Maple Leaf Stories: Election Fraud (4)

"At their 18th anniversary, husband and wife celebrate it in a fancy restaurant.

Husband: 'Darling, when I get mad at you, you never fight back. How do you control your anger?'

Wife: 'I clean the toilet.'

Husband: 'How does that help?'

Wife: 'I use your toothbrush.'"

"After voting in the voting booth, and after monitoring the results at the polling station, we then watched the 'Quick Count' on Media. If I asked 'Why is there a Quick Count?', you already knew the answer," said Maple while looking at a small area with curtains on three sides.

"The will of the people of a country—expressed in genuine, periodic elec­tions—is the basis of the authority of any democratic government. According to Melissa Estok [et al], this is recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and every major international human rights instrument addressing civil and polit­ical rights, thereby creating treaty obligations and international commitments to this principle. The principle is also enshrined in modern constitutions around the world. Yet, the realization of this democratic precept too often proves elusive.

Many countries conduct democratic elections. Those who con­trol state institutions and resources or organized means of bribery and intimidation, however, too frequently try to manipulate election processes by denying opponents the right to stand for office; blocking them from organiz­ing themselves to campaign for votes; restricting their access to mass communications media; preventing the electorate from gaining the knowl­edge needed to make an informed political choice; intimidating the electorate from making a free political choice; and gerrymandering election districts to deny equal suffrage. When these tactics appear insufficient to ensure victory, such perpetrators of fraud often seek to manipulate election day processes by: blocking access to polling stations; denying qualified electors the right to cast ballots; arranging for illegal voting in their favor; stuffing ballot boxes; manip­ ulating vote counts; rigging vote tabulations; announcing fraudulent results; and blocking proper legal redress. Violence and political retribution also some­ times follow elections. Such developments deny government its demo­cratic mandate and set the stage for political instability.

Not every election requires a quick count, Estok wrote, at least not in its most comprehensive form. Moreover, quick counts only speak to election-day processes and say nothing in and of themselves about whether pre-election or post-election developments uphold or negate the democratic nature of an election. Quick counts are best understood as a critical element of compre­ hensive election monitoring, but they are unique in their impact and sometimes essential to determining the warranted degree of confidence in election results.

Most quick counts do not involve collecting information from every polling station; rather, data are gathered from a random statistical sample of polling stations. This allows groups to rapidly assemble and report data that are reliable and accurate within a very small margin of error.

An important note of caution must be emphasized. If the process is manipulated before the vote tabulation, a verification of the count's accuracy would legitimize the underlying fraud. For example, massive ballot box stuffing that took place in Nigeria's 1999 presidential election, or the likely misrepresenta­tion of votes as officials called out and recorded them in Belarus' 2001 presidential election, would not have been reflected in the tabulation of results recorded from such polling stations. For this reason, quick counts must also examine qualitative aspects of voting and counting processes.

Also, due to the exacting nature of quick counts and the high stakes they address, it is best not to conduct one unless an organization is and remains highly confident that it can execute the exercise successfully. It has been wise­ly decided in numerous countries not to conduct a quick count for these reasons, and in some cases, election monitoring organizations have decided near the end of the pre-election period not to attempt to make numeric pro­jections even though they had hoped to conduct a full quick count. Quick counts are politically neutral—but those conducting quick counts must take careful account of the political environment. The local political context either facilitates or impedes, quick count preparations and political considerations must come into play so that the impartiality and accuracy of the quick count remain beyond question.

A quick count, according Estok, is the process of collecting information gathered by hundreds, or thousands, of volunteers. All information, or data, comes from the direct observation of the election process. Observers watch the electoral authorities as they administer the voting process and count the ballots. They record infor­mation, including the actual vote count, on standardized forms and communicate their findings to a central collection point.

A quick count is not the same as political opinion research or exit polling. Quick counts do not rely on asking voters, or anyone else, how they might vote or require that voters divulge how they did vote. No opinions are expressed and none are requested from anyone.

Most quick counts have two components: an independent check on the official vote totals; and a systematic analysis of the qualitative aspects of an electoral process. Quick counts are used to monitor the vote as a rea­sonably straightforward arithmetic exercise.

