The Failure of Reform

Twenty-eight years have elapsed since President Soeharto announced his resignation at nine o'clock on the morning of 21 May 1998, yet Indonesia continues to grapple with the same disquieting question: has Reformasi succeeded? This essay argues that, although many formal achievements are undeniable—direct presidential elections, decentralisation, and a freer press chief among them—Indonesia’s Reformasi has experienced a systemic failure in substance. Corruption has evolved rather than diminished; oligarchy has changed its garb rather than been uprooted; and institutions have proliferated without taking root. Taken together, these conditions reveal a country ensnared in the trap of partial reform. The essay examines the definition, history, and background of Reformasi; the principal arguments advanced by scholars and commentators who deem it a failure, together with supporting evidence and scholarly references; a measured account of its genuine achievements; and the consequences—in the short, medium, and long term—of failing to pursue meaningful correction.

REFORM IN CHAINS:

A Critical Analysis of Indonesia's Failed Reformasi

I. INTRODUCTION

At precisely five minutes past nine on the morning of Thursday, 21 May 1998, Indonesia’s second president, Soeharto, read out his letter of resignation in the Credential Room of the Merdeka Palace in Jakarta. The announcement was met with jubilation by millions of Indonesians who had sacrificed their lives, their liberty, and their futures in the service of a single word: Reformasi. Yet more than two decades on, a painful question continues to resonate in lecture halls and on street corners alike: where did the promises of Reformasi go?

Reformasi, in its simplest sense, means reform. In the specific context of post-New Order Indonesia, however, it carries a far heavier freight of meaning: a social contract to build a democratic, clean, just, and dignified state. That contract, for the most part, remains dishonoured.

This essay is written not as a lament over failure, but as a constructive contribution to the ongoing debate. Drawing on an extensive body of academic literature from both Indonesian and international scholars, it seeks to unravel the tangled threads of Indonesia’s reform journey—from the euphoria of 1998 to the anxieties of 2026.

II. DEFINITION AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 

A. Defining Reformasi in the Indonesian Context

The word “reform” derives from the Latin reformare, meaning to reshape or to improve. In the political science tradition, reform refers to incremental institutional and structural change within an existing system, as distinct from revolution, which is sudden and total (Huntington, 1991).

In the Indonesian context, “Reformasi”—capitalised to denote its specific historical referent—describes the movement and era of change triggered by the fall of Soeharto’s New Order regime in 1998. The Reformasi agenda, as articulated by the student movement and civil society, encompassed three broad domains.

The first was a political agenda: the abolition of the dual function (dwifungsi) of the armed forces (ABRI), restrictions on the military’s role in civilian politics, free and fair elections, regional autonomy, and constitutional amendment. The second was an economic agenda: the eradication of corruption, collusion, and nepotism (korupsi, kolusi, dan nepotisme, or KKN); transparency in state financial management; and a more equitable distribution of wealth. The third was a legal and human rights agenda: the rule of law, accountability for human rights violations committed under the New Order, freedom of the press, and respect for civil liberties.

Reformasi, as its architects understood it, was never merely about replacing one set of leaders with another. It was about transforming the very way in which the state operates, power is exercised, and justice is distributed. 

B. Criteria for Assessing the Success of Reformasi

Political scientists employ various benchmarks to evaluate the success of democratic transitions. Larry Diamond (1999), in Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation, draws a crucial distinction between “electoral democracy” — which requires only free elections — and “liberal democracy”, which encompasses the rule of law, accountability, and the protection of civil rights. By the assessment of many scholars, Indonesia remains trapped at the former level.

Andreas Schedler (2002) introduced the concept of “electoral authoritarianism” to describe systems that employ democratic procedures as a facade of legitimacy whilst preserving authoritarian practices within. That concept serves as an uncomfortably accurate mirror for post-Reformasi Indonesia.

III. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF REFORMASI 

A. The Legacy of the New Order: Seeds of a Problem Never Uprooted

To understand the failures of Reformasi, one must first appreciate the depth of the problems bequeathed by the New Order. Over thirty-two years (1966–1998), Soeharto constructed what Harold Crouch (1978) described as a “bureaucratic polity”: a system in which power was concentrated in the hands of a narrow bureaucratic-military elite whilst civil society was systematically enfeebled.

The New Order left at least four toxic legacies that obstructed genuine transformation: first, a patron-client culture entrenched at every level of the bureaucracy; second, a network of crony businesses controlling strategically important economic sectors; third, a military and police apparatus accustomed to operating beyond the control of civilian authority; and fourth, a legal culture that regarded rules as instruments of power rather than as protectors of justice.

Richard Robison and Vedi Hadiz (2004), in Reorganising Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of Markets, argue convincingly that the social classes that had dominated the New Order were not destroyed by Reformasi; rather, they adapted and reproduced themselves in new formats. The oligarchs of the New Order did not die — they metamorphosed. 

B. The Dynamics of the 1997–1998 Crisis and the Eruption of Reformasi

The Asian financial crisis that struck Indonesia in 1997–1998 served as the catalyst that accelerated the collapse of the Soeharto regime. The rupiah’s precipitous fall—from some Rp2,600 to the dollar to more than Rp14,800 to the dollar—caused mass bankruptcy, a surge in unemployment, and a food crisis. Against this backdrop, the Indonesian public watched as Soeharto’s cronies continued to live in conspicuous luxury; social fury, long suppressed, finally erupted.

The killing of four Trisakti University students by security forces on 12 May 1998, followed by the May Riots that engulfed Jakarta and other cities on 13–14 May, represented a boiling point that could no longer be contained. On 21 May 1998, Soeharto resigned. Vice-President B.J. Habibie, his protege and a creature of the New Order, assumed the presidency and declared himself the leader of the Reformasi era.

Herein lies the first great irony of Reformasi: an era of transformative change was inaugurated not by reformist figures but by an insider of the very system that was meant to be changed. Habibie, though he subsequently took several important liberalising steps, was at once a product and a part of the system he was now called upon to dismantle. 

C. The Phases of Reformasi: From Euphoria to Pragmatism

Indonesia’s reform journey may be divided into several distinct phases. The first (1998–2002) was a phase of transition and euphoria, marked by constitutional amendments, the release of political prisoners, the enactment of regional autonomy legislation, and the 1999 general election — widely praised as the most democratic in Indonesian history.

The second phase (2002–2014) was one of flawed consolidation. New institutions—the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), the Constitutional Court, and various oversight bodies—were established, but did so amid fierce resistance from entrenched interest groups. Direct regional elections were held, yet they frequently produced local political dynasties no less corrupt than their predecessors.

The third phase (2014 to the present) is one of democratic regression. Several key indicators have moved in a deeply troubling direction: the KPK has been weakened through legislative revision; military and police intervention in civilian affairs has increased; civic space has been narrowed through the weaponisation of law; and a political pragmatism that prizes stability of power above the principles of Reformasi has become dominant.

