"A married couple is sitting calmly in a coffee shop. The husband notices an old couple across the shop. He points at them and says to his wife with reflection words, 'That’s us in about ten years.'His wife looks up, laughs, puts his head back down, and says, 'That’s us now because that’s our reflection.'"
"There are roughly 50 countries in the world in which people of the Muslim faith are in the majority, although the exact number can vary depending on the source," said Jasmine while passing by Istiqlal Mosque in Jakarta. 'Istiqlal', an Arabic word for 'independence', was built to commemorate Indonesian independence, and opened to the public on 22 February 1978, and to be the largest mosque in Southeast Asia and the ninth largest mosque in the world in terms of worshipper capacity."The so-called Arab Spring of 2011, a series of spontaneous uprisings in some of the world’s most authoritarian polities, has intensified interest in the questions of whether, how or when a new wave of democratization, this one centered in the Middle East and North Africa, might be underway. The struggles to replace the fallen dictators in Egypt, Iraq, Tunisia, and Libya have rekindled interest in those Islamic countries—Indonesia and Turkey in particular—whose steps toward democratization have been relatively successful. They have also raised the intensity of a more philosophical debate on the compatibility of Islam and democracy. Long the domain of theologians and a handful of area studies specialists, the question flew into academic and political prominence in the wake of the events of September 11, 2001 (also known as 9/11) and the subsequent Western responses in Afghanistan and Iraq.Many scholars seek to find the correlation between the Arab Spring and democratization. According to Laurence Whitehead, by general consent, the ‘Arab Spring’ can be dated to January 2011, when mass protests produced the unexpected flight of Tunisia’s longstanding dictator, Zine Abedine Bin Ali, thus triggering a region-wide demonstration effect that soon brought down the Mubarak regime in Egypt, and destabilized authoritarian rulers in Libya, Syria, and Yemen, as well as producing wider political repercussions throughout the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.According to Sayre and Yousef, the MENA region is at a critical juncture. Starting with the self-immolation of street vendor Mohammed Bouazizi in the provincial town of Sidi Bouzid in the Tunisian interior, the MENA region has witnessed street protests, revolutions, limited democratic progress, political collapse into civil war, and local conflicts that threaten to engulf the entire region. Before the protests, however, young people in the region had been enduring years of economic and social exclusion. The region has had the highest youth unemployment rates in the world for decades as a result of institutional rigidities, education systems that fail to provide appropriate skills, and a demographic 'youth bulge' that has increased supply pressures on the education systems and labor markets. Once these young people eventually found jobs, institutional rigidities prevented them from making the full transition to adulthood due to obstacles arising from the region’s marriage and housing markets. In fact, in the context of the region’s growing youth bulge, such negative outcomes have persisted for decades, with youth facing social, economic, and political exclusion. Beginning in December 2010, this frustration arising from this exclusion has seemed to be erupting , and young people across the region have been at the forefront of the social unrest that was quickly dubbed the Arab Spring.John L. Esposito [et al] writes that many Western observers were shocked when Arabs began open rebellions against their governments in December 2010. The authoritarian rule had been the reality for so long that some considered it to be, if not the preferred form of government among Arabs, at least the expected and accepted reality. Some analysts suggested that the seemingly spontaneous uprisings were the unpredicted effect of the confluence of the 'youth bulge—majorities of populations under 30, unemployed, and usually better educated than their parents—and their facility with the new public cyber-sphere. Muslim-majority countries share with many other developing countries the fact that the majority of the population is under 30. Reflecting success in reducing infant mortality and improving healthcare overall, this phenomenon causes enormous social pressure in countries unable to provide employment opportunities for their restive youth. Unemployed youth in authoritarian regimes can become a potent force, especially in the context of the new social media technologies most commonly associated with younger generations. Digital social media have allowed the creation of a new, virtual public sphere that allows activists to bypass authoritarian governments’ prohibition of freedom of speech, press, and association. The virtual public sphere neutralizes