[Part 4]The war between Russia and Ukraine can indeed be interpreted as involving an ideological dimension, although it is also shaped by geopolitical, historical, and security considerations. At its core, the conflict reflects competing visions of political order, national identity, and the organisation of international power.On one side, the Russian leadership has frequently framed the war in terms of defending a civilisational sphere that resists Western political and cultural influence. This perspective is often associated with ideas of sovereignty, traditional values, and a multipolar world order in which Western liberal institutions do not dominate global governance. Russian rhetoric has sometimes portrayed Ukraine’s alignment with Western institutions such as the European Union and NATO as a threat to this vision.
On the other side, Ukraine’s political leadership and many of its supporters describe the conflict as a struggle for democratic self-determination and integration with the liberal international order. In this narrative, Ukraine represents the aspiration of a sovereign nation to choose its own political and economic orientation, including closer ties with European democratic institutions.
Thus, at the ideological level, the war is frequently framed as a contest between two broad political narratives: one emphasising sovereign spheres of influence and resistance to Western liberalism, and another emphasising national self-determination, democratic governance, and integration with Western political structures.
However, historians and political scientists generally caution that wars rarely arise from ideology alone. Strategic security concerns, historical grievances, economic interests, and regional power dynamics also play significant roles in shaping the conflict.
The war between Russia and Ukraine did not emerge suddenly in 2022, but rather developed from a long chain of historical, political, and geopolitical tensions that accumulated over several decades.
One major background factor is the historical relationship between the two countries during the era of the Soviet Union. For much of the twentieth century, Ukraine was one of the republics within the Soviet Union, and its political, economic, and military systems were closely integrated with Moscow. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Ukraine became an independent state, which fundamentally changed the geopolitical map of Eastern Europe.
After independence, Ukraine faced an internal debate about its strategic orientation. Some political groups preferred closer relations with Russia, while others advocated integration with Western institutions such as the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This division within Ukrainian society became a recurring theme in the country’s politics.
A major turning point occurred in 2014 during the political upheaval known as the Euromaidan. Mass protests erupted in Kyiv after the Ukrainian government suspended plans to sign an association agreement with the European Union. The protests eventually led to the removal of President Viktor Yanukovych, who was widely viewed as favouring closer ties with Russia.
Following these events, Russia annexed the peninsula of Crimea in 2014, a move that was widely condemned by many countries and international organisations. At the same time, armed conflict began in eastern Ukraine, particularly in the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, where separatist groups declared independence and received varying degrees of support from Russia.
Another key factor involves security concerns related to NATO expansion. Russian leaders have repeatedly argued that the eastward enlargement of NATO since the 1990s threatens Russia’s strategic security. Ukraine’s growing cooperation with NATO intensified these concerns and became a central issue in diplomatic tensions.
The situation escalated dramatically in February 2022 when Russia launched a large-scale military invasion of Ukraine. Russia described the operation as necessary for its security and for the protection of Russian-speaking populations, while Ukraine and many Western governments characterised it as an act of aggression against a sovereign state.
Thus, the war between Russia and Ukraine cannot be attributed to a single cause. Instead, it reflects a complex interaction of historical legacies, geopolitical rivalry, competing political orientations, and security anxieties within the post-Cold War international order.
The deeper historical roots of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine extend far beyond the events of the twenty-first century. To understand the persistence of tension between the two nations, historians often trace the story back several centuries, where questions of identity, empire, and political sovereignty gradually intertwined and shaped the region’s historical memory.
One of the earliest foundations of this tension lies in the shared historical heritage of Kievan Rus', a medieval federation centred in the city of Kyiv. Both Russians and Ukrainians regard this early state as a formative source of their civilisation. However, the interpretation of that heritage differs significantly. Russian historical narratives have often presented Kievan Rus' as the ancient cradle of the Russian state, while many Ukrainian historians emphasise it as the origin of a distinct Ukrainian historical identity. This divergence in historical interpretation has contributed to competing claims about cultural and political continuity in the region.
Another major historical turning point emerged during the expansion of the Russian Empire in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Large parts of present-day Ukraine gradually fell under imperial Russian control, particularly after the decline of the Cossack Hetmanate and the partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Under imperial administration, policies of centralisation often sought to integrate Ukrainian lands into a broader imperial structure. Ukrainian language and cultural expression were periodically restricted, and political autonomy was limited. These developments planted early seeds of nationalist consciousness among Ukrainian intellectuals, who began to articulate the idea of Ukraine as a separate nation with its own cultural heritage.
