Citations & References:"For the past few days, the Moon hasn't appeared, and I've been listening to the Seagull talk," said Swara when she arrived, after saying Basmalah and Salaam. Then she sang,Burung camar, tinggi melayang[Seagulls, flying high]Bersahutan, di balik awan[Shout out, behind the clouds]Membawa angan-anganku jauh meniti buih[Bringing my dreams, stepping far away over the sea foam]Lalu hilang jauh di lautan *)[Then disappeared deep into the sea]"Before telling you about what Seagull told me," Swara added, "listen to this story, 'The room was full of pregnant women and their partners. The Lamaze class was in full swing. The instructor was teaching the women, how to breathe properly, and informing the men how to give the support and encouragement needed.'Ladies, exercise is good for you,' announced the teacher.'Walking is especially benficial. And, gentlemen, it would be great for you to take the time to go walking with your partner!'A man in the middle of the group spoke up, 'Is it all right if she carries a golf bag while we walk?'""Seagull said," Swara proceeded, "'Western philosophy did not really begin with Socrates, but nevertheless, we learn about a founding myth. Socrates was a gadfly. He demonstrated that the supposedly wisest people in Athens could not answer what seemed like simple questions about their areas of expertise. The pious could not explain what piety is; the just could not explain what justice is. He showed how much people took for granted and how little they could justify their basic assumptions. Of course, this kind of behavior can be dangerous. And so, the Athenians didn’t like it; they had Socrates executed. But philosophy is not just 'dangerous' for the philosopher. Philosophy brings our hidden ideas to the surface and exposes unseen contradictions. What we think is obvious is not so obvious on reflection. Philosophical inquiry often shows that our core beliefs are a jumbled mess. We sometimes make dangerous mistakes when we try to clean up that mess. Some countries today still suffer the legacy of philosophers’ past errors.But at the same time, we do not make progress without challenging and in many cases changing our moral ideas. In general, people live far better and in far more just societies today than a thousand years ago. It matters that we now see government agents as servants appointed by the people, rather than as lords appointed by the gods. It matters that we see people everywhere as part of the same moral community rather than holding, as most early people did, that the 'barbarians' outside our borders also fall outside our moral concerns. It matters that we recognize that government leaders and civilians are fundamentally morally equal; there is not one set of rights for the high and a different set for the low. But it is true, in a far far away land, there are people who are not aware of this, and still adhere to the ideas of the the ancients. Just imagine, civil society that criticizes government agents, is considered insulting and must be brought to justice. On the other hand, if a government agent commits a dangerous act, it is considered reasonable with various justifications.Sometimes what seemed like merely academic discussions became politically salient. In the latter half of the twentieth century, philosophers debated whether torture was always wrong, or whether it might be permissible or at least excusable to extract information from terrorists in 'ticking time bomb' cases. Then the United States declared a 'War on Terror,' and suddenly these discussions were no longer academic.Critical thinking process like philosophers, often deals with dangerous questions and subjects, when it's critically examine our most basic assumptions and see if these beliefs withstand scrutiny. Doing so, is almost guaranteed to offend. Well, here it is.Jason Brennan wrote that in the real world, almost every day, the people who hold power in democratic societies— including presidents, bureaucrats, judges, police officers, Central Intelligence Agency agents, and even democratic voters— use their power in deeply unjust and irresponsible ways. Thus, one pressing question for political philosophy is what ordinary citizens are licensed to do in the face of injustice.In the famous book Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, political economist Albert Hirschman analyzed three major ways that a firm’s customers or an organization’s members might react to bad behavior on the part of the firm or organization. They might 'exit,' meaning that customers might stop buying their products or members of the organization (such as employees) might leave. They might exercise 'voice,' meaning that they might complain to people in the organization itself, such as people who hold power over the organization, or the public at large. Finally, they might be loyal— that is, they might have a tendency to stick with the firm or organization despite their flaws. Hirschman does not say that loyalty is always