French in the Indonesian Education Curriculum

On 28 May 2026, at the Élysée Palace in Paris, President Prabowo Subianto officially declared that French must be taught at all levels of Indonesian schools. During his meeting with President Emmanuel Macron, he stated, “Now, I have instructed that all levels of Indonesian schools must learn French, considering the future development of the world.” This announcement marks a significant diplomatic and educational initiative, contrasting with his earlier statement on Portuguese, delivered on 23 October 2025 in Jakarta while hosting President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil, which remains a proposal without concrete follow-up.

In an era of unceasing and dynamic globalisation, proficiency in a foreign language is no longer merely an added advantage — it has become a strategic imperative. Indonesia, as the world's largest archipelagic nation with a population of over 270 million, faces remarkable challenges and opportunities in navigating the complexities of global affairs. One of the increasingly pertinent debates concerns the systematic teaching of French in Indonesian schools, from secondary level through to higher education.

Bahasa Indonesia, as the language of national unity born from the spirit of the Youth Pledge of 1928, stands as the primary pillar of national identity. It is far more than a mere instrument of communication — it is a symbol of sovereignty, diversity, and the social cohesion of the nation. Accordingly, any discourse on the introduction of foreign languages must be firmly framed: a foreign language is a strategic supplement, not a replacement or rival to Bahasa Indonesia.

This essay aims to analyse the multidimensional advantages that Indonesian pupils and society at large may gain should French be integrated into the school curriculum. The analysis is conducted through five principal perspectives—ideological, political, economic, social, and cultural—and is complemented by a comparative examination of French against other foreign languages of global prominence.

 

II. IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

A. Bahasa Indonesia as a Symbol of National Unity

Ideologically, Bahasa Indonesia occupies an unrivalled position as the binding force of the nation. In a country that is home to over 700 regional languages, Bahasa Indonesia serves as a bridge of communication across ethnic groups, regions, and generations. The Pancasila ideology and the spirit of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika—Unity in Diversity—render Bahasa Indonesia a sacred instrument of national cohesion. It follows, therefore, that any policy on foreign language instruction must be designed in such a manner that it neither displaces nor weakens the standing of Bahasa Indonesia.

 

B. French as a Strategic Supplement

Within a sound ideological framework, French may be positioned as an enriching supplement rather than a threat. Mastery of French broadens the intellectual horizons of Indonesian pupils by granting direct access to the legacy of European Enlightenment thought, existentialist philosophy, and a rich scientific tradition. French is also the language of the global intelligentsia, having produced great thinkers such as Descartes, Voltaire, Rousseau, Sartre, and Camus—figures whose ideas helped shape modern civilisation.

 

C. National Ideology: Nationalism and Global Openness

Indonesia's national ideology need not be inward-looking or defensive. A mature nationalism is, in fact, characterised by the capacity to engage openly with the world without losing one's sense of self. This may be termed "open nationalism"—a paradigm in which the strengthening of domestic identity proceeds hand in hand with active participation in the global community. In this context, learning French is an expression of confident nationalism: a strong nation can engage in dialogue with the world in multiple languages.

 

III. POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE

A. Indonesia–France Diplomatic Relations

From a political standpoint, bilateral relations between Indonesia and France have grown considerably stronger over recent decades. France is a strategic partner to Indonesia across numerous fields, including defence, aerospace technology, civilian nuclear energy, and infrastructure. The agreement to purchase Rafale fighter jets, worth billions of euros, reflects the depth of the strategic partnership between the two nations. In this context, the availability of French-speaking Indonesian human resources becomes a genuine and pressing diplomatic necessity.

 

B. The Role of French in International Organisations

French is one of the six official languages of the United Nations and a working language of numerous prestigious multilateral institutions, including the International Olympic Committee (IOC), NATO, the European Union, the International Court of Justice, UNESCO, and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Indonesian diplomats who are proficient in French gain a significant competitive advantage in international negotiations, access to diplomatic documents, and the ability to build broader professional networks across nations.

 

C. Bahasa Indonesia in National Policy

Politically, it is important to affirm that a policy of French language instruction must be positioned as complementary to Bahasa Indonesia. Law Number 24 of 2009 on the National Flag, Language, and Emblem has mandated that Bahasa Indonesia must be used in all official state affairs, formal education, and public documents. French, therefore, serves only as an additional competency that broadens the nation's diplomatic capacity—it is not a threat to the supremacy of Bahasa Indonesia in the governance of the state.

 

IV. ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE

A. Investment, Trade, and Technology Opportunities

Economically, proficiency in French opens the door to one of the world's largest economies. France is the seventh-largest economy in the world by nominal GDP and is home to leading multinational corporations such as TotalEnergies, Airbus, L'Oréal, LVMH, Michelin, Schneider Electric, and Renault. Furthermore, la Francophonie—the community of French-speaking nations—encompasses 29 countries across the globe, including regions of Africa that are experiencing rapid economic growth. For Indonesia, which is actively expanding its export markets and attracting foreign investment, the ability to communicate in French is an economic asset of incalculable worth.

 

B. Access to Scholarships and Higher Education in France

France consistently ranks among the most sought-after international study destinations in the world, with tuition fees that are relatively affordable compared to those in the United States or the United Kingdom, owing largely to government subsidies. Scholarship programmes such as Campus France and various Erasmus+ initiatives present extraordinary opportunities for Indonesian students. With a command of French, Indonesian pupils gain access to prestigious universities such as the Sorbonne, École Polytechnique, HEC Paris, and Sciences Po—institutions that have produced world leaders and renowned scholars.

 

C. The Competitiveness of Indonesia's Workforce

In an increasingly competitive global labour market, proficiency in French significantly enhances the professional value of Indonesian workers. French multinational companies operating in Indonesia, the tourism industry serving Francophone visitors, and international organisations based in French-speaking Africa all require linguistically competent personnel. French language ability is also frequently combined with technical expertise to create highly sought-after and exceptionally valuable professional profiles.

 

V. SOCIAL PERSPECTIVE

A. Social Mobility Through Foreign Language Proficiency

From a social perspective, foreign language proficiency has been empirically demonstrated to be one of the key factors in social mobility. Individuals who command more than one foreign language generally enjoy broader access to educational opportunities, employment, and social networks. In Indonesian society, which continues to grapple with socio-economic inequality, proficiency in French can serve as an equaliser—an instrument for the democratisation of opportunity, enabling individuals from diverse backgrounds to advance and prosper.

 

B. The Global Francophone Network

The global Francophone community comprises over 321 million speakers spread across five continents. Joining this community affords access to an extensive social, professional, and intellectual network. International Francophone forums, film festivals, academic congresses, and French-language media platforms create a rich space for the exchange of ideas. Indonesian pupils who are fluent in French can participate actively in this global ecosystem, broaden their perspectives, and bring fresh insights back to Indonesia.

 

C. Bahasa Indonesia as the Primary Language of Communication

It is essential to underline that the acquisition of French will not, and should not, displace Bahasa Indonesia as the primary medium of communication in the everyday social life of Indonesian society. Bahasa Indonesia will continue to function as the language of the home, the community, and democracy itself. French is merely one layer of the linguistic competence possessed by an educated Indonesian citizen—a skill activated in specific contexts without replacing the fundamental loyalty to the national mother tongue.

 

VI. CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE

A. Insights into the World's Art, Literature, and Philosophy

Culturally, French is a window onto one of the richest intellectual and artistic traditions in human history. French literature has produced more Nobel laureates from a single country than any other, with names such as Albert Camus, Jean-Paul Sartre, Samuel Beckett (who wrote principally in French), and Annie Ernaux. In the visual arts, the Impressionist movement, born in France, transformed the way in which humankind perceives the world. In music, France gave rise to the distinctive and enduring tradition of the chanson. Accessing this wealth of culture in its original language affords a depth of appreciation that cannot be achieved through translation alone.

