War : Survivors, Memory, and Moral Responsibility (6)

Before we speak of twenty million dead, four collapsed empires, and a world map redrawn beyond recognition—let us begin with a cow. 

In the waterlogged trenches of the Western Front, the two opposing sides had their own names for one another. British soldiers were called "Tommy"—the full form being Tommy Atkins, a generic placeholder name used since the Napoleonic era to refer to the ordinary British infantryman, much as one might say "a typical bloke in uniform." German soldiers, meanwhile, were known as "Fritz"—a name so commonplace in Germany at the time that it became a collective nickname for every man in a feldgrau uniform on the other side of the wire. Two simple names, for two groups of men who were supposed to be killing each other.

One day, a cow wandered into No Man's Land—the deadly strip of ground between the two front lines. Both sides coveted her for her milk and meat, yet to venture out and fetch her meant almost certain death. So Tommy lobbed a note wrapped round a stone into the German trench, proposing a wager: toss a coin into the air, and whoever shot it down could claim the cow. Fritz agreed. Coin after coin spun skyward—and was missed. Five rounds passed without a winner. On the sixth, Tommy finally hit his mark. 

The Germans duly asked for their marks back. Tommy obligingly climbed out, gathered up all the coins scattered across the ground, and carried the German marks over to their trench. What Fritz had not noticed was that Tommy had paid for those marks with the German shillings already lying in the mud—the very coins Fritz himself had tossed and missed. The Germans cheered, handed over six bottles of beer by way of congratulation, and praised Tommy's marksmanship. Tommy walked back to the British lines with the cow, the beer, and not a penny out of his own pocket.  

[This story about the cow is taken from "Funny Story of the Great War as Told by the Soldier" collated by Carleton B. Case (2017, Abela Publishing), with some explanations added] 

This, in miniature, is the First World War: the most devastating conflict mankind had ever known—and yet, in the midst of all its horror, Tommy and Fritz could still find a moment to wager over a stray cow and share a laugh across the barbed wire. The question worth asking is this: how did two men capable of such easy humanity end up trapped in a war that killed twenty million people? The answer is long—and it begins well before that cow went astray.

THE FIRST WORLD WAR

How Europe Tore Itself Apart

1914 – 1918

Imagine a continent that is wealthy, sophisticated, and utterly convinced that its civilisation is the finest the world has ever produced—and then imagine that same continent, within the space of barely two months, plunging headlong into the most catastrophic war mankind had ever witnessed. That was Europe in the summer of 1914. That was the beginning of what we now call the First World War.

The war lasted from the 28th of July 1914 until the 11th of November 1918—more than four years of bloodshed that claimed some 20 million lives, brought down four great empires, and permanently redrew the map of the world. Yet what astonishes us still is not merely the scale of the carnage, but how swiftly it all unravelled—from a single bullet fired in Sarajevo to a global conflagration involving virtually every corner of the earth.

Europe Before the Storm

To understand why the First World War broke out, one must first step back and survey the state of Europe in the early years of the twentieth century. This was no innocent, peaceable place. It was a continent perched atop a powder keg, waiting for a spark.

For several decades prior, the great European powers had arranged themselves into two vast military alliances, facing one another like two armed camps that had each sworn to defend their own members, come what may. On one side stood the Triple Entente, comprising France, Russia, and Great Britain. On the other stood the Triple Alliance, formed by Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy. The logic underpinning these alliances was straightforward enough: an attack upon one of us is an attack upon us all. It was precisely this logic that would eventually transform a single assassination into a world war.

An arms race of unprecedented scale was also well underway. Germany under Kaiser Wilhelm II had been aggressively expanding its army and, crucially, its navy—directly challenging the maritime supremacy that Britain had enjoyed for centuries. Britain responded by building ever larger and more formidable warships. France enlarged its army. Russia modernised its forces. Everyone was preparing for war, and when everyone prepares for war, war has a peculiar habit of arriving.

