2026 EID AL-ADHA AND THE DAY OF ARAFAH: A Reflective Essay

The Convergence of Islamic Values and the Principles of Human Rights

I. Introduction

Eid al-Adha is one of the greatest celebrations in Islam, observed on the tenth of Dhul Hijjah. Far beyond a mere ritual festivity, it carries profound spiritual, moral, and social dimensions. It commemorates the sacrifice of the Prophet Ibrahim and his son the Prophet Ismail, alaihimassalam, encompasses the act of udhiyah (the ritual slaughter of livestock), and marks the culmination of the Hajj pilgrimage — most notably the standing at the Plain of Arafah.

Human Rights (HR), on the other hand, is a modern concept born of humanity’s long struggle for equality, justice, and respect for the dignity of every individual. Although the term itself gained prominence in twentieth-century international law, many of its foundational principles had long been present within Islamic teaching — most vividly in the Qur’an and in the Prophet’s (ﷺ) farewell sermon delivered on the Plain of Arafah.

This essay seeks to trace the threads that connect the values enshrined in Eid al-Adha and the Day of Arafah with the foundational principles of Human Rights, whilst reflecting upon both the points of convergence and the philosophical distinctions between the two traditions within a contemporary Islamic intellectual framework.

II. Human Equality: The Universal Message of the Plain of Arafah

One of the most awe-inspiring sights of the Hajj pilgrimage is the sea of humanity — millions of people from every corner of the globe — dressed in identical white ihram garments, standing together upon the Plain of Arafah. There are no symbols of wealth or poverty, no social castes, no nationality deemed more honourable than another. All stand equal before Allah as His servants.

This principle of equality is deeply consonant with the foremost foundation of modern Human Rights: the recognition that every human being is born with equal dignity and with rights that may not be taken away. Allah declares in the Qur’an:

“O mankind, indeed We have created you from male and female and made you peoples and tribes that you may know one another…”

(Qur’an, Al-Hujurat: 13)

This verse constitutes an unequivocal rejection of racial supremacy and ethnic arrogance. In the same spirit, during his farewell sermon on the Plain of Arafah, the Prophet (ﷺ) declared that no Arab has superiority over a non-Arab, nor has any non-Arab superiority over an Arab, save through piety. Many Muslim scholars regard this address as one of the earliest moral declarations of human equality in the history of civilisation.

III. The Right to Life and the Sanctity of the Human Soul

The occasion of Eid al-Adha and the Hajj pilgrimage places considerable emphasis upon the sanctity of human life. In his Farewell Sermon (Khutbah al-Wada’), the Prophet (ﷺ) declared that the blood, property, and honour of every person are inviolable. This statement speaks directly to three of the central pillars of modern Human Rights: the right to life, the right to personal security, and the protection of individual honour and dignity.

The Qur’an itself lays a supremely robust moral foundation in this regard:

“Whosoever kills a soul without just cause, it is as though he has killed all of mankind.”

(Qur’an, Al-Ma’idah: 32)

This value establishes a firm moral bedrock: that no human being may be treated arbitrarily or with impunity. The principle is not merely a prohibition against killing; it is a summons to regard every life as an entity of immeasurable worth — a conviction that lies at the very heart of the entire edifice of international human rights law.

IV. Social Justice and Economic Rights Through the Act of Sacrifice

The act of udhiyah during Eid al-Adha is far more than a purely ritual slaughter of livestock. It carries unmistakably tangible social dimensions: feeding the poor, sharing one’s sustenance with others, alleviating socio-economic inequality, and strengthening communal solidarity. Allah commands in the Qur’an:

“Eat of them and feed the contented and the needy.”

(Qur’an, Al-Hajj: 36)

The message of this verse is unambiguous: acts of worship must not remain confined to the realm of private ritual, but must give rise to genuine social and humanitarian impact. From a Human Rights perspective, this ethos corresponds directly to the right to food, the right to an adequate standard of living, and the aspiration of social justice. In other words, the act of udhiyah represents a concrete manifestation of Islam’s concern for the economic and social rights of its most vulnerable members.

V. Moral Freedom and Human Dignity in the Story of Ibrahim

The narrative of the Prophet Ibrahim and the Prophet Ismail, alaihimassalam, which forms the spiritual backdrop of Eid al-Adha, contains a lesson on moral freedom that is frequently overlooked. In the Qur’an, the Prophet Ibrahim did not coerce Ismail unilaterally or by brute force. Instead, there was a dialogue of remarkable nobility:

“O my son, indeed I have seen in a dream that I am to slaughter you. So consider what you think.”

(Qur’an, As-Saffat: 102)

There are elements of communication, conscious awareness, and consent within this narrative. It suggests that the human being is not a mere object devoid of will, but a dignified creature invited to understand the meaning of sacrifice. A number of contemporary Muslim scholars and thinkers see in this dialogue a lesson that Islam honours human agency and the freedom of the will — a value that equally stands at the core of the concept of rights and freedoms within the Human Rights tradition.

VI. The Day of Arafah and the Universal Consciousness of Humanity

The Plain of Arafah is widely regarded by Islamic scholars as a miniature of the Day of Judgement: humanity gathers stripped of all worldly status, conscious of the transience of life, and in anticipation of divine reckoning. From this profound spiritual experience arises a vital existential awareness — that all human beings are mortal, all are weak before Allah, and all are in need of His mercy.

It is precisely this awareness that forms the ethical root of respect for one’s fellow human beings: if all people are equally mortal and equally weak before Allah, then no one has the right to oppress another. This spiritual value is closely akin to the ethical foundation of Human Rights — namely, the recognition that every person possesses an inherent dignity that no power, however great, may diminish.

VII. Points of Convergence and Philosophical Differences with Modern Human Rights

Despite the many strong points of convergence, it must equally be understood that Islam and modern Human Rights are not entirely identical. Islam is exceptionally robust in its affirmation of the right to life, social justice, the protection of the vulnerable, the prohibition of racism, and the safeguarding of personal honour. Nevertheless, on certain specific contemporary issues, differences of interpretation exist between international human rights law and classical Islamic jurisprudence.

The most fundamental difference lies in their philosophical groundings. Many modern human rights frameworks place individual rights at the centre as an autonomous, self-standing concept. In Islam, by contrast, rights are always paired with responsibilities — to Allah, to the community, to the family, and to moral values. Freedom in Islam does not mean freedom without limits, but rather freedom that is bound by justice and accountability.