 

B. Cross-Cultural Appreciation

Learning French does not merely open a door to French culture alone, but to the entire spectrum of the diverse Francophone world—from the cultures of the Maghreb in North Africa to the dynamic societies of sub-Saharan Africa, from the unique traditions of Québec in North America to the exotic cultures of the Pacific islands. This diversity fosters the development of empathy, tolerance, and an appreciation of difference—values that are entirely consonant with the spirit of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika that underpins Indonesian national life.

 

C. The Synergy of Local and Global Culture

Within the paradigm of glocalisation—the integration of globalisation and localisation—proficiency in French can serve as a vehicle for showcasing the richness of Indonesian culture on the world stage. Indonesian artists, writers, and cultural practitioners who command French can directly promote batik, gamelan, wayang, the Nusantara culinary tradition, and other forms of local cultural heritage to the global Francophone community. This is not cultural subordination—it is an equal and mutually beneficial cultural dialogue.

 

VII. A STRATEGIC COMPARISON OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES

In order to assess the relative advantages of French, an honest comparative analysis of other foreign languages of potential relevance to Indonesia is required:

 

A. French

• An official language in 29 countries across five continents, spoken by over 321 million people.
• An official working language of the United Nations, WTO, NATO, IOC, the International Court of Justice, and the European Union.
• An unrivalled force in culture, diplomacy, and academia on the global stage.
• Access to a scholarship ecosystem, research opportunities, and quality higher education at a relatively affordable cost.

B. Dutch

Dutch holds historical relevance for Indonesia given over three centuries of colonial rule. However, its global reach is severely limited — it is spoken in the Netherlands, Belgium (alongside French and German), and a few small Caribbean territories. Its relevance in multilateral diplomacy, global business, and world culture is considerably smaller than that of French. There is also a psychological dimension to consider: requiring Indonesian pupils to learn the language of their former colonisers may engender a counter-productive resistance rooted in national identity.

 

C. Mandarin Chinese

Mandarin Chinese is the language with the greatest number of native speakers in the world and is of considerable importance in the context of Indonesia's deepening economic relationship with China. However, the highly complex system of Chinese characters (hanzi) makes the learning process far more lengthy and intensive—requiring two to three times longer than a European language to achieve equivalent proficiency. Mandarin also plays a very limited role in multilateral diplomatic forums and international institutions outside the Asia-Pacific region.

 

D. Russian

Russian holds relevance in the fields of energy, space technology, and military studies. As an official language of the United Nations, it also carries diplomatic weight. However, its global reach is largely confined to the Eurasian region and the former Soviet states. The current geopolitical situation, which has placed Russia in an increasingly isolated position at many international forums, further limits the practical utility of Russian beyond specific contexts. Compared to French, Russian offers a considerably narrower cultural and diplomatic network for Indonesia's younger generation.

 

E. Spanish

Spanish is a widely spoken language that is relatively straightforward to learn, particularly for speakers of other Romance languages. With over 580 million speakers worldwide, primarily in Latin America, Spanish commands considerable market potential. Strategically, however, Indonesia's bilateral relations with Spanish-speaking nations remain relatively limited compared to those with France. The role of Spanish in the multilateral organisations most relevant to Indonesia is also smaller. Nonetheless, Spanish remains an attractive option as a third or fourth language, to be learnt after Bahasa Indonesia, English, and French.

 

F. Arabic

Arabic carries profound significance for Indonesia as the country with the world's largest Muslim population. Its relevance is multidimensional: religious (as the language of the Qur'an and classical Islamic literature), economic (trade with Middle Eastern nations), and demographic (migrant workers in the Gulf region). However, in the context of multilateral diplomacy, technology, and access to international higher education, Arabic's role remains more limited than that of French. Arabic also employs a script that differs from the Latin alphabet, adding a further challenge to the learning process.

 

G. Comparative Analysis: Why French Stands Out

Based on the comparative analysis above, French emerges as the most strategically superior choice, offering an optimal balance across four dimensions: (1) recognised global diplomatic weight within the most important multilateral institutions; (2) economic leverage through access to Francophone markets and French multinational corporations; (3) the depth of a rich cultural and intellectual heritage; and (4) relatively favourable learnability, given its use of the Latin alphabet and the numerous loanwords that have entered Bahasa Indonesia via Dutch and English. No other language simultaneously meets all four of these criteria to a comparable degree of excellence.

French has been adopted as either an official language or a recognised second language in a wide range of countries across Europe, Africa, the Americas, and Oceania. In Europe, it is the principal language of France and Monaco, and it shares official status in Belgium, Switzerland, and Luxembourg. In Africa, it serves as the administrative and educational language in numerous states such as Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Gabon, among many others, where it functions as a lingua franca despite the diversity of local tongues. In the Americas, French is co‑official in Canada, particularly in Quebec and New Brunswick, and it is also spoken in Haiti alongside Haitian Creole. In Oceania, Vanuatu recognises French as one of its three official languages, and several Pacific territories under French administration continue to use it extensively. Although countries such as Vietnam no longer accord French official status, it remains a respected second language in education and diplomacy. Altogether, French is spoken by around three hundred million people worldwide, the majority of whom use it as a second language, and it continues to be valued as a medium of international communication, culture, and diplomacy.

 

VIII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

On the basis of a comprehensive analysis from ideological, political, economic, social, and cultural perspectives, as well as a comparative examination of other foreign languages, it may be concluded that the teaching of French in Indonesian schools offers genuine and multidimensional strategic advantages. French is not merely a language of communication — it is a key that unlocks access to global diplomatic networks, world-class educational ecosystems, priceless intellectual and artistic heritage, and extensive economic opportunities.

These advantages, however, can only be realised optimally within an appropriate framework: Bahasa Indonesia must remain the core of national identity, the principal language of formal education, and the firm foundation of all national language policy. French is present as an enriching supplement—not as a threat that supplants.

This essay therefore recommends that the Indonesian government formulate a balanced and carefully planned bilingual policy, with the following measures:

• Strengthen the teaching of Bahasa Indonesia as an unshakeable foundation at all levels of education, including through the revitalisation of Indonesian literature and the appreciation of regional languages as cultural treasures.
• Integrate French as an elective subject or specialist programme at the senior secondary (SMA) and vocational secondary (SMK) levels, particularly within streams related to international relations, tourism, and global business.
• Build strategic partnerships with institutions such as the Institut Français d'Indonésie (IFI) and the Agence Universitaire de la Francophonie (AUF) to support teacher training, curriculum development, and student exchange programmes.
• Ensure that the French language policy does not divert the allocation of resources and attention that ought to be devoted to strengthening Bahasa Indonesia and to the preservation of regional languages as the nation's invaluable cultural heritage.

Ultimately, the vision to be realised is the cultivation of a generation of Indonesians who stand firmly rooted in a strong national identity, whilst at the same time being able to reach out and contribute to the world with full confidence—including through the mastery of French as one of the vehicles for their global engagement. This is not a choice between nationalism and cosmopolitanism; it is a synthesis of both, embodied in the figure of an Indonesian citizen who is whole, intelligent, and empowered.

To conclude this essay, Indila’s “Love Story” stands as a symbol of harmony between language, culture, and human emotion that transcends borders. Through its gentle melody and evocative lyrics, the song reminds us that language is not merely a tool of communication but a bridge of feeling and understanding between nations—much like the growing connection between Indonesia and France.

REFERENCES

Fishman, J. A. (1972). The Sociology of Language. Newbury House Publishers.

Graddol, D. (2006). English Next. British Council.

Institut Français d'Indonésie. (2023). Rapport Annuel 2023. IFI Jakarta.

Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie. (2022). La Langue Française dans le Monde. OIF.

United Nations. (2023). Official Languages of the United Nations. UN Publications.

Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 24 of 2009 on the National Flag, Language, Emblem, and Anthem.

Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 20 of 2003 on the National Education System.