Nationalism, too, was running at a fever pitch across the whole of Europe. Every nation believed itself to be the most righteous, the most capable, the most deserving. In the Balkans — commonly described as the 'powder keg of Europe'—South Slav nationalism was growing ever more assertive, threatening the cohesion of the ageing Austro-Hungarian Empire. Serbia, freshly emboldened after two Balkan Wars (1912–1913), harboured ambitions of uniting all South Slavic peoples beneath a single banner. This prospect deeply alarmed Vienna.

One Bullet That Changed the World

On the 28th of June 1914, Archduke Franz Ferdinand — heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary—arrived in Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia, a territory Austria had annexed only six years earlier. It was a provocation he scarcely seemed to recognise: Bosnia's largely Serbian population had never reconciled itself to Austrian rule, and the wounds of annexation were still raw.

That morning, a group of young Serbian nationalists belonging to a secret organisation called the 'Black Hand' (Ujedinjenje ili smrt—Union or Death) had positioned themselves along the route of the Archduke's motorcade. The first attempt on his life failed—a grenade bounced off the back of the car and exploded beneath the vehicle behind, wounding several members of the escort. Franz Ferdinand survived, and the procession continued.

Yet fate had other intentions. On his way to visit the wounded at the hospital, the Archduke's driver took a wrong turning, reversed, and came to a halt directly in front of a young man standing outside a delicatessen—Gavrilo Princip, one of the conspirators, who had given up and was on his way home. From a distance of less than two metres, Princip fired twice. Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophie were dead within the hour.

Europe's countdown had begun.

Austria-Hungary, which had long been seeking a pretext to crush Serbia, issued an ultimatum deliberately designed to be unacceptable. Serbia agreed to nearly every demand — yet Austria declared the reply unsatisfactory. On the 28th of July 1914, exactly one month after the Sarajevo assassination, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia.

The alliance system then proceeded to function with the terrible efficiency of clockwork. Russia began mobilising its forces to defend Serbia. Germany, which had already issued Austria a 'blank cheque' of unconditional support, declared war on Russia on the 1st of August, and on France on the 3rd. When Germany invaded neutral Belgium to attack France by a swifter route—in accordance with the Schlieffen Plan, drawn up years in advance—Britain could no longer stand aside. On the 4th of August 1914, Great Britain declared war on Germany. Within less than six weeks of those two shots in Sarajevo, nearly the whole of Europe was at war.

Who Was Fighting Whom?

Ranged against them in the Central Powers were Germany—the principal military force—Austria-Hungary, whose recklessness had ignited the whole conflagration; the Ottoman Empire, which entered the war in October 1914 and opened new fronts across the Middle East, and Bulgaria, which joined in 1915.

There is a particularly rich irony buried in all of this: Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany and King George V of Great Britain were first cousins — both grandsons of the selfsame Queen Victoria. The First World War was, in a very real sense, a family quarrel amongst the royal houses of Europe, settled at the cost of millions of ordinary men who had never been consulted on the matter.

Four Years of Hell

No one anticipated that the war would last very long. Generals assured their men it would all be over before the autumn leaves had fallen in 1914. They were comprehensively mistaken.

On the Western Front—the line of battle stretching from the North Sea to the Swiss border through France and Belgium—both sides quickly became mired in a murderous war of attrition. Thousands of miles of trenches were dug into the waterlogged earth. Soldiers lived for months in narrow, flooded, rat-infested ditches reeking of mud and decay, occasionally ordered to 'go over the top'—to sprint across No Man's Land through storms of machine-gun fire and artillery bombardment.

The year 1916 represented the very nadir of this industrialised slaughter. The Battle of Verdun, which ground on for nearly the entire year, claimed some 700,000 casualties from both sides without meaningfully shifting the front line. Meanwhile, the Battle of the Somme—begun on the 1st of July 1916—recorded the bloodiest single day in the history of the British Army: more than 57,000 British soldiers were killed or wounded on that first day alone.

The technology of warfare also evolved in horrifying ways. Poison gas—chlorine and mustard gas—was first deployed on a large scale by the Germans at Ypres in 1915, introducing a new dimension of terror to the battlefield. Tanks made their debut at the Somme in 1916. Fighter aircraft duelled overhead. German U-boats blockaded Britain. This was war conducted with the full, pitiless machinery of industrial modernity.