IV. WHY SCHOLARS AND COMMENTATORS REGARD REFORMASI AS HAVING FAILED

There is no single scholarly consensus on the precise measure of Reformasi’s failure. There are, however, several major themes that recur persistently throughout the academic literature and research reports. 

A. Corruption: Evolved Rather Than Eradicated

The eradication of corruption was the central promise of Reformasi, and it has proved to be the most conspicuous failure. Indonesia did indeed establish the KPK in 2002, a step that merits recognition. But corruption in Indonesia has not disappeared; it has evolved. From the centralised corruption of the New Order era, it has mutated into a decentralised form that permeates every layer of governance, from central government to the village level.

Edward Aspinall and Gerry van Klinken (2011), in The State and Illegality in Indonesia, document in meticulous detail how post-Reformasi decentralisation, far from bringing services closer to the people, created thousands of new corruption hotspots at the regional level. They term this phenomenon “predatory localism” — the manner in which local strongmen exploited autonomy for personal enrichment.

Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) has consistently reported the absence of any significant downward trend in corruption. Its annual reports record thousands of corruption cases each year involving regional heads, legislators, and judges. The Committee for the Monitoring of Regional Autonomy Implementation (KPPOD) has likewise identified licensing corruption as a persistent and serious obstacle to investment.

The most damaging blow to the spirit of reform came in 2019, when the House of Representatives revised the KPK Law in a manner that drastically curtailed the body’s independence and authority. The KPK Employees’ Association described the revision as “the institutional assassination of the KPK”. Tom Power (2018), in his analysis of Indonesia’s anti-corruption backsliding, concludes that the assault on the KPK was systematic and premeditated by political elites.

“Reformasi in Indonesia produced the democratisation of corruption, not its eradication. What changed was its scale and distribution, not its substance.” — Vedi Hadiz, in an interview with New Mandala, 2016 

B. Oligarchy: Changed its Costume, Never Uprooted

One of the most influential arguments about the failure of Reformasi comes from Jeffrey Winters (2011) in his book Oligarchy. Winters contends that Reformasi never posed a genuine threat to the power of oligarchs—individuals or groups possessing extraordinary material wealth and deploying it to shape politics in defence of their interests.

The data bear this out: wealth concentration in Indonesia actually increased during the Reformasi era. Oxfam Indonesia (2017) reported that the four wealthiest Indonesians hold wealth equivalent to that of the poorest 100 million combined. The Gini coefficient—a standard measure of economic inequality—rose from around 0.30 in the early 1990s to above 0.40 by the mid-2010s.

Robison and Hadiz (2004) describe how the oligarchs of the New Order—including Soeharto’s cronies—managed to preserve, and indeed expand, their economic power in the democratic era by more sophisticated means: becoming donors to political parties, financing regional election campaigns, and building family political dynasties. Democracy, rather than serving as a vehicle for popular emancipation, became a mechanism for the reproduction of oligarchy.

C. Civil Liberties and the Shrinking Democratic Space

One of Reformasi’s most important achievements was greater freedom of the press and expression. Yet over the past decade, Freedom House has consistently downgraded Indonesia in its Press Freedom and Democracy indices. By 2023, Freedom House classified Indonesia as only “partly free”—a significant decline from its former reputation as a model democratic transition in South-East Asia.

Andreas Harsono of Human Rights Watch has documented how the Electronic Information and Transactions Law (UU ITE) has been systematically misused to silence criticism of the government and public officials. Since coming into force, the law has been deployed against hundreds of activists, journalists, and social media users who dared to criticise government policy.

Imparsial and the National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) regularly report on the increasing involvement of the military and police in operations that ought properly to be civilian in nature. The dual function of ABRI may have been formally abolished, yet Jun Honna (2003), in Military Politics and Democratisation in Indonesia, argues that the Indonesian military has never fully relinquished its influence over the political and economic spheres.

D. Political Dynasties and the Personalisation of Power

Reformasi envisioned a democracy that would produce leaders on the basis of competence and integrity. What has emerged instead is a proliferation of political dynasties. Surveys conducted by the Independent Election Monitoring Committee (KIPP) and various research institutions show a steady increase in the proportion of public offices at the regional level held by relatives of incumbent officials.

Marcus Mietzner (2013), in Money, Power, and Ideology: Political Parties in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia, documents how political parties have failed in their function as instruments of popular representation. Rather than serving as schools of democracy, parties have become vehicles for group and individual interests, relying on “money politics” as the engine of voter recruitment and mobilisation.

The phenomenon that several analysts have described as “Jokowification” is perhaps the most troubling symptom of this malaise: a populist leader initially celebrated as a symbol of change subsequently practising modes of governance not substantially different from his predecessors—including the consolidation of family power, the use of state apparatus to suppress criticism, and the manipulation of institutions in the service of dynastic ambition. 

Jokowi’s Legacy and the Crisis of Reform

The Reformasi of 1998 opened the path for Indonesia to build a healthier democracy, with the hope that each president would strengthen institutions, eradicate corruption, and safeguard the freedoms of the people. Yet, among the presidents of the Reformasi era, Joko Widodo’s leadership is widely regarded as having left the deepest scars upon democracy and governance. 

Institutions undermined

The Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), once a symbol of public hope, lost its independence after legislative revisions weakened its authority. Other supervisory bodies have not escaped political interference, eroding public trust in the state. 

Entrenched corruption

Although Jokowi projected the image of a modest and clean leader, corruption remained rampant. Major cases implicated senior officials and those close to power, revealing that oversight mechanisms were ineffective. Transparency, once promised, became little more than rhetoric. 

Dynastic politics

The candidacy of Gibran Rakabuming Raka as vice president sparked accusations that Jokowi was constructing a political dynasty. The criticism lies not merely in familial ties but in the absence of proven competence. A democracy that should have fostered meritocracy instead fell into nepotism, undermining public faith in the political process. 

Oligarchy ascendant

Economic and resource policies disproportionately favoured business elites and major investors. Mining concessions, infrastructure projects, and energy policies were frequently linked to oligarchic interests, leaving ordinary citizens increasingly marginalised.

Democracy eroded

Freedom of expression was curtailed, critics of the government were often criminalised, and public space was narrowed. Procedural democracy continued, but its substance was hollowed out, placing Indonesia at risk of sliding towards authoritarianism.

Manipulated image

Political buzzers and media were deployed to polish Jokowi’s image whilst attacking opponents. Tempo magazine highlighted the “Nawadosa Jokowi” as emblematic of the failure of his Nawacita, while image management campaigns sought to conceal policy weaknesses. 

Social inequality

Despite massive infrastructure development, the gulf between rich and poor widened. Economic growth was not fully inclusive, fuelling social unrest and exacerbating political polarisation.

Consequences for President Prabowo

Jokowi’s legacy is a heavy burden for President Prabowo. He must:

• Restore institutions by reinstating the independence of legal bodies.
• Confront oligarchy by reshaping economic policy to serve the people rather than elites.
• Heal polarisation left behind by divisive politics.
• Build legitimacy as a leader capable of reviving democracy.
• Criticism of Jokowi is not confined to policy shortcomings but extends to a moral and institutional crisis. The weakening of democracy, entrenched corruption, dynastic politics, oligarchy, and social inequality illustrate that his legacy is a profound challenge for Indonesia. That challenge now rests upon Prabowo, who must prove himself able to steer Reformasi back onto its rightful course.

