Should the Free Nutritious Meals Programme Be Terminated

The Free Nutritious Meals Programme is a public policy designed to ensure adequate nutrition for schoolchildren, reduce stunting, improve concentration in class, and strengthen the foundations of long‑term human capital. Amid public debate, calls have arisen to terminate the programme because it places a heavy burden on the State Budget (APBN). This essay adopts a firm position: the programme must not be terminated. The analysis employs an ideopoleksosbud framework — ideology, politics, economy, social, and culture — to demonstrate that ending the programme would inflict structural harm far greater than the short‑term fiscal burden often cited as justification.

Theoretical Framework and Methodology

This analysis integrates human development theory, political legitimacy theory, and welfare perspectives. Methodologically, it is normative‑analytic: it examines the programme’s consistency with the nation’s ideological commitments, assesses political impacts on governmental legitimacy, evaluates the economic trade‑offs between fiscal outlays and human capital investment, and weighs social and cultural consequences. Arguments are constructed through causal and conceptual reasoning linking child nutrition to future productivity, public health costs, and social cohesion.

Ideological Analysis

From the standpoint of national ideology, particularly Pancasila which foregrounds social justice for all Indonesians, the Free Nutritious Meals Programme is a concrete manifestation of that mandate. A state that professes to secure citizens’ welfare cannot readily abandon responsibility for basic needs of children, especially nutrition that determines cognitive development and learning capacity. Terminating the programme solely for fiscal efficiency would be ideologically inconsistent: the state would be rhetorically committed to equity but retreat from implementation when costs become tangible.

Moreover, human development ideology prioritises investment in children as both a moral and strategic imperative. Adequate nutrition in childhood is not mere consumption; it is human capital formation shaping the next generation’s productive capacity. Thus, ending the programme would contravene ideological principles that require the state to prioritise the welfare of future citizens.

Political Analysis

Politically, the programme serves both symbolic and instrumental functions. Symbolically, it signals government commitment to public welfare; instrumentally, it can increase school attendance, reduce dropout rates, and enhance the administration’s public image. Termination would produce tangible political costs: erosion of public trust, narratives that the government values fiscal metrics over citizens’ welfare, and opportunities for opposition actors to mobilise discontent.

Political legitimacy depends on the perception that the state meets basic citizen needs. When policies that affect daily life—such as provision of nutritious meals to children—are withdrawn, legitimacy is undermined. Over the medium term, this erosion can precipitate political instability that, in turn, generates additional economic and social costs, rendering the short‑term fiscal savings counterproductive.

Economic Analysis

The principal fiscal objection is the programme’s drain on the APBN. While national‑scale programmes do require substantial budgetary allocations, a comprehensive economic assessment must account for long‑term costs and benefits. Childhood undernutrition is directly associated with reduced cognitive capacity, lower adult productivity, and higher lifetime healthcare costs due to chronic conditions rooted in early malnutrition.

Public expenditure on child nutrition should be viewed as productive investment in human capital. Spending on nutritious school meals increases learning outcomes and eventual earnings potential, thereby expanding the tax base and reducing future reliance on social assistance. Additionally, reductions in stunting and nutrition‑related illnesses lower public healthcare expenditure. Terminating the programme to reduce short‑term deficits, without considering cumulative effects on national productivity, is a shortsighted fiscal policy.

Cost‑benefit analyses typically show that the long‑term economic returns from improved child nutrition exceed initial outlays. Therefore, fiscal concerns alone do not justify termination; instead, budgetary management should focus on improving implementation efficiency while preserving coverage and quality.

Social Analysis

Socially, the Free Nutritious Meals Programme functions as a redistributive instrument that narrows disparities in access to basic needs. Children from low‑income households frequently face nutritional deficits that impede physical and cognitive development. The programme provides direct compensation that mitigates intergenerational inequality. Ending it would reinforce poverty cycles: undernourished children are more likely to underperform academically, secure lower‑paid employment, and perpetuate poverty into the next generation.

The programme also fosters social cohesion. State provision of basic needs strengthens perceptions of fairness and solidarity. Conversely, termination could engender feelings of injustice and alienation among vulnerable groups, weakening social networks essential for stability and collective action.

Cultural Analysis

Indonesia’s cultural values of gotong royong and mutual care are reflected in collective responsibility for the young and vulnerable. The Free Nutritious Meals Programme can be interpreted as a modern policy expression of these cultural norms. Termination would not merely be an economic decision; it would signal a cultural shift towards individualisation of welfare responsibilities, placing the burden solely on families.

Such a shift risks eroding communal practices of mutual support. Over time, diminished collective responsibility may reduce societal capacity to cooperate in addressing shared challenges, including public health crises and natural disasters.

Addressing Fiscal Objections and Policy Recommendations

Fiscal concerns are the most frequently cited reason for calls to terminate the programme. These concerns can be addressed without abolishing the programme. First, conduct independent audits and operational reviews to eliminate waste, leakage, and corruption. Second, improve targeting so that resources prioritise the most vulnerable populations. Third, integrate the programme with complementary interventions—nutrition education, support for local agriculture, and family economic empowerment—to amplify impact.

Concrete policy recommendations include:

• Strengthen targeting mechanisms to ensure benefits reach the most needy.
• Enhance transparency and accountability in procurement and distribution to reduce leakage.
• Standardise kitchen operations and food safety protocols, and provide training for staff.
• Foster public‑private and civil society partnerships to share costs and introduce innovation.
• Integrate the programme with health and education services to create synergistic outcomes.
• Implement rigorous monitoring and evaluation using outcome indicators such as stunting reduction and academic performance.
• These measures demonstrate that fiscal constraints are a managerial challenge rather than a reason to terminate a strategically important programme.

Risks and Consequences of Termination

Terminating the programme would carry concrete risks: increased stunting and malnutrition, declining academic achievement, higher long‑term healthcare costs, erosion of political legitimacy, and weakened social cohesion. These risks are cumulative and mutually reinforcing, meaning the aggregate cost of termination would far exceed immediate budgetary savings. In strategic terms, termination would constitute a false economy: short‑term fiscal relief that generates larger social and economic liabilities in the future.

The Free Nutritious Meals Programme must be kept, and its governance and accountability need urgent improvement so public funds are used efficiently and can be properly accounted for. Improvements should include transparent, auditable procurement, clear division of responsibilities between central and local government, and firm sanctions for misuse to reduce budget leakage.

To ensure the benefits reach those who need them most, the targeting system must be refined so assistance goes to vulnerable children and communities rather than being distributed uniformly. A data‑driven approach using social protection registries and school enrolment records will cut waste, and an appeals process should be available to prevent eligible families from being excluded.

Meal quality directly affects nutritional outcomes, so nutrition standards and menu design must be clear and evidence‑based. Menus developed by qualified nutritionists and adapted to local ingredients and seasons will increase acceptance, reduce food waste and ensure adequate calories, protein and micronutrients.

Operational problems often stem from limited capacity at school kitchens and local providers, so technical skills must be strengthened through certification, training and regular inspections. Kitchens and suppliers should meet food‑safety, storage and distribution standards, and central kitchens must have reliable cold‑chain systems.

To contain costs without lowering quality, procurement and supply chains must be reformed. Open, competitive tendering and local sourcing where feasible will reduce prices and support local farmers, while contracts should include clear performance metrics and penalties for non‑compliance.

Policy decisions must be guided by solid evidence, which means establishing a robust monitoring and evaluation system. Real‑time data on coverage, meal quality, school attendance, nutritional outcomes and unit costs should be collected, and findings focused on reductions in stunting and improvements in learning should be published regularly.

Financial sustainability requires a mix of efficiency measures, diversified funding and medium‑term budget planning. Savings can come from cutting duplication and administrative overheads, while additional funding might be secured from local government contributions, targeted private‑sector partnerships and performance‑based grants.