Contemporary Muslim scholars endeavour to bridge these two traditions through the framework of maqasid al-shari’ah — the overarching objectives of Islamic law — which encompass the preservation of religion, life, intellect, lineage, and property. These five objectives, in fact, overlap substantially with the fundamental rights recognised in international human rights instruments.

VIII. Conclusion

Eid al-Adha and the Day of Arafah are not merely occasions of annual ritual observance. They are grand reminders of universal human values: the equal dignity of all people, the sanctity of life and honour, social solidarity, the rejection of all forms of racism and arrogance, and the moral responsibility of every individual towards others.

These values share a powerful intersection with the foundations of Human Rights, even though the two traditions emerge from different intellectual sources. Herein lies the richness of civilisation: that truth concerning the dignity and rights of human beings may be arrived at by different paths — whether through divine revelation or through the long and arduous reasoning of human history.

By understanding the deep connection between Eid al-Adha and the principles of Human Rights, it is hoped that the commemoration of this celebration will no longer remain a ritual merely to be observed, but will become a genuine inspiration to champion justice, equality, and respect for the dignity of every human being in the course of daily life.

Bahasa

Will the Rupiah Weaken Further?

A country's exchange rate is one of the most sensitive and strategically significant economic indicators. For Indonesia, the movement of the rupiah against the US dollar is far more than a figure on a trading board — it reflects the overall health of the national economy: from household purchasing power and government foreign debt burdens, to export competitiveness and international investor confidence in Indonesia's economic foundations.

As of mid-2026, the rupiah finds itself under considerable strain. In the third week of May 2026, the currency weakened to the Rp 17,600–17,750 per US dollar range — far exceeding the government's State Budget (APBN) assumption of Rp 16,500 per dollar for 2026. This situation raises a fundamental question: where is the rupiah headed, and what forces will determine its fate?

This essay seeks to answer that question by analysing historical trends, current conditions, key determining factors, and projections from authoritative institutions, in order to outline the most plausible scenarios for the rupiah's trajectory.

The Development of the Indonesian Rupiah

Projections, Challenges, and Key Determinants Against the US Dollar

Economic & Monetary Analysis | May 2026

Part I: A Historical Overview — The Rupiah's Long Journey

To understand the rupiah's current position, one must first examine its historical patterns.

The rupiah enjoyed a period of relative stability in the early New Order era, hovering around Rp 2,000 per dollar. However, the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–1998 devastated that foundation: the currency plummeted to Rp 16,650 per dollar in January 1998 — a figure that was, at the time, regarded as a national economic catastrophe.

Following the reform era, the rupiah gradually recovered. Throughout 2003–2013, the exchange rate remained relatively stable in the Rp 8,500–12,000 range, supported by high global commodity prices, abundant foreign capital flows into emerging markets, and Indonesia's consistently strong economic growth above 5 per cent.

However, from 2013 onwards, a depreciatory trend resumed. The Federal Reserve's tapering of quantitative easing triggered capital outflows from emerging markets (the 'Taper Tantrum'). The rupiah continued its long-term slide, breaking through Rp 14,000 in 2015, Rp 15,000 in 2018, and permanently exceeding Rp 16,000 from 2023 onwards.

This pattern points to an inescapable structural reality: the rupiah is on a long-term depreciatory trend against the US dollar, shaped by a combination of domestic factors — such as current account deficits and import dependency — and global forces, including dollar strength and US interest rate dynamics.

Part II: Current Conditions — Where Does the Rupiah Stand Today?

In the third week of May 2026, the rupiah stood at Rp 17,600–17,750 per US dollar, far from the government's and Bank Indonesia's targets. On 19 May 2026, the currency closed at Rp 17,700, before recovering slightly to Rp 17,629 on 20 May 2026.

This depreciation did not occur overnight. Several significant events served as key triggers:

Trump's Tariff Shock

In early April 2025, US President Donald Trump announced a 32 per cent reciprocal tariff on Indonesian products. This 'Trade War 2.0' policy immediately rattled markets: the rupiah briefly touched levels above Rp 17,000 in Non-Deliverable Forward (NDF) trading, momentarily surpassing the lowest level recorded during the 1998 monetary crisis. Although Trump announced a 90-day tariff pause on 9 April 2025, pressure on the rupiah did not fully subside.

Persistent Capital Outflows

Sustained net foreign selling in Indonesia's capital markets since October 2024 continued to drain foreign exchange reserves and weigh on the rupiah. The proportion of foreign investor holdings in Indonesia's capital markets fell from 48.5 per cent in August 2024 to 41.24 per cent in February 2025, reflecting diminished global investor confidence in Indonesian assets.

Sustained High US Interest Rates

The Federal Reserve has yet to signal any significant interest rate cuts. Elevated US rates make dollar-denominated assets — particularly US Treasuries — highly attractive, prompting global investors to shift funds from emerging markets, including Indonesia, towards dollar safe-haven assets.

Seasonal Pressures

Bank Indonesia has noted that April through June historically represents a period of seasonal pressure on the rupiah, driven by heightened dollar demand for dividend payments, fuel imports, and foreign debt servicing.

Part III: Key Determinants of Rupiah Movement

The rupiah's exchange rate is shaped by a complex interplay of global and domestic variables. Understanding these factors is essential to projecting the currency's future direction.

A. Global Factors

1. US Federal Reserve Monetary Policy

The Fed's interest rate is effectively the 'gravitational force' for all global currencies. As long as the Fed maintains high rates, the US dollar will remain strong and pressure on the rupiah will persist. Conversely, any credible signal of rate cuts will weaken the dollar and create room for the rupiah to appreciate.

2. Geopolitical Tensions and Trade Wars

Trump's tariffs on Indonesia are not merely a bilateral economic matter — they generate global uncertainty that pushes investors towards safe-haven assets (the dollar, gold, US government bonds). The more the trade war escalates, the greater the pressure on emerging market currencies.

3. Export Commodity Prices

Indonesia is a major exporter of commodities: palm oil (CPO), coal, nickel, and rubber. When global commodity prices rise, foreign exchange inflows to Indonesia increase, rupiah demand strengthens, and the exchange rate tends to appreciate. A decline in commodity prices weakens the trade balance and the currency.