Hope in President Prabowo

Indonesia enters a new chapter following Joko Widodo’s controversial leadership. The legacy of weakened institutions, entrenched corruption, dynastic politics, and rampant oligarchy is indeed a heavy burden. Yet amidst this complexity, there remains space for President Prabowo to rekindle the spirit of Reformasi and prove himself as a leader capable of restoring public trust. 

Restoring institutions

The greatest hope lies in Prabowo’s courage to revive the independence of state institutions. Should the KPK, Constitutional Court, and other supervisory bodies be returned to their rightful standing, the foundations of democracy will once again be solid. 

Eradicating corruption

The people yearn for a leader who dares to act decisively against corruption. Through tangible measures, Prabowo can build strong moral legitimacy and demonstrate that his leadership is distinct from the old patterns.

Confronting oligarchy

The oligarchy that has long gripped Indonesia’s economy must be challenged. If Prabowo succeeds in reshaping policy to favour ordinary citizens rather than elites, he will be remembered as the president who restored economic sovereignty to the nation.

Healing polarisation

The divisive politics left behind by Jokowi can be mended through inclusive communication. Prabowo has the opportunity to become a unifier of the nation, not merely a ruler.

Building meritocracy

By ending dynastic practices and prioritising competence, Prabowo can pave the way for a new generation of leaders of higher quality. This is a crucial step towards improving the calibre of democracy.

Hope in President Prabowo is not an empty dream. He holds a genuine opportunity to rewrite the course of Reformasi: to restore institutions, eradicate corruption, confront oligarchy, heal polarisation, and build meritocracy. If these steps are pursued with courage and resolve, history will record Prabowo as the leader who transformed crisis into renewal.

E. A Judiciary That Has Yet to Win Its Independence

An independent judiciary is one of the foundational pillars of a democratic rule of law. In Indonesia, that aspiration remains some distance from reality. The Judicial Commission and the Supreme Court regularly uncover bribery cases involving judges at various levels, and the KPK itself has arrested scores of judges and court officials for accepting bribes.

Sebastiaan Pompe (2005), in The Indonesian Supreme Court: A Study of Institutional Collapse, presents a sobering portrait of Indonesia’s highest court, which he characterises as having undergone institutional collapse as a result of systemic corruption, weak management, and an absence of a culture of professional integrity.

Major cases involving members of the elite frequently remain unresolved or conclude with verdicts that invite serious questioning. Meanwhile, poor Indonesians continue to face a legal system that is not oriented towards their interests. The old saying — that “the law is sharp at the bottom and blunt at the top” — retains its painful currency in everyday life. 

F. The Failure to Reckon with Past Human Rights Abuses

One of the most solemn promises of Reformasi was the resolution of the grave human rights violations that occurred under the New Order: from the events of 1965–66, the disappearances of activists in 1997–98, and the Semanggi tragedies, to the various episodes of violence in Aceh, Papua, and East Timor. The overwhelming majority of those promises have never been honoured.

Kontras (the Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence) documents that barely a single perpetrator of the New Order’s grave human rights abuses has been effectively prosecuted. Several figures associated with those violations have gone on to enjoy distinguished political careers in the Reformasi era, even occupying the highest offices of state.

John Roosa (2006), in Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement and Suharto’s Coup d’état in Indonesia, reveals how successive post-Reformasi governments have chosen not to correct the official historical narrative of the 1965 events, because doing so would mean contesting the legitimacy of groups that remain very much in power.

V. THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF REFORMASI: A RECORD THAT CANNOT BE OVERLOOKED

It would be dishonest for a critical analysis of this kind to disregard the accomplishments of Reformasi entirely. Genuine progress has been made in several areas, though its scale has not been commensurate with the magnitude of the problems that remain.

The constitutional amendments of 1999–2002 produced substantive changes in the institutional design of the state: term limits on the presidency, direct presidential elections, the establishment of the Constitutional Court as guardian of the constitution, and the removal of appointed functional group representatives from the People’s Consultative Assembly (Horowitz, 2013). The elections of 1999 and thereafter, notwithstanding their imperfections, nonetheless represented mechanisms for the transfer of power that were vastly more open than anything seen under the New Order.

Decentralisation, for all the problems it has introduced, has created spaces for local political participation that never previously existed. Freedom of the press, though now under threat, once reached levels that allowed genuinely critical coverage of power. The KPK, before it was weakened, succeeded in imprisoning hundreds of corrupt politicians and officials from across the political spectrum (Butt, 2011).

Progress in health and education as well as relatively stable economic growth, represents an achievement that should not be minimised. Yet, as Aspinall (2010) observes, these gains owe more to fiscal pressures and the dynamics of global markets than they do to any fundamental transformation of governance.

VI. THE CONSEQUENCES OF FAILING TO PURSUE REFORM

A. Short Term (1–3 Years): Erosion of Trust and Instability

In the short term, a failure to correct the course of Reformasi will continue to erode public confidence in democratic institutions. Opinion surveys conducted by Indikator Politik Indonesia and SMRC consistently show declining trust in the House of Representatives, political parties, and the judiciary.

Low public trust correlates directly with political apathy and with the growth of anti-establishment sentiment. In such conditions, populism — whether in the guise of religious nationalism or of nostalgia for authoritarianism — finds extraordinarily fertile ground. The symptoms are already visible in growing support for figures who offer tough solutions without democratic foundations.

The weakening of the KPK and the increasing impunity enjoyed by corrupt actors will, in the short term, further damage the investment climate. Transparency International (2023) notes that high corruption perception directly increases the cost of doing business and undermines the confidence of foreign investors. 

B. Medium Term (4–10 Years): Structural Poverty and a Crisis of Legitimacy

Over the medium term, the failure of structural reform will consolidate poverty as a permanent condition for tens of millions of Indonesians. High inequality, sustained by oligarchy and corruption, creates a social mobility trap in which education and hard work alone are insufficient to escape poverty without access to patron-client networks.

Mancur Olson (2000), in Power and Prosperity, argues that stable oligarchy — powerful but narrow interest groups — tends to retard long-term economic growth, because such groups are more concerned with protecting existing rents than with promoting innovation and healthy competition. Indonesia, with its entrenched oligarchic structures, risks becoming indefinitely mired in the middle-income trap.

At the political level, the crisis of governmental legitimacy will deepen. If elections continue to be won through money politics rather than through a substantive contest of policy ideas, the results of those elections will be challenged with increasing frequency, and trust in the democratic process will continue to decline. In the worst-case scenario, such disillusionment may give rise to serious political instability. 

C. Long Term (10 or More Years): New Authoritarianism and Social Fragmentation

From a long-term perspective, the failure to consolidate democracy opens the way for what Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way (2010), in Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War, describe as “competitive authoritarianism”: a system that maintains the outward forms of democratic procedure whilst hollowing out its substance. Indonesia displays a number of the warning signs of such a trajectory.