Community involvement will improve accountability and local relevance. Parents’ associations, farmer cooperatives and credible civil‑society organisations should be engaged in menu design, quality monitoring and logistical support, with clear rules to prevent conflicts of interest.

Reform also depends on skilled personnel, so investment in human resources is essential. Training for procurement officers, nutritionists, kitchen managers and monitoring staff, together with career paths and performance incentives, will help retain qualified staff and build lasting capacity.

Public trust is vital, so transparency and communication must be prioritised. An accessible public dashboard showing budgets, procurement contracts, service coverage and evaluation results will reduce misinformation and enable civic oversight. Clear, regular communication about the programme’s aims, costs and measurable outcomes will help secure broad public support for its continuation. 

Conclusion

Based on an ideopoleksosbud analysis, the Free Nutritious Meals Programme must not be terminated. The strongest rationale is that termination would undermine investment in human capital, contravene the principle of social justice enshrined in Pancasila, erode political legitimacy, exacerbate social inequality, and weaken cultural norms of mutual care. The fiscal burden cited by critics is a solvable governance issue; it should be addressed through improved management, targeting, transparency, and cross‑sector collaboration rather than by abolishing a programme with strategic long‑term benefits.

Closing Remarks and Policy Implications

Retaining the programme requires a firm commitment to efficiency, transparency, and evidence‑based evaluation. The government should treat the programme as a strategic investment rather than a mere expenditure. Better implementation will maximise economic and social returns, reinforce political legitimacy, and uphold the nation’s ideological and cultural commitments. Maintaining the Free Nutritious Meals Programme is therefore a rational, ethical, and strategic choice for the country’s future.

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Pertamax and The Paradox of Indonesia's Energy Policy

Every time the government or PT Pertamina (Persero) announces (it should be, but in recent years, it has been done secretly in the middle of the night along with thieves looting people's homes) an increase in the price of fuel (Bahan Bakar Minyak / BBM), the public response is almost invariably the same: waves of criticism on social media, long queues at petrol station forecourts, and demonstrations across the country. Yet this patterned, recurring response conceals a deeper question—is a fuel price increase merely a technical fiscal matter, or does it in fact reflect an ideological choice and the direction of a nation’s energy politics?

I. BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM

Pertamax, a petrol with a 92 octane rating, occupies a unique position within Indonesia’s energy policy architecture. Unlike Pertalite (RON 90) and Solar (diesel), which receive direct subsidies from the State Budget (Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara / APBN), Pertamax is classified as a non-subsidised fuel. Its retail price is therefore linked directly to global market mechanisms: international crude oil prices, the rupiah-to-US-dollar exchange rate, and distribution and operational costs.

Periodically, Pertamina adjusts the price of Pertamax with reference to the Mean of Platts Singapore (MOPS) formula, plus an alpha or profit margin. When global oil prices fluctuate violently—as occurred in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, the global energy crisis of 2021–2022, and the Russia–Ukraine geopolitical tensions—the price of Pertamax rises correspondingly.

Although Pertamax is unsubsidised, the impact of its price increases cannot be dismissed out of hand. Millions of motor vehicles in Indonesia—particularly in urban areas—consume Pertamax daily. Pertamax users are predominantly urban middle-class motorists who own vehicles with fuel-injection engines, which require higher-octane petrol to maintain engine performance and efficiency.

On the fiscal front, the government faces a far from simple dilemma. Energy subsidies—particularly for Pertalite, Solar, and 3-kilogram LPG canisters—place an enormous burden on the state budget. In years when global oil prices are elevated, subsidy expenditure can reach hundreds of trillions of rupiah, threatening the balance of the APBN and the government’s capacity to fund other development programmes. In this context, increases in the price of non-subsidised fuels such as Pertamax are frequently positioned as part of a broader fiscal rationalisation strategy.

“When the price of Pertamax rises, it is not merely a number on a petrol station forecourt that changes. What changes is the social equilibrium, the economic burden on households, and public trust in the government.”

This essay seeks to dissect the complexities of the impact of Pertamax price increases through five analytical lenses: an ideological perspective that interrogates the role of the state versus the market; a political perspective that examines governmental legitimacy and stability; an economic perspective that analyses the impact on purchasing power and the state budget; a social perspective that unpacks inequality and public responses; and a cultural perspective that highlights the values, identities, and collective narratives embedded in energy consumption.

II. THE IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

2.1. The State as Protector or the Market as Arbiter?

The most fundamental debate underlying fuel pricing policy is an authentically ideological question: to what extent should the state intervene in regulating energy prices? At one pole lies an interventionist view, which holds that energy is an essential public good and that the state is therefore obliged to ensure its accessibility to all citizens. At the other, the free-market perspective argues that state interference creates distortions, inefficiencies, and an unsustainable fiscal burden.

Indonesia, in its historical and constitutional context, has in fact already formulated an answer to this question. Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution explicitly states that the land, waters, and natural resources contained therein are controlled by the state and used for the greatest possible welfare of the people. The phrase “controlled by the state” does not mean outright ownership or monopoly, but rather that the state possesses the authority to regulate, supervise, and direct the exploitation of natural resources — including energy—in the public interest.

In practice, however, the implementation of this constitutional mandate frequently comes into conflict with the pressures of global economic liberalisation. Indonesia’s membership of various free trade agreements and its need to attract foreign investment have impelled the government to progressively reduce its intervention in price mechanisms. The fuel deregulation policies that commenced during the Reform Era (Reformasi) represent the clearest expression of this ideological shift.

2.2. Energy Justice: Who Is Protected?

From the perspective of energy justice, Indonesia’s two-tier fuel pricing policy—subsidised Pertalite and Solar on the one hand, non-subsidised Pertamax on the other—contains a genuine paradox. On the one side, Pertalite and Solar subsidies are nominally intended to protect lower-income households. On the other, a body of research indicates that the bulk of the benefits from fuel subsidies are in fact enjoyed by upper-middle-class households, which own considerably more motor vehicles.

Meanwhile, the middle class who consciously choose Pertamax—whether because their vehicles’ engine specifications require higher-octane petrol, or out of environmental and efficiency considerations—bear the full cost of global oil price volatility. They receive no subsidy protection, yet nor are they sufficiently affluent to absorb price increases without financial consequence.

This situation raises a deeper ideological question: is social justice in energy policy adequately measured by the availability of cheap fuel for particular groups, or must it encompass a more comprehensive principle concerning who bears the cost of the externalities of fossil fuel consumption?

III. THE POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE

3.1. Governmental Legitimacy Amid Rising Prices

Politically, a fuel price increase is amongst the most high-risk decisions any government can take. Indonesian history records that such increases have almost invariably triggered significant socio-political upheaval. Student and labour protests, falling public trust indices, and heightened opposition sentiment are consequences that can be expected to follow virtually every price announcement.

This occurs because fuel has become a form of “social contract” between the state and its citizens. The public, regardless of market logic and fiscal rationality, holds the expectation that the state—as steward of natural resources—ought to be capable of providing energy at affordable prices. When that expectation is violated, the reaction is not merely an economic grievance but a deeper political disillusionment.

Interestingly, different governments have adopted markedly different political communication strategies when confronting fuel price increases. The Soeharto era foregrounded a narrative of sacrifice for national development. The early Reform Era tended to be more defensive and reactive. The administration of Joko Widodo, particularly at the time of the September 2022 fuel price increases, attempted to frame the rises as “difficult but responsible choices”, whilst simultaneously announcing a social protection compensation package worth Rp 24.17 trillion.

3.2. Political Stability and Opportunities for the Opposition

Price increases for Pertamax have consistently been exploited by opposition groups as ammunition for criticism of the government. The narratives constructed typically revolve around two accusations: first, that the government has failed to manage the economy competently, such that fuel prices continue to rise; and second, that the government is more aligned with the interests of corporations and the global market than with those of the people.

In the age of digital democracy, this dynamic has grown considerably more complex. Social media accelerates the spread of negative sentiment and enables the rapid mobilisation of large numbers of people. Hashtags criticising fuel policy effortlessly become trending topics, generating genuine political pressure even if they do not always reflect the majority of public opinion.

