"A young usher, who had never before participated in a wedding, asked an arriving guest, 'Are you a friend of the bride or groom?''I'm a friend of both,' came the reply.'I'm sorry, Madam,' the youthful usher replied. 'I'm afraid you'll have to choose a side. I haven't been told where to seat the neutrals.'""Let's keep going!" Aloe exclaimed. "Of course, the question will rise, why Dynasties or what causes of Dynastic Politics? One explanation for the phenomenon of democratic dynasties, says Smith, points to the dominance of elites in political life more generally. Scholars of political elites and power have long argued that the ruling class of a society can perpetuate its status over the less organized masses, even within a democracy. In America the most prominent dynasties have shared a more or less common background that might be considered the 'best butter' in American politics.In Japan, it is common for members of Japanese dynasties to have advanced degrees from the finest universities (or to have studied abroad), and many come from wealthy backgrounds. For example, brothers Hatoyama Yukio and Kunio were heirs to the Bridgestone Corporation fortune through their mother.13 Even in democracies, elite families might continue to dominate the political process simply by virtue of their superior endowments of income, education, and connections. These advantages might arguably give legacy candidates a head start over non-legacy candidates in building a political career.This type of elite dominance theory for dynastic politics is likely to have the most power in explaining dynasties in developing democracies, where political elites typically enjoy higher standards of living than their constituents and political parties play a smaller role in organizing and financing political competition. In the Philippines, for example, jurisdictions represented by legacy MPs tend to be associated with higher poverty, lower employment, and greater economic inequality. A high proportion of dynasties has also been documented in developing democracies in Latin America, such as Mexico and Nicaragua, and in South Asian developing democracies like India and Bangladesh.If holding political office brings private rents that exceed what might be gained in other professions, elite families might also try to hold on to power through direct manipulation of the electoral or candidate selection processes. For example, Pablo Querubín finds that term limits in the Philippines do not stop the perpetuation of dynasties—rather, they allow them to spread because politicians tend to seek higher office and get their relatives elected to their previous positions. Pradeep Chhibber looks at dynastic succession in party leadership in India through a similar lens. He argues that dynastic leadership succession is more likely in parties that lack broader organizational ties to groups in society and have centralized party finances in the top leadership. Such personalized parties might be compared to family firms, with incentives to keep leadership and control of the party within the family (as well as knowledge of any financial malfeasance).Kanchan Chandra makes a similar argument about access to state resources and weak party control over nominations to explain the Indian case, but she considers all MPs elected to recent parliaments, not just party leaders. Chandra tells us that in India, the formal basis of dynastic rule was abolished three times over after India obtained independence in 1947, first with the integration of 'princely states' into the Indian union, then when India severed even a symbolic association with the British crown by declaring itself a republic, and finally with legislation abolishing the system of zamindari, or hereditary landownership. But new dynasties emerged through the democratic process, replacing those that were eliminated. Now, in the twenty-first century, about a quarter of MPs in the directly elected lower house of Indian parliament (Lok Sabha) on average, have had a dynastic background: 20% in the 2004 parliament, 30% in the 2009 parliament, and 22% in the 2014 parliament.These 'democratic dynasties', says Chandra, are a modern phenomenon, distinguished from traditional aristocracies in one key respect: their dependence on electoral endorsement. In a traditional aristocracy, birth is sufficient to guarantee entry. But in a democratic aristocracy, members must also win elections.Chandra sugests that these democratic dynasties are the product, not of some cultural predilection for family-based politics, but of the high returns to state office and the organizational weakness of political parties. He then argue that the effect of dynastic politics on democracy is mixed. It amplifies some forms of exclusion while simultaneously creating opportunities for inclusion. But both exclusion and inclusion are products, not of some property intrinsic to political dynasties, but of the institutional environment within which dynastic politics has arisen in India. Dynasties may not arise at all in democracies with differently structured institutions, and if they do, they may