On the Eastern Front, Russia—vast but poorly organised—suffered a succession of catastrophic defeats at German hands. Millions of Russian soldiers were killed or taken prisoner. This military crisis deepened an already severe political crisis at home, which erupted in 1917 into the Bolshevik Revolution. Tsar Nicholas II was overthrown, and the new revolutionary government under Lenin signed a separate peace with Germany in March 1918 — freeing the German army to concentrate its full strength on the Western Front.

Yet the infusion of fresh American troops and matériel—Washington having finally been provoked into the war by Germany's unrestricted submarine warfare and the notorious Zimmermann Telegram, in which Germany invited Mexico to attack the United States—tipped the balance decisively. Germany's great spring offensive of 1918 failed. The Allies counter-attacked with devastating force. By the autumn of 1918, the German army was in retreat on all fronts, its economy ruined, its civilian population starving under the Royal Navy's blockade.

The End of the War and the Victor

On the 11th of November 1918, at eleven o'clock in the morning—the eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the eleventh month—the guns fell silent across the Western Front. The Armistice was signed in a railway carriage in the Forest of Compiègne, France. After 1,568 days of war, quiet descended upon millions of square miles of shattered landscape.

The victors were the Allied Powers. Germany surrendered unconditionally. Austria-Hungary dissolved and fractured into several new nations. The Ottoman Empire collapsed, paving the way for the emergence of modern Turkey under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The Russian Empire had already fallen, replaced by the Soviet Union.

On the 28th of June 1919—exactly five years to the day after the assassination of Franz Ferdinand—the Treaty of Versailles was signed in the Hall of Mirrors at the Palace of Versailles. Its terms were punishing in the extreme: Germany was required to pay colossal war reparations, to surrender roughly thirteen per cent of her territory, to accept severe restrictions on her armed forces, and—most wounding of all to German pride—Article 231, the notorious 'War Guilt Clause', obliged Germany to accept full and sole responsibility for having caused the war.

The humiliation and bitterness sown by the Treaty of Versailles would prove fertile ground for the rise of Adolf Hitler two decades later. The First World War did not, as so many had hoped, end all wars. It planted the seeds of the Second.

A Legacy That Cannot Be Forgotten

The First World War claimed approximately 20 million lives—both military and civilian—and left more than 21 million others wounded. Millions more were permanently disabled, physically or mentally. The term 'shell shock'—now recognised as post-traumatic stress disorder—entered common parlance as a result of the psychological devastation suffered by a generation of veterans.

The map of the world was utterly transformed. In Europe alone, some ten new nations emerged from the ruins of four collapsed empires. In the Middle East, the borders drawn by British and French diplomats under the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916—which carved up the former Ottoman territories with scant regard for tribal or religious boundaries—remain the root cause of conflicts that continue to this day.

And somewhere in a muddy trench on the Western Front, on a day that no history book has thought to record, a British soldier named Tommy and a German soldier named Fritz paused for a moment amidst all the madness — to wager over a stray cow, share a few bottles of beer, and remind us that beneath the uniforms and the rifles, they were, after all, only human.

Further Reading

For those wishing to explore this subject in greater depth, the following works are warmly recommended:

1. Tuckman, Barbara W. The Guns of August. New York: Macmillan, 1962.—A Pulitzer Prize-winning narrative masterpiece covering the opening weeks of the war.
2. Keegan, John. The First World War. London: Hutchinson, 1998.—A comprehensive military analysis by one of the foremost historians of warfare.
3. Strachan, Hew. The First World War. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.—An authoritative, multi-volume academic study covering every aspect and front of the war.
4. Clark, Christopher. The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914. London: HarperCollins, 2012.—A penetrating examination of how Europe's leaders stumbled into a war none of them fully intended.
5. MacMillan, Margaret. The War That Ended Peace. New York: Random House, 2013.—An elegant analysis of the decades leading up to 1914 that made war all but inevitable.
6. Taylor, A.J.P. The First World War: An Illustrated History. London: Penguin, 1963.—A vivid popular account from one of Britain's most provocative and influential historians.
7. Ferguson, Niall. The Pity of War. London: Allen Lane, 1998.—A revisionist perspective questioning whether the war was truly unavoidable, and whether Britain was right to enter it.
8. Stevenson, David. 1914–1918: The History of the First World War. London: Penguin, 2004.—A balanced and richly detailed account of the full course of the war.