“In modern democracy, public perception of policy is as important as the substance of the policy itself. A government that fails to manage the narrative will encounter political resistance far greater than the actual economic impact warrants.”

Political stability is also bound up with the government’s capacity to build supporting coalitions. When the price of Pertamax rises, transport business associations, logistics associations, and trade unions typically become the most vociferous critics. The government’s ability to manage the interests of these groups is a decisive factor in determining how far a price increase will destabilise the political landscape.

3.3. The Narrative of National Energy Policy

How the government frames Pertamax price increases within a broader national energy policy narrative is also a crucial political dimension. Successful governments are those able to connect short-term, painful policies to a convincing long-term vision—for instance, an energy transition, renewable energy development, or a more precisely targeted subsidy reform programme.

The challenge, however, is that energy transition narratives are frequently too abstract and long-term to dampen public disappointment that is immediate and concrete. When Pertamax prices rise today, promises about solar panels and electric vehicles in the future feel far too distant to offer much consolation.

IV. THE ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE

4.1. The Impact on Inflation and Purchasing Power

From a macroeconomic standpoint, Pertamax price increases carry both direct and indirect consequences for the national rate of inflation. The direct impact is felt in the transport component of the Consumer Price Index (CPI), whilst the indirect impact is wider and more sustained—affecting the entire supply chain that depends on fuel as a production input.

Transport is the most sensitive sector. Freight vehicles, ride-hailing services, motorcycle taxis (ojek), and various other modes of commercial transport immediately revise their fares when fuel prices rise. These fare adjustments then ripple through to the prices of consumer goods, since virtually every product that reaches the consumer passes through a distribution process dependent upon fuel.

Bank Indonesia, as the monetary authority, must tread carefully in responding to fuel-price-driven inflation. On the one hand, rising inflation calls for a tighter monetary policy stance. On the other hand, excessive monetary tightening risks slowing economic growth. This is the classic dilemma confronted by central banks in developing nations when faced with supply-side inflation.

4.2. The Knock-On Effect: From Logistics to Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises

One of the most significant yet frequently overlooked impacts of Pertamax price increases is the knock-on effect on Micro, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (MSMEs, or UMKMs in Indonesian). MSMEs are the backbone of the Indonesian economy, contributing more than 60 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and absorbing more than 97 per cent of the workforce.

MSMEs in the food and beverage sector, for instance, face simultaneous increases in raw material costs and distribution expenses. Small traders (warung) that use refrigerated motorcycles to transport ice or fresh produce must bear higher operating costs. Catering businesses, grocery shops, and market traders face pressure from two directions: costs are rising whilst consumer purchasing power is being eroded.

The capacity of MSMEs to absorb these cost increases is far more limited than that of large corporations, which can achieve economies of scale, negotiate long-term contracts, or even hedge against commodity price fluctuations. As a consequence, fuel price increases frequently impose a disproportionately heavier burden on small business operators.

4.3. Implications for the State Budget

From a fiscal perspective, Pertamax price increases have an ambivalent relevance for the state budget. On the one side, state revenues from oil and gas taxation and non-tax state revenue (PNBP) will increase as prices rise. On the other, the inflationary pressures generated may compel the government to increase allocations for social protection and direct cash transfers.

Of greater strategic importance is how Pertamax price increases are positioned within the context of broader energy subsidy reform. If such increases are accompanied by a restructuring of subsidy schemes towards more precisely targeted delivery—for example, through direct cash transfers to vulnerable groups—the net fiscal impact could be substantially positive.

However, Indonesia continues to face significant challenges in respect of its subsidy recipient database. Subsidy programmes that are poorly targeted not only squander state resources but also create long-term moral hazard and economic inefficiency. Without comprehensive subsidy system reform, Pertamax price increases merely relocate the fiscal problem rather than resolve it.

V. THE SOCIAL PERSPECTIVE

5.1. An Added Burden on the Urban Middle Class

Indonesia’s urban middle class occupies a paradoxical position: too affluent to qualify for subsidies, yet not wealthy enough to absorb price increases without consequence. They are the principal users of Pertamax—both because their vehicles’ engine specifications require higher-octane fuel and because they were concerned for efficiency and environmental responsibility.

When Pertamax prices rise, the consequences for the middle class are cumulative. Daily transport costs increase, basic necessities become more expensive, and the room for saving or investment narrows further. In a context where Indonesia’s middle class remains highly vulnerable—many having only recently graduated from the “near-poor” category—this pressure can have a significant impact on their social mobility.

This phenomenon is also reflected in changing consumption behaviour. Research indicates that a proportion of Pertamax users switch to Pertalite when the price differential widens significantly, despite the attendant risks of reduced engine efficiency and increased vehicle emissions. Others begin to consider greater use of public transport or vehicle-sharing arrangements in order to reduce costs.

5.2. Inequality and Social Resentment

One of the most subtle yet potentially explosive social impacts of Pertamax price increases is the potential widening of social inequality and horizontal resentment. When Pertalite subsidies are maintained whilst Pertamax prices are raised, an increasingly clear demarcation emerges between the “subsidised group” and the “group paying market prices.”

At the community level, this distinction can deepen existing social fault lines. Moreover, debates about who is “entitled” to subsidies are frequently laden with assumptions about class, lifestyle, and social propriety that are not always accurate or fair.

“Inequality is not merely a matter of income differentials; it is also a question of who bears risk and uncertainty. In the fuel context, Pertamax users absorb the volatility of global oil prices, whilst Pertalite users are shielded by subsidies whose financing comes from taxes paid by all citizens—including Pertamax users themselves.”

5.3. Public Response and Adaptation

Indonesian society has demonstrated a considerable capacity for adaptation when confronted with fuel price increases. Responses range widely: from formal protests through demonstrations and petitions, to pragmatic adjustments in everyday behaviour.

Several commonly observed adaptation patterns include the following:

• Switching to lower-octane fuel, albeit with the risk of reduced engine efficiency

• Increased use of public transport or ride-hailing services for particular journeys

• Journey consolidation—combining several errands into a single trip

• Growing interest in electric vehicles as a long-term alternative

• The formation of carpooling communities and vehicle-sharing arrangements

Viewed positively, these adaptations may in the long run drive more sustainable behavioural change. However, access to these alternatives is not evenly distributed—not everyone lives in an area served by an adequate public transport network, and not everyone is in a position to switch to an electric vehicle.

VI. THE CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE

6.1. A Culture of Private Vehicle Ownership: The Structural Root of Dependency

To understand why the impact of Pertamax price increases is felt so keenly in Indonesia, it is necessary to examine the cultural roots of the country’s energy consumption patterns. Indonesia is one of the largest automotive markets in South-East Asia, with a motor vehicle fleet that continues to grow year on year. Ownership of a private vehicle—particularly a motorcycle—has become a kind of minimum standard of living in many urban areas.

This phenomenon is not solely the product of individual choice; it is the consequence of urban planning policies and infrastructure development that, over several decades, have consistently prioritised roads over public transport. Indonesian cities, particularly those outside the Jabodetabek agglomeration, were built on the assumption that their residents would use private vehicles. Without a vehicle, everyday mobility becomes severely restricted.

As a result, motor vehicle ownership is no longer merely a lifestyle choice but a functional necessity that cannot easily be negotiated away. In this context, fuel price increases do not merely affect one’s wallet; they strike at the very foundations of daily mobility and productivity.

6.2. Pertamax as a Status Symbol and Marker of Social Identity

Beyond its technical function, Pertamax also carries a symbolic dimension that cannot be overlooked. Within Indonesia’s fuel hierarchy, Pertamax — and even more so Pertamax Turbo or Pertamina Dex — is frequently perceived as a more “upmarket” or “prestigious” choice than Pertalite. Choosing Pertamax is regarded as a marker of financial capability, quality consciousness, or concern for the condition of one’s engine.