well have a different effect on democratic politics.Dynastic politics in India is pervasive across regions. Constituencies in all of India’s major regions have sent significant proportions of dynastic members of Parlement (MP) to parliament, with some variation in the degree of dynasticism across regions and across elections. In the 2004 and 2009 elections, the North-Western region was significantly more dynastic than other regions. But in 2014, all regions with the exception of the West sent a roughly equal percentage of dynastic MPs to parliament. Further, several constituencies in many regions, as I note later, switch from a dynastic to a non-dynastic MP and back again across elections. Dynastic MPs are elected from both 'general' and 'reserve' constituencies, although there is significant variation in dynasticism across them. Dynastic MPs are also found in significant proportions across gender categories. Finally, dynastic MPs are pervasive across ethnic categories, with variations across them in the degree of dynasticism.In Indonesia, Zaldi Rusnaedy explained that the emergence of political dynasties' phenomenon is characterized by husbands, wives, children and other relatives of incumbents participate in the political arena, be it regional head elections, legislative elections, or the placement of other important positions. The increasing strength of political dynasties indicates symptoms of what is called, neopatrimonialism, that small regional kings increasingly expand their political power through kinship networks. Zaldi argues that a political dynasty is an effort to perpetuate power by involving family members (up, side and down) to occupy the same or different political positions. Political dynasties occur because incumbents suffer from post power syndrome and status quo, because they do not want to lose their position. This is also done as an effort to cover up 'some ulcers' during the incumbent leadership period, so that if any of 'relatives' were elected, it could be covered.Furthermore, Zaldi said that the historical roots of feudalism and the traditions of kingdoms in Indonesia were other causes of the proliferation of political dynasties. The transformation from the royal era to the democratic era left behind various problems. The reluctance to relinquish the power that 'the grandparents' had as rulers of the kingdom sparked family members to continue that power. Post power syndrome and status quo illustrate that the traditions of feudalism and kingship cannot really be eliminated in our modern political system. These two things then transformed in the era of democracy by forming a modern political kingdom which we later came to know as a political dynasty.Zaldi also added, the widespread acts of corruption is always associated with the practices of political dynasties, and confirmed by several political dynasties committing acts of corruption. Therefore, several political analysts always associate that political dynasties and corruption a thick tangent point. Political dynasties have a greater potential for committing corrupt acts than non-dynasties.There are some theories that can be related to dynastic politics. Robert A. Dahl considers political equality to be a defining feature of a democratic political system. At the same time, he recognizes that there is bound to be an unequal distribution of 'political resource'” within any society that, in turn, result in differences in the extent to which individuals are able to gain political influence. This basic fact then begs the following question: What kinds of 'political resources' should determine access to political influence? Democratic theory does not give us a definitive answer to this question. But, a logical consequence of many theories of distributive justice and political equality is that political resources that are not a product of an individual’s actions or decisions should not determine access to political influence. Conversely, if an individual obtains public office by taking deliberate action to increase her knowledge and political skills, this route to power would be compatible with the kind of political equality that should, according to these theories, exist in a society.What are the normative implications of these theories for dynastic politics? One implication they suggest, says Anjali Thomas Bohlken, is that the mere existence of dynasties in the political sphere does not necessarily violate the principle of political equality. In fact, if those with family connections in politics simply have a greater predisposition towards acquiring the knowledge and skills that allow them to gain public influence, then the prevalence of politicians with family connections in politics may be perfectly compatible with ideals of political equality.What would be normatively problematic, however, is if individuals with family connections in politics were more likely than others to be able to achieve success in the political arena without climbing up the institutional ladder and acquiring the necessary skills and knowledge on the way.The question of whether dynasts are able to gain