class, gender, and even sectarian distinctions, allowing for the creation of a new kind of social activism, one that does not require a charismatic leader or vanguard, just numbers. In the first decade of the 21st century, participation in this virtual public sphere was approaching critical mass.There is no inevitable transition from a popular uprising—youth bulge and new social media or not—to a sustainable social or political movement. For an uprising to become a sustained movement, there are many prerequisites, including diffuse social networks, familiar forms of collective action, cultural frames shared broadly across a population, and political opportunity. As the re-emergence of military control indicates, in Egypt and Syria, at any rate, political opportunity was lacking. In Libya, it is questionable whether any of the social movement elements existed. In any case, there are arguably as many youth involved in protests against the elected Egyptian President, Mohammad Morsi as in demonstrations supporting him, and in Syria’s and Libya’s militias. Pew surveys conducted in 2012 indicate that nearly two-thirds of Egyptians preferred the Saudi model of governance over Turkey’s secular model. And, as the queue of ISIS videos indicates, not all tech-savvy youth are pro-democracy.A Muslim jurist writing a few centuries ago on the subject of Islam and government would have commenced his treatise by distinguishing three types of political systems. The first he would have described as a natural system—like a primitive state of nature, an uncivilized, anarchic world where the most powerful tyrannize the rest. Instead of law, there would be custom; instead of government, there would be tribal elders who would be obeyed only so long as they remained the strongest.The jurist would then describe a second system, ruled by a prince or king whose word is the law. Because the law would be fixed by the arbitrary will of the ruler and the people would obey out of necessity or compulsion, this system, too, would be tyrannical and illegitimate.The third and best system would be the caliphate, based on Shari'ah law—the body of Muslim religious law founded on the Qur’an and the conduct and statements of the Prophet (ﷺ). According to Muslim jurists, Shari'ah law fulfills the criteria of justice and legitimacy and binds the governed and governor alike. Because it is based on the rule of law and thus deprives human beings of arbitrary authority over each other, the caliphate system was considered superior to any other. But, what kind of government is this caliphate, especially in modern times? What does the term mean? Is it a concept that we can interpret and use today?The concept of a caliphate has had many different interpretations and realizations through the centuries, but fundamental to them all is that it offers an idea of leadership which is about the just ordering of Muslim society according to the will of Allah. The office, or perhaps role would be more accurate, has scriptural authority and any ruler might be pleased to follow in succession to these two. But what does the word mean? The Arabic root khalafa, from which the Arabic term khalīfa (the origin of the English word caliph) comes, is well known, but like many Arabic words, it has a variety of English equivalents. Basically, it means to succeed or deputize for a person or, in this case, for Allah. It is used in ordinary administrative and secular contexts with these meanings. But, like many passages in the Qur’ān, its precise meaning here is difficult to determine. It clearly cannot mean successor, since Allah is eternal and therefore, by definition, cannot have a successor, so it must mean deputy or representative of Allah on earth.The term appears to have been used in the time of the Prophet (ﷺ). When he (ﷺ) left Medina on a military expedition or for any other reason, he (ﷺ) would appoint a deputy (khalīfa) for the duration of his (ﷺ) absence. We know the names of at least some of these and, curiously, most of them were obscure men who played no part in the later history of the institution and their powers were very limited. Only Uthmān, radhiyallahu 'anhu, the third caliph, was among their number, and neither Abū Bakr nor Umar, radhiyallahu 'anhum, the first two caliphs, were appointed. Nevertheless, it was perhaps because of this use of the term that the Muslims naturally adopted it at the moment of the Prophet’s (ﷺ) (permanent) absence.The first four caliphs, Abū Bakr (632–4), Umar ibn al-Khattāb (634–44), Uthmān ibn Affān (644–56) and Alī b. Abī Tālib (656–61), are described as Rāshidūn. The historical sources provide a huge variety of information about the four men, but what is certain is that they are not kings, they were respected for their ability to apply Islamic teachings. In their era, there was no caste distinction, the Sahaba were free to express their suggestions and opinions.When the first of the Umayyad caliphs, Muāwiya ibn Abī Sufyān came to the caliphate in 661 almost by default. Hugh Kennedy writes that