This perception is not merely an external projection; it has also been actively constructed through Pertamina’s marketing strategy, which promotes Pertamax as the fuel for high-quality vehicles. Pertamax advertisements habitually project images of luxury, smooth motoring, and well-maintained engines—reinforcing the association between fuel choice and social status.

When Pertamax prices rise, users who have chosen this fuel as part of their social identity face a cultural dilemma: to continue using Pertamax in order to maintain their social image, or to switch to Pertalite at the risk of being perceived as having “come down in the world.” This dynamic may sound trivial, yet it reflects how deeply social values can be embedded in everyday consumption decisions.

6.3. Media Narratives and the Framing of Popular Culture

The manner in which media and popular culture frame the issue of Pertamax price increases is also an important cultural dimension. Two dominant frames recur in Indonesian media coverage and public discourse.

The first is the “crisis” frame: price increases are portrayed as indicators of economic policy failure, public suffering, and governmental incompetence. This frame predominates in media outlets that adopt a critical stance towards the government and frequently gives rise to dramatic narratives about the impact of the rises.

The second is the “routine” frame: as price increases recur, segments of the public and media begin to treat them as ordinary events requiring no extraordinary reaction. “Fuel has gone up again” becomes a kind of routine that generates a well-established cycle of complaint and adaptation.

What is striking is how memes, humour, and viral content on social media have become a paradoxically expressive medium—at once serious and comic. Such content reflects the manner in which Indonesian society processes socio-economic pressure through cultural creativity and horizontal solidarity, whilst simultaneously revealing how deeply the fuel issue has become embedded in the popular consciousness.

VII. REFLECTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Having navigated five distinct analytical perspectives—ideological, political, economic, social, and cultural — we arrive at a conclusion that is paradoxical yet important: a Pertamax price increase is not merely a technical commodity price adjustment. It is a multidimensional event that reflects and reproduces fundamental choices about how this country wishes to be governed and in whose interests.

From an ideological perspective, every decision about the price of Pertamax contains an implicit answer to questions about the role of the state in the economy, the meaning of social justice, and intergenerational responsibility for environmental sustainability. From a political perspective, fuel price increases constitute a serious test of governmental legitimacy and the state’s capacity to manage public expectations.

Economically, the impact of Pertamax price increases resonates far beyond merely a rise in an individual’s petrol expenditure—it affects inflation, purchasing power, the viability of MSMEs, and the fiscal balance of the state. Socially, it reinforces existing fault lines of inequality and tests society’s adaptive capacity. Culturally, it touches identity, values, and the way in which society understands itself in relation to the state and the market.

More important than the question of whether a Pertamax price increase is right or wrong is a more fundamental question: does Indonesia possess a coherent, equitable, and sustainable national energy vision? A vision that is not merely reactive to global oil price fluctuations, but proactive in building an energy infrastructure that reduces dependence on fossil fuels, promotes the transition to renewable energy, and ensures that the burdens and benefits of that transition are borne equitably by all sections of society.

“Today’s rise in the price of Pertamax is not merely an economic figure. It is a harbinger of the collective choices we have made and will continue to make regarding the direction of development, social justice, and the legacy we leave to future generations.”

In the final analysis, the best response to Pertamax price increases is not mere protest or resignation, but a consistent demand upon the government to build an energy policy that is transparent, equitable, and far-sighted—one that does not merely calculate short-term fiscal costs and benefits, but also takes into account the social, ecological, and generational costs of every energy choice made.

Indonesia, with all its extraordinary natural resource wealth and vast renewable energy potential, possesses every means necessary to build a more independent, more equitable, and more sustainable energy system. What is required is the political courage to make difficult choices today for the sake of a better future for all its citizens.

REFERENCES AND SOURCES

The following represent key conceptual and empirical references pertinent to the themes addressed in this essay:

• Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS). Monthly Inflation Reports and Consumer Price Index. Jakarta: BPS.

• Bank Indonesia. Financial Stability Reviews and Indonesian Economic Reports. Jakarta: BI.

• Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (ESDM). Non-Subsidised Fuel Price Policy. Jakarta: Ministry of ESDM.

• PT Pertamina (Persero). Annual Reports and Fuel Price Adjustment Policies. Jakarta: Pertamina.

• Institute for Economic and Social Research (LPEM), University of Indonesia. Analysis of the Impact of Fuel Price Increases on Inflation and Poverty. Jakarta: LPEM UI.

• International Energy Agency (IEA). World Energy Outlook. Paris: IEA.

• Stiglitz, J. E. (2002). Globalisation and Its Discontents. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

• Sadli, M. (1993). Economic Problems and Government Policy in Indonesia. Jakarta: LP3ES.

• Winters, J. A. (2011). Oligarchy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

• Aspinall, E., & Mietzner, M. (Eds.) (2010). Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia. Singapore: ISEAS.

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CHANGING THE GUARD AT THE NATIONAL NUTRITION AGENCY: A MOMENT OF REFORM OR MERELY A CHANGE OF FACE?

The Free Nutritious Meals Programme (Makan Bergizi Gratis, hereafter MBG) stands as one of the flagship initiatives of President Prabowo Subianto's administration, launched on 6 January 2025. Designed to serve millions of beneficiaries — from toddlers and school pupils across all levels of education to pregnant and breastfeeding women — the programme carries the commendable ambition of reducing stunting and malnutrition as part of the broader vision of a prosperous Indonesia by 2045. By June 2026, it had reportedly reached 62.9 million beneficiaries, a figure that, in sheer scale, commands respect.

Yet beneath these impressive numbers lies a series of serious problems that cannot be overlooked. On 2 June 2026, President Prabowo formally removed Dadan Hindayana from his post as Head of the Badan Gizi Nasional (BGN, the National Nutrition Agency) after eighteen months in office, replacing him with Nanik Sudaryati Deyang. This was no routine reshuffle. It constituted an open admission that something had gone fundamentally wrong in the management of the largest nutritional programme in Indonesia's history. The question that immediately follows is whether this change of leadership is sufficient to address the deep-seated structural problems at hand, or whether it amounts to little more than rearranging the furniture whilst the foundations remain unsound.

A Critical Appraisal of New Leadership at Indonesia's Badan Gizi Nasional

The Anatomy of Failure: Why Dadan Had to Go

The removal of Dadan Hindayana was grounded in an eighteen-month evaluation that identified three principal shortcomings: violations of standard operating procedures (SOPs), deficiencies in organisational governance, and a failure to maintain the food quality standards established by the BGN itself. None of these can be dismissed as minor technical oversights; collectively, they strike at the very heart of what a large-scale food distribution programme must get right.

The concrete evidence of these failures is sobering. Data from the Ministry of Health recorded 37,673 cases of food poisoning across 445 incidents as of May 2026, with 2,348 victims requiring hospitalisation. The Indonesian Education Monitoring Network (JPPI) reported an even higher cumulative figure of 21,254 poisoning cases from 2025 through to early 2026. In the city of Solo alone, 78 out of the operational nutrition service units (SPPG) were found to be non-compliant with technical guidelines — their facilities substandard, their physical construction deviating from specifications, and lacking dedicated spaces for nutrition supervisors.

These failures echo well-established findings in the academic literature on government-run food programmes. Bhutta et al. (2013), writing in The Lancet, argue unequivocally that nutritional interventions will falter in the absence of rigorous quality oversight and consistent food safety standards. Similarly, Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler (2004), in their seminal framework on transformative social protection, caution that programmes focused solely on quantitative reach — how many people are covered — whilst neglecting the quality of the service provided, risk producing outcomes that are ultimately counterproductive to the very welfare they seek to promote.

Nanik S. Deyang: Assets and Expectations

Nanik Sudaryati Deyang is no stranger to the BGN. She served as Deputy Head for Public Communication and Investigation from 17 September 2025 — approximately nine months before her appointment as head — and her tenure in that role was not confined to administrative routine. She was actively engaged in field monitoring, budget efficiency reviews, and the closure of substandard production kitchens. It is this track record, more than anything else, that provides the most credible basis for cautious optimism about her leadership.