Weber, G. (1997). The World's 10 Most Influential Languages. Language Today, 2, 12–18.

Weinreich, U. (1953). Languages in Contact: Findings and Problems. Linguistic Circle of New York.

Zein, S. (2020). Language Policy in Superdiverse Indonesia. Routledge.

Bahasa

Awaiting Al-Mahdi or Setting One’s Own House in Order?

Among the subjects that most readily animate discussion within Muslim communities—whether in scholarly circles, on social media, or in online forums—few rival the topic of the End of Times. The signs of the Final Hour, the emergence of Imam al-Mahdi, the coming of the Dajjal (the Antichrist), the descent of the Prophet ʿIsā (Jesus), peace be upon him, and various apocalyptic scenarios are debated with considerable fervour. Yet beneath this enthusiasm lies a more fundamental question: for what purpose did the Prophet ﷺ actually convey all of this? Was it to turn the Muslim community into passive spectators of history, patiently waiting for prophesied figures to appear? Or was it to galvanise believers into action—to reform themselves and their societies?

This is far from a merely academic question. It bears directly upon how a Muslim chooses to live: whether one’s energy is consumed by speculation about an uncertain future, or channelled into the very real and pressing work of self-improvement and service to others. The scholars of the Ahl al-Sunnah wa’l-Jamāʿah have articulated a clear and coherent answer to this question—and that answer is far more practical than is often assumed.

The Five Phases of Leadership: Reading History, Not Predicting the Future

A fitting starting point for understanding the true purpose of these traditions is a report transmitted in the Musnad of Imam Ahmad from the companion Hudhayfah ibn al-Yamān. In it, the Prophet ﷺ foretells that the history of Muslim governance will pass through five phases: prophethood (nubuwwah); a caliphate modelled upon prophethood (khilāfah ʿalā minhāj al-nubuwwah); a biting kingship (mulkan ʿaḍḍhan); a coercive kingship (mulkan jabrīyyan); and finally, a return of the caliphate upon the prophetic model.

Scholars have understood the first phase as the era of the Prophet ﷺ himself, when revelation was still descending and every aspect of communal life was guided directly by Divine instruction. This era represents the unrivalled ideal. The second phase is generally associated with the four Rightly-Guided Caliphs—Abū Bakr, ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, ʿUthmān ibn ʿAffān, and ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib, radhiyallahu 'anhum—with some scholars including Hasan ibn ʿAlī (appointed caliph in 661 AD after the death of his father. He ruled for about 6 to 7 months before peacefully handing over the caliphate to Muawiyah bin Abi Sufyan to prevent civil war—and was characterised by leadership chosen through consultation (shūrā), justice as its cornerstone, and authority regarded as a trust rather than a privilege.

The third and fourth phases—the “biting” and the “coercive” kingships—reflect a gradual departure from that ideal. Power became hereditary, consultation waned, authority grew centralised, and dissent was suppressed. Scholars are nonetheless careful to note that the third phase was not wholly dark: the spread of Islam, advances in learning, and the flourishing of civilisation continued within it. What was lost was not everything, but rather the spirit of shūrā and the austere simplicity that had marked the earliest caliphs.

The fifth phase—the return of a caliphate upon the prophetic model—is widely linked by scholars to the events of the End of Times, including the emergence of Imam al-Mahdi. Yet it must be noted that the Prophet ﷺ gave no specific name, date, or constitutional blueprint for this phase. This is precisely where many go astray: attempting to fill the silence with speculation, the identification of contemporary figures, or claims that lack any sound basis.

The most important lesson of this tradition, therefore, is not a map for determining which phase we presently inhabit. It is a reminder that human governance is ever-changing in form, whilst the Muslim’s duty remains constant: to have faith in Allah, to hold fast to the Sunnah of His Prophet ﷺ, to improve oneself, to uphold justice, and to remain steadfast until one meets Allah.

The Meanings and Wisdom Embedded in the Traditions of the End of Times

History Rests in Allah’s Hands

When the Prophet ﷺ foretold events yet to come—from the minor signs of the Final Hour to its great upheavals—this was not a mere display of supernatural knowledge. There is a profound theological message contained within: human history does not unfold without direction or purpose. Not a single event lies beyond the knowledge and will of Allah.

قُل لَّن يُصيبَنَا إِلَّا مَا كَتَبَ ٱللَّهُ لَنَا

“Say: Nothing shall befall us save that which Allah has decreed for us.”

— Qur’ān, Sūrat al-Tawbah (9): 51

The traditions of the End of Times, therefore, instil serenity and trust in Allah (tawakkul), rather than panic or dread. A Muslim who truly grasps that Allah governs history will not be easily swept along by sensationalist narratives about imminent catastrophe, knowing that whatever comes to pass does so within His design.

 

Warning Against Tribulation, Not a Calendar of Its Arrival

The majority of the prophetic traditions concerning the End of Times consist of warnings about the various trials (fitan) that will afflict humanity: the appearance of impostors claiming prophethood, the spread of religious ignorance, the temptation of wealth, moral dissolution, and unjustified bloodshed. Most significantly, they speak of the Dajjāl—a figure of such danger that every prophet before Muhammad ﷺ was commanded to warn his people of him.

“There is not a single prophet but that he warned his community about the Dajjāl.”

— Recorded in Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī and Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim

What must be carefully observed is that the purpose of these warnings is not to prompt the calculation of the Dajjāl’s arrival date, nor to draw up maps of his anticipated movements. The purpose is to enable believers to recognise the symptoms of tribulation and to keep their distance. The emphasis is on active vigilance, not passive identification.

A Call to Hasten in Good Deeds

One of the most direct traditions concerning the orientation Muslims should adopt in the face of the End of Times is the following saying of the Prophet ﷺ:

“Make haste in performing good deeds before tribulations descend like portions of a dark night.”

— Recorded in Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim

Notice the urgency and the active voice of this command. The Prophet ﷺ did not say, “Sit and wait for those tribulations.” He said, “Make haste in good deeds.” This reveals the genuine orientation of all the traditions on the End of Times: not fatalistic passivity, but productive immediacy. The tribulations that lie ahead are intended to serve as a motivation for multiplying one’s good works, not as a pretext for resignation or for awaiting a saviour from the heavens.

Hope in the Midst of Darkness

The pedagogical wisdom of the Prophet ﷺ is evident in the balance with which he conveyed the news of the End of Times. On one side, he warned of tribulations and moral decline; on the other, he announced tidings to strengthen the heart: the appearance of Imam al-Mahdī bringing justice, the descent of the Prophet ʿIsā, the destruction of the Dajjāl, and the ultimate triumph of truth.

These glad tidings are not meant to generate speculative euphoria, but to plant a firm and enduring hope: that, however dire the state of the world becomes, Allah does not abandon His servants. His mercy is ever-present, and history shall ultimately conclude with His justice. A Muslim, for this reason, must never succumb to despair over the condition of the age. 

A Reminder of the World’s Transience

There is a profound dimension of renunciation (zuhd) embedded in the traditions of the End of Times. When the Prophet ﷺ conveyed that the whole of human civilisation—its kingdoms, its governments, its wealth, its technologies, its powers—will eventually perish, this was an invitation not to cling too dearly to the world at the expense of the Hereafter. Many classical scholars have linked the discourse on the End of Times with the theme of zuhd and preparation for one’s meeting with Allah, for both ultimately rest upon the same awareness: this world is transient, and what endures is only what one brings before Him.

Two Extremes to Be Avoided

In their approach to the traditions of the End of Times, Muslims frequently find themselves drawn to one of two equally mistaken poles. Understanding both is essential to adopting a sound position.