4. Global Risk-On/Risk-Off Sentiment

In periods of global uncertainty, investors tend towards risk-off behaviour — selling risky assets and buying safe ones. As an emerging market, Indonesia is perpetually vulnerable during such phases: capital flees, equities fall, and the rupiah weakens.

 

B. Domestic Factors

1. Fiscal Discipline

An excessively large budget deficit can trigger negative market perceptions regarding the sustainability of Indonesia's public finances. This may prompt capital outflows and weigh on the rupiah. Conversely, prudent fiscal management enhances market confidence.

2. Current Account Balance

When imports exceed exports (a current account deficit), demand for dollars outstrips supply, placing downward pressure on the rupiah. Conversely, a trade surplus — such as Indonesia's USD 19.3 billion surplus with the United States — provides a cushion for the currency.

3. Bank Indonesia's Foreign Exchange Reserves

Bank Indonesia uses its foreign exchange reserves to intervene in the currency market to stabilise the rupiah. Strong reserves provide greater intervention capacity; however, sustained intervention gradually depletes those reserves, imposing a practical limit.

4. BI's Interest Rate Policy

Higher BI rates make rupiah-denominated instruments more attractive to foreign investors, encouraging capital inflows and supporting the currency. Yet rate increases also slow domestic economic growth — a classic dilemma for any central bank.

5. Political Stability and Investor Confidence

A conducive investment climate, policy transparency, and political stability are intangible yet highly influential factors that shape foreign investors' risk perception of Indonesia.

Part IV: Projections from Authoritative Institutions

Various institutions — from Bank Indonesia to international research firms — have issued their forecasts for the rupiah. The table below summarises the key projections:

Institution / Source	Projected IDR/USD Rate (2026)
Bank Indonesia (BI)	Annual average Rp 16,430; APBN range Rp 16,200–16,800
State Budget 2026 (APBN Assumption)	Rp 16,500 per USD
Mirae Asset Securities	Rp 16,350 (end-2026, revised down from Rp 15,400)
International Research Institutions	Range of Rp 16,700–Rp 17,400 throughout 2026
Long Forecast	Range Rp 16,459–Rp 17,687, average ~Rp 17,000
Economist Josua	Rp 16,675–Rp 16,775 (end-2026)
President Prabowo's Target (2027)	Rp 16,800–Rp 17,500 per USD

These figures reflect a wide band of uncertainty. Crucially, many of these projections were formulated before the rupiah actually weakened to the Rp 17,600 level in May 2026. Current conditions have already exceeded the upper bound of several forecasts, at least temporarily.

Part V: Forward-Looking Scenarios — Where Is the Rupiah Headed?

Based on the foregoing analysis, three plausible scenarios emerge:

 

Scenario 1: Moderate Recovery (Optimistic)

Supporting conditions: The Fed cuts rates, the US–Indonesia trade war eases through tariff negotiations, global commodity prices stabilise or rise, Bank Indonesia intervenes effectively, and significant capital inflows materialise post-July 2026.

Projected outcome: The rupiah gradually strengthens towards Rp 16,500–16,800 by end-2026, approaching the APBN assumption. Bank Indonesia itself is optimistic that the annual average can return to the Rp 16,200–16,800 range, with July–August 2026 predicted as the turning point for appreciation.

 

Scenario 2: Stabilisation at a Weaker Level (Moderate / Realistic)

Supporting conditions: Global uncertainty remains elevated, the Fed holds rates steady, tariff negotiations remain inconclusive, and Indonesia's economic growth slows.

Projected outcome: The rupiah trades in the Rp 17,000–17,500 range through to end-2026 — weaker than the APBN target but without further deterioration. This aligns with Long Forecast's projection of an average around Rp 17,000.

 

Scenario 3: Continued Depreciation (Pessimistic)

Supporting conditions: The US trade war escalates, the 32 per cent tariff is applied in full, commodity prices collapse, confidence in Indonesian assets erodes, and large-scale capital outflows persist.

Projected outcome: The rupiah could weaken towards Rp 17,500–18,000, potentially approaching the psychologically significant Rp 17,845 level — which ironically mirrors Indonesia's proclamation of independence date (17-8-45), a scenario already discussed with some alarm by members of the Indonesian parliament in their hearings with the BI Governor.

Part VI: Implications and Policy Responses

A weakening rupiah carries contradictory effects that must be carefully managed:

Negative Impacts:

• Higher foreign debt servicing costs for the government (denominated in dollars)

• Rising import prices, fuelling domestic inflation

• Increased production costs for import-dependent industries

• Erosion of household purchasing power

Positive Impacts:

• Indonesian exports become more price-competitive internationally

• Higher government revenues from export levies and oil and gas income tax

• Commodity export earnings (in dollars) are worth more when converted to rupiah

In responding to these pressures, Bank Indonesia has several instruments at its disposal: intervention in the spot market and the Domestic Non-Deliverable Forward (DNDF) market, interest rate policy, and coordination with the government to maintain market confidence. The government, meanwhile, needs to strengthen its negotiating position in tariff discussions with the United States, diversify export markets, and maintain fiscal discipline.

Conclusion: Reading the Rupiah's Direction with Prudence

If there is a single lesson from the rupiah's history, it is that exchange rate forecasting carries inherent and substantial uncertainty. The factors shaping the exchange rate — from Fed policy to geopolitical conflict, from palm oil prices to global market sentiment — are too complex and dynamic to be reliably compressed into a single definitive figure.

The current situation (May 2026), with the rupiah at Rp 17,600, reflects exceptionally strong external pressures. Nevertheless, Bank Indonesia remains cautiously optimistic that the annual average exchange rate can return to the Rp 16,200–16,800 APBN range, with an expected appreciation commencing in July–August 2026 as seasonal pressures ease.

In the near term (second half of 2026), the rupiah has the potential to strengthen towards Rp 16,800–17,200, provided positive catalysts materialise: a signal of Fed easing, progress in tariff negotiations with the United States, and domestic political stability.

In the medium term (2027), President Prabowo has himself set a target of Rp 16,800–17,500 per dollar — a range that tellingly reflects expectations that the rupiah is unlikely to return to the Rp 16,000 level in the near future.