Her academic credentials — a first degree in Biology from Universitas Jenderal Soedirman and a Master's in Forestry from Universitas Gadjah Mada — offer a grounding in the life sciences, even if they do not directly encompass clinical nutrition. Her earlier role as Deputy Head of the Body for Accelerating Poverty Alleviation (2024–2025) and her continued involvement with the GSN Foundation, which focuses on empowering women, children, and the poor, suggest a genuine familiarity with the programme's target groups.

Nanik also brings a quality that many career technocrats lack: the investigative instinct of a seasoned journalist. As a former editor-in-chief of Femme magazine and a commissioner of several media companies, she is trained to identify problems, shape narratives, and manage crises under public scrutiny. At a time when the MBG is beset by negative press coverage and protests from various quarters, these communication and investigative capabilities may prove to be genuine assets.

From the perspective of leadership theory, the political trust vested in Nanik by the President — she was a loyal member of the Prabowo-Sandi campaign team in 2019 and serves as Vice Chair of the GSN Foundation — can be read as conferring sufficient political capital to take decisive action when needed. Burns (1978), in his foundational work on transformational leadership, emphasises that meaningful institutional change requires a leader who possesses not only moral vision but also the full confidence of the highest authority. On that criterion, Nanik would appear to be reasonably well-placed.

The Challenges Ahead: Not a Question of Willingness, but of Systems

Optimism, however, must be tempered by a clear-eyed assessment of the scale of the challenges awaiting the new head. The first and most urgent is the ongoing crisis of food poisoning. The figure of 37,673 victims is not merely a statistic; it is evidence of a systemic failure across the food safety chain — from production kitchens and distribution logistics through to the point of service. Arresting this failure requires far more than vocal leadership: it demands comprehensive SOP reform and real-time audit mechanisms that are genuinely operational rather than merely nominal.

The second challenge is the absence of adequate legal foundations. As of June 2026, the Presidential Regulation (Perpres) governing the MBG's operational framework had still not been issued, despite the programme having been in operation for more than ten months. The House of Representatives has repeatedly pressed the government for regulatory clarity. Without a Perpres, the division of responsibilities between institutions remains ambiguous, accountability is diffuse, and the BGN is exposed to legitimate legal challenges. This is not a problem that Nanik can resolve on her own; it demands political will from the government as a whole.

The third challenge concerns the management of an enormous budget. The MBG has been allocated between IDR 335 trillion and IDR 400 trillion for 2026 — a 96 per cent increase on the previous year — to serve a target of 82.9 million beneficiaries. The sheer scale of these resources creates fertile ground for inefficiency and misappropriation. Reports by BBC Indonesia have drawn attention to more than a hundred partner foundations affiliated with individuals close to government officials, the marginal participation of local small and medium enterprises, and the opacity surrounding the remuneration of workers officially classified as volunteers. These are warning signs that demand urgent attention.

Sidel and Jones (2019) have written perceptively on this risk in the context of developing countries, describing the phenomenon of "elite capture" — a condition in which the benefits of social programmes are diverted towards those already in positions of power rather than reaching the intended recipients. This risk becomes substantially more pronounced when independent oversight mechanisms are weak or poorly functioning.

The fourth challenge is the complexity entailed by operating at such an extraordinary scale. Overseeing a programme that reaches 62.9 million people across Indonesia — including the most remote and underdeveloped regions known as daerah 3T — is a logistical undertaking of remarkable difficulty. An institution whose capacity has not yet fully matured cannot simply be propelled forward by the energy and good intentions of a new leader. What is required is planned and systematic institutional strengthening.

Finally, there remains the question of technical competence. Nanik is not a nutritionist, not a medical professional, and has no prior experience managing a food programme of comparable scale. In a programme whose central concern is the health and safety of millions of children, dependence on a capable and well-resourced technical team is not optional — it is essential. As Marini et al. (2017) demonstrate in their analysis of school nutrition programmes in developing countries, the effectiveness of nutritional interventions is determined above all by the quality of evidence-based monitoring and evaluation systems, not by the general management or communications abilities of the leadership at the top.

Is a Change of Leadership Sufficient?

The critical question that must be confronted is this: does the root cause of the MBG's problems lie in its leadership, or in the design of the programme itself? If the principal failing has been a lack of rigour in enforcing SOPs, then Nanik — with her record of closing non-compliant kitchens and her investigative disposition — does represent a logical source of hope. But if the problems are structural in nature — weak regulation, inadequate institutional capacity, and entrenched conflicts of interest — then changing the head of the agency is, at best, a sticking plaster applied to a deeper wound.

The Indonesian Child Protection Commission (KPAI) has framed this correctly: what is needed is not merely a change of personnel but a thorough overhaul of governance. The Centre for Indonesian Policy Studies (CIPS) has gone further, calling for a fundamental re-evaluation of the programme in light of the mounting poisoning cases that have endangered the very groups it was designed to protect.

Nanik Sudaryati Deyang inherits her position under far from favourable circumstances. She takes on a programme that is simultaneously ambitious and troubled, burdened with a vast budget, intense public scrutiny, and expectations that considerably exceed the institutional capacity available to meet them. The political trust she enjoys from the President is a valuable asset, but it is not sufficient on its own. What is more urgently required is systemic reform: the enactment of the MBG's Perpres, the strengthening of independent audit mechanisms, the consistent enforcement of food safety standards, and a genuine openness to evaluation grounded in scientific evidence.

Conclusion

The Free Nutritious Meals Programme represents a laudable intention in need of substantially better execution. The replacement of the BGN's head in June 2026 is an event that admits of two interpretations: either it signals the government's genuine readiness to put its house in order, or it represents an attempt to find a scapegoat without addressing the underlying causes of dysfunction. This moment will carry real meaning only if it is followed by structural reform of genuine substance.

Nanik S. Deyang possesses sufficient assets to serve as an effective agent of change — insider knowledge of the BGN's operations, the President's confidence, and a sharp investigative sensibility. Yet she must also recognise that the challenges before her exceed what any individual can resolve alone. The long-term success of the MBG is not primarily a question of who leads the BGN; it is a question of whether the entire policy ecosystem — regulation, oversight, budgetary management, and technical human resources — can be reformed in a systematic and accountable manner, in the service of the Indonesian children who remain the programme's ultimate purpose.

References

Foreign References

Bhutta, Z. A., Das, J. K., Rizvi, A., Gaffey, M. F., Walker, N., Horton, S., ... & Black, R. E. (2013). Evidence-based interventions for improvement of maternal and child nutrition: What can be done and at what cost? The Lancet, 382(9890), 452–477. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(13)60646-6

Burns, J. M. (1978). Leadership. Harper & Row.

Devereux, S., & Sabates-Wheeler, R. (2004). Transformative social protection. IDS Working Paper 232. Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex.