The twentieth century introduced another layer of historical trauma and political complexity. After the collapse of the Russian Empire during the Russian Revolution, Ukraine briefly attempted to establish an independent state. However, the region soon became a battleground in the broader struggles of the revolution and civil war. Eventually Ukraine was incorporated into the newly formed Soviet Union as the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. During this period, relations between Moscow and Ukraine were shaped by both integration and repression. One of the most tragic episodes remembered in Ukrainian history is the famine known as the Holodomor, which caused millions of deaths and remains a deeply sensitive subject in historical memory.
When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Ukraine emerged as an independent state for the first time in many decades. However, the long history of shared institutions, intertwined economies, and overlapping identities meant that the separation was politically complex. Some regions of Ukraine retained strong linguistic and cultural ties with Russia, while others looked increasingly towards Europe. This internal diversity of identity contributed to political debates about the country’s orientation in the international system.
In this sense, the contemporary war cannot be understood merely as a dispute over territory or military strategy. Rather, it reflects centuries of historical narratives, imperial legacies, and competing visions of national identity. The conflict illustrates how unresolved historical questions can persist across generations, shaping political decisions long after the original events have faded into the past. What appears today as a geopolitical confrontation is therefore also a struggle over memory, history, and the meaning of sovereignty in Eastern Europe.
One noticeable pattern in the war between Russia and Ukraine is the recurring struggle between a major regional power and a neighbouring state seeking stronger integration with Western institutions. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has consistently reacted with suspicion and resistance whenever former Soviet or post-Soviet territories attempt to align themselves more closely with organisations such as NATO or the European Union.
Another pattern is the strategic importance of geography. Ukraine occupies a significant position between Russia and Europe, and historically it has served both as a cultural crossroads and a geopolitical buffer. For Russian leadership, particularly under Vladimir Putin, Ukraine is often viewed not merely as a neighbouring country but as a territory deeply connected to Russia’s historical identity and security considerations.
A further pattern lies in the transformation of modern warfare itself. The conflict demonstrates that contemporary wars are not fought solely with tanks and missiles. They also involve information warfare, cyber operations, economic sanctions, and global media narratives. Ukraine, under the leadership of Volodymyr Zelenskyy, has been particularly effective in mobilising international sympathy and support through communication strategies and diplomacy.
Another recurring feature is the internationalisation of the conflict. Although the war is fought primarily on Ukrainian territory, it has become a wider geopolitical confrontation involving Western military assistance, economic sanctions against Russia, and diplomatic alignments across the globe. In this sense, the conflict resembles earlier proxy struggles in world history where great powers compete indirectly through regional wars.
So, there is a broader historical pattern: wars often emerge when unresolved political tensions, historical grievances, and security fears accumulate over time without a mutually accepted framework for resolution. The Russia–Ukraine war appears to follow this pattern, where decades of mistrust, competing narratives of history, and strategic anxieties eventually culminated in open conflict.
In the long tradition of political and military thought, war has often been interpreted not merely as a clash of armies but as the visible expression of deeper forces within human society. The ancient historian Thucydides, writing about the Peloponnesian War, argued that wars usually arise from three powerful motivations: fear, honour, and interest. These forces continue to appear in many conflicts across history, including the war between Russia and Ukraine. From this perspective, the conflict can be interpreted as a modern example of how states react when they perceive shifts in power and security around them.In the nineteenth century, the Prussian military thinker Carl von Clausewitz developed a famous idea that war is “the continuation of politics by other means.” His insight suggests that wars do not occur in isolation but grow out of political disagreements that have failed to find peaceful solutions. The Russia–Ukraine war illustrates this principle clearly, because it emerged from long-standing disputes over security arrangements in Eastern Europe, particularly regarding Ukraine’s potential relationship with institutions such as NATO. When diplomacy and negotiation proved unable to resolve these tensions, the conflict moved into the realm of military force.