Beyond that, the failure of the state to resolve historical and structural injustices may sow the seeds of serious social conflict. Papua is the clearest example: when the hopes vested in Reformasi for meaningful autonomy were disappointed, they became fuel for separatist sentiment and a protracted armed conflict that remains unresolved to this day.

From a generational perspective, young Indonesians born after 1998 — who have no memory of the New Order — now face a difficult set of choices: to accept a corrupt status quo, to emigrate (a brain drain of growing concern), or to demand change through channels that are progressively narrowing. If the system fails to respond adequately, the frustration of this generation may take forms that are difficult to predict.

VII. MATTERS DESERVING OF SERIOUS REFLECTION

A. Reformasi Is a Process, Not a Destination

One of the gravest errors in understanding Reformasi is to treat it as a single, completed event. Reform is a process that never concludes, one that requires the vigilance, the struggle, and the commitment of every generation. When society ceases to watch, when students cease to mobilise, and when the press loses its courage, Reformasi will inevitably move backwards. 

B. The Problem of Institutional Design

Indonesia has succeeded in establishing a large number of new institutions since 1998. Many of them, however, were designed with loopholes that allow capture by elite interests. Improving institutional design — including the mechanisms for selecting KPK commissioners, the independence of the National Human Rights Commission, and the accountability of the Supreme Court — is an urgent agenda that requires a strong political consensus. 

C. The Indispensability of a Robust Civil Society

The comparative experience of countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, and South Africa demonstrates that enduring democratic progress is almost always underpinned by a civil society that is strong, active, and independent of the state. Indonesia possesses a rich tradition of civil society organisations — from Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama to networks of NGOs and grassroots communities — yet many of these face growing financial pressure and regulatory constraints that are progressively limiting their room for manoeuvre. 

D. Historical Accountability as the Foundation of Reconciliation

No healthy democracy can stand upon a foundation of impunity. The experiences of post-Nazi Germany, post-apartheid South Africa, and post-junta Argentina demonstrate that accountability for the crimes of the past is not an act of vengeance but a precondition for the restoration of trust and the construction of a moral basis for a new order. Indonesia must find the political courage to tread the same path. 

E. The Urgency of Civic Education

Democracy requires politically literate citizens, critical in their thinking, and aware of both their rights and their obligations. Indonesia’s education system, still heavily reliant on rote learning and still inclined to avoid sensitive historical subjects, has not adequately prepared the younger generation to be active democratic citizens. Reform of civic education must be treated as an integral part of the broader renewal agenda.

VIII. CONCLUSION: A REFORM STILL UNFINISHED

Twenty-eight years is ample time in which to assess an era. Reformasi has produced formal changes that cannot be dismissed: more competitive elections, a freer press than the New Order permitted, and a number of oversight institutions that were wholly absent before 1998. Yet it has failed to transform the substance of how the state operates, how power is distributed, and how justice is guaranteed for all citizens.

The failure of Reformasi is not a total failure, nor is it an inevitable verdict of history. It is a failure of choices — the choices of elites to preserve their privileges, of institutions to evade genuine change, and the collective choice of society to acquiesce in the status quo rather than to persevere in realising the promises of 1998.

The generation born after Reformasi must not become merely the inheritors of disappointment. They must become the inheritors of its animating flame: more critical in their thought, better organised in their action, more imaginative in their search for new paths towards the justice and human dignity that were the deepest aspirations of the movement that brought this era into being.

Reformasi is not dead. It is merely in chains. And those who can free it — as was true twenty-eight years ago — are the people of Indonesia themselves.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Aspinall, E. and van Klinken, G. (eds.) (2011) The State and Illegality in Indonesia. Leiden: KITLV Press.

Butt, S. (2011) ‘Anti-Corruption Reform in Indonesia: An Obituary?’, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 47(3), pp. 381–394.

Crouch, H. (1978) The Army and Politics in Indonesia. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Diamond, L. (1999) Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Honna, J. (2003) Military Politics and Democratisation in Indonesia. London: RoutledgeCurzon.

Horowitz, D.L. (2013) Constitutional Change and Democracy in Indonesia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Huntington, S.P. (1991) The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press.

Levitsky, S. and Way, L.A. (2010) Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mietzner, M. (2013) Money, Power, and Ideology: Political Parties in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia. Singapore: NUS Press.

Olson, M. (2000) Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships. New York: Basic Books.

Pompe, S. (2005) The Indonesian Supreme Court: A Study of Institutional Collapse. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications.

Robison, R. and Hadiz, V.R. (2004) Reorganising Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of Markets. London: RoutledgeCurzon.

Roosa, J. (2006) Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement and Suharto’s Coup d’état in Indonesia. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.

Winters, J.A. (2011) Oligarchy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Journal Articles and Reports

Aspinall, E. (2010) ‘The Irony of Success’, Journal of Democracy, 21(2), pp. 20–34.

Hadiz, V.R. (2016) ‘Indonesia’s Year of Democratic Testing’, New Mandala. Available at: https://www.newmandala.org (Accessed: 21 May 2026).

Oxfam Indonesia (2017) Towards a More Equal Indonesia: How the Government Can Take Action to Close the Gap. Oxford: Oxfam Briefing Paper.

Power, T.P. (2018) ‘Jokowi’s Authoritarian Turn and Indonesia’s Democratic Decline’, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 54(3), pp. 307–338.

Schedler, A. (2002) ‘The Menu of Manipulation’, Journal of Democracy, 13(2), pp. 36–50.

Transparency International (2023) Corruption Perceptions Index 2023. Berlin: Transparency International. 

Civil Society Sources

Freedom House (2023) Freedom in the World 2023: Indonesia. Washington, DC: Freedom House.

Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) (2022) Tren Penindakan Kasus Korupsi 2022 [Trends in Corruption Enforcement 2022]. Jakarta: ICW.

Kontras (2023) Laporan Tahunan: Pemantauan Kebebasan Sipil dan HAM di Indonesia [Annual Report: Monitoring Civil Liberties and Human Rights in Indonesia]. Jakarta: Kontras.

[Bahasa]

A Reflection on Indonesia’s National Awakening Day

A Dawn Born in a Classroom

On 20 May 1908, in a modest room of the School tot Opleiding van Inlandsche Artsen (STOVIA) in Batavia, a group of young indigenous students founded an organisation called Budi Utomo. They were not armed fighters. They were not aristocrats who had inherited power. They were pupils — young men who had only recently encountered the world of modern knowledge — who suddenly awoke to the realisation that their people were sleeping soundly in the shackles of colonialism.

It was that very awareness which became the first spark. Not a bullet, nor a sword. But an enlightened mind, a stirred heart, and an unwavering resolve to ask: Why must we continue to live beneath the heel of others?

“Awakening is not merely resistance — it is self-discovery. The moment a nation begins to know itself, that is the moment it is truly reborn.”

