Zakat: Not Popularized?

There is verified reporting that Nasaruddin Umar, the Indonesian Minister of Religious Affairs, made public remarks in February 2026 that have been interpreted by some as suggesting that the Qur’an does not “popularise” zakat or emphasise it as prominently as other forms of giving, such as sadaqah. Multiple Indonesian news outlets covered the controversy.

In those reports, he was quoted during a discussion at the “Sarasehan 99 Ekonom Syariah” on 24 February 2026 as saying that “zakat is not popular” and that the Qur’an “does not popularise zakat” in the way it mentions other charitable acts. He also reportedly remarked that in the early Muslim community, both under the Prophet ﷺ and the Companions, rahiyallahu anhum, sadaqah was more widely practised and discussed than zakat.

These statements quickly sparked debate online and in political forums, with some commentators sharply criticising the claim and pointing out that the Qur’an contains numerous verses commanding zakat. The Ministry of Religious Affairs itself later issued clarifications, saying that some circulated clips were edited out of context and that Nasaruddin Umar’s broader point was intended to encourage Muslims — especially those who are wealthy—to go beyond the minimum obligatory 2.5 % zakat and practise wider forms of generosity such as infaq, sedekah, hibah, and wakaf, not to deny that zakat exists or that it is an Islamic obligation.

The distinction between zakat, infaq, sadaqah, and charitable donation lies primarily in their legal status, scope of meaning, and degree of regulation within Islamic teaching. Although all four terms relate to giving or generosity, they do not occupy the same theological or juridical level.

Zakat is a formal religious obligation and constitutes one of the pillars of Islam. It is explicitly commanded in the Qur’an and is treated in Sunni jurisprudence as a mandatory act of worship. Zakat is subject to clearly defined conditions, including a minimum wealth threshold (nisab), a holding period (haul), specified rates—such as 2.5 per cent for certain categories of wealth—and designated categories of recipients as outlined in the Qur’an. It is therefore not merely an act of moral generosity but a structured legal duty. Deliberately denying or rejecting its obligatory status carries serious theological implications within orthodox Sunni doctrine.

Infaq, by contrast, has a broader linguistic and conceptual meaning. The term literally signifies spending or disbursing wealth. In a religious context, it refers to any expenditure made for the sake of goodness or in the path of God, whether obligatory or voluntary. Zakat may be considered a type of infaq because it involves the disbursement of wealth, but not every act of infaq qualifies as zakat. Infaq does not necessarily require a minimum threshold, fixed percentage, or restricted categories of beneficiaries. It may be given at any time and in any amount, depending upon one’s means and intention.

Sadaqah encompasses an even wider sphere. In Islamic teaching, sadaqah is not limited to financial giving. It includes every act of kindness performed sincerely for the sake of God. A smile, a helpful gesture, removing harm from a pathway, or speaking a kind word may all be regarded as forms of sadaqah. While in common usage the term often refers to voluntary charitable donations, its theological meaning extends well beyond material contributions and embraces the broader moral dimension of compassion and benevolence.

The term “charitable donation” or “almsgiving” in a general sense corresponds most closely to the Indonesian word derma, which is not a technical juristic category in Islamic law. It is a general social expression describing acts of giving or philanthropy, whether religiously motivated or not. Unlike zakat, it carries no prescribed rates, thresholds, or ritual framework. It may be practised by anyone, irrespective of faith tradition, and functions primarily as a social rather than a theological classification.

In summary, zakat is a structured and obligatory pillar of Islamic practice; infaq is a broader category of spending for good purposes; sadaqah embraces all forms of sincere kindness, both material and immaterial; and charitable donation in the general sense is a socially defined act of giving without the specific legal framework that characterises zakat.

 The distinctions between zakat, infaq, sadaqah, and what is commonly termed charitable donation may be demonstrated directly through Qur’anic verses and Prophetic hadith, alongside their recognised degrees of authenticity within Sunni scholarship.

Zakat is presented in the Qur’an as a clearly defined obligation. In Surah al-Baqarah (2:43), God commands: “Establish prayer and give zakat” (wa aqīmū al-ṣalāh wa ātū al-zakāh). The imperative form indicates obligation, and the repeated pairing of prayer and zakat throughout the Qur’an reinforces its foundational status. Moreover, Surah al-Tawbah (9:60) specifies eight categories of recipients, thereby demonstrating that zakat is not merely a general exhortation to generosity but a structured and regulated duty. This is further confirmed in the well-known hadith in which the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ said, “Islam is built upon five [pillars]…”, and he included zakat among them. This hadith is recorded in the Sahih collections of Muhammad al-Bukhari and Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj and is classified as muttafaq ‘alayh, meaning its authenticity is agreed upon by both authorities and is therefore unquestionably sahih.