Another philosophical pattern concerns the struggle between spheres of influence. Throughout history, powerful states have attempted to maintain influence over neighbouring regions, while smaller states have often sought autonomy or protection from rival powers. The war reflects this dynamic. Russia has historically regarded Ukraine as part of its strategic environment, whereas Ukraine has increasingly pursued closer political and economic ties with the European Union and the wider Western world. This tension between regional dominance and national self-determination represents a recurring theme in geopolitical history.
The conflict also reflects a broader historical pattern in which wars serve as moments of systemic adjustment in the international order. When the balance of power between states begins to shift, conflicts sometimes emerge as violent attempts to redefine that balance. In the case of the Russia–Ukraine war, the struggle can be interpreted as part of a wider debate about the future structure of the international system: whether it will remain centred on Western-led institutions or move toward a more multipolar arrangement involving several competing centres of power.
Finally, philosophers and historians have long observed that wars often expose underlying questions about identity, legitimacy, and historical narrative. In this conflict, both sides appeal to different interpretations of history, culture, and political destiny. Such narratives influence how populations perceive the war and justify its sacrifices. Thus, beyond military operations and territorial disputes, the war between Russia and Ukraine also illustrates how conflicts are shaped by ideas, memories, and competing visions of the past and the future.
Before explaining the deeper psychological pattern of war on the next chapter—often summarised as “fear, honour, and interest”—it is useful to mention several historical works that support both the earlier structural analysis of war and the broader interpretation of recurring patterns in conflict. Historians and political theorists have repeatedly argued that wars tend to follow recognisable patterns shaped by power transitions, strategic anxiety, ideology, and human motivations.
One of the earliest and most influential sources is the work of the Greek historian Thucydides in History of the Peloponnesian War (translated edition, 1954, Penguin Classics). In this classic account of the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta, Thucydides offered one of the earliest analytical explanations of war in history rather than merely a narrative description. He argued that the real cause of the war was the rise of Athens and the fear this inspired in Sparta. This insight has become foundational for modern theories about power transitions and geopolitical rivalry.
A modern reinterpretation of this idea appears in the work of the American political scientist Graham Allison, particularly in Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (2017, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt). Allison examined several historical cases in which a rising power challenged an established power and found that such transitions frequently led to war. Although his focus is on contemporary geopolitics, the historical examples he presents reinforce the argument that wars often arise from structural tensions within the international system.
To deepen the philosophical understanding of war, it is helpful to consider how several influential thinkers interpreted the nature of conflict within the broader condition of human society. Among the most significant figures in this discussion are Augustine of Hippo, Thomas Hobbes, and Carl von Clausewitz. Although they lived in very different historical periods, their reflections reveal that war has long been understood not merely as a military event but as a manifestation of deeper moral, political, and psychological realities.
The theological reflection begins most prominently with Augustine of Hippo in his monumental work The City of God (translated edition, 2003, Penguin Classics). Augustine wrote in the aftermath of the dramatic upheavals that followed the decline of the Roman Empire, and he sought to explain why violence and conflict persist in human history despite humanity’s longing for peace. According to Augustine, war ultimately arises from the disordered loves of the human heart. When individuals and societies place excessive attachment on power, domination, or earthly glory, conflict becomes almost inevitable. Augustine did not celebrate war; rather, he regarded it as a tragic consequence of human sinfulness. Yet he also acknowledged that war might sometimes be morally permissible when it is undertaken to restore justice, defend the innocent, or restrain wrongdoing. This reasoning laid the intellectual foundation for what later came to be known as the Just War tradition, a moral framework that attempts to distinguish legitimate warfare from unjust aggression.
Many centuries later, the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes approached the problem from a different angle in Leviathan (1651; modern edition 1996, Cambridge University Press). Writing during the turmoil of the English Civil War, Hobbes offered a starkly pessimistic view of human nature. He argued that in the absence of strong political authority, human society would fall into what he famously described as a “war of every man against every man.” In such a state of nature, life would become “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” For Hobbes, war is not merely the clash of armies; it is the condition that emerges whenever fear, competition, and distrust dominate human relationships. The solution, he believed, was the establishment of a powerful sovereign authority capable of imposing order and preventing the constant descent into conflict.
A third influential interpretation came from the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz in his classic treatise On War (1832; Princeton University Press edition, 1984). Clausewitz famously argued that war is “the continuation of politics by other means.” By this he meant that war should not be understood as an irrational breakdown of politics but rather as an extension of political objectives when diplomacy fails. According to Clausewitz, wars are shaped by a dynamic interaction of three forces: the passions of the people, the strategic calculations of military leaders, and the political aims of governments. This insight emphasises that war is never purely military; it is embedded within the broader structure of political decision-making.