Marini, A., Rokx, C., & Gallagher, P. (2017). Standing tall: Peru's success in overcoming its stunting crisis. World Bank Group. https://doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-1205-9

Sidel, M., & Jones, B. (2019). Elite capture and civil society in Southeast Asia: Rethinking social protection programs. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 50(1), 45–67. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022463418000929

World Food Programme. (2020). State of school feeding worldwide 2020. World Food Programme. https://www.wfp.org/publications/state-school-feeding-worldwide-2020

Indonesian References

Badan Gizi Nasional. (2026). Progres kinerja BGN per 1 Juni 2026. Kompas TV Nasional. https://www.kompas.tv/nasional/672561/progres-kinerja-bgn-per-1-juni-2026

BBC Indonesia. (2026, February). Dapur MBG bermasalah: Pengelolaan dan konflik kepentingan [MBG kitchens problematic: Management and conflicts of interest]. BBC Indonesia. https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/articles/czxgx1rx2pxo

Bisnis.com. (2026, 2 June). Ini alasan Prabowo ganti Dadan Hindayana sebagai Kepala BGN [The reasons behind Prabowo's replacement of Dadan Hindayana as BGN Head]. Bisnis.com. https://kabar24.bisnis.com/read/20260602/15/1977954/ini-alasan-prabowo-ganti-dadan-hindayana-sebagai-kepala-bgn

CNN Indonesia. (2026, 2 June). Profil Nanik S. Deyang, Kepala BGN baru pengganti Dadan Hindayana [Profile: Nanik S. Deyang, the new BGN Head replacing Dadan Hindayana]. CNN Indonesia. https://www.cnnindonesia.com/ekonomi/20260602202013-92-1364655/

Databoks Katadata. (2026). RAPBN 2026: Anggaran Makan Bergizi Gratis Rp335 triliun [State Budget 2026: Free Nutritious Meals allocation IDR 335 trillion]. Katadata. https://databoks.katadata.co.id/ekonomi-makro/statistik/689c504a56ce6/

Hukumonline. (2026). Menanti janji pemerintah untuk segera terbitkan Perpres tata kelola MBG [Awaiting the government's promise to issue the MBG governance Presidential Regulation]. Hukumonline. https://www.hukumonline.com/berita/a/menanti-janji-pemerintah-untuk-segera-terbitkan-perpres-tata-kelola-mbg-lt68f1f9d05cd8b/

Kompas. (2026, 3 June). Dadan Hindayana dicopot, pemerintah rombak kepemimpinan BGN: Kualitas makanan jadi sorotan [Dadan Hindayana removed, government overhauls BGN leadership: Food quality under scrutiny]. Kompas. https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2026/06/03/05473131/

Kompas. (2026, 2 June). Profil Nanik S. Deyang yang diangkat jadi Kepala BGN gantikan posisi Dadan [Profile: Nanik S. Deyang appointed as BGN Head to replace Dadan]. Kompas. https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2026/06/02/21360211/

Kompas Regional. (2026, 12 May). Kemenkes catat 37.000 korban keracunan program Makan Bergizi Gratis hingga Mei 2026 [Ministry of Health records 37,000 poisoning victims under the Free Nutritious Meals Programme through May 2026]. Kompas. https://regional.kompas.com/read/2026/05/12/184946778/

Kontan Nasional. (2026). Dapur MBG bermasalah: Pengawasan harus ketat karena kelola anggaran sangat besar [MBG kitchens problematic: Oversight must be strict given the enormous budget managed]. Kontan. https://nasional.kontan.co.id/news/dapur-mbg-bermasalah-pengawasan-harus-ketat

Kumparan. (2026, 2 June). Alasan Prabowo copot Dadan dari Kepala BGN: Hasil evaluasi SOP dan tata kelola [Reasons for Prabowo removing Dadan as BGN Head: SOP and governance evaluation findings]. Kumparan. https://kumparan.com/news/alasan-prabowo-copot-dadan-dari-kepala-bgn-hasil-evaluasi-sop-dan-tata-kelola-27WIAr8CXQ7

Liputan6. (2026, 2 June). Alasan Dadan Hindayana dicopot dari Kepala BGN [The reasons for Dadan Hindayana's removal from the BGN Headship]. Liputan6. https://www.liputan6.com/news/read/7589777/

Suara.com. (2026, 3 June). Nanik S. Deyang: Pendidikannya apa? Resmi gantikan Dadan sebagai Kepala BGN [Nanik S. Deyang: What is her educational background? Officially replaces Dadan as BGN Head]. Suara.com. https://www.suara.com/lifestyle/2026/06/03/074313/

Tempo. (2026, June). KPAI desak perbaikan tata kelola MBG usai Kepala BGN dicopot [KPAI urges improvement of MBG governance following BGN Head's removal]. Tempo. https://www.tempo.co/politik/kpai-desak-perbaikan-tata-kelola-mbg-usai-kepala-bgn-dicopot-2217678

Tempo. (2026). Mengapa program Makan Bergizi Gratis perlu dihentikan? [Why the Free Nutritious Meals Programme should be halted]. Tempo. https://www.tempo.co/ekonomi/mengapa-program-makan-bergizi-gratis-perlu-dihentikan--2071906

Wikipedia Indonesia. (2026). Makan Bergizi Gratis. Wikipedia. https://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Makan_Bergizi_Gratis

Bahasa

2026 EID AL-ADHA AND THE DAY OF ARAFAH: A Reflective Essay

The Convergence of Islamic Values and the Principles of Human Rights

I. Introduction

Eid al-Adha is one of the greatest celebrations in Islam, observed on the tenth of Dhul Hijjah. Far beyond a mere ritual festivity, it carries profound spiritual, moral, and social dimensions. It commemorates the sacrifice of the Prophet Ibrahim and his son the Prophet Ismail, alaihimassalam, encompasses the act of udhiyah (the ritual slaughter of livestock), and marks the culmination of the Hajj pilgrimage — most notably the standing at the Plain of Arafah.

Human Rights (HR), on the other hand, is a modern concept born of humanity’s long struggle for equality, justice, and respect for the dignity of every individual. Although the term itself gained prominence in twentieth-century international law, many of its foundational principles had long been present within Islamic teaching — most vividly in the Qur’an and in the Prophet’s (ﷺ) farewell sermon delivered on the Plain of Arafah.

This essay seeks to trace the threads that connect the values enshrined in Eid al-Adha and the Day of Arafah with the foundational principles of Human Rights, whilst reflecting upon both the points of convergence and the philosophical distinctions between the two traditions within a contemporary Islamic intellectual framework.

II. Human Equality: The Universal Message of the Plain of Arafah

One of the most awe-inspiring sights of the Hajj pilgrimage is the sea of humanity — millions of people from every corner of the globe — dressed in identical white ihram garments, standing together upon the Plain of Arafah. There are no symbols of wealth or poverty, no social castes, no nationality deemed more honourable than another. All stand equal before Allah as His servants.

This principle of equality is deeply consonant with the foremost foundation of modern Human Rights: the recognition that every human being is born with equal dignity and with rights that may not be taken away. Allah declares in the Qur’an:

“O mankind, indeed We have created you from male and female and made you peoples and tribes that you may know one another…”

(Qur’an, Al-Hujurat: 13)

This verse constitutes an unequivocal rejection of racial supremacy and ethnic arrogance. In the same spirit, during his farewell sermon on the Plain of Arafah, the Prophet (ﷺ) declared that no Arab has superiority over a non-Arab, nor has any non-Arab superiority over an Arab, save through piety. Many Muslim scholars regard this address as one of the earliest moral declarations of human equality in the history of civilisation.

III. The Right to Life and the Sanctity of the Human Soul

The occasion of Eid al-Adha and the Hajj pilgrimage places considerable emphasis upon the sanctity of human life. In his Farewell Sermon (Khutbah al-Wada’), the Prophet (ﷺ) declared that the blood, property, and honour of every person are inviolable. This statement speaks directly to three of the central pillars of modern Human Rights: the right to life, the right to personal security, and the protection of individual honour and dignity.

The Qur’an itself lays a supremely robust moral foundation in this regard:

“Whosoever kills a soul without just cause, it is as though he has killed all of mankind.”

(Qur’an, Al-Ma’idah: 32)

This value establishes a firm moral bedrock: that no human being may be treated arbitrarily or with impunity. The principle is not merely a prohibition against killing; it is a summons to regard every life as an entity of immeasurable worth — a conviction that lies at the very heart of the entire edifice of international human rights law.

IV. Social Justice and Economic Rights Through the Act of Sacrifice

The act of udhiyah during Eid al-Adha is far more than a purely ritual slaughter of livestock. It carries unmistakably tangible social dimensions: feeding the poor, sharing one’s sustenance with others, alleviating socio-economic inequality, and strengthening communal solidarity. Allah commands in the Qur’an:

“Eat of them and feed the contented and the needy.”