An Awakening Beyond Rebellion

We often mistakenly understand National Awakening Day as an event of purely physical resistance. Yet what occurred in 1908 ran far deeper than that. Budi Utomo was not an armed separatist movement. It was a movement of consciousness—an endeavour to forge a national identity through the channels of education, culture, and unity.

Its founders, such as Dr Wahidin Sudirohusodo and Soetomo, understood that colonialism was not merely a matter of seized land or plundered wealth. The deepest form of colonialism is the colonisation of the mind — when a people are convinced that they are inherently inferior, less intelligent, and less worthy than their rulers.

The true awakening, therefore, began here: with the courage to declare, “We are not servants. We are human beings possessed of dignity.”

Threads Woven Towards Independence

Budi Utomo was a seed. From that seed grew other trees of struggle. Sarekat Islam arose to champion the rights of indigenous traders. Indische Partij stood to voice political rights. Jong Java, Jong Sumatranen Bond, and a host of youth organisations began uniting resolve across ethnic groups and islands. Until, on 28 October 1928, the Youth Pledge declared in a single breath: One Homeland, One Nation, One Language.

The 20th of May is not merely the starting point of a single organisation. It is the symbol of a long process—the process of a nation learning to know itself, weaving its differences into strength, and ultimately daring to proclaim its independence on 17 August 1945.

What Does Awakening Mean for Us Today?

More than a century after Budi Utomo was founded, we live in an independent Indonesia. Yet physical independence does not of itself guarantee a truly sovereign existence. Every generation is called to reinterpret awakening—no longer against foreign colonialism, but against every form of backwardness, injustice, and intellectual lethargy that erodes from within.

National awakening in this era means daring to innovate without forsaking cultural roots. It means upholding justice not only in the great cities, but reaching to the remotest corners of the archipelago. It means honouring difference not as a threat, but as a richness that becomes the nation’s distinction in the eyes of the world.

“A great nation is not one that merely commemorates the deeds of its heroes, but one that dares to carry their struggle forward within the context of its own age.”

The Responsibility of the Succeeding Generation

The young men of STOVIA in 1908 may never have imagined that their actions would be remembered more than a century later. They simply followed the voice of their conscience — that what is wrong must be changed, that what sleeps must be awakened, that what is divided must be united.

Now it is our turn. The turn of a generation that has inherited a free Indonesia, yet one which still has much work yet to be done. Our turn to awaken from the reluctance to think critically. To awaken from indifference towards the fate of our fellow countrymen. To awaken from the temptation to be mere spectators of history, rather than its makers.

National Awakening Day is not merely a day for ceremonies and speeches. It is an invitation — an invitation to every Indonesian soul to ask itself: What have I awakened today, within myself and for my nation?

Happy National Awakening Day, 20 May 2026

May the spirit of Budi Utomo live on—not in a museum,

but in the actions we take each and every day.

Indonesia rises—not by chance, but by choice.

Bahasa

The Winds of Age

In classical Greek and Roman mythology, the Anemoi exist as the personification of the Wind Gods who rule over the four cardinal directions. Among them is Eurus, the ruler of the East Wind, who brings warmth. In a poetic context, Eurus is frequently associated with weather that brings warm rain or turbulent storms, whilst also symbolising transition and the dawning of a new day, as he blows from the place where the sun rises. Next is Afer—or more fully Africus in Latin—the embodiment of the south-west wind, blowing from the direction of the African continent when viewed from the perspective of ancient Rome. This wind is often depicted as bringing moisture, heavy clouds, and rainstorms to the Mediterranean region, and its presence lends an exotic touch that enhances the atmosphere. Meanwhile, Zephyrus is the most beloved deity, serving as the bringer of the gentle, warm West Wind that heralds the arrival of spring. As a symbol of peace, comfort, and new beginnings, Zephyrus is credited with restoring life to plants and flowers that had frozen during the winter. The antithesis of Zephyrus is Boreas, the powerful and mighty god of the North Wind. He brings biting cold air, blizzards, and the freezing winter, visually depicted as an old bearded man with a chilling, magical aura. These four winds from every corner of the earth seem to guide, sway, and carry our imagination across an endless dreamworld, akin to the visuals of a watercolour painting moving freely in the breeze.

Discussing the "wind" amidst today's global landscape, which is heating up due to political warfare, introduces a highly intriguing shift in metaphor. Whilst in poetic works the wind acts as a soothing guide through dreams, in modern geopolitical reality it has transformed into a symbol of invisible forces driving change, uncertainty, and global tension. The dynamics of today's "political winds" are marked by the world's shift from a unipolar or bipolar system to a multipolar one, where new polarisations trigger fierce gusts of tension between the Western bloc and the new Eastern alliance. Political warfare, trade wars, and physical conflicts in various parts of the world create a vortex of headwinds that leaves economic stability and global peace incredibly fragile, whilst major powers vie for influence to steer the course of diplomacy, economic sanctions, and digital propaganda.

In the digital age, this political warfare extends into cyberspace as the winds of information and propaganda, where social media has become a vessel for generating massive "winds of opinion" through the manipulation of algorithms to destabilise nations or influence election outcomes. Consequently, ordinary people are often left tossed about amidst the uncertainty of information storms, struggling to distinguish objective truth from narratives deliberately spun for political gain. As politics heat up, the impact immediately triggers a series of interconnected global crises, ranging from energy and food crises due to embargoes that sever global logistics lines—thereby fuelling inflation that hits the lower classes hardest—to refugee crises where millions are forced to move along the "winds of fate" in search of protection, sparking fresh political debates in destination countries. Reflecting upon humanity, ancient philosophy regarding the wind teaches us about cycles and balance; no matter how fierce the political storms whipped up by the ambition for power, history always notes that they will eventually subside. Therefore, our greatest challenge is to ensure that we do not easily waver or get carried away by the winds of hatred, but instead subdue our egos, maintain clarity of thought, and nurture empathy as the finest anchor to keep us from foundering amidst the storms of the age.

The ancient Anemoi blew soft and wild,

From eastern dawns to springtimes mild; 

But now the winds of conflict roar, 

As politics inflame the shore.

The storms of power twist and bend, 

Yet every tempest finds its end; 

Hold fast the anchor, clear and kind, 

To brave the rages of mankind.

Bahasa

Higher Order Thinking Skills

In a land that prided itself on democracy, there stood a peculiar institution known as the Bank of Standing Tall. Its reputation did not rest upon financial acumen, but upon the miraculous ascents of certain individuals within its walls.

One day, a newcomer arrived. Before he had even learnt the rhythm of the photocopier, he was seated in the director’s chair. The employees whispered amongst themselves: “Is this divine providence, or merely the invisible hand of political patronage?” No answer was forthcoming, only a smile that concealed more than it revealed.

His career soared like a kite tugged by the winds of power. From the Bank of Standing Tall, he leapt into the ministerial office, entrusted with the nation’s public health. Yet the diploma he carried was less a testament to scholarship than a counterfeit parchment from a roadside stall.

The people asked, with weary voices: how could the nation’s health be safeguarded by one more versed in calculating loan interest than in listening to a heartbeat? But in that land, the questions of the people were drowned out by the chorus of paid applause.