before Muāwiya died in 680, he had made a move that aroused bitter opposition and overshadowed his later years. He had his son Yazīd proclaimed as his heir, his successor as caliph. He seems to have known that the adoption of hereditary succession to decide the caliphate would be controversial and to have taken all the precautions he could to ensure that the baya to his son aroused as little controversy as possible.And so, the Umayyad caliphate was the first major Islamic dynasty began to rule. The Spanish Umayyads were the first of many Muslim dynasties to rule in Spain. The Abbasid caliphate was the second major Islamic dynasty and one of the longest in power. The Samanids were the first native Persian dynasty to rule Iran after the collapse of the Sasanian empire and the Arab Muslim conquests. he Seljuqs were a Turkic people from Central Asia. The Almoravids and Almohads were Berber dynasties that ruled southern Spain after the collapse of the Spanish Umayyad regime in 1032. Seljuqs of Rum was part of the Seljuq dynasty of Iran broke off and established control over a large portion of Anatolia. Ilkhanids was established by the descendants of the Mongol conqueror Genghis Khan. The Nasrids, centered at their capital of Granada. The Mamluks were originally Turkic military forces who served the preceding Egyptian dynasty. Ottoman empire was one of the longest-lasting dynasties in world history. The Timurids were Turks who conquered much of Greater Iran and Central Asia. The Safavids were a Shi'a dynasty that traced its lineage to an important Sufi mystic. The Mughals traced their lineage to the Mongol rulers of Iran.In espousing the rule of law and limited government, classical Muslim scholars embraced core elements of modern democratic practice. Limited government and the rule of law, however, are only two elements in the system of government with the most compelling claim to legitimacy today. Democracy’s moral power lies in the idea that the citizens of a nation are sovereign, and—in modern representative democracies—they express their sovereign will by electing representatives. In a democracy, the people are the source of the law, and the law in turn ensures the fundamental rights that protect the well-being and interests of the individual members of the sovereignty.For Islam, democracy poses a formidable challenge. Muslim jurists have argued that the law made by a sovereign monarch is illegitimate because it substitutes human authority for Allah’s sovereignty. But law made by sovereign citizens faces the same problem of legitimacy. In Islam, Allah is the only sovereign and the ultimate source of legitimate law. How, then, can a democratic conception of the people’s authority be reconciled with an Islamic understanding of Allah’s authority? Answering this question is extraordinarily important but also extraordinarily difficult for both political and conceptual reasons. On the political side, democracy faces several practical hurdles in Islamic countries—authoritarian political traditions, a history of colonial and imperial rule, and state domination of the economy and society.Many Muslims are actively engaged in defining Islamic democracy. They believe that the global processes of religious resurgence and democratization can be, and, in the case of the Muslim world, are, complementary. In Islamic history, there are a number of very important concepts and images that shape the contemporary visions of what a just human society should be. These are the foundations for the Islamic perceptions of democracy.In the traditional and modern debates over the nature of the caliphate, the institution was viewed in essentially monarchical terms. However, there is a profoundly different meaning of the term that has received increasing attention in the second half of the twentieth century. In addition to the connotations of 'successor' that the Arabic term khalifah involves, there is also a sense in which a khalifah is a deputy, representative, or agent. It is possible to interpret some sections of the Quran as identifying human beings in general as Allah's agents (khalifahs) on earth, and human stewardship over Allah's creation as the broader cosmic meaning of khilafah.The authority of the caliphate is bestowed on the entire group of people, the community as a whole, which is ready to fulfill the conditions of representation after subscribing to the principles of Tawheed. Such a society carries the responsibility of the caliphate as a whole and each one of its shares the Divine Caliphate. This is the point where democracy begins in Islam. Every person in an Islamic society enjoys the rights and powers of the caliphate of Allah and in this respect all individuals are equal.The identification of 'caliph' with humanity as a whole, rather than with a single ruler or political institution, is affirmed in the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights, a document drawn up by the Islamic Council of Europe. In this framework, the first phase of the 'fulfillment of