Ultimately, the strength of the rupiah cannot be separated from the strength of Indonesia's economic fundamentals: productivity, export competitiveness, investment quality, and investor confidence. So long as these foundations continue to be reinforced, there remains hope that the rupiah — whilst unlikely to revisit the Rp 13,000 era — can at least be maintained at a level that supports inclusive and sustainable economic growth.

This essay was compiled based on data and projections current as of May 2026, drawn from Bank Indonesia, the Indonesian Ministry of Finance, Mirae Asset Securities, Long Forecast, and various reputable economic media outlets. Exchange rate projections are indicative and subject to change in line with global dynamics.

Bahasa 

The Failure of Reform

Twenty-eight years have elapsed since President Soeharto announced his resignation at nine o'clock on the morning of 21 May 1998, yet Indonesia continues to grapple with the same disquieting question: has Reformasi succeeded? This essay argues that, although many formal achievements are undeniable—direct presidential elections, decentralisation, and a freer press chief among them—Indonesia’s Reformasi has experienced a systemic failure in substance. Corruption has evolved rather than diminished; oligarchy has changed its garb rather than been uprooted; and institutions have proliferated without taking root. Taken together, these conditions reveal a country ensnared in the trap of partial reform. The essay examines the definition, history, and background of Reformasi; the principal arguments advanced by scholars and commentators who deem it a failure, together with supporting evidence and scholarly references; a measured account of its genuine achievements; and the consequences—in the short, medium, and long term—of failing to pursue meaningful correction.

REFORM IN CHAINS:

A Critical Analysis of Indonesia's Failed Reformasi

I. INTRODUCTION

At precisely five minutes past nine on the morning of Thursday, 21 May 1998, Indonesia’s second president, Soeharto, read out his letter of resignation in the Credential Room of the Merdeka Palace in Jakarta. The announcement was met with jubilation by millions of Indonesians who had sacrificed their lives, their liberty, and their futures in the service of a single word: Reformasi. Yet more than two decades on, a painful question continues to resonate in lecture halls and on street corners alike: where did the promises of Reformasi go?

Reformasi, in its simplest sense, means reform. In the specific context of post-New Order Indonesia, however, it carries a far heavier freight of meaning: a social contract to build a democratic, clean, just, and dignified state. That contract, for the most part, remains dishonoured.

This essay is written not as a lament over failure, but as a constructive contribution to the ongoing debate. Drawing on an extensive body of academic literature from both Indonesian and international scholars, it seeks to unravel the tangled threads of Indonesia’s reform journey—from the euphoria of 1998 to the anxieties of 2026.

II. DEFINITION AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 

A. Defining Reformasi in the Indonesian Context

The word “reform” derives from the Latin reformare, meaning to reshape or to improve. In the political science tradition, reform refers to incremental institutional and structural change within an existing system, as distinct from revolution, which is sudden and total (Huntington, 1991).

In the Indonesian context, “Reformasi”—capitalised to denote its specific historical referent—describes the movement and era of change triggered by the fall of Soeharto’s New Order regime in 1998. The Reformasi agenda, as articulated by the student movement and civil society, encompassed three broad domains.

The first was a political agenda: the abolition of the dual function (dwifungsi) of the armed forces (ABRI), restrictions on the military’s role in civilian politics, free and fair elections, regional autonomy, and constitutional amendment. The second was an economic agenda: the eradication of corruption, collusion, and nepotism (korupsi, kolusi, dan nepotisme, or KKN); transparency in state financial management; and a more equitable distribution of wealth. The third was a legal and human rights agenda: the rule of law, accountability for human rights violations committed under the New Order, freedom of the press, and respect for civil liberties.

Reformasi, as its architects understood it, was never merely about replacing one set of leaders with another. It was about transforming the very way in which the state operates, power is exercised, and justice is distributed. 

B. Criteria for Assessing the Success of Reformasi

Political scientists employ various benchmarks to evaluate the success of democratic transitions. Larry Diamond (1999), in Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation, draws a crucial distinction between “electoral democracy” — which requires only free elections — and “liberal democracy”, which encompasses the rule of law, accountability, and the protection of civil rights. By the assessment of many scholars, Indonesia remains trapped at the former level.

Andreas Schedler (2002) introduced the concept of “electoral authoritarianism” to describe systems that employ democratic procedures as a facade of legitimacy whilst preserving authoritarian practices within. That concept serves as an uncomfortably accurate mirror for post-Reformasi Indonesia.

III. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF REFORMASI 

A. The Legacy of the New Order: Seeds of a Problem Never Uprooted

To understand the failures of Reformasi, one must first appreciate the depth of the problems bequeathed by the New Order. Over thirty-two years (1966–1998), Soeharto constructed what Harold Crouch (1978) described as a “bureaucratic polity”: a system in which power was concentrated in the hands of a narrow bureaucratic-military elite whilst civil society was systematically enfeebled.

The New Order left at least four toxic legacies that obstructed genuine transformation: first, a patron-client culture entrenched at every level of the bureaucracy; second, a network of crony businesses controlling strategically important economic sectors; third, a military and police apparatus accustomed to operating beyond the control of civilian authority; and fourth, a legal culture that regarded rules as instruments of power rather than as protectors of justice.

Richard Robison and Vedi Hadiz (2004), in Reorganising Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of Markets, argue convincingly that the social classes that had dominated the New Order were not destroyed by Reformasi; rather, they adapted and reproduced themselves in new formats. The oligarchs of the New Order did not die — they metamorphosed. 

B. The Dynamics of the 1997–1998 Crisis and the Eruption of Reformasi

The Asian financial crisis that struck Indonesia in 1997–1998 served as the catalyst that accelerated the collapse of the Soeharto regime. The rupiah’s precipitous fall—from some Rp2,600 to the dollar to more than Rp14,800 to the dollar—caused mass bankruptcy, a surge in unemployment, and a food crisis. Against this backdrop, the Indonesian public watched as Soeharto’s cronies continued to live in conspicuous luxury; social fury, long suppressed, finally erupted.

The killing of four Trisakti University students by security forces on 12 May 1998, followed by the May Riots that engulfed Jakarta and other cities on 13–14 May, represented a boiling point that could no longer be contained. On 21 May 1998, Soeharto resigned. Vice-President B.J. Habibie, his protege and a creature of the New Order, assumed the presidency and declared himself the leader of the Reformasi era.