When the ideas of Augustine, Hobbes, and Clausewitz are considered together, a striking philosophical picture emerges. Augustine explains the moral and spiritual roots of war, Hobbes reveals the psychological and social anxieties that generate conflict, and Clausewitz clarifies the political logic that directs war toward concrete objectives. Each thinker illuminates a different dimension of the same phenomenon, suggesting that war is not simply an accident of history but a recurring expression of human ambition, fear, and political organisation.
This philosophical tradition also helps explain why wars often appear tragically repetitive. Human societies continually pursue power, security, honour, and prosperity, yet these pursuits frequently collide with the ambitions of others. The result is a cycle in which peace is desired, conflict erupts, and new political arrangements emerge from the aftermath of war. From the perspective of history, war thus appears both as a destructive force and as a mechanism through which political orders are challenged, reshaped, and sometimes rebuilt.
In this sense, the philosophical reflections of Augustine, Hobbes, and Clausewitz remind us that the study of war cannot be limited to battles, weapons, and military campaigns. War is also a mirror reflecting the deepest tensions within human nature, political authority, and moral responsibility. To understand war fully, therefore, one must examine not only what happens on the battlefield but also the ideas, fears, and aspirations that lead societies to fight in the first place.
Another important historical study is The Causes of War (1989, Free Press) by the historian Geoffrey Blainey. Blainey argues that wars usually occur when states believe they can win or when there is disagreement about the balance of power between rivals. His analysis emphasises that wars are rarely the result of a single cause; rather, they emerge from a complex combination of strategic miscalculations, economic interests, and political ambitions.
A broader civilisational perspective appears in War: What Is It Good For? (2014, Farrar, Straus and Giroux) by the historian and archaeologist Ian Morris. Morris examines warfare across thousands of years of human history and argues that organised violence has paradoxically played a role in shaping large political structures and long-term stability. His work illustrates how war has historically been intertwined with the formation of states, institutions, and social orders.
Within this intellectual tradition, the psychological explanation of war offered by Thucydides remains particularly influential. In one of the most famous passages of History of the Peloponnesian War, he wrote that human conflicts are often driven by three fundamental motivations: fear, honour, and interest. These three motives, though expressed in the language of ancient Greece, describe patterns that continue to appear in modern conflicts.
Fear refers to the anxiety that one political community feels when it perceives another as becoming stronger or more threatening. In international politics, fear often arises from uncertainty about the intentions of other states. Even if a rival power claims peaceful intentions, the possibility that it might eventually use its strength aggressively can lead to defensive preparations. Ironically, these defensive preparations can themselves appear threatening to others, creating a cycle of suspicion that gradually escalates into conflict.
Honour represents the powerful role of prestige, reputation, and dignity in political life. States, like individuals, often react strongly to perceived humiliation or loss of status. Throughout history, rulers and societies have entered wars not merely to defend territory but to defend honour, restore reputation, or demonstrate strength. This motivation explains why symbolic events—such as insults, provocations, or challenges to sovereignty—sometimes trigger wars that appear disproportionate to the immediate issue at stake.
Interest refers to the tangible benefits that states seek to obtain or protect, including territory, trade routes, natural resources, and economic influence. Many wars have been fought over material advantages that promise wealth, security, or strategic leverage. Economic interests may involve access to land, control of maritime routes, or dominance over valuable resources that sustain national power.
What makes the framework of fear, honour, and interest so enduring is that these motivations rarely operate in isolation. Most wars emerge from a mixture of all three forces. A state may justify a war as a matter of honour, fear the growing power of a rival, and simultaneously hope to gain economic or strategic advantages. Because these motivations are deeply rooted in human psychology and political competition, they recur across vastly different historical periods.
Thus, when historians analyse modern conflicts—whether in Europe, the Middle East, or elsewhere—they often discover that the underlying dynamics described by Thucydides more than two thousand years ago remain surprisingly relevant. The technologies of war may change, and the political systems involved may evolve, but the fundamental motives of fear, honour, and interest continue to shape the decisions that lead societies into war.
[Part 2]