Quick count history can be traced back to NAMFREL organizers, widely recognized as the pioneers of the quick count in emerging democracies. In the years since their first experience, quick counts have evolved, been thoroughly tested and now constitute a best practice for civil society oversight of the voting and tabulating processes.

In 1986 Philippines elections, the results reported by Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos in 1984 were viewed with considerable distrust. When Marcos called a "snap" elec­tion for President in 1986, the National Citizens Movement for Free Elections |NAMFREL) initiated 'Operation Quick Count' as a comprehensive attempt to mirror the official count of all 90,000 polling stations. Unlike most subsequent quick counts, which collect information from a random statistical sample of polling stations, NAMFREL performed a remarkable task in collecting data on a majority of the polling stations. The organization was instrumental in helping uncover the massive vote counting fraud attempted by Marcos supporters.

A successful quick count begins with a clear understanding and statement of the project's goals. The most basic reason to undertake a quick count is to deter fraud. A quick count that is widely publicized and implemented by a credible organization or political party can deter or derail a fraudulent vote count.

To fulfill that deterrent function, a quick count must be well publicized and conducted in a transparent manner. The project must be promoted to raise awareness that electoral misconduct will be detected. The project's method­ ology should be understood and trusted. Plans should be publicized and open for scrutiny and debate, and written materials such as observer training man­ uals and forms should be distributed. For example: Chile, 1988. In the plebiscite determining whether to continue General Pinochet's presi­ dency, the Committee for Free Elections (CEL) used a statistically-based quick count to forecast the results from Chile's 22,000 polling stations. Based on a sample of 10 percent of the polling sites, CEL accurately forecasted the victo­ ry for anti-Pinochet forces. The quick count led to a statement by a member of the ruling junta conceding defeat. Experts speculate it was highly likely that the Pinochet regime would have manipulated the vote count to declare vic­ tory had there not been this independent verification of the count.

In cases where the quick count has been unable to deter fraud, the data should at a minimum be able to detect vote-counting fraud. More often, fraud is revealed when the results of the official tabulation process differ from a quick count's comprehensive results or statistical forecasts. For example, Panama, 1989, when it became apparent to Panamanian President Manuel Noriega that his proxy in the presidential contest was losing the vote, the government sus­ pended the the tabulation of results at the regional level and attempted to announce a fraudulent outcome. A Catholic Church organization, the Archdiocese Commission for the Coordination of Laity (a predecessor to the Commission for Justice and Peace), used its quick count (corroborated with a comprehensive count done by the political opposition) to forecast what the vote would have been had the ballots been properly and completely counted. This independent result demonstrated that Noriega's candidate, in fact, lost the election, which was a major factor in the weakening of the Noriega regime.

In transitional democracies, the official vote count often can take days, even weeks, to be publicly announced. Extended time lags between the completion of voting and the announcement of an official result may produce an uncer­ tain political climate or a political vacuum that threatens stability. An accurate, credible quick count can forecast returns in a timely fashion, help reduce post­ election tensions and increase citizens' confidence in the election outcome. Example: Indonesia, 1999. In the first truly free elections in Indonesia's history, the quick count conducted by the Indonesian Rector's Forum proved crucial. Indonesia's daunting phys­ ical geography and limited rural infrastructure resulted in a near collapse of the government's vote counting mechanisms. The only credible election results available for several weeks were those provided by the Rector's Forum quick count.

Most challenges to electoral processes are based on anecdotes. For example, one party may allege that its supporters were prevented from voting; in anoth­ er instance a party may present witnesses who claim that they were paid to vote for a certain candidate. Without documentation and analysis of the impact of such problems it is very difficult to obtain redress.

A quick count is designed to collect systematic and reliable information about qualitative aspects of the process. Opposition political parties and indepen­ dent monitors can supposedly rely on statistical methods used by quick counts to supply reliable and valid evidence about the voting and counting processes.

Quick count organizers mobilize hundreds, thousands, sometimes tens of thou­ sands of citizens. These are often individuals who are not interested in participating in partisan politics but still want to actively support the devel­ opment of a democratic political system. They serve as quick count trainers, observers, data processors and in other supporting roles. They become well versed in the country's electoral process and often stay involved in similar pro­ jects following elections.