(Qur’an, Al-Hajj: 36)

The message of this verse is unambiguous: acts of worship must not remain confined to the realm of private ritual, but must give rise to genuine social and humanitarian impact. From a Human Rights perspective, this ethos corresponds directly to the right to food, the right to an adequate standard of living, and the aspiration of social justice. In other words, the act of udhiyah represents a concrete manifestation of Islam’s concern for the economic and social rights of its most vulnerable members.

V. Moral Freedom and Human Dignity in the Story of Ibrahim

The narrative of the Prophet Ibrahim and the Prophet Ismail, alaihimassalam, which forms the spiritual backdrop of Eid al-Adha, contains a lesson on moral freedom that is frequently overlooked. In the Qur’an, the Prophet Ibrahim did not coerce Ismail unilaterally or by brute force. Instead, there was a dialogue of remarkable nobility:

“O my son, indeed I have seen in a dream that I am to slaughter you. So consider what you think.”

(Qur’an, As-Saffat: 102)

There are elements of communication, conscious awareness, and consent within this narrative. It suggests that the human being is not a mere object devoid of will, but a dignified creature invited to understand the meaning of sacrifice. A number of contemporary Muslim scholars and thinkers see in this dialogue a lesson that Islam honours human agency and the freedom of the will — a value that equally stands at the core of the concept of rights and freedoms within the Human Rights tradition.

VI. The Day of Arafah and the Universal Consciousness of Humanity

The Plain of Arafah is widely regarded by Islamic scholars as a miniature of the Day of Judgement: humanity gathers stripped of all worldly status, conscious of the transience of life, and in anticipation of divine reckoning. From this profound spiritual experience arises a vital existential awareness — that all human beings are mortal, all are weak before Allah, and all are in need of His mercy.

It is precisely this awareness that forms the ethical root of respect for one’s fellow human beings: if all people are equally mortal and equally weak before Allah, then no one has the right to oppress another. This spiritual value is closely akin to the ethical foundation of Human Rights — namely, the recognition that every person possesses an inherent dignity that no power, however great, may diminish.

VII. Points of Convergence and Philosophical Differences with Modern Human Rights

Despite the many strong points of convergence, it must equally be understood that Islam and modern Human Rights are not entirely identical. Islam is exceptionally robust in its affirmation of the right to life, social justice, the protection of the vulnerable, the prohibition of racism, and the safeguarding of personal honour. Nevertheless, on certain specific contemporary issues, differences of interpretation exist between international human rights law and classical Islamic jurisprudence.

The most fundamental difference lies in their philosophical groundings. Many modern human rights frameworks place individual rights at the centre as an autonomous, self-standing concept. In Islam, by contrast, rights are always paired with responsibilities — to Allah, to the community, to the family, and to moral values. Freedom in Islam does not mean freedom without limits, but rather freedom that is bound by justice and accountability.

Contemporary Muslim scholars endeavour to bridge these two traditions through the framework of maqasid al-shari’ah — the overarching objectives of Islamic law — which encompass the preservation of religion, life, intellect, lineage, and property. These five objectives, in fact, overlap substantially with the fundamental rights recognised in international human rights instruments.

VIII. Conclusion

Eid al-Adha and the Day of Arafah are not merely occasions of annual ritual observance. They are grand reminders of universal human values: the equal dignity of all people, the sanctity of life and honour, social solidarity, the rejection of all forms of racism and arrogance, and the moral responsibility of every individual towards others.

These values share a powerful intersection with the foundations of Human Rights, even though the two traditions emerge from different intellectual sources. Herein lies the richness of civilisation: that truth concerning the dignity and rights of human beings may be arrived at by different paths — whether through divine revelation or through the long and arduous reasoning of human history.

By understanding the deep connection between Eid al-Adha and the principles of Human Rights, it is hoped that the commemoration of this celebration will no longer remain a ritual merely to be observed, but will become a genuine inspiration to champion justice, equality, and respect for the dignity of every human being in the course of daily life.

Bahasa

Will the Rupiah Weaken Further?

A country's exchange rate is one of the most sensitive and strategically significant economic indicators. For Indonesia, the movement of the rupiah against the US dollar is far more than a figure on a trading board — it reflects the overall health of the national economy: from household purchasing power and government foreign debt burdens, to export competitiveness and international investor confidence in Indonesia's economic foundations.

As of mid-2026, the rupiah finds itself under considerable strain. In the third week of May 2026, the currency weakened to the Rp 17,600–17,750 per US dollar range — far exceeding the government's State Budget (APBN) assumption of Rp 16,500 per dollar for 2026. This situation raises a fundamental question: where is the rupiah headed, and what forces will determine its fate?

This essay seeks to answer that question by analysing historical trends, current conditions, key determining factors, and projections from authoritative institutions, in order to outline the most plausible scenarios for the rupiah's trajectory.

The Development of the Indonesian Rupiah

Projections, Challenges, and Key Determinants Against the US Dollar

Economic & Monetary Analysis | May 2026

Part I: A Historical Overview — The Rupiah's Long Journey

To understand the rupiah's current position, one must first examine its historical patterns.

The rupiah enjoyed a period of relative stability in the early New Order era, hovering around Rp 2,000 per dollar. However, the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–1998 devastated that foundation: the currency plummeted to Rp 16,650 per dollar in January 1998 — a figure that was, at the time, regarded as a national economic catastrophe.

Following the reform era, the rupiah gradually recovered. Throughout 2003–2013, the exchange rate remained relatively stable in the Rp 8,500–12,000 range, supported by high global commodity prices, abundant foreign capital flows into emerging markets, and Indonesia's consistently strong economic growth above 5 per cent.

However, from 2013 onwards, a depreciatory trend resumed. The Federal Reserve's tapering of quantitative easing triggered capital outflows from emerging markets (the 'Taper Tantrum'). The rupiah continued its long-term slide, breaking through Rp 14,000 in 2015, Rp 15,000 in 2018, and permanently exceeding Rp 16,000 from 2023 onwards.

This pattern points to an inescapable structural reality: the rupiah is on a long-term depreciatory trend against the US dollar, shaped by a combination of domestic factors — such as current account deficits and import dependency — and global forces, including dollar strength and US interest rate dynamics.

Part II: Current Conditions — Where Does the Rupiah Stand Today?

In the third week of May 2026, the rupiah stood at Rp 17,600–17,750 per US dollar, far from the government's and Bank Indonesia's targets. On 19 May 2026, the currency closed at Rp 17,700, before recovering slightly to Rp 17,629 on 20 May 2026.

This depreciation did not occur overnight. Several significant events served as key triggers:

Trump's Tariff Shock

In early April 2025, US President Donald Trump announced a 32 per cent reciprocal tariff on Indonesian products. This 'Trade War 2.0' policy immediately rattled markets: the rupiah briefly touched levels above Rp 17,000 in Non-Deliverable Forward (NDF) trading, momentarily surpassing the lowest level recorded during the 1998 monetary crisis. Although Trump announced a 90-day tariff pause on 9 April 2025, pressure on the rupiah did not fully subside.

Persistent Capital Outflows

Sustained net foreign selling in Indonesia's capital markets since October 2024 continued to drain foreign exchange reserves and weigh on the rupiah. The proportion of foreign investor holdings in Indonesia's capital markets fell from 48.5 per cent in August 2024 to 41.24 per cent in February 2025, reflecting diminished global investor confidence in Indonesian assets.

Sustained High US Interest Rates

The Federal Reserve has yet to signal any significant interest rate cuts. Elevated US rates make dollar-denominated assets — particularly US Treasuries — highly attractive, prompting global investors to shift funds from emerging markets, including Indonesia, towards dollar safe-haven assets.

Seasonal Pressures

Bank Indonesia has noted that April through June historically represents a period of seasonal pressure on the rupiah, driven by heightened dollar demand for dividend payments, fuel imports, and foreign debt servicing.