an alternative to voice or exit. Instead, loyal behavior can augment one’s voice or threat of exit.Many philosophers and laypeople seem to believe that when we react to political oppression and injustice, our options are limited to voice, exit, or loyalty. Some think that we have obligations to participate in politics, protest, engage in political campaigns, and push for social change through political channels. Others think that such actions are merely praiseworthy. Most think that we have the option of keeping quiet or emigrating to another country. In general, they tend to assume or conclude that when a government issues an unjust command, behaves unjustly, or passes an unjust law, we may only comply, complain, or quit. Usually, we should obey that law, or if we break the law in protest, we should be prepared to bear the consequences of doing so, including accepting punishment. They typically tend to agree that we may not fight back against government agents, especially agents of a democratic regime.Consider the question of defensive assassination or defensive killing, Andrew Altman and Christopher Wellman say, 'Surely, it would have been permissible for somebody to assassinate [Joseph] Stalin in the 1930s.' But if so, is it not also permissible to take similar action against a government official if it is the only way to stop them from harming the innocent? If you may assassinate Adolf Hitler to stop him from invading Poland, are you also permitted to do the same to a president in order to stop him from invading the Philippines, or ordering the genocidal slaughter and forced relocation of an ethnic group? If you may kill a Gestapo agent to stop him from murdering innocent people, may you do the same to a police officer who uses excessive violence?Philosophers and laypeople often assume or argue not. They assume or argue that in liberal democracies, only nonviolent resistance to state injustice is permissible. They assume that we must defer to democratic government agents, even when these agents act in deeply unjust, harmful, and destructive ways. This view is puzzling. The prevailing view is that when it comes to government agents, defensive violence, deception, destruction, and subterfuge are governed by different moral principles from those that govern defensive violence and subterfuge in other contexts. This presupposes that it makes a difference to the permissibility of lying to, deceiving, sabotaging, or killing an aggressor in selfdefense or the defense of others that the aggressor is wearing a uniform, holds an office, or was appointed by someone who was in turn elected by my neighbors. According to the prevailing view, my neighbors can eliminate my right of self- defense or the defense of others by granting someone an office. This is especially puzzling because almost everyone today recognizes that the law and justice are not the same thing; laws can be deeply unjust.Instead of the three options, exit, voice, or loyalty, probably wold bring up the fourth option: resistance. The terim 'Resistance,' maybe take in a wide range of behaviors. It includes passive behaviors such as noncompliance—that is, strategically breaking the law or ignoring the state’s commands whenever you can get away with it. It also includes more active forms of resistance, such as blocking police cars, damaging or destroying government property, deceiving and lying to government agents, or combating government agents. Such forms of resistance are often justified, even in response to injustice within modern democratic nation- states, most of which have relatively just governments overall.The standard view, which almost everyone of every ideology seems to accept, is that government agents are surrounded by a kind of magic moral force field. They enjoy a special or privileged status when they commit unjust actions. The standard view holds both that government agents have a special permission to perform unjust actions—actions that we would judge evil and impermissible were a non-government agent to perform them—and that these agents enjoy a special right against being stopped when they commit injustice. Government agents somehow may perform unjust acts, and we’re supposed to stand by and let them.Maybe 'let them' is a bit strong. Most people believe we may complain when government agents act badly. We may demand that other government agents punish their colleagues for their colleagues’ bad behavior. Some philosophers go further: they think that when government acts badly, we are morally obligated to protest, write letters to newspaper editors and senators, and vote for better candidates. But, they think, we’re not supposed to stop injustice ourselves. But we don’t think that way about private injustice. If an attacker tries to harm you, no one would say that you have no right to fight back. You aren’t required to lie down and take it, and then hope the police will later capture the attacker and bring them to justice.Some political philosophers and laypeople