[Part 7]
[Part 5]

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War : Survivors, Memory, and Moral Responsibility (5)

Indonesia has formally offered itself as a mediator in the conflict that erupted on 28 February 2026, when the United States and Israel launched a joint military operation against Iran. Indonesia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs explicitly stated the government's readiness to facilitate dialogue in order to create conducive security conditions, and even declared that the President of Indonesia was willing to travel to Tehran to conduct mediation should both parties agree to it. But how substantial is Indonesia's actual capacity to play such a role?

Indonesia's Strengths: Genuine Capital

The most fundamental strength that Indonesia possesses as a prospective mediator is its identity as a moderate and democratic Muslim nation. As the country with the world's largest Muslim population, Indonesia holds the moral legitimacy to advance dialogue, mediation, and preventive diplomacy in response to global tensions. This moral legitimacy is by no means trivial in the context of a conflict involving Iran as an Islamic state: Jakarta can speak to Tehran in a language that Washington or Tel Aviv simply cannot—the language of Islamic world solidarity, unsullied by any direct military interest in the Middle East.

Upon this moral foundation, Indonesia also possesses a long and consistent track record of diplomacy. Indonesia has repeatedly adopted an impartial stance towards Iran's isolation by the United States and its allies, in order to maintain good relations with Tehran, and has actively served as a mediator between Iran and the international community, particularly with the United States, including by advocating for the lifting of sanctions. It is this track record that renders Indonesia far from a newcomer in Iranian diplomatic affairs — there exists a degree of trust and established channels of communication that have been built over many years. Furthermore, Indonesia can leverage its membership in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to push for consensus regarding recent developments, call for an immediate cessation of all forms of violence, and strongly condemn the escalation in the Middle East. Indonesia's standing within the OIC furnishes it with a multilateral platform that can significantly amplify the weight of its diplomatic bargaining position.

Another strength that is frequently overlooked is Indonesia's unique position of straddling two worlds simultaneously. By positioning itself as a bridge between the West and the Islamic world, Indonesia appears to be endeavouring to balance pro-Iran sentiment at home whilst preserving the economic and security agreements recently secured with the United States. It is precisely this presence on both sides that constitutes a diplomatic asset: Indonesia enjoys communicative access to Washington through the BoP and the bilateral trade agreement, whilst simultaneously maintaining credibility in the eyes of Tehran as a Muslim nation that has never been hostile towards Iran.

Indonesia's Weaknesses: Real Obstacles

Regrettably, the strengths outlined above must be weighed against several serious structural weaknesses. The most significant obstacle ironically, stems from a situation of Prabowo's own making — namely, Indonesia's membership in the Board of Peace. Indonesia's mediation offer sounds ambitious, yet various factors suggest that it amounts more to an optical performance than genuine operational influence — in a conflict that is actively escalating, in which the United States and its allies have already launched airstrikes and Tehran has responded militarily, such language appears more as an attempt to secure a seat on the global diplomatic circuit than a genuinely credible peace initiative. 

This credibility deficit is compounded by Indonesia's initial response, which was widely regarded as excessively muted. Indonesia refrained from condemning the attack outright, and merely expressed that it "deeply regretted" the failure of negotiations and called for restraint — a striking contrast to, for instance, Malaysia and Brunei, which were considerably more forthright in condemning the US-Israeli strikes. In the eyes of Iran and the broader Islamic world, a nation that is reluctant to characterise a military strike as wrongful conduct is difficult to regard as a genuinely neutral mediator. Some observers have questioned whether any peace agenda can truly deliver justice for Palestine whilst the United States and Israel are actively conducting strikes and killing leaders, a question that implicitly challenges Indonesia's legitimacy, given that it has bound itself to the US-led BoP framework.