The first extreme is speculative obsession. A considerable number of people expend a great deal of time and energy on fixing the year of al-Mahdī’s emergence, accusing particular contemporary figures of being the Dajjāl, or drawing equivalences between every political development and a prophetic narration. Social media is saturated with such content, often packaged with dramatic effect. Yet scholars of the stature of Imam al-Nawawī, Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, and Ibn Kathīr have stated plainly that the signs of the Final Hour are matters to be believed, not instruments of groundless speculation. The Companions of the Prophet—who lived closest to the age of prophethood—were not preoccupied with such guesswork. They busied themselves with knowledge, worship, calling people to Islam, refinement of character, and building their communities.

The second extreme is dismissiveness. At the opposite end, some regard the traditions of the End of Times as irrelevant or unworthy of attention. This too is mistaken, for the Prophet ﷺ conveyed them with a clear intention: that the Muslim community might recognise and prepare for the trials that lie ahead. To disregard these warnings is akin to entering perilous terrain without provisions.

The More Important Question: “What Have You Prepared?”

There is a brief exchange preserved in both Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī and Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim that may well be the most eloquent response to the entirety of this discussion. A man came to the Prophet ﷺ and asked:

“When will the Final Hour come?”

Rather than answering with a time, the Prophet ﷺ replied with a question of his own:

“What have you prepared for it?”

— Recorded in Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī and Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim

This response is remarkable for the way it redirects attention from the question of timing to the question of personal readiness. For most human beings, their personal “final hour”—death—arrives long before the great eschatological events. What is therefore most pressing is not knowing when al-Mahdī will emerge or when the Dajjāl will appear. What is most pressing is this: whether one’s prayers are sound, whether one’s heart is free from its hidden maladies, whether one has repented from accumulated sins, whether one has discharged the rights owed to others, and whether one’s provisions for meeting Allah are sufficient.

A Productive Response: From the Individual to Society

Translated into concrete action, the approach of the mainstream Sunnī scholarly tradition to the traditions of the End of Times produces an agenda that is strikingly immediate—rooted not in the realm of speculation, but in the fabric of everyday life.

At the individual level, the priorities are clear: to rectify one’s creed and purge it of deviation, to maintain and improve the quality of one’s prayer, to seek repentance frequently, to pursue sound religious knowledge, and to continually refine one’s character. At the level of the family, the focus shifts to raising children upon a firm religious foundation, guarding the household from the moral tribulations that press upon it from all sides, and cultivating an atmosphere of Qur’ānic recitation and remembrance of Allah within the home. At the level of society, the responsibilities extend to upholding justice, defending the vulnerable, combating corruption and oppression, and spreading both knowledge and moral refinement.

None of this is an agenda that awaits the coming of al-Mahdī to be set in motion. It is an agenda that can—and must—be commenced today, by anyone, wherever they may be.

Conclusion

Having traced the various dimensions of the prophetic traditions on the End of Times, the answer to the question posed in this essay’s title becomes considerably clearer. Awaiting al-Mahdī and setting one’s own house in order are not mutually exclusive. Yet if one must identify the primary orientation, the scholars of the Ahl al-Sunnah have answered without equivocation: it is self-reform.

For al-Mahdī—should Allah ordain his appearance—will not come to those who have done nothing but wait. He will arrive into a particular moment in history, and those fortunate enough to be counted amongst his companions will be those who had already prepared themselves: whose creed was sound, whose deeds were consistent, whose character was noble, and whose contribution to their communities was real.

The practical message bequeathed by generations of scholars from the entire treasury of these prophetic traditions may be distilled into a single sentence: be a servant of Allah who is ready should al-Mahdī arrive, and equally ready should you depart this world before he does.

For in the end, what will be asked of us before Allah is not how accurate our analysis of the signs of the Final Hour was. What will be asked is: what did you prepare?

Bibliography 

1. Al-Bukhārī, Muḥammad ibn Ismāʿīl. Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī. Beirut: Dār Ibn Kathīr, 1407 AH. [Traditions concerning the Dajjāl; the ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib narration on preparation for the Final Hour]

2. Muslim ibn al-Ḥajjāj. Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim. Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʼ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, n.d. [Traditions on hastening to perform good deeds before tribulation; the narration on preparation for the Final Hour; traditions concerning the Dajjāl] 

3. Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal. Musnad al-Imām Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal. Beirut: Muʼassasat al-Risālah, 1421 AH. [The narration of Hudhayfah ibn al-Yamān on the five phases of Muslim governance] 

4. Al-Nawawī, Yaḥyā ibn Sharaf. Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim. Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʼ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, 1392 AH. 

5. Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, Aḥmad ibn ʿAlī. Fatḥ al-Bārī Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī. Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifah, 1379 AH. 

6. Ibn Kathīr, Ismāʿīl ibn ʿUmar. Al-Nihāyah fī al-Fitan wa’l-Malāḥim. Beirut: Maktabat al-Manār al-Islāmīyah, 1988. 

7. The Holy Qurʼan. Sūrat al-Tawbah [9]: 51.

Bahasa

Indonesia Doesn't Need the Corleone Family

The student representatives who staged a protest in Jakarta were received directly by Vice‑President Gibran on Monday, 15 June 2026, while President Prabowo was contending with a wave of demonstrations. This meeting may be viewed as a political manoeuvre, in which Gibran opened direct access to the protesting crowd. More accurately, however, it should be described as an attempt to preserve Gibran’s image and position amidst the pressure of demonstrations, rather than as a hidden threat.

The students welcomed by Gibran came from UBK (Universitas Bung Karno), UT (Universitas Terbuka), and UMh Thamrin (Universitas MH Thamrin). These institutions are not traditionally recognised as strongholds of student activism, unlike UI, UGM, Unair, or ITB. This lends the situation an unusual air: suddenly there was a protest over the MBG issue, which is typically championed by students from major universities with a robust activist base.

The presence of only fifteen participants further undermines the notion of a “large‑scale protest” deserving national attention. Stranger still, after the orator announced the agenda, the students were promptly received by Gibran in a process that appeared swift and highly structured. The meeting itself lasted an hour behind closed doors, with the media barred from entry and asked to wait outside, thereby raising concerns about transparency.

Possible interpretations include the idea that this was a “manufactured” or “co‑ordinated” protest, perhaps initiated or supported by certain parties to exert pressure on the government. Students from smaller universities may have been “steered” towards demonstrating on a specific issue. While the MBG controversy is undeniably a hot topic nationwide, which could plausibly draw in students from less activist‑oriented campuses, the circumstances remain peculiar. With such a small number of participants, the action seems more symbolic—an opportunity to gain access to Gibran—rather than a genuine attempt to destabilise the government.

Questions worth raising:

• Who actually organised the demonstration?
• Why did BEM UBK suddenly issue a 5×24‑hour ultimatum, despite its usual inactivity?
• Do these fifteen students represent a broader protest movement, or were they acting alone?
• The observation that “it seems odd for them to protest in isolation” is indeed reasonable. It suggests that this was not a purely spontaneous student movement, but rather one facilitated by a co‑ordinator or third party.

Gibran’s meeting with representatives from non‑traditional universities raised significant questions about its motives and substance. Amidst the public scrutiny surrounding this political manoeuvre, he then appeared in a video that proved equally controversial: speaking about artificial intelligence whilst stroking a cat, a gesture that immediately drew comparisons with Vito "Don" Corleone in The Godfather.

Many observers argued that the video emphasised image over substance. The act of stroking the cat rendered his political message more akin to a visual “gimmick”, with audiences more inclined to note the resemblance to Don Corleone than to listen to the content of his speech. Some even suspected that the AI discourse might serve as a potential business or commercial project, particularly should Gibran pursue the presidency.

The video can be interpreted as an attempt to project a “modern and technologically attuned” persona, yet it ultimately reinforced the impression that Gibran relies more on visual symbolism than intellectual capacity. With public doubts about his competence already widespread, the cat became a symbol that further entrenched the perception of style prevailing over substance.

A Family at the Wrong Address

Picture a dimly lit room. Velvet curtains seal off the windows, and the only light falls from a single desk lamp, trained squarely on the host’s face. In his lap sits a Persian cat, stroked slowly, in time with words delivered low and measured, as though each one were a bullet too precious to waste. “I’m going to make him an offer,” he murmurs, “he can’t refuse.”