would scoff. They claim that they have a far more constrained and reasonable version of the 'government agents are magic' view. They deny that all governments, government agents, or political actors, enjoy special permission to perform unjust actions. They deny that we must stand back and let government actors behave unjustly. Rather, they say, 'In our modest view, only democratic governments, agents, and actors are surrounded by a magic moral force field that both removes their normal moral obligations and at the same time requires the rest of us to let them act unjustly. Of course, nondemocratic governments and their agents enjoy no such privilege.Thus, many people subscribe to, what is called, the Special Immunity thesis. The special immunity thesis holds that there is a special burden to justify interfering with, trying to stop, or fighting back against government agents who, acting ex officio, commit injustice. Government agents—or at least the agents of democratic governments—enjoy a special immunity against being deceived, lied to, sabotaged, attacked, or killed in selfdefense or the defense of others. Government property enjoys a special immunity against being damaged, sabotaged, or destroyed. The set of conditions under which it is permissible, in self- defense or the defense of others, to deceive, lie to, sabotage, or use force against a government agent (acting ex officio), or destroy government property, is much more stringent as well as tightly constrained than the set of conditions under which it is permissible to deceive, lie to, sabotage, attack, or kill a private civilian, or destroy private property.As an opponent or rejection of this Special Immunity Thesis, Brennan offers the Moral Parity Thesis. The moral parity thesis holds that justifying self-defense or the defense of others against government agents is on par with justifying self-defense or the defense of others against civilians. That government officials (including the officials of democratic governments, acting ex officio) do not enjoy a special moral status that immunizes them from defensive actions. When government officials commit injustices of any sort, it is morally permissible for us, as private individuals, to treat them the same way we would treat private individuals committing those same injustices. Whatever we may do to private individuals, we may do to government officials. We may respond to governmental injustice however we may respond to private injustice. Government agents are due no greater moral deference when they act unjustly than private agents are due.The moral parity thesis holds that democratic government agents, property, and agencies are as much legitimate targets of defensive deception, sabotage, or violence as civilians are. The principles explaining how we may use defensive violence and subterfuge against civilians, and the principles explaining how we may use defensive violence and subterfuge against government agents, are one and the same. Government agents (including citizens when they vote) who commit injustice are on par with civilians who commit the same injustices."Probably," Swara was about to end the discussion, "we'd all frown at Brennan's suggestion, but it is true. If Moral Hazard for government agents who act unfairly, are no longer heard, the only way, is to say no to the Special Immunity, and executing the Moral Parity.And lastly, listen to this, ''Look at that speed!' said one hawk to another as a jet-fighter plane zoomed over their heads.'Hmph!' snorted the other. 'You would ɻy fast, too, if your tail was on fire!'And Allah knows best."Before her voice faded away, Swara then sang,Tiba-tiba 'ku tertegun, lubuk hatiku tersentuh[Suddenly, I'm stuned, my subconscious is touched]Perahu kecil terayun, nelayan tua di sana[The small boat is swinging, the old fisherman is there]Tiga malam, bulan t'lah menghilang[Three nights, the Moon has been disapeared]Langit sepi, walau tak bermegaThe sky is quiet, though there are no clouds]Tiba-tiba kusadari, lagu burung camar tadi[I suddenly realized, the seagull song earlier]Cuma kisah sedih, nada duka hati yang terluka[Just a sad story, a tone of sorrow for a wounded heart]Tiada teman berbagi derita[No friends to share affliction]Bahkan untuk berbagi cerita[Even to share stories]Burung camar, tinggi melayang[Seagulls, flying high]Bersahutan, di balik awan[Shout out, behind the clouds]Kini membawa anganku yang tadi melayang[Now carrying my dream had floated earlier]Jatuh dia, dekat di kakiku *)[It falls, close to my legs]
- Jason Brennan, When Else False - The Ethics of Resistance to State Injustice, Princeton University Press
- Mark Osiel, The Right To Do Wrong - Morality and the Limits of Law, Harvard University Press
- Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty - Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States, Harvard University Press
*) "Burung Camar" written by Ridwan Armansjah Abdulrachman
*) "Burung Camar" written by Ridwan Armansjah Abdulrachman