The Sunni-Shia dimension is also a complication that must not be overlooked. Although Indonesia and Iran are each globally recognised as the countries with the largest Sunni and Shia Muslim populations, respectively, the Sunni-Shia divide has engendered suspicion among some Sunni Muslims in Indonesia regarding the spread of Shia beliefs within the country. This reality constrains Prabowo's domestic political room for manoeuvre in pursuing too openly warm a diplomatic alignment with Tehran.

The Potential Exists, but the Path Is Arduous

On the whole, for Indonesia, this is by no means a distant geopolitical drama. Instability in the Middle East will send shockwaves through global energy markets, disrupt supply chains, and burden the already fragile economic recovery of developing nations. Indonesia has a genuine incentive to become an effective mediator — not merely for reasons of image, but in the service of its own national interest. Its legitimacy capital as a moderate, democratic Muslim nation with a historic tradition of non-aligned diplomacy is a real and tangible asset. However, for as long as Indonesia remains bound to the Trump-led BoP, refrains from condemning military strikes in unequivocal terms, and responds only with expressions of "deep regret", its mediation offer will continue to sound more like ambition than genuine capacity — at least in the eyes of Tehran, which is ultimately the party whose acceptance or rejection of that offer matters most.

Indonesia's Position in the Board of Peace: A Constitutional Perspective

The central constitutional touchstone for evaluating Indonesia's membership in the Board of Peace is the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution (Pembukaan UUD 1945), which expressly declares that one of the fundamental goals of the Indonesian state is "to participate in the establishment of a world order based on freedom, lasting peace, and social justice" (ikut melaksanakan ketertiban dunia yang berdasarkan kemerdekaan, perdamaian abadi dan keadilan sosial). The Prabowo government has invoked precisely this clause to justify its decision, arguing that Indonesia's participation in the BoP is a concrete implementation of its independent and active foreign policy, and this principle emphasises Indonesia's active involvement in international forums to achieve world peace, as stated in the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution. On its face, this argument has constitutional plausibility: a body nominally dedicated to peace reconstruction would appear to sit comfortably within the constitutional mandate to promote lasting peace.

However, the constitutional case against membership is equally—if not more—compelling when one examines the deeper principles embedded in the same Preamble and in the broader constitutional architecture. The Preamble also enshrines the notion that independence is the right of all nations (kemerdekaan ialah hak segala bangsa), and that colonialism in all its forms must be abolished. The first major criticism of the BoP concerns the fundamental paradox of the organisation itself: it has notably excluded Palestine, an immediate victim of the ongoing conflict, while extending membership to Israel — a configuration that is considered unfair and unequal and that undermines the spirit of justice in international conflict resolution. From a constitutional standpoint, participating in a body that structurally marginalises the very people whose independence Indonesia has historically championed sits in profound tension with the Preamble's anti-colonial ethos.

The constitutional principle of bebas aktif—the free and active foreign policy doctrine that serves as the operational expression of the Preamble—adds another layer of constitutional concern. Critics argue that Indonesia's decision risks diluting its normative foreign policy principles, and the decision needs to be viewed in a wider context of what analysts describe as a transactional strategic shift under President Prabowo. The constitutional ideal of "free" (bebas) foreign policy means freedom from the gravitational pull of great power blocs, yet Indonesia was motivated to join by the ongoing trade negotiations with the US government, which culminated in the signing of the US-Indonesia Reciprocal Trade Agreement, and, according to reporting, joining the BoP was the Trump administration's precondition for the finalisation of the agreement. If membership was effectively coerced by trade threats, then the "freedom" component of bebas aktif is constitutionally compromised, because the foreign policy decision was not made from a position of genuine independence but under economic duress.