We know this scene so well from the cinema that we forget it isn’t merely fiction. It is a mirror—and, unfortunately, that mirror sometimes hangs in rooms that ought to contain a roadmap for the people’s welfare, rather than a roadmap for one family’s grip on power.

In the world of film, the Corleones operate by their own logic: loyalty above the law, honour above truth, power handed down like an heirloom. That makes for gripping cinema. But a nation is not a crime family, and a president is not a Don bequeathing the throne to his eldest son with a murmured, “It’s not personal. It’s strictly business.”

Regrettably, some of our elites seem altogether too fond of playing the lead in their own family saga: deciding who may run, who must step aside, which projects are “safe”, and who is fit to kiss the ring before being granted their blessing. The difference is that in the film, the casualties are fictional extras. Here, the casualties are the budgets that should have built schools, clinics, and village roads.

Lighthouses That Dazzle Rather Than Guide

There is a particular species of project that always seems to spring up in election years: vast, grand, christened with an imposing name, unveiled with a red ribbon and a rousing speech. A “beacon project”, they call it—a symbol of progress. But a true lighthouse guides ships safely home; it does not blind the public to the sight of other vessels sinking under the weight of poverty, nor obscure the fact that its dazzling beam is funded from the very same purse as healthcare and education.

More damning still is the rumour that some of that light also illuminates the path to the party congress, the roadside billboards, and, naturally, the ambition to become the country’s most powerful man. The beacon project, then, is no longer about lighting the nation’s way—it is about lighting one man’s way to the throne, with the electricity bill quietly settled by the public.

 

Not the Inheritance the Founders Intended

The founding fathers did not gather in committee to draft a dynasty. In the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution—not as decorative prose, but as a solemn pledge—they wrote that this nation was established to protect the entire people, to advance the general welfare, to educate the life of the nation, and to realise social justice for all Indonesians.

Not one of those four aims reads: to ensure a particular family remains in power. No clause states: beacon projects are permissible, provided they benefit the sponsoring party. The founders bequeathed an ideal, not a signet ring to be kissed down the generations. 

Closing: Stroke the Cat, but Don’t Take the Public for Fools

There is nothing wrong with stroking a cat—it is, after all, a soothing private habit. What is wrong is when that soft-spoken, dignified delivery is used to mask a cold calculation: how many projects can be secured, how much can be funnelled into party coffers, how many steps remain to the top seat—while poverty and inequality are left as a footnote, skimmed over rather than read.

Indonesia does not need a family that speaks in gentle, veiled threats. It needs leaders who speak plainly about the price of rice, the wages of labourers, and access to healthcare in the furthest-flung villages. Not an offer that can’t be refused, but accountability that cannot be avoided.

For in the end, a great nation is not measured by the grandeur of its beacons, but by how brightly it lights the way home for those left furthest behind—without requiring anyone to kiss a ring to get there.

Bahasa

Should the Free Nutritious Meals Programme Be Terminated

The Free Nutritious Meals Programme is a public policy designed to ensure adequate nutrition for schoolchildren, reduce stunting, improve concentration in class, and strengthen the foundations of long‑term human capital. Amid public debate, calls have arisen to terminate the programme because it places a heavy burden on the State Budget (APBN). This essay adopts a firm position: the programme must not be terminated. The analysis employs an ideopoleksosbud framework — ideology, politics, economy, social, and culture — to demonstrate that ending the programme would inflict structural harm far greater than the short‑term fiscal burden often cited as justification.

Theoretical Framework and Methodology

This analysis integrates human development theory, political legitimacy theory, and welfare perspectives. Methodologically, it is normative‑analytic: it examines the programme’s consistency with the nation’s ideological commitments, assesses political impacts on governmental legitimacy, evaluates the economic trade‑offs between fiscal outlays and human capital investment, and weighs social and cultural consequences. Arguments are constructed through causal and conceptual reasoning linking child nutrition to future productivity, public health costs, and social cohesion.

Ideological Analysis

From the standpoint of national ideology, particularly Pancasila which foregrounds social justice for all Indonesians, the Free Nutritious Meals Programme is a concrete manifestation of that mandate. A state that professes to secure citizens’ welfare cannot readily abandon responsibility for basic needs of children, especially nutrition that determines cognitive development and learning capacity. Terminating the programme solely for fiscal efficiency would be ideologically inconsistent: the state would be rhetorically committed to equity but retreat from implementation when costs become tangible.

Moreover, human development ideology prioritises investment in children as both a moral and strategic imperative. Adequate nutrition in childhood is not mere consumption; it is human capital formation shaping the next generation’s productive capacity. Thus, ending the programme would contravene ideological principles that require the state to prioritise the welfare of future citizens.

Political Analysis

Politically, the programme serves both symbolic and instrumental functions. Symbolically, it signals government commitment to public welfare; instrumentally, it can increase school attendance, reduce dropout rates, and enhance the administration’s public image. Termination would produce tangible political costs: erosion of public trust, narratives that the government values fiscal metrics over citizens’ welfare, and opportunities for opposition actors to mobilise discontent.

Political legitimacy depends on the perception that the state meets basic citizen needs. When policies that affect daily life—such as provision of nutritious meals to children—are withdrawn, legitimacy is undermined. Over the medium term, this erosion can precipitate political instability that, in turn, generates additional economic and social costs, rendering the short‑term fiscal savings counterproductive.

Economic Analysis

The principal fiscal objection is the programme’s drain on the APBN. While national‑scale programmes do require substantial budgetary allocations, a comprehensive economic assessment must account for long‑term costs and benefits. Childhood undernutrition is directly associated with reduced cognitive capacity, lower adult productivity, and higher lifetime healthcare costs due to chronic conditions rooted in early malnutrition.

Public expenditure on child nutrition should be viewed as productive investment in human capital. Spending on nutritious school meals increases learning outcomes and eventual earnings potential, thereby expanding the tax base and reducing future reliance on social assistance. Additionally, reductions in stunting and nutrition‑related illnesses lower public healthcare expenditure. Terminating the programme to reduce short‑term deficits, without considering cumulative effects on national productivity, is a shortsighted fiscal policy.

Cost‑benefit analyses typically show that the long‑term economic returns from improved child nutrition exceed initial outlays. Therefore, fiscal concerns alone do not justify termination; instead, budgetary management should focus on improving implementation efficiency while preserving coverage and quality.

Social Analysis

Socially, the Free Nutritious Meals Programme functions as a redistributive instrument that narrows disparities in access to basic needs. Children from low‑income households frequently face nutritional deficits that impede physical and cognitive development. The programme provides direct compensation that mitigates intergenerational inequality. Ending it would reinforce poverty cycles: undernourished children are more likely to underperform academically, secure lower‑paid employment, and perpetuate poverty into the next generation.

The programme also fosters social cohesion. State provision of basic needs strengthens perceptions of fairness and solidarity. Conversely, termination could engender feelings of injustice and alienation among vulnerable groups, weakening social networks essential for stability and collective action.

Cultural Analysis

Indonesia’s cultural values of gotong royong and mutual care are reflected in collective responsibility for the young and vulnerable. The Free Nutritious Meals Programme can be interpreted as a modern policy expression of these cultural norms. Termination would not merely be an economic decision; it would signal a cultural shift towards individualisation of welfare responsibilities, placing the burden solely on families.

Such a shift risks eroding communal practices of mutual support. Over time, diminished collective responsibility may reduce societal capacity to cooperate in addressing shared challenges, including public health crises and natural disasters.

Addressing Fiscal Objections and Policy Recommendations

Fiscal concerns are the most frequently cited reason for calls to terminate the programme. These concerns can be addressed without abolishing the programme. First, conduct independent audits and operational reviews to eliminate waste, leakage, and corruption. Second, improve targeting so that resources prioritise the most vulnerable populations. Third, integrate the programme with complementary interventions—nutrition education, support for local agriculture, and family economic empowerment—to amplify impact.