Part III: Key Determinants of Rupiah Movement

The rupiah's exchange rate is shaped by a complex interplay of global and domestic variables. Understanding these factors is essential to projecting the currency's future direction.

A. Global Factors

1. US Federal Reserve Monetary Policy

The Fed's interest rate is effectively the 'gravitational force' for all global currencies. As long as the Fed maintains high rates, the US dollar will remain strong and pressure on the rupiah will persist. Conversely, any credible signal of rate cuts will weaken the dollar and create room for the rupiah to appreciate.

2. Geopolitical Tensions and Trade Wars

Trump's tariffs on Indonesia are not merely a bilateral economic matter — they generate global uncertainty that pushes investors towards safe-haven assets (the dollar, gold, US government bonds). The more the trade war escalates, the greater the pressure on emerging market currencies.

3. Export Commodity Prices

Indonesia is a major exporter of commodities: palm oil (CPO), coal, nickel, and rubber. When global commodity prices rise, foreign exchange inflows to Indonesia increase, rupiah demand strengthens, and the exchange rate tends to appreciate. A decline in commodity prices weakens the trade balance and the currency.

4. Global Risk-On/Risk-Off Sentiment

In periods of global uncertainty, investors tend towards risk-off behaviour — selling risky assets and buying safe ones. As an emerging market, Indonesia is perpetually vulnerable during such phases: capital flees, equities fall, and the rupiah weakens.

 

B. Domestic Factors

1. Fiscal Discipline

An excessively large budget deficit can trigger negative market perceptions regarding the sustainability of Indonesia's public finances. This may prompt capital outflows and weigh on the rupiah. Conversely, prudent fiscal management enhances market confidence.

2. Current Account Balance

When imports exceed exports (a current account deficit), demand for dollars outstrips supply, placing downward pressure on the rupiah. Conversely, a trade surplus — such as Indonesia's USD 19.3 billion surplus with the United States — provides a cushion for the currency.

3. Bank Indonesia's Foreign Exchange Reserves

Bank Indonesia uses its foreign exchange reserves to intervene in the currency market to stabilise the rupiah. Strong reserves provide greater intervention capacity; however, sustained intervention gradually depletes those reserves, imposing a practical limit.

4. BI's Interest Rate Policy

Higher BI rates make rupiah-denominated instruments more attractive to foreign investors, encouraging capital inflows and supporting the currency. Yet rate increases also slow domestic economic growth — a classic dilemma for any central bank.

5. Political Stability and Investor Confidence

A conducive investment climate, policy transparency, and political stability are intangible yet highly influential factors that shape foreign investors' risk perception of Indonesia.

Part IV: Projections from Authoritative Institutions

Various institutions — from Bank Indonesia to international research firms — have issued their forecasts for the rupiah. The table below summarises the key projections:

Institution / Source	Projected IDR/USD Rate (2026)
Bank Indonesia (BI)	Annual average Rp 16,430; APBN range Rp 16,200–16,800
State Budget 2026 (APBN Assumption)	Rp 16,500 per USD
Mirae Asset Securities	Rp 16,350 (end-2026, revised down from Rp 15,400)
International Research Institutions	Range of Rp 16,700–Rp 17,400 throughout 2026
Long Forecast	Range Rp 16,459–Rp 17,687, average ~Rp 17,000
Economist Josua	Rp 16,675–Rp 16,775 (end-2026)
President Prabowo's Target (2027)	Rp 16,800–Rp 17,500 per USD

These figures reflect a wide band of uncertainty. Crucially, many of these projections were formulated before the rupiah actually weakened to the Rp 17,600 level in May 2026. Current conditions have already exceeded the upper bound of several forecasts, at least temporarily.

Part V: Forward-Looking Scenarios — Where Is the Rupiah Headed?

Based on the foregoing analysis, three plausible scenarios emerge:

 

Scenario 1: Moderate Recovery (Optimistic)

Supporting conditions: The Fed cuts rates, the US–Indonesia trade war eases through tariff negotiations, global commodity prices stabilise or rise, Bank Indonesia intervenes effectively, and significant capital inflows materialise post-July 2026.

Projected outcome: The rupiah gradually strengthens towards Rp 16,500–16,800 by end-2026, approaching the APBN assumption. Bank Indonesia itself is optimistic that the annual average can return to the Rp 16,200–16,800 range, with July–August 2026 predicted as the turning point for appreciation.

 

Scenario 2: Stabilisation at a Weaker Level (Moderate / Realistic)

Supporting conditions: Global uncertainty remains elevated, the Fed holds rates steady, tariff negotiations remain inconclusive, and Indonesia's economic growth slows.

Projected outcome: The rupiah trades in the Rp 17,000–17,500 range through to end-2026 — weaker than the APBN target but without further deterioration. This aligns with Long Forecast's projection of an average around Rp 17,000.

 

Scenario 3: Continued Depreciation (Pessimistic)

Supporting conditions: The US trade war escalates, the 32 per cent tariff is applied in full, commodity prices collapse, confidence in Indonesian assets erodes, and large-scale capital outflows persist.

Projected outcome: The rupiah could weaken towards Rp 17,500–18,000, potentially approaching the psychologically significant Rp 17,845 level — which ironically mirrors Indonesia's proclamation of independence date (17-8-45), a scenario already discussed with some alarm by members of the Indonesian parliament in their hearings with the BI Governor.

Part VI: Implications and Policy Responses

A weakening rupiah carries contradictory effects that must be carefully managed:

Negative Impacts:

• Higher foreign debt servicing costs for the government (denominated in dollars)

• Rising import prices, fuelling domestic inflation

• Increased production costs for import-dependent industries

• Erosion of household purchasing power

Positive Impacts:

• Indonesian exports become more price-competitive internationally

• Higher government revenues from export levies and oil and gas income tax

• Commodity export earnings (in dollars) are worth more when converted to rupiah

In responding to these pressures, Bank Indonesia has several instruments at its disposal: intervention in the spot market and the Domestic Non-Deliverable Forward (DNDF) market, interest rate policy, and coordination with the government to maintain market confidence. The government, meanwhile, needs to strengthen its negotiating position in tariff discussions with the United States, diversify export markets, and maintain fiscal discipline.

Conclusion: Reading the Rupiah's Direction with Prudence

If there is a single lesson from the rupiah's history, it is that exchange rate forecasting carries inherent and substantial uncertainty. The factors shaping the exchange rate — from Fed policy to geopolitical conflict, from palm oil prices to global market sentiment — are too complex and dynamic to be reliably compressed into a single definitive figure.

The current situation (May 2026), with the rupiah at Rp 17,600, reflects exceptionally strong external pressures. Nevertheless, Bank Indonesia remains cautiously optimistic that the annual average exchange rate can return to the Rp 16,200–16,800 APBN range, with an expected appreciation commencing in July–August 2026 as seasonal pressures ease.

In the near term (second half of 2026), the rupiah has the potential to strengthen towards Rp 16,800–17,200, provided positive catalysts materialise: a signal of Fed easing, progress in tariff negotiations with the United States, and domestic political stability.

In the medium term (2027), President Prabowo has himself set a target of Rp 16,800–17,500 per dollar — a range that tellingly reflects expectations that the rupiah is unlikely to return to the Rp 16,000 level in the near future.

Ultimately, the strength of the rupiah cannot be separated from the strength of Indonesia's economic fundamentals: productivity, export competitiveness, investment quality, and investor confidence. So long as these foundations continue to be reinforced, there remains hope that the rupiah — whilst unlikely to revisit the Rp 13,000 era — can at least be maintained at a level that supports inclusive and sustainable economic growth.

This essay was compiled based on data and projections current as of May 2026, drawn from Bank Indonesia, the Indonesian Ministry of Finance, Mirae Asset Securities, Long Forecast, and various reputable economic media outlets. Exchange rate projections are indicative and subject to change in line with global dynamics.

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