The governance structure of the BoP itself raises further constitutional concerns of sovereignty (kedaulatan), which is one of the foundational principles of the Indonesian constitutional order under Article 1. The Board's charter establishes a chairman-centred structure under which President Trump, as Chairman, holds sweeping authority to invite or exclude members, break ties, and approve or veto all Board resolutions. For a constitution that places popular sovereignty at its core and that jealously guards Indonesia's status as a free and independent state, the subordination of Indonesian foreign policy decisions to the veto of a foreign head of government—whose chairmanship is, astonishingly, not even tied to his presidential term—presents a real question of whether such an arrangement is compatible with the constitutional principle of national sovereignty. Trump's chairmanship is independent of his presidency of the United States, and he has indicated that he wants to remain chairman for life, with the sole authority to nominate his designated successor. 

The most recent developments have only sharpened the constitutional tension. Following the US and Israeli attacks on Iran, the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) urged the government to withdraw from the BoP, arguing that it is ineffective in achieving true independence for Palestine, and similar demands have been made by members of parliament. Despite this domestic pressure, President Prabowo convened a forum with former presidents, vice presidents, and party leaders at the Presidential Palace on 3 March 2026 to explain Indonesia's continued participation, with his allies affirming that Indonesia remains a member of the BoP. This tug-of-war between the executive and the broader political community reflects precisely the constitutional anxiety at play: the Preamble's mandate to pursue peace is being pulled in two directions simultaneously—towards pragmatic engagement and away from an arrangement that many Indonesians constitutionally feel betrays the foundational commitment to justice and self-determination for all peoples.

In sum, Indonesia's position in the Board of Peace is constitutionally ambiguous at best and constitutionally strained at worst. The government's argument that BoP membership fulfils the constitutional mandate to contribute to world peace is not without merit, but it sits uncomfortably alongside the constitutional imperatives of genuine freedom from great-power coercion, the inviolability of national sovereignty, the anti-colonial spirit of the Preamble, and the long-standing commitment to Palestinian self-determination that has animated Indonesian foreign policy since independence. President Prabowo has stated he is prepared to withdraw from the Board of Peace if it "fails to advance the goal of an independent Palestine," which at least suggests that the government itself recognises that the constitutional justification for membership is conditional rather than absolute.

Indonesia's Strategic Calculus: Withdraw or Remain in the Board of Peace?

The current context must first be understood before weighing either option. Foreign Minister Sugiono has stated that "all BoP discussions are currently suspended" owing to the situation in Iran, whilst US-Israeli airstrikes have disrupted global aviation, driven oil prices upward, and effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz. Indonesia thus finds itself in an exceedingly difficult position — caught between powerful domestic pressure to withdraw and geopolitical calculations that argue for remaining.

Advantages of Withdrawing

The most tangible advantage of a withdrawal decision is the restoration of Indonesia's moral and constitutional credibility in the eyes of the Islamic world. Indonesian public support for Palestinian independence has historically been strong and consistent, rooted in the constitutional mandate to oppose colonialism and uphold the right to self-determination. Indonesia's membership in the BoP creates a palpable moral contradiction, particularly given that Israel's membership in the BoP ought to be a compelling reason for Indonesia to withdraw without delay. By withdrawing, Indonesia restores the consistency between its rhetoric and its actions as a defender of Palestine—something that has long served as a pillar of its diplomatic identity.

Furthermore, Indonesia's withdrawal from the BoP would paradoxically strengthen its capacity as a genuine mediator. Jakarta now faces a choice in which mediation efforts may offer greater diplomatic capital than participation in a US-led initiative that is increasingly overshadowed by a broader regional war. As a party no longer bound to either camp, an Indonesia that has withdrawn from the BoP becomes far more credible in the eyes of Tehran and the broader Islamic world as a truly neutral interlocutor. Moreover, withdrawing legitimacy from a flawed process is sometimes more powerful than lending it. 

From the standpoint of domestic politics, Indonesia's withdrawal from the BoP would ease the mounting internal pressure that has been building steadily. A member of the House of Representatives from PDI-P, TB Hasanuddin, has called upon Indonesia to immediately leave the BoP in order to preserve its free and active foreign policy approach and to prevent any indication of tolerance towards aggression against other sovereign states. Such a step would also align the government's position with the demands of the MUI, academics, and civil society—all of whom constitute important constituencies for Prabowo's domestic political stability.

