasi Is a Process, Not a Destination
One of the gravest errors in understanding Reformasi is to treat it as a single, completed event. Reform is a process that never concludes, one that requires the vigilance, the struggle, and the commitment of every generation. When society ceases to watch, when students cease to mobilise, and when the press loses its courage, Reformasi will inevitably move backwards.
B. The Problem of Institutional DesignIndonesia has succeeded in establishing a large number of new institutions since 1998. Many of them, however, were designed with loopholes that allow capture by elite interests. Improving institutional design — including the mechanisms for selecting KPK commissioners, the independence of the National Human Rights Commission, and the accountability of the Supreme Court — is an urgent agenda that requires a strong political consensus.C. The Indispensability of a Robust Civil SocietyThe comparative experience of countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, and South Africa demonstrates that enduring democratic progress is almost always underpinned by a civil society that is strong, active, and independent of the state. Indonesia possesses a rich tradition of civil society organisations — from Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama to networks of NGOs and grassroots communities — yet many of these face growing financial pressure and regulatory constraints that are progressively limiting their room for manoeuvre.D. Historical Accountability as the Foundation of ReconciliationNo healthy democracy can stand upon a foundation of impunity. The experiences of post-Nazi Germany, post-apartheid South Africa, and post-junta Argentina demonstrate that accountability for the crimes of the past is not an act of vengeance but a precondition for the restoration of trust and the construction of a moral basis for a new order. Indonesia must find the political courage to tread the same path.E. The Urgency of Civic EducationDemocracy requires politically literate citizens, critical in their thinking, and aware of both their rights and their obligations. Indonesia’s education system, still heavily reliant on rote learning and still inclined to avoid sensitive historical subjects, has not adequately prepared the younger generation to be active democratic citizens. Reform of civic education must be treated as an integral part of the broader renewal agenda.VIII. CONCLUSION: A REFORM STILL UNFINISHEDTwenty-eight years is ample time in which to assess an era. Reformasi has produced formal changes that cannot be dismissed: more competitive elections, a freer press than the New Order permitted, and a number of oversight institutions that were wholly absent before 1998. Yet it has failed to transform the substance of how the state operates, how power is distributed, and how justice is guaranteed for all citizens.The failure of Reformasi is not a total failure, nor is it an inevitable verdict of history. It is a failure of choices — the choices of elites to preserve their privileges, of institutions to evade genuine change, and the collective choice of society to acquiesce in the status quo rather than to persevere in realising the promises of 1998.The generation born after Reformasi must not become merely the inheritors of disappointment. They must become the inheritors of its animating flame: more critical in their thought, better organised in their action, more imaginative in their search for new paths towards the justice and human dignity that were the deepest aspirations of the movement that brought this era into being.Reformasi is not dead. It is merely in chains. And those who can free it — as was true twenty-eight years ago — are the people of Indonesia themselves.
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