Quick counts can set the stage for sponsoring groups to undertake non-elec­ toral democracy-building activities. Successful quick counts set a precedent for citizens affecting the political process. Civic organizations emerge from quick count experiences with reputations for honesty and effectiveness, and citizens want and expect them to continue similar work. These organizations are equipped to do so because organizing a quick count builds skills that can be employed in a wide variety of activities. In fact, many organizations for which a quick count was their first project have subsequently taken on pro­ grams to promote accountability and transparency in government, to educate citizens on the principles behind, and mechanics of, democracy and to advo­ cate for democratic reforms or specific policies.

As important a tactic as quick counts may be, this methodology is not a sub­ stitute for more comprehensive election monitoring. A quick count is one of numerous tools available to election monitors. By definition, a quick count focus­ es on the task of verifying that the ballots that go into a ballot box are counted accurately in the first instance and that these votes remain part of the final elec­ toral tally. If a ballot is placed in the box illegally, a quick count will count it as surely as a legal vote (unless ballot box stuffing is also detected.) If voters have been paid for their votes, the quick count will count these like any other vote. If voters have been intimidated into staying away from the polls or sup­ porting a party or candidate, the quick count will not report that problem. Thus, a quick count cannot act as a substitute for other more qualitative aspects of election monitoring.

Quick counts can project or verify official results, detect and report irregular­ ities or expose fraud. In the majority of cases, quick counts build confidence in the work of election officials and the legitimacy of the electoral process.

Although nearly every country in the world today holds multiparty elections, these contests are often blatantly unfair. For governments, electoral misconduct is a tempting but also a risky practice, because it represents a violation of international standards for free and fair elections.

An effective democratic society depends on the confidence citizens place in their government. Payment of taxes, acceptance of legislative and judicial decisions, compliance with social service programs, and support of military objectives are but some examples of the need for public cooperation with state demands. At the same time, voters expect their officials to behave ethically and responsibly.

Our regimes are democratic, but we are not governed demo­ cratically. This apparent paradox, says Pierre Rosanvallon, is at the root of the disenchant­ment and dismay that are so widely felt today. Our regimes are democratic in the sense that power comes from the ballot box at the end of an open competition, and that we live in a legally constituted state that recog­ nizes and protects individual liberties. To be sure, democracy has by no means been fully achieved. People often feel abandoned by their elected representatives; once the campaign is over, they discover that they are scarcely more sovereign than they were before. But this reality must not be allowed to mask another common phenomenon: bad government. Though it is still poorly understood, no one doubts its power to erode the foundations of our societies.

Political life is organized around institutions that, taken together, de fine a type of regime. But it is also bound up with governmental action, which is to say with the day-to-day management of state affairs, the authority to decide and command. It is where power—which in consti­tutional terms means executive power—is exercised. Politics affect people directly, every day of their lives. By the same token, the center of political gravity in democratic societies has imperceptibly shifted: until recently it was located in the relationship between representatives and those who are represented; now it is the relationship between governors and those who are governed that matters. This shift does not amount to a complete break with the past, however. The question of representation continues to occupy a prominent place in public discussion; indeed, one is forever being told that there is a 'crisis of representation' today. The chief failing of democracy in the minds of many is that their voice is not heard. They see their leaders making decisions without consultation, failing to take responsibility for their actions, lying with impunity, living in a bubble—in short, a government shut off from the world, a system whose workings are opaque.

Politics never used to be thought of in this way. Democracy has traditionally been understood as a kind of regime, very seldom as a specific mode of government. The fact that, historically, the words 'regime' and 'government' were used more or less synonymously is proof of this. Trust and goverment seems like contradictory.

In the next episode, we'll continue to discuss 'trust', bi 'idhnillah."

And before entering into the new fragment, Maple then sang,

Is there anybody out there?

Is there anybody left who cares?

All I wanna do is dance

Here in Wonderland *)

Citations & References:

- Melissa Estok, Neil Nevitte & Glenn Cowan, The Quick Count and Election Observation: An NDI Handbook for Civic Organizations and Political Parties, 2002, National Democratic Institute for International Affair

- Pierre Rosanvallon, Good Government: Democracy Beyond Elections, Translated by Malcolm DeBevoise, 2018, Harvard University Press

*) "Wonderland" written by Roxanne Emery, Sean Mcdonagh, Daniel Oestergaard & Dom Liu

[Episode 5]

[Episode 4]

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