Herein lies the first great irony of Reformasi: an era of transformative change was inaugurated not by reformist figures but by an insider of the very system that was meant to be changed. Habibie, though he subsequently took several important liberalising steps, was at once a product and a part of the system he was now called upon to dismantle. 

C. The Phases of Reformasi: From Euphoria to Pragmatism

Indonesia’s reform journey may be divided into several distinct phases. The first (1998–2002) was a phase of transition and euphoria, marked by constitutional amendments, the release of political prisoners, the enactment of regional autonomy legislation, and the 1999 general election — widely praised as the most democratic in Indonesian history.

The second phase (2002–2014) was one of flawed consolidation. New institutions—the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), the Constitutional Court, and various oversight bodies—were established, but did so amid fierce resistance from entrenched interest groups. Direct regional elections were held, yet they frequently produced local political dynasties no less corrupt than their predecessors.

The third phase (2014 to the present) is one of democratic regression. Several key indicators have moved in a deeply troubling direction: the KPK has been weakened through legislative revision; military and police intervention in civilian affairs has increased; civic space has been narrowed through the weaponisation of law; and a political pragmatism that prizes stability of power above the principles of Reformasi has become dominant.

IV. WHY SCHOLARS AND COMMENTATORS REGARD REFORMASI AS HAVING FAILED

There is no single scholarly consensus on the precise measure of Reformasi’s failure. There are, however, several major themes that recur persistently throughout the academic literature and research reports. 

A. Corruption: Evolved Rather Than Eradicated

The eradication of corruption was the central promise of Reformasi, and it has proved to be the most conspicuous failure. Indonesia did indeed establish the KPK in 2002, a step that merits recognition. But corruption in Indonesia has not disappeared; it has evolved. From the centralised corruption of the New Order era, it has mutated into a decentralised form that permeates every layer of governance, from central government to the village level.

Edward Aspinall and Gerry van Klinken (2011), in The State and Illegality in Indonesia, document in meticulous detail how post-Reformasi decentralisation, far from bringing services closer to the people, created thousands of new corruption hotspots at the regional level. They term this phenomenon “predatory localism” — the manner in which local strongmen exploited autonomy for personal enrichment.

Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) has consistently reported the absence of any significant downward trend in corruption. Its annual reports record thousands of corruption cases each year involving regional heads, legislators, and judges. The Committee for the Monitoring of Regional Autonomy Implementation (KPPOD) has likewise identified licensing corruption as a persistent and serious obstacle to investment.

The most damaging blow to the spirit of reform came in 2019, when the House of Representatives revised the KPK Law in a manner that drastically curtailed the body’s independence and authority. The KPK Employees’ Association described the revision as “the institutional assassination of the KPK”. Tom Power (2018), in his analysis of Indonesia’s anti-corruption backsliding, concludes that the assault on the KPK was systematic and premeditated by political elites.

“Reformasi in Indonesia produced the democratisation of corruption, not its eradication. What changed was its scale and distribution, not its substance.” — Vedi Hadiz, in an interview with New Mandala, 2016 

B. Oligarchy: Changed its Costume, Never Uprooted

One of the most influential arguments about the failure of Reformasi comes from Jeffrey Winters (2011) in his book Oligarchy. Winters contends that Reformasi never posed a genuine threat to the power of oligarchs—individuals or groups possessing extraordinary material wealth and deploying it to shape politics in defence of their interests.

The data bear this out: wealth concentration in Indonesia actually increased during the Reformasi era. Oxfam Indonesia (2017) reported that the four wealthiest Indonesians hold wealth equivalent to that of the poorest 100 million combined. The Gini coefficient—a standard measure of economic inequality—rose from around 0.30 in the early 1990s to above 0.40 by the mid-2010s.

Robison and Hadiz (2004) describe how the oligarchs of the New Order—including Soeharto’s cronies—managed to preserve, and indeed expand, their economic power in the democratic era by more sophisticated means: becoming donors to political parties, financing regional election campaigns, and building family political dynasties. Democracy, rather than serving as a vehicle for popular emancipation, became a mechanism for the reproduction of oligarchy.

C. Civil Liberties and the Shrinking Democratic Space

One of Reformasi’s most important achievements was greater freedom of the press and expression. Yet over the past decade, Freedom House has consistently downgraded Indonesia in its Press Freedom and Democracy indices. By 2023, Freedom House classified Indonesia as only “partly free”—a significant decline from its former reputation as a model democratic transition in South-East Asia.

Andreas Harsono of Human Rights Watch has documented how the Electronic Information and Transactions Law (UU ITE) has been systematically misused to silence criticism of the government and public officials. Since coming into force, the law has been deployed against hundreds of activists, journalists, and social media users who dared to criticise government policy.

Imparsial and the National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) regularly report on the increasing involvement of the military and police in operations that ought properly to be civilian in nature. The dual function of ABRI may have been formally abolished, yet Jun Honna (2003), in Military Politics and Democratisation in Indonesia, argues that the Indonesian military has never fully relinquished its influence over the political and economic spheres.

D. Political Dynasties and the Personalisation of Power

Reformasi envisioned a democracy that would produce leaders on the basis of competence and integrity. What has emerged instead is a proliferation of political dynasties. Surveys conducted by the Independent Election Monitoring Committee (KIPP) and various research institutions show a steady increase in the proportion of public offices at the regional level held by relatives of incumbent officials.

Marcus Mietzner (2013), in Money, Power, and Ideology: Political Parties in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia, documents how political parties have failed in their function as instruments of popular representation. Rather than serving as schools of democracy, parties have become vehicles for group and individual interests, relying on “money politics” as the engine of voter recruitment and mobilisation.

The phenomenon that several analysts have described as “Jokowification” is perhaps the most troubling symptom of this malaise: a populist leader initially celebrated as a symbol of change subsequently practising modes of governance not substantially different from his predecessors—including the consolidation of family power, the use of state apparatus to suppress criticism, and the manipulation of institutions in the service of dynastic ambition. 

Jokowi’s Legacy and the Crisis of Reform

The Reformasi of 1998 opened the path for Indonesia to build a healthier democracy, with the hope that each president would strengthen institutions, eradicate corruption, and safeguard the freedoms of the people. Yet, among the presidents of the Reformasi era, Joko Widodo’s leadership is widely regarded as having left the deepest scars upon democracy and governance. 