Infaq, by contrast, appears in the Qur’an in a broader and more general sense. In Surah al-Baqarah (2:261), God states: “The example of those who spend their wealth in the way of God (alladhīna yunfiqūna amwālahum fī sabīlillāh) is like a grain that grows seven ears…” This verse speaks generally of spending wealth in God’s cause without specifying minimum thresholds, fixed percentages, or restricted beneficiaries. Classical exegetes therefore understand infaq as encompassing all forms of expenditure for righteous purposes, whether obligatory or voluntary. Zakat may fall under the umbrella of infaq linguistically, but the Qur’anic usage shows that infaq itself is the wider category.

Sadaqah is used in the Qur’an in both specific and general senses. In Surah al-Tawbah (9:103), Allah commands the Prophet to take “a charity (ṣadaqah) from their wealth in order to purify them”. Many exegetes interpret the term ṣadaqah in this context as referring to obligatory zakat. However, the Prophetic hadith literature makes clear that the concept of sadaqah extends far beyond financial obligation. The Prophet ﷺ said, “Every good deed is charity (kullu ma‘rūfin ṣadaqah).” This narration is recorded by Muhammad al-Bukhari in his Sahih and is therefore classified as sahih. In another sahih narration recorded by Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj, the Prophet ﷺ taught that even a smile offered to one’s brother is an act of charity. These reports demonstrate that sadaqah, in its Prophetic usage, includes all acts of kindness, whether material or immaterial.

As for what is termed “charitable donation” in general language, there is no distinct technical category in the Qur’an or hadith corresponding precisely to the modern social term. Rather, it would fall under voluntary sadaqah or tathawwu‘ (voluntary good works). A hadith recorded by Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj in his Sahih relates that if a person cannot give charity from wealth, he should work and benefit himself and others; if he cannot do that, he should assist someone in need; and if he cannot do that, he should refrain from harm, and that restraint itself will be counted as charity. This hadith is sahih and further illustrates that voluntary giving is not confined to monetary contributions.

Taken together, these textual evidences show that zakat is a legally mandated and structured pillar of Islam; infaq denotes the broader act of spending wealth in God’s cause; sadaqah encompasses every sincere act of goodness; and general charitable donation corresponds to voluntary forms of sadaqah without the fixed legal framework that characterises zakat.

Islamic terminology concerning charity and financial devotion is considerably richer than the four commonly cited terms of zakat, infaq, sadaqah, and general charitable donation. The Qur’an and Sunnah employ several additional expressions that reflect different dimensions of generosity, obligation, purification, and social responsibility.

One important term is tathawwu‘, which refers to voluntary acts of devotion performed beyond what is obligatory. In the context of financial giving, it denotes voluntary charity that exceeds the minimum requirement of zakat. The Qur’an alludes to this spirit in Surah al-Baqarah (2:184), where acts done willingly and beyond obligation are described as “better” for the believer. Jurists often use the expression ṣadaqah tathawwu‘ to distinguish voluntary charity from obligatory zakat.

Another significant term is hibah, meaning a gift given freely without expectation of return. Unlike zakat, hibah is not necessarily directed towards the poor and does not carry devotional legal requirements, although it may be given with pious intention. It is primarily discussed in Islamic jurisprudence under commercial and personal law rather than ritual worship, yet it remains part of the broader ethic of generosity.

The concept of waqf (endowment) also plays a central role in Islamic charitable tradition. A waqf involves dedicating an asset—such as land, a building, or a source of income—for perpetual public benefit. Historically, waqf institutions funded mosques, schools, hospitals, roads, and water systems throughout the Muslim world. Although waqf is not identical to zakat or sadaqah, it represents a structured and enduring form of charitable commitment rooted in Prophetic practice.

The Qur’an also frequently uses the phrase fi sabīlillāh (“in the way of God”) to describe spending directed towards causes that uphold religion and communal welfare. This phrase appears in numerous verses concerning infaq and struggle, indicating that generosity is not merely interpersonal but can also support wider social and moral objectives.

Another related term is kaffārah, which refers to expiatory charity given as atonement for certain violations, such as breaking an oath or invalidating a fast. While not classified as zakat, kaffārah involves mandated financial or material compensation and therefore intersects with the broader framework of ethical giving.