And as if by natural law, counterfeit diplomas never walk alone. The minister was chosen by a president whose own crown was fashioned from a forged certificate. Together they formed a duet of deception, like twin puppets upon a stage: one promising health, the other promising justice, both delivering only illusion.

The citizens laughed bitterly, for in that land, a counterfeit diploma was not a disgrace but a golden ticket to the theatre of power. And the theatre spun endlessly, filled with orchestrated clapping, while the true voice of the public faded into silence.

Ironically, in a nation where counterfeit diplomas serve as golden tickets to the theatre of power, the public is increasingly compelled to cultivate High Order Thinking Skills (HOTS). Only through the faculties of critical, analytical, and evaluative reasoning can citizens peel back the layers of illusion woven by fraudulent qualifications and instant promotions. Without HOTS, society risks being ensnared by hollow rhetoric, mistaking forged certificates for genuine merit, and overlooking the truth that integrity outweighs any piece of paper. In essence, HOTS serves as the intellectual vaccine that shields the populace from the contagion of political and social manipulation.

HIGHER ORDER THINKING SKILLS

Cultivating the Minds of a Nation

It was an ordinary Tuesday afternoon in a secondary school classroom in Surabaya. The teacher had just finished explaining the water cycle — evaporation, condensation, precipitation — with commendable clarity. She then posed a question to her pupils: “What would happen to coastal cities like Jakarta if global temperatures rose by two degrees Celsius?” The room fell silent. Most students reached for their textbooks, as if the answer might be tucked between the diagrams of cumulus clouds and rainfall charts. One boy, however, set his book aside. He leaned forward, furrowed his brow, and began to reason aloud: floods, he said, would displace millions; rice paddies along the northern coast would be submerged; the economy of fishing communities would collapse; and the government would be forced to reconsider urban planning from the ground up. His classmates stared. His teacher beamed. What distinguished that boy was not that he knew more than his peers. What distinguished him was that he could think — deeply, critically, and in a connected way. He was, without knowing the terminology, practising Higher Order Thinking Skills.

This vignette is not exceptional. It is, in fact, precisely the kind of intellectual engagement that education systems around the world are striving — and often failing — to cultivate. As we move deeper into the twenty-first century, the capacity to memorise facts is fast becoming less valuable than the capacity to interrogate, synthesise, evaluate, and create. This essay explores the concept of Higher Order Thinking Skills (HOTS): its intellectual roots, its theoretical architecture, its applications across disciplines and demographics, its particular importance for nations navigating complex socio-economic realities, and the urgent messages it carries for educators, policymakers, and citizens alike.

I. Definition and Conceptual Foundations

The term “Higher Order Thinking Skills” finds its most authoritative conceptual home in the work of the American educational psychologist Benjamin Samuel Bloom. In 1956, Bloom and his colleagues published Taxonomy of Educational Objectives: The Classification of Educational Goals — a landmark text that proposed a hierarchical model of cognitive learning objectives. The taxonomy organised thinking into six levels: Knowledge, Comprehension, Application, Analysis, Synthesis, and Evaluation (Bloom et al., 1956). The first three were categorised as lower-order thinking; the latter three as higher-order.

In 2001, a revised edition of the taxonomy was published by Anderson and Krathwohl, who updated the original nouns to verbs and reordered the top two levels. The revised taxonomy reads as follows: Remembering, Understanding, Applying, Analysing, Evaluating, and Creating (Anderson & Krathwohl, 2001). The final three levels — Analysing, Evaluating, and Creating — constitute what is now commonly referred to as HOTS. These are the cognitive processes that require learners to go beyond passive reception of information and engage in active, reflective, and generative intellectual work.

Complementing Bloom’s taxonomy, the philosopher and educator John Dewey had earlier articulated a vision of “reflective thinking” as the cornerstone of genuine education. In his 1910 work How We Think, Dewey argued that education must cultivate the habit of considered, purposeful reasoning rather than the mere accumulation of received wisdom (Dewey, 1910). Robert Ennis (1962) further developed this lineage in his foundational definition of critical thinking as “the correct assessing of statements,” whilst Richard Paul and Linda Elder (2006) later articulated a comprehensive model of critical thinking as self-directed, self-disciplined, self-monitored, and self-corrective thinking.

Beyond critical thinking, HOTS encompasses creative thinking — the ability to generate novel ideas and connections — as theorised by Edward de Bono through his concept of lateral thinking (De Bono, 1970), and by Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi in his studies of creativity and flow (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996). Problem-solving and decision-making complete the quartet of core higher-order capacities, each of which demands that the thinker manage uncertainty, weigh competing values, and act judiciously.

II. Historical Trajectory: From Ancient Paideia to Modern Pedagogy

The aspiration to cultivate higher-order cognition is not a modern invention. In ancient Athens, the Socratic method — a technique of disciplined questioning designed to expose the limits of received opinion and lead interlocutors towards more rigorous understanding — embodied the spirit of HOTS millennia before the term was coined (Plato, Meno, c. 385 BCE). Aristotle, too, distinguished between episteme (scientific knowledge), techne (craft knowledge), and phronesis (practical wisdom), privileging phronesis as the highest form of human intellectual virtue (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, c. 350 BCE).

The Renaissance humanists, particularly Erasmus and Montaigne, championed an education that formed the whole person rather than merely transmitting doctrine. Francis Bacon’s inductive method in the seventeenth century, and Immanuel Kant’s insistence on autonomous rational inquiry in the eighteenth, further cemented the intellectual genealogy of HOTS. The progressive education movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, spearheaded by Dewey in America and Maria Montessori in Italy, brought these philosophical ideals into institutional practice.

The post-war era saw Bloom’s taxonomy formalise the conceptual framework, whilst the cognitive revolution in psychology — associated with scholars such as Piaget, Vygotsky, and Bruner — provided empirical grounding for understanding how higher-order cognition develops across the lifespan (Piaget, 1952; Vygotsky, 1978; Bruner, 1960). By the turn of the twenty-first century, international frameworks such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) had made critical thinking and problem-solving central metrics of educational quality worldwide (OECD, 2019). 

III. The Four Core Higher Order Thinking Skills 

3.1 Critical Thinking

Critical thinking is the disciplined intellectual process of actively and skilfully conceptualising, applying, analysing, synthesising, and evaluating information gathered from observation, experience, reflection, reasoning, or communication, as a guide to belief and action (Paul & Elder, 2006). It is the antidote to intellectual passivity, superstition, and demagoguery. In an era of misinformation and “fake news,” the capacity to evaluate the credibility of sources, identify logical fallacies, and distinguish between fact and opinion is not merely an academic virtue but a civic necessity. 

3.2 Creative Thinking

Creative thinking involves the generation of ideas, solutions, or products that are both novel and appropriate to the context (Sternberg & Lubart, 1999). It is the engine of innovation, entrepreneurship, and cultural vitality. Contrary to the popular misconception that creativity is an innate gift bestowed upon a fortunate few, research in cognitive psychology consistently demonstrates that creative thinking can be taught, practised, and systematically developed (Torrance, 1974; Sawyer, 2012). 