Institutions undermined

The Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), once a symbol of public hope, lost its independence after legislative revisions weakened its authority. Other supervisory bodies have not escaped political interference, eroding public trust in the state. 

Entrenched corruption

Although Jokowi projected the image of a modest and clean leader, corruption remained rampant. Major cases implicated senior officials and those close to power, revealing that oversight mechanisms were ineffective. Transparency, once promised, became little more than rhetoric. 

Dynastic politics

The candidacy of Gibran Rakabuming Raka as vice president sparked accusations that Jokowi was constructing a political dynasty. The criticism lies not merely in familial ties but in the absence of proven competence. A democracy that should have fostered meritocracy instead fell into nepotism, undermining public faith in the political process. 

Oligarchy ascendant

Economic and resource policies disproportionately favoured business elites and major investors. Mining concessions, infrastructure projects, and energy policies were frequently linked to oligarchic interests, leaving ordinary citizens increasingly marginalised.

Democracy eroded

Freedom of expression was curtailed, critics of the government were often criminalised, and public space was narrowed. Procedural democracy continued, but its substance was hollowed out, placing Indonesia at risk of sliding towards authoritarianism.

Manipulated image

Political buzzers and media were deployed to polish Jokowi’s image whilst attacking opponents. Tempo magazine highlighted the “Nawadosa Jokowi” as emblematic of the failure of his Nawacita, while image management campaigns sought to conceal policy weaknesses. 

Social inequality

Despite massive infrastructure development, the gulf between rich and poor widened. Economic growth was not fully inclusive, fuelling social unrest and exacerbating political polarisation.

Consequences for President Prabowo

Jokowi’s legacy is a heavy burden for President Prabowo. He must:

• Restore institutions by reinstating the independence of legal bodies.
• Confront oligarchy by reshaping economic policy to serve the people rather than elites.
• Heal polarisation left behind by divisive politics.
• Build legitimacy as a leader capable of reviving democracy.
• Criticism of Jokowi is not confined to policy shortcomings but extends to a moral and institutional crisis. The weakening of democracy, entrenched corruption, dynastic politics, oligarchy, and social inequality illustrate that his legacy is a profound challenge for Indonesia. That challenge now rests upon Prabowo, who must prove himself able to steer Reformasi back onto its rightful course.

Hope in President Prabowo

Indonesia enters a new chapter following Joko Widodo’s controversial leadership. The legacy of weakened institutions, entrenched corruption, dynastic politics, and rampant oligarchy is indeed a heavy burden. Yet amidst this complexity, there remains space for President Prabowo to rekindle the spirit of Reformasi and prove himself as a leader capable of restoring public trust. 

Restoring institutions

The greatest hope lies in Prabowo’s courage to revive the independence of state institutions. Should the KPK, Constitutional Court, and other supervisory bodies be returned to their rightful standing, the foundations of democracy will once again be solid. 

Eradicating corruption

The people yearn for a leader who dares to act decisively against corruption. Through tangible measures, Prabowo can build strong moral legitimacy and demonstrate that his leadership is distinct from the old patterns.

Confronting oligarchy

The oligarchy that has long gripped Indonesia’s economy must be challenged. If Prabowo succeeds in reshaping policy to favour ordinary citizens rather than elites, he will be remembered as the president who restored economic sovereignty to the nation.

Healing polarisation

The divisive politics left behind by Jokowi can be mended through inclusive communication. Prabowo has the opportunity to become a unifier of the nation, not merely a ruler.

Building meritocracy

By ending dynastic practices and prioritising competence, Prabowo can pave the way for a new generation of leaders of higher quality. This is a crucial step towards improving the calibre of democracy.

Hope in President Prabowo is not an empty dream. He holds a genuine opportunity to rewrite the course of Reformasi: to restore institutions, eradicate corruption, confront oligarchy, heal polarisation, and build meritocracy. If these steps are pursued with courage and resolve, history will record Prabowo as the leader who transformed crisis into renewal.

E. A Judiciary That Has Yet to Win Its Independence

An independent judiciary is one of the foundational pillars of a democratic rule of law. In Indonesia, that aspiration remains some distance from reality. The Judicial Commission and the Supreme Court regularly uncover bribery cases involving judges at various levels, and the KPK itself has arrested scores of judges and court officials for accepting bribes.

Sebastiaan Pompe (2005), in The Indonesian Supreme Court: A Study of Institutional Collapse, presents a sobering portrait of Indonesia’s highest court, which he characterises as having undergone institutional collapse as a result of systemic corruption, weak management, and an absence of a culture of professional integrity.

Major cases involving members of the elite frequently remain unresolved or conclude with verdicts that invite serious questioning. Meanwhile, poor Indonesians continue to face a legal system that is not oriented towards their interests. The old saying — that “the law is sharp at the bottom and blunt at the top” — retains its painful currency in everyday life. 

F. The Failure to Reckon with Past Human Rights Abuses

One of the most solemn promises of Reformasi was the resolution of the grave human rights violations that occurred under the New Order: from the events of 1965–66, the disappearances of activists in 1997–98, and the Semanggi tragedies, to the various episodes of violence in Aceh, Papua, and East Timor. The overwhelming majority of those promises have never been honoured.

Kontras (the Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence) documents that barely a single perpetrator of the New Order’s grave human rights abuses has been effectively prosecuted. Several figures associated with those violations have gone on to enjoy distinguished political careers in the Reformasi era, even occupying the highest offices of state.

John Roosa (2006), in Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement and Suharto’s Coup d’état in Indonesia, reveals how successive post-Reformasi governments have chosen not to correct the official historical narrative of the 1965 events, because doing so would mean contesting the legitimacy of groups that remain very much in power.

V. THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF REFORMASI: A RECORD THAT CANNOT BE OVERLOOKED

It would be dishonest for a critical analysis of this kind to disregard the accomplishments of Reformasi entirely. Genuine progress has been made in several areas, though its scale has not been commensurate with the magnitude of the problems that remain.

The constitutional amendments of 1999–2002 produced substantive changes in the institutional design of the state: term limits on the presidency, direct presidential elections, the establishment of the Constitutional Court as guardian of the constitution, and the removal of appointed functional group representatives from the People’s Consultative Assembly (Horowitz, 2013). The elections of 1999 and thereafter, notwithstanding their imperfections, nonetheless represented mechanisms for the transfer of power that were vastly more open than anything seen under the New Order.