Concrete policy recommendations include:

• Strengthen targeting mechanisms to ensure benefits reach the most needy.
• Enhance transparency and accountability in procurement and distribution to reduce leakage.
• Standardise kitchen operations and food safety protocols, and provide training for staff.
• Foster public‑private and civil society partnerships to share costs and introduce innovation.
• Integrate the programme with health and education services to create synergistic outcomes.
• Implement rigorous monitoring and evaluation using outcome indicators such as stunting reduction and academic performance.
• These measures demonstrate that fiscal constraints are a managerial challenge rather than a reason to terminate a strategically important programme.

Risks and Consequences of Termination

Terminating the programme would carry concrete risks: increased stunting and malnutrition, declining academic achievement, higher long‑term healthcare costs, erosion of political legitimacy, and weakened social cohesion. These risks are cumulative and mutually reinforcing, meaning the aggregate cost of termination would far exceed immediate budgetary savings. In strategic terms, termination would constitute a false economy: short‑term fiscal relief that generates larger social and economic liabilities in the future.

The Free Nutritious Meals Programme must be kept, and its governance and accountability need urgent improvement so public funds are used efficiently and can be properly accounted for. Improvements should include transparent, auditable procurement, clear division of responsibilities between central and local government, and firm sanctions for misuse to reduce budget leakage.

To ensure the benefits reach those who need them most, the targeting system must be refined so assistance goes to vulnerable children and communities rather than being distributed uniformly. A data‑driven approach using social protection registries and school enrolment records will cut waste, and an appeals process should be available to prevent eligible families from being excluded.

Meal quality directly affects nutritional outcomes, so nutrition standards and menu design must be clear and evidence‑based. Menus developed by qualified nutritionists and adapted to local ingredients and seasons will increase acceptance, reduce food waste and ensure adequate calories, protein and micronutrients.

Operational problems often stem from limited capacity at school kitchens and local providers, so technical skills must be strengthened through certification, training and regular inspections. Kitchens and suppliers should meet food‑safety, storage and distribution standards, and central kitchens must have reliable cold‑chain systems.

To contain costs without lowering quality, procurement and supply chains must be reformed. Open, competitive tendering and local sourcing where feasible will reduce prices and support local farmers, while contracts should include clear performance metrics and penalties for non‑compliance.

Policy decisions must be guided by solid evidence, which means establishing a robust monitoring and evaluation system. Real‑time data on coverage, meal quality, school attendance, nutritional outcomes and unit costs should be collected, and findings focused on reductions in stunting and improvements in learning should be published regularly.

Financial sustainability requires a mix of efficiency measures, diversified funding and medium‑term budget planning. Savings can come from cutting duplication and administrative overheads, while additional funding might be secured from local government contributions, targeted private‑sector partnerships and performance‑based grants.

Community involvement will improve accountability and local relevance. Parents’ associations, farmer cooperatives and credible civil‑society organisations should be engaged in menu design, quality monitoring and logistical support, with clear rules to prevent conflicts of interest.

Reform also depends on skilled personnel, so investment in human resources is essential. Training for procurement officers, nutritionists, kitchen managers and monitoring staff, together with career paths and performance incentives, will help retain qualified staff and build lasting capacity.

Public trust is vital, so transparency and communication must be prioritised. An accessible public dashboard showing budgets, procurement contracts, service coverage and evaluation results will reduce misinformation and enable civic oversight. Clear, regular communication about the programme’s aims, costs and measurable outcomes will help secure broad public support for its continuation. 

Conclusion

Based on an ideopoleksosbud analysis, the Free Nutritious Meals Programme must not be terminated. The strongest rationale is that termination would undermine investment in human capital, contravene the principle of social justice enshrined in Pancasila, erode political legitimacy, exacerbate social inequality, and weaken cultural norms of mutual care. The fiscal burden cited by critics is a solvable governance issue; it should be addressed through improved management, targeting, transparency, and cross‑sector collaboration rather than by abolishing a programme with strategic long‑term benefits.

Closing Remarks and Policy Implications

Retaining the programme requires a firm commitment to efficiency, transparency, and evidence‑based evaluation. The government should treat the programme as a strategic investment rather than a mere expenditure. Better implementation will maximise economic and social returns, reinforce political legitimacy, and uphold the nation’s ideological and cultural commitments. Maintaining the Free Nutritious Meals Programme is therefore a rational, ethical, and strategic choice for the country’s future.

Bahasa

Pertamax and The Paradox of Indonesia's Energy Policy

Every time the government or PT Pertamina (Persero) announces (it should be, but in recent years, it has been done secretly in the middle of the night along with thieves looting people's homes) an increase in the price of fuel (Bahan Bakar Minyak / BBM), the public response is almost invariably the same: waves of criticism on social media, long queues at petrol station forecourts, and demonstrations across the country. Yet this patterned, recurring response conceals a deeper question—is a fuel price increase merely a technical fiscal matter, or does it in fact reflect an ideological choice and the direction of a nation’s energy politics?

I. BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM

Pertamax, a petrol with a 92 octane rating, occupies a unique position within Indonesia’s energy policy architecture. Unlike Pertalite (RON 90) and Solar (diesel), which receive direct subsidies from the State Budget (Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara / APBN), Pertamax is classified as a non-subsidised fuel. Its retail price is therefore linked directly to global market mechanisms: international crude oil prices, the rupiah-to-US-dollar exchange rate, and distribution and operational costs.

Periodically, Pertamina adjusts the price of Pertamax with reference to the Mean of Platts Singapore (MOPS) formula, plus an alpha or profit margin. When global oil prices fluctuate violently—as occurred in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, the global energy crisis of 2021–2022, and the Russia–Ukraine geopolitical tensions—the price of Pertamax rises correspondingly.

Although Pertamax is unsubsidised, the impact of its price increases cannot be dismissed out of hand. Millions of motor vehicles in Indonesia—particularly in urban areas—consume Pertamax daily. Pertamax users are predominantly urban middle-class motorists who own vehicles with fuel-injection engines, which require higher-octane petrol to maintain engine performance and efficiency.

On the fiscal front, the government faces a far from simple dilemma. Energy subsidies—particularly for Pertalite, Solar, and 3-kilogram LPG canisters—place an enormous burden on the state budget. In years when global oil prices are elevated, subsidy expenditure can reach hundreds of trillions of rupiah, threatening the balance of the APBN and the government’s capacity to fund other development programmes. In this context, increases in the price of non-subsidised fuels such as Pertamax are frequently positioned as part of a broader fiscal rationalisation strategy.

“When the price of Pertamax rises, it is not merely a number on a petrol station forecourt that changes. What changes is the social equilibrium, the economic burden on households, and public trust in the government.”

This essay seeks to dissect the complexities of the impact of Pertamax price increases through five analytical lenses: an ideological perspective that interrogates the role of the state versus the market; a political perspective that examines governmental legitimacy and stability; an economic perspective that analyses the impact on purchasing power and the state budget; a social perspective that unpacks inequality and public responses; and a cultural perspective that highlights the values, identities, and collective narratives embedded in energy consumption.

II. THE IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

2.1. The State as Protector or the Market as Arbiter?

The most fundamental debate underlying fuel pricing policy is an authentically ideological question: to what extent should the state intervene in regulating energy prices? At one pole lies an interventionist view, which holds that energy is an essential public good and that the state is therefore obliged to ensure its accessibility to all citizens. At the other, the free-market perspective argues that state interference creates distortions, inefficiencies, and an unsustainable fiscal burden.

Indonesia, in its historical and constitutional context, has in fact already formulated an answer to this question. Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution explicitly states that the land, waters, and natural resources contained therein are controlled by the state and used for the greatest possible welfare of the people. The phrase “controlled by the state” does not mean outright ownership or monopoly, but rather that the state possesses the authority to regulate, supervise, and direct the exploitation of natural resources — including energy—in the public interest.