social-political Khilafah' is 'the creation of the community of believers,' while the second phase 'is to reach the level of self-governance.' This perception of 'caliph' becomes a foundation for concepts of human responsibility and of opposition to systems of domination. It also provides a basis for distinguishing between democracy in Western and in Islamic terms.In presentations of democracy within a broad Islamic conceptual framework, much attention is given to some specific aspects of social and political operation. In particular, Islamic democracy is seen as affirming longstanding Islamic concepts of consultation (shurah), consensus (ijma), and independent interpretive judgement (ijtihad).The necessity of consultation is a political consequence of the principle of the caliphate of human beings. Popular vicegerency in an Islamic state is reflected especially in the doctrine of mutual consultation (shura). Because all sane adult Muslims, male and female, are vicegerents (agents of Allah), it is they who delegate their authority to the ruler and whose opinion must also be sought in the conduct of state. The importance of consultation as a part of Islamic systems of rule is widely recognized.A similarly important operational concept is consensus or ijma. Consensus has long been accepted as a formal validating concept in Islamic law, especially among Sunni Muslims. A third operational concept of major importance is ijtihad or the exercise of informed independent judgment. In the minds of many Muslim thinkers, this is the key to the implementation of Allah's will at any given time or place.Governance in Islam is one of the spheres of the Islamic system. The Islamic theory of government is based on the same bases upon which all spheres of the Islamic system are based. First is the unity of humanity in race, nature, and origin. Second, Islam has universal applicability; as declared in the Qur’an, Allah is the Sovereign over the universe, life and humanity. These ideas are applied not only to the political sphere but also to the economic, social, intellectual, and moral spheres of the Islamic system. After that, the government in Islam is based on justice on the part of the rulers, obedience on the part of the ruled, and consultation between the rulers and the ruled. From these broad basic lines branch all the principles that provide the foundation, the forms and nature of government in Islam.Based on these broad outlines, government in Islam can take any form or shape. Islam does not impose a specific type or a specific form of government. The political ordinances of the shari‘ah do not prescribe a specific form to which an Islamic state must conform. Thus, there is not only one form of the Islamic state, but many, and it is for the Muslims of every period to discover the form most suitable to their needs, based on the shari‘ah and in agreement with its laws relating to communal life. Thus, the form of government has no impact on the Islamic identity of the state. Government in Islam can take many forms to implement justice and equality based on the shari‘ah, which is the foundation of legislation in the state.Islam does not deal with abstract human beings, but with human beings walking and living on this planet. The Lawgiver knows that human affairs are not fixed or rigid and rigidity is not in the nature of human life. This requires a political scheme capable of realisation at all times and under all conditions of human life. The type and form of government need to be flexible and left to human reason to shape; according to the condition and public circumstances; within the framework of the general principles of the shari‘ah. This does not necessarily mean that the political law emerging from the shari‘ah is unclear. The political law is ‘very vivid and concrete in as much as it gives us the clear outline of a political scheme. But precisely because it was meant to be realised at all times and under all conditions, that scheme has been offered in outline only and not in detail. Man’s political, social and economic needs are time-bound and, therefore, extremely variable.In the next episode, we'll continue with the organs and functions of the state from an Islamic perspective. Bi 'idhnillah."
Citations & References:
- John L. Esposito, Tamara Sonn & John O. Voll, Islam and Democracy after the Arab Spring, 2016, Oxford University Press
- Edward A. Sayre and Tarik M. Yousef, Young Generation Awakening: Economics, Society, and Policy on the Eve of the Arab Spring, 2016, Oxford University Press
- Larbi Sadiki (Ed.), Routledge Handbook of the Arab Spring: Rethinking Democratization, 2015, Routledge
- Edward Schneier, Muslim Democracy: Politics, Religion and Society in Indonesia, Turkey and the Islamic World, 2016, Routledge
- Khaled Abou El Fadl, Islam and the Challenge of Democracy, 2004, Princeton University Press
- Hugh Kennedy, Caliphate: The History of an Idea, 2016, Basic Books
- Hugh Kennedy, The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates, 2023, Routledge