power without proceeding through the 'normal' channels of entry that non-dynasts must pass through has practical implications as well. A politician who is able to gain political office by virtue of family connections alone may be less able to perform their duties well as they lack the skills or background that a politician who has 'legitimately earned' their position might have.Hendry C. Hart argues that leaders who have gained power at the upper echelons of the political hierarchy by climbing the institutional ladder tend to be of higher quality than leaders who have achieved power through dynastic succession because the former group of leaders need to demonstrate certain orientations and skills in order to take each step up the ladder. Leaders who have taken this route tend to be 'insiders' who become gradually more aware of the 'rules of the game' as they ascend the political hierarchy. These leaders thus tend to have certain orientations that make them effective leaders such as appreciating 'the need for vigorous party organization reaching to the voters' and 'for bureaucratic staff and procedures capable of delivering services and carrying policies into execution'. Since each step in the ladder is competitive, this route to power may also grant the leader more legitimacy amongst other contenders for the post. If this characterization of the institutional route to power is accurate and if dynasts are more likely to be able to avoid the institutional or insider route to political power, it follows that dynasts would also be more likely to suffer a relative lack of political knowledge, skill and legitimacy compared to other politicians.Patrick French describes Rahul Gandhi addressing a gathering of students in Madhya Pradesh as follows, 'There are three-four ways of entering politics .... 'First, if one has money and power. Second, through family connections. I am an example of that. Third, if one knows somebody in politics. And fourth, by working hard for the people.' This statement by Rahul Gandhi, a self-professed political dynast, reflects a common perception that dynastic ties can serve as a substitute for other modes of entry into politics such as wealth, connections or political experience. While we cannot be sure what Rahul Gandhi intended to convey with this statement, one reading of it is that dynastic ties should serve as a substitute for political experience in becoming an MP, but that family ties are just one way in which an MP can achieve political success without 'working hard for the people.'What about the age restrictions? In Bohlken's research, the figures on age, suggest what may be constructed as a positive aspect of dynastic politics–that it brings younger people into the national political sphere who is likely to bring along with them new ideas and skills. While dynastic politics is responsible for producing a more youthful parliament, this is not necessarily an unqualified benefit and may even be a cost.So, no matter how the justification is sought, there are still arguments and proof to disprove dynastic politics. Thomas Pain says, 'But it is not so much the absurdity as the evil of hereditary succession which concerns mankind. Did it ensure a race of good and wise men it would have the seal of divine authority, but as it opens a door to the foolish, the wicked, and the improper, it hath in it the nature of oppression. Men who look upon themselves born to reign, and others to obey, soon grow insolent; selected from the rest of mankind, their minds are early poisoned by importance; and the world they act in differs so materially from the world at large, that they have but little opportunity of knowing its true interests, and when they succeed to the government are frequently the most ignorant and unfit of any throughout the dominions.'And Allah knows best."The night was getting late, but the party had just begun, and the wine was already being poured. Aloe and Wulandari ended their podcast, and together, they sang a song from the Dayak land,Tagal haranan duit dan jabatan[Just because of money and position]Balalu cinta mu bapindah pilihan[Then your love changes]Aku je susah, kalah saingan[I'm the one who's having a hard time, losing to the competition]Tasingkir mundur, buhau kan saran ***)[Knocked backwards, cornered to the side]
Citations & References:
- Claude Chidamian, The Book of Cacti and Other Succulents, 1984, Timber Press
- Linda Brand (Ed.), Cactus and Succulents, 1978, Lane Publishing
- Akshay Chopra, The Magic of Aloevera, 2021, We R Stupid
- Zaldy Rusnaedy, Dinasti Politik di Aras Lokal, 2020, Deepublish
- Kanchan Chandra (Ed.), Democratic Dynasties: State, Party and Family in Contemporary Indians Politics, 2016, Cambridge University Press
- Daniel M. Smith, Dynasties and Democracy: The Inherited Incumbency Advantage in Japan, 2018, Stanford University Press
- Stephen Hess, America's Political Dynasties, 1997, Routledges
*) "Jangan Bicara" written by Iwan Fals
**) "Jangan Ada Dusta di Antara Kita" written by Harry Tasman
***) "Malihi Janji" written by Dian P Angga & Adv Habibi B.A, SH.
[Session 3]
[Session 1]