In practice, however, the implementation of this constitutional mandate frequently comes into conflict with the pressures of global economic liberalisation. Indonesia’s membership of various free trade agreements and its need to attract foreign investment have impelled the government to progressively reduce its intervention in price mechanisms. The fuel deregulation policies that commenced during the Reform Era (Reformasi) represent the clearest expression of this ideological shift.

2.2. Energy Justice: Who Is Protected?

From the perspective of energy justice, Indonesia’s two-tier fuel pricing policy—subsidised Pertalite and Solar on the one hand, non-subsidised Pertamax on the other—contains a genuine paradox. On the one side, Pertalite and Solar subsidies are nominally intended to protect lower-income households. On the other, a body of research indicates that the bulk of the benefits from fuel subsidies are in fact enjoyed by upper-middle-class households, which own considerably more motor vehicles.

Meanwhile, the middle class who consciously choose Pertamax—whether because their vehicles’ engine specifications require higher-octane petrol, or out of environmental and efficiency considerations—bear the full cost of global oil price volatility. They receive no subsidy protection, yet nor are they sufficiently affluent to absorb price increases without financial consequence.

This situation raises a deeper ideological question: is social justice in energy policy adequately measured by the availability of cheap fuel for particular groups, or must it encompass a more comprehensive principle concerning who bears the cost of the externalities of fossil fuel consumption?

III. THE POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE

3.1. Governmental Legitimacy Amid Rising Prices

Politically, a fuel price increase is amongst the most high-risk decisions any government can take. Indonesian history records that such increases have almost invariably triggered significant socio-political upheaval. Student and labour protests, falling public trust indices, and heightened opposition sentiment are consequences that can be expected to follow virtually every price announcement.

This occurs because fuel has become a form of “social contract” between the state and its citizens. The public, regardless of market logic and fiscal rationality, holds the expectation that the state—as steward of natural resources—ought to be capable of providing energy at affordable prices. When that expectation is violated, the reaction is not merely an economic grievance but a deeper political disillusionment.

Interestingly, different governments have adopted markedly different political communication strategies when confronting fuel price increases. The Soeharto era foregrounded a narrative of sacrifice for national development. The early Reform Era tended to be more defensive and reactive. The administration of Joko Widodo, particularly at the time of the September 2022 fuel price increases, attempted to frame the rises as “difficult but responsible choices”, whilst simultaneously announcing a social protection compensation package worth Rp 24.17 trillion.

3.2. Political Stability and Opportunities for the Opposition

Price increases for Pertamax have consistently been exploited by opposition groups as ammunition for criticism of the government. The narratives constructed typically revolve around two accusations: first, that the government has failed to manage the economy competently, such that fuel prices continue to rise; and second, that the government is more aligned with the interests of corporations and the global market than with those of the people.

In the age of digital democracy, this dynamic has grown considerably more complex. Social media accelerates the spread of negative sentiment and enables the rapid mobilisation of large numbers of people. Hashtags criticising fuel policy effortlessly become trending topics, generating genuine political pressure even if they do not always reflect the majority of public opinion.

“In modern democracy, public perception of policy is as important as the substance of the policy itself. A government that fails to manage the narrative will encounter political resistance far greater than the actual economic impact warrants.”

Political stability is also bound up with the government’s capacity to build supporting coalitions. When the price of Pertamax rises, transport business associations, logistics associations, and trade unions typically become the most vociferous critics. The government’s ability to manage the interests of these groups is a decisive factor in determining how far a price increase will destabilise the political landscape.

3.3. The Narrative of National Energy Policy

How the government frames Pertamax price increases within a broader national energy policy narrative is also a crucial political dimension. Successful governments are those able to connect short-term, painful policies to a convincing long-term vision—for instance, an energy transition, renewable energy development, or a more precisely targeted subsidy reform programme.

The challenge, however, is that energy transition narratives are frequently too abstract and long-term to dampen public disappointment that is immediate and concrete. When Pertamax prices rise today, promises about solar panels and electric vehicles in the future feel far too distant to offer much consolation.

IV. THE ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE

4.1. The Impact on Inflation and Purchasing Power

From a macroeconomic standpoint, Pertamax price increases carry both direct and indirect consequences for the national rate of inflation. The direct impact is felt in the transport component of the Consumer Price Index (CPI), whilst the indirect impact is wider and more sustained—affecting the entire supply chain that depends on fuel as a production input.

Transport is the most sensitive sector. Freight vehicles, ride-hailing services, motorcycle taxis (ojek), and various other modes of commercial transport immediately revise their fares when fuel prices rise. These fare adjustments then ripple through to the prices of consumer goods, since virtually every product that reaches the consumer passes through a distribution process dependent upon fuel.

Bank Indonesia, as the monetary authority, must tread carefully in responding to fuel-price-driven inflation. On the one hand, rising inflation calls for a tighter monetary policy stance. On the other hand, excessive monetary tightening risks slowing economic growth. This is the classic dilemma confronted by central banks in developing nations when faced with supply-side inflation.

4.2. The Knock-On Effect: From Logistics to Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises

One of the most significant yet frequently overlooked impacts of Pertamax price increases is the knock-on effect on Micro, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (MSMEs, or UMKMs in Indonesian). MSMEs are the backbone of the Indonesian economy, contributing more than 60 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and absorbing more than 97 per cent of the workforce.

MSMEs in the food and beverage sector, for instance, face simultaneous increases in raw material costs and distribution expenses. Small traders (warung) that use refrigerated motorcycles to transport ice or fresh produce must bear higher operating costs. Catering businesses, grocery shops, and market traders face pressure from two directions: costs are rising whilst consumer purchasing power is being eroded.

The capacity of MSMEs to absorb these cost increases is far more limited than that of large corporations, which can achieve economies of scale, negotiate long-term contracts, or even hedge against commodity price fluctuations. As a consequence, fuel price increases frequently impose a disproportionately heavier burden on small business operators.

4.3. Implications for the State Budget

From a fiscal perspective, Pertamax price increases have an ambivalent relevance for the state budget. On the one side, state revenues from oil and gas taxation and non-tax state revenue (PNBP) will increase as prices rise. On the other, the inflationary pressures generated may compel the government to increase allocations for social protection and direct cash transfers.

Of greater strategic importance is how Pertamax price increases are positioned within the context of broader energy subsidy reform. If such increases are accompanied by a restructuring of subsidy schemes towards more precisely targeted delivery—for example, through direct cash transfers to vulnerable groups—the net fiscal impact could be substantially positive.

However, Indonesia continues to face significant challenges in respect of its subsidy recipient database. Subsidy programmes that are poorly targeted not only squander state resources but also create long-term moral hazard and economic inefficiency. Without comprehensive subsidy system reform, Pertamax price increases merely relocate the fiscal problem rather than resolve it.

V. THE SOCIAL PERSPECTIVE

5.1. An Added Burden on the Urban Middle Class

Indonesia’s urban middle class occupies a paradoxical position: too affluent to qualify for subsidies, yet not wealthy enough to absorb price increases without consequence. They are the principal users of Pertamax—both because their vehicles’ engine specifications require higher-octane fuel and because they were concerned for efficiency and environmental responsibility.

When Pertamax prices rise, the consequences for the middle class are cumulative. Daily transport costs increase, basic necessities become more expensive, and the room for saving or investment narrows further. In a context where Indonesia’s middle class remains highly vulnerable—many having only recently graduated from the “near-poor” category—this pressure can have a significant impact on their social mobility.

This phenomenon is also reflected in changing consumption behaviour. Research indicates that a proportion of Pertamax users switch to Pertalite when the price differential widens significantly, despite the attendant risks of reduced engine efficiency and increased vehicle emissions. Others begin to consider greater use of public transport or vehicle-sharing arrangements in order to reduce costs.