Disadvantages of Withdrawing

Nevertheless, the decision to withdraw carries risks that are by no means negligible. The most immediate and quantifiable risk is the threat to the bilateral trade agreement with the United States. BoP membership was linked to a contribution of one billion US dollars, and Indonesia's joining was effectively a precondition set by the Trump administration for the finalisation of the US-Indonesia Reciprocal Trade Agreement. Indonesia's withdrawal could trigger economic retaliation from Washington that might unsettle the rupiah and impede national economic growth targets. Furthermore, what appears to be a short-term gain from joining the BoP may produce long-term pain, but conversely, withdrawal too carries the risk of forcing Indonesia to choose between proximity to an unpredictable power and its own credibility as an independent actor. 

Indonesia's withdrawal could also narrow its room for influence over the Gaza peace process itself. Some analysts contend that the BoP is the only option currently available to the world for pursuing Palestinian independence, and that Indonesia ought to adopt an active position as a policymaker within the BoP — rather than merely a follower. By withdrawing, Indonesia forfeits its seat at the negotiating table which, however structurally flawed, remains the only forum in which the reconstruction of Gaza is being discussed in concrete terms.

Advantages of Remaining

The primary advantage of remaining in the BoP is the preservation of direct access to and influence over the regional peace agenda. According to the analysis of Indonesian experts, the BoP is currently the only option available to the world for pursuing Palestinian independence, and Indonesia must adopt an active position not merely as a follower but as a policymaker within the BoP. From within, Indonesia can theoretically push for the BoP to be more accommodating of Palestinian interests, press for the 20-point roadmap to be amended into an explicit two-state solution, and exploit its position to restrain initiatives that are harmful to that cause.

From an economic perspective, remaining means protecting the bilateral trade framework that has been painstakingly constructed. The newly signed US-Indonesia Reciprocal Trade Agreement represents an important economic milestone that provides market access, technology transfer, and investment that Indonesia requires to sustain its development trajectory. Indonesia's participation in the BoP, despite attracting criticism, reflects an attempt to balance pro-Iran sentiment domestically with the preservation of economic and security agreements recently secured with the United States. 

Disadvantages of Remaining

Conversely, remaining in the BoP in the midst of an active war carries reputational consequences of the most serious kind. The BoP is increasingly losing its moral, political, and even legal legitimacy, having proven itself incapable of creating genuine peace, let alone justice — such is the assessment of leading Indonesian academics. For a country that currently holds the Presidency of the UN Human Rights Council, involvement in a forum led by the United States whilst it is actively conducting military strikes represents a contradiction that is institutionally embarrassing in the extreme.

What is perhaps most concerning from a long-term perspective is the risk of the permanent erosion of Indonesia's diplomatic identity. Indonesia risks becoming a country that is present at every forum yet champions no values whatsoever — one that speaks the language of peace whilst accommodating injustice. This constitutes a serious erosion of the country's diplomatic heritage. Moreover, having no diplomatic relations with Israel, Jakarta holds no bilateral cards to play and cannot threaten to recall an ambassador or freeze trade assets, rendering Indonesia nothing more than a rule-taker rather than a rule-maker within the BoP. 

Conclusion: Where Does the Balance Lie?

The official and verified position of President Prabowo at present is to remain in the BoP. At a meeting held at the Presidential Palace on 3 March 2026, President Prabowo confirmed that Indonesia is maintaining its BoP membership even though the forum's principal driving force, the United States, is actively engaged in military action against Iran alongside Israel. NasDem Chairman Surya Paloh, who was present at the meeting, conveyed that "as of today, Indonesia's position remains as it is—staying in the Board of Peace." 

The justification employed by the government to sustain this membership has also been progressively reinforced over time. President Prabowo elaborated that Indonesia's membership was by no means an impulsive decision, but rather the outcome of extensive communication with the leaders of Gulf states, describing it as a strategic shift from an external position to one of "struggling from within the system." 