3.3 Problem-Solving

Problem-solving is the cognitive process of moving from a given state to a desired goal state when the path forward is not immediately obvious (Newell & Simon, 1972). Effective problem-solvers are able to represent problems accurately, generate and evaluate potential strategies, monitor their progress, and adapt their approach when initial strategies prove ineffective. Real-world problems — in engineering, medicine, governance, and everyday life — are invariably complex, ill-structured, and resistant to algorithmic solutions. 

3.4 Decision-Making

Decision-making refers to the process of selecting a course of action from among several alternatives, typically under conditions of uncertainty (Kahneman, 2011). Sound decision-making requires not only cognitive rigour but also emotional intelligence, ethical awareness, and an appreciation of systemic consequences. Daniel Kahneman’s distinction between “System 1” (fast, intuitive) and “System 2” (slow, deliberate) thinking highlights the importance of cultivating the habits of mind that override cognitive biases and prompt more reflective judgment. 

IV. For Whom Are HOTS Relevant? The Universal Imperative

A common misconception positions HOTS as the exclusive province of gifted learners, elite universities, or knowledge economy professionals. This view is not only empirically unsupported but socially dangerous. Higher-order thinking is relevant — indeed, essential — for every human being who must navigate a complex world, make consequential choices, and participate in democratic civic life.

For children and young people, HOTS development begins in early childhood through play, questioning, and imaginative exploration (Whitebread et al., 2012). For primary school pupils, it is nurtured through enquiry-based learning, collaborative problem-solving, and exposure to open-ended challenges. For secondary students, it deepens through engagement with complex texts, ethical dilemmas, and discipline-specific methods of reasoning. For university students, it becomes a prerequisite for original scholarship and professional competence.

Beyond formal education, HOTS matter profoundly for workers, citizens, parents, and community leaders. The factory operative who must troubleshoot a malfunction, the farmer who must adapt to unpredictable weather patterns, the community organiser who must mobilise disparate stakeholders — all require higher-order cognitive capacities. In this sense, HOTS is not a luxury of the educated elite but a democratic entitlement of every human person. 

V. Why HOTS Matter: The Multidimensional Imperative 

5.1 Ideological Imperative

From an ideological standpoint, the cultivation of HOTS is inseparable from the vision of human dignity and democratic citizenship. Democracies depend upon citizens who can critically evaluate political claims, resist manipulation, and deliberate rationally about the common good. As the philosopher Martha Nussbaum has argued, education for democratic citizenship must cultivate the “narrative imagination” — the ability to think what it might be like to be in the shoes of a person different from oneself — alongside the capacity for critical self-examination (Nussbaum, 1997).

In the Indonesian context, the national philosophy of Pancasila enshrines values of humanity, unity, deliberative democracy, and social justice. HOTS education is, in this respect, not foreign to Indonesian ideological tradition but a fulfilment of it. A citizenry equipped with critical and creative thinking capacities is better positioned to embody the consultative, deliberative spirit of musyawarah and mufakat, and to resist the authoritarian populisms and identity-based mobilisations that threaten democratic institutions worldwide. 

5.2 Philosophical Imperative

Philosophically, HOTS education reflects a commitment to human flourishing — what Aristotle termed eudaimonia. The good life, in this tradition, is not the life of passive consumption or unreflective conformity but the life of active rational engagement with the world. Paulo Freire’s critical pedagogy, articulated in Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1968), frames education as a fundamentally political and humanising practice. The “banking model” of education, in which students are passive receptacles for deposited knowledge, is, for Freire, a form of dehumanisation. HOTS pedagogy, by contrast, treats learners as active, questioning subjects who co-create knowledge with their educators.

This philosophical commitment has practical implications. Schools that take HOTS seriously must redesign not only their curricula but their pedagogical relationships, assessment systems, and institutional cultures. The authoritarian classroom, in which the teacher holds a monopoly on legitimate knowledge, is fundamentally incompatible with the cultivation of critical and creative thinkers. 

5.3 Economic Imperative

The economic arguments for HOTS are perhaps the most frequently invoked, though they are by no means the most important. The World Economic Forum’s Future of Jobs Report (2023) identifies critical thinking, creativity, problem-solving, and decision-making among the most in-demand competencies for the workforce of the coming decade. As automation and artificial intelligence displace routine cognitive and manual tasks, the economic premium on distinctively human capacities — complex reasoning, empathy, ethical judgement, and creative synthesis — will continue to rise.

For Indonesia, which aspires to achieve the status of a high-income economy by 2045 (the centenary of independence), the development of HOTS in its workforce is a strategic economic priority. The country cannot compete globally by relying upon low-cost, low-skill labour indefinitely. Productivity growth, industrial upgrading, and the transition to a knowledge-based economy all require a population capable of innovating, adapting, and solving complex problems (World Bank, 2021). 

5.4 Social Imperative

Socially, HOTS education contributes to the reduction of inequality, the strengthening of social cohesion, and the promotion of justice. Societies in which HOTS are the preserve of privileged minorities are societies in which the power capacity is also unequally distributed. When the ability to question authority, evaluate evidence, and articulate alternative visions of the social good is concentrated among elites, democracy is hollowed out and inequality is reproduced across generations.

Conversely, when HOTS are democratised through high-quality public education, communities become more resilient, more adaptive, and more capable of collective self-governance. Research consistently demonstrates that higher levels of education — particularly education that emphasises reasoning, critical literacy, and civic engagement — are associated with greater social trust, lower levels of inter-group prejudice, and stronger democratic participation (Putnam, 2000; Nie, Junn & Stehlik-Barry, 1996). 

5.5 Cultural Imperative

Culturally, HOTS education enriches the aesthetic, intellectual, and spiritual life of communities. Literature, music, visual art, and performance are all domains in which higher-order thinking — interpretation, evaluation, creation — is intrinsic to meaningful engagement. A nation of critical readers, creative artists, and reflective cultural participants is a nation with a vibrant cultural life.

For Indonesia, with its extraordinary cultural diversity — over 1,300 ethnic groups, hundreds of regional languages, and a rich tapestry of artistic traditions — the cultivation of HOTS offers a means of engaging with this heritage not as a museum of static artefacts but as a living, evolving, and internally contested domain of meaning. HOTS education can encourage young Indonesians to analyse the values embedded in their cultural traditions, evaluate their contemporary relevance, and create new cultural expressions that honour the past whilst speaking to the present. 

VI. Applications of HOTS Across Contexts 

6.1 In Education

In the classroom, HOTS is operationalised through pedagogical strategies such as enquiry-based learning, problem-based learning (PBL), project-based learning, Socratic seminars, collaborative debate, and design thinking (Hmelo-Silver, 2004; Thomas, 2000). These approaches shift the role of the teacher from sage-on-the-stage to guide-on-the-side — a facilitator of intellectual exploration rather than a transmitter of fixed content.