5.2. Inequality and Social Resentment

One of the most subtle yet potentially explosive social impacts of Pertamax price increases is the potential widening of social inequality and horizontal resentment. When Pertalite subsidies are maintained whilst Pertamax prices are raised, an increasingly clear demarcation emerges between the “subsidised group” and the “group paying market prices.”

At the community level, this distinction can deepen existing social fault lines. Moreover, debates about who is “entitled” to subsidies are frequently laden with assumptions about class, lifestyle, and social propriety that are not always accurate or fair.

“Inequality is not merely a matter of income differentials; it is also a question of who bears risk and uncertainty. In the fuel context, Pertamax users absorb the volatility of global oil prices, whilst Pertalite users are shielded by subsidies whose financing comes from taxes paid by all citizens—including Pertamax users themselves.”

5.3. Public Response and Adaptation

Indonesian society has demonstrated a considerable capacity for adaptation when confronted with fuel price increases. Responses range widely: from formal protests through demonstrations and petitions, to pragmatic adjustments in everyday behaviour.

Several commonly observed adaptation patterns include the following:

• Switching to lower-octane fuel, albeit with the risk of reduced engine efficiency

• Increased use of public transport or ride-hailing services for particular journeys

• Journey consolidation—combining several errands into a single trip

• Growing interest in electric vehicles as a long-term alternative

• The formation of carpooling communities and vehicle-sharing arrangements

Viewed positively, these adaptations may in the long run drive more sustainable behavioural change. However, access to these alternatives is not evenly distributed—not everyone lives in an area served by an adequate public transport network, and not everyone is in a position to switch to an electric vehicle.

VI. THE CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE

6.1. A Culture of Private Vehicle Ownership: The Structural Root of Dependency

To understand why the impact of Pertamax price increases is felt so keenly in Indonesia, it is necessary to examine the cultural roots of the country’s energy consumption patterns. Indonesia is one of the largest automotive markets in South-East Asia, with a motor vehicle fleet that continues to grow year on year. Ownership of a private vehicle—particularly a motorcycle—has become a kind of minimum standard of living in many urban areas.

This phenomenon is not solely the product of individual choice; it is the consequence of urban planning policies and infrastructure development that, over several decades, have consistently prioritised roads over public transport. Indonesian cities, particularly those outside the Jabodetabek agglomeration, were built on the assumption that their residents would use private vehicles. Without a vehicle, everyday mobility becomes severely restricted.

As a result, motor vehicle ownership is no longer merely a lifestyle choice but a functional necessity that cannot easily be negotiated away. In this context, fuel price increases do not merely affect one’s wallet; they strike at the very foundations of daily mobility and productivity.

6.2. Pertamax as a Status Symbol and Marker of Social Identity

Beyond its technical function, Pertamax also carries a symbolic dimension that cannot be overlooked. Within Indonesia’s fuel hierarchy, Pertamax — and even more so Pertamax Turbo or Pertamina Dex — is frequently perceived as a more “upmarket” or “prestigious” choice than Pertalite. Choosing Pertamax is regarded as a marker of financial capability, quality consciousness, or concern for the condition of one’s engine.

This perception is not merely an external projection; it has also been actively constructed through Pertamina’s marketing strategy, which promotes Pertamax as the fuel for high-quality vehicles. Pertamax advertisements habitually project images of luxury, smooth motoring, and well-maintained engines—reinforcing the association between fuel choice and social status.

When Pertamax prices rise, users who have chosen this fuel as part of their social identity face a cultural dilemma: to continue using Pertamax in order to maintain their social image, or to switch to Pertalite at the risk of being perceived as having “come down in the world.” This dynamic may sound trivial, yet it reflects how deeply social values can be embedded in everyday consumption decisions.

6.3. Media Narratives and the Framing of Popular Culture

The manner in which media and popular culture frame the issue of Pertamax price increases is also an important cultural dimension. Two dominant frames recur in Indonesian media coverage and public discourse.

The first is the “crisis” frame: price increases are portrayed as indicators of economic policy failure, public suffering, and governmental incompetence. This frame predominates in media outlets that adopt a critical stance towards the government and frequently gives rise to dramatic narratives about the impact of the rises.

The second is the “routine” frame: as price increases recur, segments of the public and media begin to treat them as ordinary events requiring no extraordinary reaction. “Fuel has gone up again” becomes a kind of routine that generates a well-established cycle of complaint and adaptation.

What is striking is how memes, humour, and viral content on social media have become a paradoxically expressive medium—at once serious and comic. Such content reflects the manner in which Indonesian society processes socio-economic pressure through cultural creativity and horizontal solidarity, whilst simultaneously revealing how deeply the fuel issue has become embedded in the popular consciousness.

VII. REFLECTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Having navigated five distinct analytical perspectives—ideological, political, economic, social, and cultural — we arrive at a conclusion that is paradoxical yet important: a Pertamax price increase is not merely a technical commodity price adjustment. It is a multidimensional event that reflects and reproduces fundamental choices about how this country wishes to be governed and in whose interests.

From an ideological perspective, every decision about the price of Pertamax contains an implicit answer to questions about the role of the state in the economy, the meaning of social justice, and intergenerational responsibility for environmental sustainability. From a political perspective, fuel price increases constitute a serious test of governmental legitimacy and the state’s capacity to manage public expectations.

Economically, the impact of Pertamax price increases resonates far beyond merely a rise in an individual’s petrol expenditure—it affects inflation, purchasing power, the viability of MSMEs, and the fiscal balance of the state. Socially, it reinforces existing fault lines of inequality and tests society’s adaptive capacity. Culturally, it touches identity, values, and the way in which society understands itself in relation to the state and the market.

More important than the question of whether a Pertamax price increase is right or wrong is a more fundamental question: does Indonesia possess a coherent, equitable, and sustainable national energy vision? A vision that is not merely reactive to global oil price fluctuations, but proactive in building an energy infrastructure that reduces dependence on fossil fuels, promotes the transition to renewable energy, and ensures that the burdens and benefits of that transition are borne equitably by all sections of society.

“Today’s rise in the price of Pertamax is not merely an economic figure. It is a harbinger of the collective choices we have made and will continue to make regarding the direction of development, social justice, and the legacy we leave to future generations.”

In the final analysis, the best response to Pertamax price increases is not mere protest or resignation, but a consistent demand upon the government to build an energy policy that is transparent, equitable, and far-sighted—one that does not merely calculate short-term fiscal costs and benefits, but also takes into account the social, ecological, and generational costs of every energy choice made.

Indonesia, with all its extraordinary natural resource wealth and vast renewable energy potential, possesses every means necessary to build a more independent, more equitable, and more sustainable energy system. What is required is the political courage to make difficult choices today for the sake of a better future for all its citizens.

REFERENCES AND SOURCES

The following represent key conceptual and empirical references pertinent to the themes addressed in this essay:

• Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS). Monthly Inflation Reports and Consumer Price Index. Jakarta: BPS.

• Bank Indonesia. Financial Stability Reviews and Indonesian Economic Reports. Jakarta: BI.

• Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (ESDM). Non-Subsidised Fuel Price Policy. Jakarta: Ministry of ESDM.

• PT Pertamina (Persero). Annual Reports and Fuel Price Adjustment Policies. Jakarta: Pertamina.

• Institute for Economic and Social Research (LPEM), University of Indonesia. Analysis of the Impact of Fuel Price Increases on Inflation and Poverty. Jakarta: LPEM UI.

• International Energy Agency (IEA). World Energy Outlook. Paris: IEA.

• Stiglitz, J. E. (2002). Globalisation and Its Discontents. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

• Sadli, M. (1993). Economic Problems and Government Policy in Indonesia. Jakarta: LP3ES.

• Winters, J. A. (2011). Oligarchy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

• Aspinall, E., & Mietzner, M. (Eds.) (2010). Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia. Singapore: ISEAS.

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