Nevertheless, this position is not entirely rigid. Indonesia has not ruled out the possibility of taking further steps, including evaluating its presence within the BoP together with other member states, "unless there are new developments in due course." In other words, the door to evaluation remains ajar — however, the prospect of unilateral withdrawal is not something that Prabowo is actively contemplating at the present time.

Which Option Yields Greater Benefit?

Under normal circumstances—that is, before the outbreak of the Iran-US-Israel war—the argument for remaining in the BoP carried considerable weight. The BoP is essentially the only option currently available to the world for pursuing Palestinian independence, and Indonesia ought to adopt an active position not merely as a follower but as a policymaker within the BoP. In that scenario, the economic costs of withdrawal—including the threat to the Reciprocal Trade Agreement with the United States — were too substantial to disregard, and the logic of "struggling from within the system" remained defensible.

However, circumstances have changed in a fundamentally irreversible manner since 28 February 2026. The longer the ongoing war continues, the greater the likelihood that Indonesia will abandon the initiative, and perhaps even the Gaza peace plan itself. This shift in circumstances alters the entire calculus at its foundation, for the BoP is no longer merely a controversial peace forum — it has become a forum chaired by a nation that is actively engaged in warfare. The MUI stated that the US strikes against Iran fundamentally undermine the credibility of the peace initiative. 

It is within this context that the weight of evidence suggests that the benefits of withdrawing from the BoP at this juncture outweigh the benefits of remaining, for three principal reasons that mutually reinforce one another.

First, concerning diplomatic credibility and identity, Indonesia cannot simultaneously offer itself as a mediator in the Iran-US-Israel war whilst remaining a member of a forum chaired by one of the belligerent parties. This contradiction is not merely a matter of optics—it operationally neutralises the effectiveness of Indonesia's mediation efforts. Tehran will not accept a mediation offer from a nation that shares a table with Washington within the BoP. Foreign policy experts have criticised Prabowo's move, highlighting the absence of Palestinian representation and the excessively dominant role of the United States within the BoP. 

Second, from a constitutional standpoint, as has been analysed at considerable length throughout this conversation, remaining in a forum whose structure subordinates Indonesia's decisions to the veto of a foreign chairman holding a lifelong appointment runs contrary to the principle of sovereignty enshrined in the 1945 Constitution. The longer Indonesia remains, the deeper the erosion of the bebas aktif principle that constitutes the constitutional foundation of its foreign policy.

Third, from the standpoint of domestic pragmatism, the pressure to withdraw immediately comes not only from the opposition, but from the MUI, members of the House of Representatives across party lines, and academics — and rather than allowing this situation to drag on and create ever greater difficulties, the government ought to take prompt steps to withdraw. President Prabowo's own domestic political stability is increasingly at risk should he persist in maintaining a position widely regarded as contrary to the fundamental values of the Indonesian majority.

As for the economic risk of withdrawal — namely, the threat to the trade agreement with the United States—this is real, yet must be assessed proportionately. Nahdlatul Ulama has suggested that Indonesia could use its role within the board to advocate for de-escalation in the Middle East and to promote renewed peace efforts, whilst calling for the board's agenda to be paused until negotiations begin to ease regional tensions. This "pause" option proposed by NU could in fact serve as an elegant middle path—Indonesia does not formally withdraw, yet neither does it actively participate, whilst simultaneously signalling to Washington that its membership is conditional. However, should the war continue without any sign of resolution, even a pause must ultimately be transformed into a formal and dignified withdrawal.

The overall conclusion is therefore as follows: Indonesia ought to prepare itself to exit the BoP in a measured, dignified, and strategically well-articulated manner—not out of emotional pressure, but because clear strategic and constitutional logic demands it. President Prabowo's decision to establish conditional terms is a step in the right direction. What is now required is the resolve to act upon those terms, should—and based on current developments, it appears sufficiently clear that—the BoP proves itself incapable of advancing Palestinian independence in the midst of this ongoing war.

[Part 6]
[Part 4]

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