Assessment of HOTS requires moving beyond multiple-choice tests that privilege recall and recognition. Performance-based assessments, portfolios, extended essays, oral examinations, and authentic tasks that mirror real-world challenges are all more appropriate vehicles for evaluating higher-order competencies (Wiggins, 1998). Indonesia’s Asesmen Nasional (AN), introduced in 2021 as a replacement for the Ujian Nasional, represents a significant step in this direction, with its emphasis on literacy, numeracy, and character rather than content recall.

6.2 In Professional Life

In professional contexts, HOTS underpins effective leadership, strategic planning, ethical decision-making, and innovation. Managers who can analyse complex organisational challenges, evaluate competing strategies, and synthesise information from diverse sources are more effective than those who rely upon habit and precedent. Healthcare professionals who engage in clinical reasoning — a form of applied HOTS — deliver better patient outcomes. Legal practitioners who can identify relevant precedents, evaluate conflicting arguments, and construct compelling cases exemplify HOTS in action. 

6.3 In Civic Life

In the public sphere, HOTS is the foundation of informed citizenship. The ability to critically evaluate media coverage, identify propaganda techniques, assess the credibility of political claims, and deliberate rationally about policy alternatives is essential for democratic self-governance. In an era of social media-driven polarisation and algorithmically amplified misinformation, the civic importance of HOTS has never been greater (Kahne & Bowyer, 2017). 

VII. How to Develop Higher Order Thinking Skills

The development of HOTS is neither instantaneous nor accidental. It requires deliberate, sustained, and scaffolded educational experiences. Research and practice point to several key strategies:

• Pose open-ended, divergent questions that resist single correct answers and invite multiple perspectives.

• Engage learners in collaborative problem-solving tasks that mirror real-world complexity and ambiguity.

• Encourage metacognition — the practice of thinking about one’s own thinking — through reflective journals, think-alouds, and self-assessment protocols.

• Provide exposure to diverse perspectives, texts, and cultural contexts that challenge learners’ assumptions and expand their conceptual repertoire.

• Create a psychologically safe classroom climate in which intellectual risk-taking, questioning, and productive failure are valued rather than penalised.

• Design authentic assessment tasks that require learners to demonstrate higher-order competencies in contexts that matter beyond the school walls.

• Integrate HOTS across all subject areas rather than confining it to dedicated “critical thinking” courses.

• Model higher-order thinking explicitly: think aloud, demonstrate reasoning processes, and share intellectual uncertainties with learners.

Research by Hattie (2009), in his landmark meta-analysis Visible Learning, identifies several high-effect teaching strategies that are closely aligned with HOTS development, including reciprocal teaching, problem-solving instruction, and feedback that promotes metacognitive awareness. Vygotsky’s concept of the Zone of Proximal Development (ZPD) offers a theoretical basis for scaffolded HOTS instruction: learners are challenged to operate at the upper edge of their current competence, with appropriate support, in order to internalise more sophisticated cognitive strategies over time (Vygotsky, 1978). 

VIII. Benefits for the Nation’s Generation: A Multidimensional Analysis

The benefits of equipping a nation’s young people with HOTS are not confined to the cognitive domain. They ramify across the ideological, philosophical, economic, social, and cultural dimensions of national life in ways that are mutually reinforcing and cumulatively transformative.

Ideologically, a HOTS-literate citizenry is more resistant to extremism, authoritarianism, and divisive populism. Young people who have been trained to evaluate evidence, question authority, and reason across difference are less susceptible to radicalisation, ethnic scapegoating, and political manipulation. This is of particular importance in a diverse, decentralised democracy such as Indonesia, where the management of cultural and religious pluralism is a permanent civic challenge.

Philosophically, HOTS education nurtures a generation that relates to knowledge not as a fixed inheritance to be received and preserved, but as a living enterprise to be questioned, extended, and enriched. This orientation — which the philosopher Karl Popper associated with the “open society” — is the foundation of intellectual progress and cultural vitality (Popper, 1945).

Economically, the returns on HOTS investment are both individual and social. Individuals with strong higher-order cognitive competencies command higher wages, adapt more successfully to labour market disruptions, and are more likely to engage in entrepreneurial activity (Hanushek & Woessmann, 2015). At the national level, cognitive skills have been shown to be the single most powerful predictor of long-run economic growth, more powerful than years of schooling alone (Hanushek & Woessmann, 2008).

Socially, HOTS education contributes to a more equitable and cohesive society by democratising access to intellectual capital. When children from disadvantaged backgrounds receive HOTS-rich education, the social reproduction of cognitive inequality is interrupted, and the correlation between socioeconomic origin and life outcomes is weakened. This is not merely an economic benefit but a moral one: a society that squanders the intellectual potential of its least-advantaged members impoverishes itself in ways that extend far beyond economic metrics.

Culturally, a generation equipped with HOTS will approach Indonesia’s extraordinary cultural heritage with the curiosity, analytical depth, and creative energy that it deserves. Rather than treating adat traditions, batik patterns, wayang narratives, or gamelan compositions as museum pieces, HOTS-literate young Indonesians will engage with them as dynamic texts to be read, interrogated, reinterpreted, and creatively renewed. This cultural vitality is itself a form of national resilience. 

IX. Critical Reflections and Important Messages

No essay on HOTS would be complete without acknowledging the tensions and challenges that complicate its implementation. First, there is the persistent tension between HOTS and the coverage imperatives of content-heavy curricula. Teachers who are under pressure to cover vast syllabi within limited time feel little latitude for the open-ended enquiry that HOTS demands. Systemic curriculum reform, not merely exhortation, is required to resolve this tension.

Second, there is the challenge of assessment. High-stakes examinations that reward rapid, accurate recall will always exert a distorting influence on pedagogical practice. Assessments must be redesigned to reward higher-order competencies if teaching is to follow suit. This is a political as much as a technical challenge, requiring courage from policymakers who must resist the seductions of simple, cheap, and easily comparable standardised tests.

Third, there is the issue of teacher preparation. One cannot teach what one has not experienced. Teachers who have themselves been trained through rote-learning pedagogies, assessed through recall-based examinations, and employed in institutions that do not value intellectual risk-taking are ill-equipped to model and facilitate HOTS in their classrooms. Pre-service and in-service teacher education must be radically reimagined if HOTS is to become a reality rather than a slogan.

Fourth, there is the question of equity. HOTS education risks becoming yet another advantage of the privileged if it is not deliberately extended to learners in under-resourced schools, rural communities, and socially marginalised groups. Universal access to HOTS-rich education is a social justice imperative, not merely an educational aspiration.

The most important message of this essay is, perhaps, the simplest: thinking cannot be outsourced. As artificial intelligence grows more capable of performing routine cognitive tasks, the uniquely human capacities for critical judgment, creative synthesis, ethical reasoning, and empathetic understanding become not less but more valuable. The boy in that Surabaya classroom — who set his textbook aside and thought — represents not merely an educational ideal but a human one. Our task, as educators, policymakers, parents, and citizens, is to create the conditions in which every child can do the same.

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