Decentralisation, for all the problems it has introduced, has created spaces for local political participation that never previously existed. Freedom of the press, though now under threat, once reached levels that allowed genuinely critical coverage of power. The KPK, before it was weakened, succeeded in imprisoning hundreds of corrupt politicians and officials from across the political spectrum (Butt, 2011).

Progress in health and education as well as relatively stable economic growth, represents an achievement that should not be minimised. Yet, as Aspinall (2010) observes, these gains owe more to fiscal pressures and the dynamics of global markets than they do to any fundamental transformation of governance.

VI. THE CONSEQUENCES OF FAILING TO PURSUE REFORM

A. Short Term (1–3 Years): Erosion of Trust and Instability

In the short term, a failure to correct the course of Reformasi will continue to erode public confidence in democratic institutions. Opinion surveys conducted by Indikator Politik Indonesia and SMRC consistently show declining trust in the House of Representatives, political parties, and the judiciary.

Low public trust correlates directly with political apathy and with the growth of anti-establishment sentiment. In such conditions, populism — whether in the guise of religious nationalism or of nostalgia for authoritarianism — finds extraordinarily fertile ground. The symptoms are already visible in growing support for figures who offer tough solutions without democratic foundations.

The weakening of the KPK and the increasing impunity enjoyed by corrupt actors will, in the short term, further damage the investment climate. Transparency International (2023) notes that high corruption perception directly increases the cost of doing business and undermines the confidence of foreign investors. 

B. Medium Term (4–10 Years): Structural Poverty and a Crisis of Legitimacy

Over the medium term, the failure of structural reform will consolidate poverty as a permanent condition for tens of millions of Indonesians. High inequality, sustained by oligarchy and corruption, creates a social mobility trap in which education and hard work alone are insufficient to escape poverty without access to patron-client networks.

Mancur Olson (2000), in Power and Prosperity, argues that stable oligarchy — powerful but narrow interest groups — tends to retard long-term economic growth, because such groups are more concerned with protecting existing rents than with promoting innovation and healthy competition. Indonesia, with its entrenched oligarchic structures, risks becoming indefinitely mired in the middle-income trap.

At the political level, the crisis of governmental legitimacy will deepen. If elections continue to be won through money politics rather than through a substantive contest of policy ideas, the results of those elections will be challenged with increasing frequency, and trust in the democratic process will continue to decline. In the worst-case scenario, such disillusionment may give rise to serious political instability. 

C. Long Term (10 or More Years): New Authoritarianism and Social Fragmentation

From a long-term perspective, the failure to consolidate democracy opens the way for what Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way (2010), in Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War, describe as “competitive authoritarianism”: a system that maintains the outward forms of democratic procedure whilst hollowing out its substance. Indonesia displays a number of the warning signs of such a trajectory.

Beyond that, the failure of the state to resolve historical and structural injustices may sow the seeds of serious social conflict. Papua is the clearest example: when the hopes vested in Reformasi for meaningful autonomy were disappointed, they became fuel for separatist sentiment and a protracted armed conflict that remains unresolved to this day.

From a generational perspective, young Indonesians born after 1998 — who have no memory of the New Order — now face a difficult set of choices: to accept a corrupt status quo, to emigrate (a brain drain of growing concern), or to demand change through channels that are progressively narrowing. If the system fails to respond adequately, the frustration of this generation may take forms that are difficult to predict.

VII. MATTERS DESERVING OF SERIOUS REFLECTION

A. Reformasi Is a Process, Not a Destination

One of the gravest errors in understanding Reformasi is to treat it as a single, completed event. Reform is a process that never concludes, one that requires the vigilance, the struggle, and the commitment of every generation. When society ceases to watch, when students cease to mobilise, and when the press loses its courage, Reformasi will inevitably move backwards. 

B. The Problem of Institutional Design

Indonesia has succeeded in establishing a large number of new institutions since 1998. Many of them, however, were designed with loopholes that allow capture by elite interests. Improving institutional design — including the mechanisms for selecting KPK commissioners, the independence of the National Human Rights Commission, and the accountability of the Supreme Court — is an urgent agenda that requires a strong political consensus. 

C. The Indispensability of a Robust Civil Society

The comparative experience of countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, and South Africa demonstrates that enduring democratic progress is almost always underpinned by a civil society that is strong, active, and independent of the state. Indonesia possesses a rich tradition of civil society organisations — from Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama to networks of NGOs and grassroots communities — yet many of these face growing financial pressure and regulatory constraints that are progressively limiting their room for manoeuvre. 

D. Historical Accountability as the Foundation of Reconciliation

No healthy democracy can stand upon a foundation of impunity. The experiences of post-Nazi Germany, post-apartheid South Africa, and post-junta Argentina demonstrate that accountability for the crimes of the past is not an act of vengeance but a precondition for the restoration of trust and the construction of a moral basis for a new order. Indonesia must find the political courage to tread the same path. 

E. The Urgency of Civic Education

Democracy requires politically literate citizens, critical in their thinking, and aware of both their rights and their obligations. Indonesia’s education system, still heavily reliant on rote learning and still inclined to avoid sensitive historical subjects, has not adequately prepared the younger generation to be active democratic citizens. Reform of civic education must be treated as an integral part of the broader renewal agenda.

VIII. CONCLUSION: A REFORM STILL UNFINISHED

Twenty-eight years is ample time in which to assess an era. Reformasi has produced formal changes that cannot be dismissed: more competitive elections, a freer press than the New Order permitted, and a number of oversight institutions that were wholly absent before 1998. Yet it has failed to transform the substance of how the state operates, how power is distributed, and how justice is guaranteed for all citizens.

The failure of Reformasi is not a total failure, nor is it an inevitable verdict of history. It is a failure of choices — the choices of elites to preserve their privileges, of institutions to evade genuine change, and the collective choice of society to acquiesce in the status quo rather than to persevere in realising the promises of 1998.

The generation born after Reformasi must not become merely the inheritors of disappointment. They must become the inheritors of its animating flame: more critical in their thought, better organised in their action, more imaginative in their search for new paths towards the justice and human dignity that were the deepest aspirations of the movement that brought this era into being.

Reformasi is not dead. It is merely in chains. And those who can free it — as was true twenty-eight years ago — are the people of Indonesia themselves.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Aspinall, E. and van Klinken, G. (eds.) (2011) The State and Illegality in Indonesia. Leiden: KITLV Press.

Butt, S. (2011) ‘Anti-Corruption Reform in Indonesia: An Obituary?’, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 47(3), pp. 381–394.

Crouch, H. (1978) The Army and Politics in Indonesia. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Diamond, L. (1999) Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Honna, J. (2003) Military Politics and Democratisation in Indonesia. London: RoutledgeCurzon.

Horowitz, D.L. (2013) Constitutional Change and Democracy in Indonesia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Huntington, S.P. (1991) The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press.

Levitsky, S. and Way, L.A. (2010) Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mietzner, M. (2013) Money, Power, and Ideology: Political Parties in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia. Singapore: NUS Press.

Olson, M. (2000) Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships. New York: Basic Books.

Pompe, S. (2005) The Indonesian Supreme Court: A Study of Institutional Collapse. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications.

Robison, R. and Hadiz, V.R. (2004) Reorganising Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of Markets. London: RoutledgeCurzon.

Roosa, J. (2006) Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement and Suharto’s Coup d’état in Indonesia. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.

Winters, J.A. (2011) Oligarchy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Journal Articles and Reports

Aspinall, E. (2010) ‘The Irony of Success’, Journal of Democracy, 21(2), pp. 20–34.

Hadiz, V.R. (2016) ‘Indonesia’s Year of Democratic Testing’, New Mandala. Available at: https://www.newmandala.org (Accessed: 21 May 2026).

Oxfam Indonesia (2017) Towards a More Equal Indonesia: How the Government Can Take Action to Close the Gap. Oxford: Oxfam Briefing Paper.

Power, T.P. (2018) ‘Jokowi’s Authoritarian Turn and Indonesia’s Democratic Decline’, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 54(3), pp. 307–338.

Schedler, A. (2002) ‘The Menu of Manipulation’, Journal of Democracy, 13(2), pp. 36–50.

Transparency International (2023) Corruption Perceptions Index 2023. Berlin: Transparency International. 

Civil Society Sources

Freedom House (2023) Freedom in the World 2023: Indonesia. Washington, DC: Freedom House.

Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) (2022) Tren Penindakan Kasus Korupsi 2022 [Trends in Corruption Enforcement 2022]. Jakarta: ICW.

Kontras (2023) Laporan Tahunan: Pemantauan Kebebasan Sipil dan HAM di Indonesia [Annual Report: Monitoring Civil Liberties and Human Rights in Indonesia]. Jakarta: Kontras.

[Bahasa]

A Reflection on Indonesia’s National Awakening Day

A Dawn Born in a Classroom

On 20 May 1908, in a modest room of the School tot Opleiding van Inlandsche Artsen (STOVIA) in Batavia, a group of young indigenous students founded an organisation called Budi Utomo. They were not armed fighters. They were not aristocrats who had inherited power. They were pupils — young men who had only recently encountered the world of modern knowledge — who suddenly awoke to the realisation that their people were sleeping soundly in the shackles of colonialism.

It was that very awareness which became the first spark. Not a bullet, nor a sword. But an enlightened mind, a stirred heart, and an unwavering resolve to ask: Why must we continue to live beneath the heel of others?

“Awakening is not merely resistance — it is self-discovery. The moment a nation begins to know itself, that is the moment it is truly reborn.”

An Awakening Beyond Rebellion

We often mistakenly understand National Awakening Day as an event of purely physical resistance. Yet what occurred in 1908 ran far deeper than that. Budi Utomo was not an armed separatist movement. It was a movement of consciousness—an endeavour to forge a national identity through the channels of education, culture, and unity.

Its founders, such as Dr Wahidin Sudirohusodo and Soetomo, understood that colonialism was not merely a matter of seized land or plundered wealth. The deepest form of colonialism is the colonisation of the mind — when a people are convinced that they are inherently inferior, less intelligent, and less worthy than their rulers.

The true awakening, therefore, began here: with the courage to declare, “We are not servants. We are human beings possessed of dignity.”

Threads Woven Towards Independence

Budi Utomo was a seed. From that seed grew other trees of struggle. Sarekat Islam arose to champion the rights of indigenous traders. Indische Partij stood to voice political rights. Jong Java, Jong Sumatranen Bond, and a host of youth organisations began uniting resolve across ethnic groups and islands. Until, on 28 October 1928, the Youth Pledge declared in a single breath: One Homeland, One Nation, One Language.

The 20th of May is not merely the starting point of a single organisation. It is the symbol of a long process—the process of a nation learning to know itself, weaving its differences into strength, and ultimately daring to proclaim its independence on 17 August 1945.

What Does Awakening Mean for Us Today?

More than a century after Budi Utomo was founded, we live in an independent Indonesia. Yet physical independence does not of itself guarantee a truly sovereign existence. Every generation is called to reinterpret awakening—no longer against foreign colonialism, but against every form of backwardness, injustice, and intellectual lethargy that erodes from within.

National awakening in this era means daring to innovate without forsaking cultural roots. It means upholding justice not only in the great cities, but reaching to the remotest corners of the archipelago. It means honouring difference not as a threat, but as a richness that becomes the nation’s distinction in the eyes of the world.

“A great nation is not one that merely commemorates the deeds of its heroes, but one that dares to carry their struggle forward within the context of its own age.”

The Responsibility of the Succeeding Generation

The young men of STOVIA in 1908 may never have imagined that their actions would be remembered more than a century later. They simply followed the voice of their conscience — that what is wrong must be changed, that what sleeps must be awakened, that what is divided must be united.

Now it is our turn. The turn of a generation that has inherited a free Indonesia, yet one which still has much work yet to be done. Our turn to awaken from the reluctance to think critically. To awaken from indifference towards the fate of our fellow countrymen. To awaken from the temptation to be mere spectators of history, rather than its makers.

National Awakening Day is not merely a day for ceremonies and speeches. It is an invitation — an invitation to every Indonesian soul to ask itself: What have I awakened today, within myself and for my nation?

Happy National Awakening Day, 20 May 2026

May the spirit of Budi Utomo live on—not in a museum,

but in the actions we take each and every day.

Indonesia rises—not by chance, but by choice.

Bahasa