The concept of ‘aṭā’ (grant or provision) appears in classical literature to describe gifts or stipends distributed by rulers or public authorities, sometimes from public funds including zakat revenues. Although administrative in nature, it reflects institutionalised generosity within Islamic governance.

Finally, Islamic spirituality emphasises iḥsān, excellence in conduct, which includes generosity beyond strict obligation. While iḥsān is not a technical financial term, it underpins the moral philosophy of giving in Islam: believers are encouraged not merely to fulfil minimum requirements but to give with sincerity, beauty, and compassion.

Taken together, these terms demonstrate that Islamic teachings on charity are not limited to a single legal category. Rather, they form a layered ethical system in which obligatory redistribution (zakat), voluntary generosity (sadaqah and tathawwu‘), personal gifting (hibah), perpetual endowment (waqf), expiation (kaffārah), and broader moral excellence (iḥsān) all contribute to a comprehensive vision of social and spiritual responsibility.

Here is a clear and historically grounded comparison between what was actually said — and subsequently clarified — by the Minister of Religious Affairs, Professor KH Nasaruddin Umar, regarding the “popularity” of zakat, and how mainstream Islamic scholarship and the historical record treat the status and prevalence of zakat across Islamic history, presented in full British English and without advocacy.

In a speech delivered at the Sarasehan 99 Ekonom Syariah on 24 February 2026, Nasaruddin Umar used phrasing to the effect that zakat was “not popular” and that even the Qur’an does not “popularise” zakat. He further suggested that during the time of the Prophet ﷺ and the Companions, ṣadaqah and other forms of voluntary giving were more widespread in practice than zakat, and he encouraged Muslims not to confine themselves to the fixed minimum rate of 2.5 per cent applicable to certain categories of wealth. Instead, he urged an expansion of generosity through instruments such as sedekah, infak, hibah, and wakaf, all of which do not carry fixed quantitative limits and may be applied more broadly across social needs.

The circulation of a shortened and decontextualised video excerpt led to considerable public misunderstanding and criticism. In response, the Minister and officials from the Ministry of Religious Affairs clarified that the intended message had been to promote a broader culture of philanthropy rather than to deny the obligation of zakat or its clear foundation in the Qur’an. They reaffirmed that zakat is fardhu ‘ain—an individual obligation upon eligible Muslims — and one of the Five Pillars of Islam. They also expressed regret for the wording that had caused confusion. Furthermore, representatives of the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) observed that the specific expression “meninggalkan zakat” (“leave zakat”) was inappropriate, as there exists a scholarly consensus (ijma‘) across Islamic jurisprudence that zakat is a foundational religious obligation and cannot be treated as optional or marginal.

When examined against the broader sweep of Islamic history, however, the characterisation of zakat as “not popular” does not align with how the institution has been understood by classical jurists and historians. From the earliest period of Islam, zakat was established as a compulsory financial duty closely associated with the performance of prayer. The Qur’an repeatedly commands believers to “establish prayer and give zakat”, coupling the two acts as core expressions of worship. This formulation appears across numerous verses and has been consistently interpreted in exegetical and theological works as evidence that zakat constitutes a pillar of the faith rather than a supplementary or peripheral practice.

During the lifetime of the Prophet ﷺ in the seventh century CE, zakat was not merely a private charitable gesture but an organised public obligation administered within the emerging Muslim polity. Appointed collectors were tasked with gathering and distributing zakat according to specified categories of recipients. Following the Prophet’s death, when certain Arabian tribes refused to continue paying zakat, the first Caliph, Abu Bakr al-Siddiq, radhiyallahu anhu, initiated what later came to be known as the Riddah Wars in order to enforce compliance. Classical historical sources cite this episode as decisive evidence that zakat was understood as integral to the political and religious structure of the Muslim community. It was neither symbolic nor discretionary; rather, it was regarded as inseparable from communal allegiance and legal order.

Across subsequent caliphates and classical Islamic states, zakat functioned as a structured instrument of governance and social welfare. Although the efficiency of collection varied depending upon the strength of central authority, the legal and theological status of zakat did not diminish in scholarly discourse. Jurists across the major schools of law treated it as a clearly defined obligation, with detailed discussions of nisab thresholds, categories of wealth, and eligible beneficiaries. Even when political fragmentation reduced centralised administration, the doctrinal centrality of zakat remained intact.

The debate, therefore, appears to hinge upon the meaning of “popularity”. If by popularity one refers to the frequency of informal, voluntary giving, then it is historically accurate that Muslims have widely practised ṣadaqah and other spontaneous forms of generosity. Texts of spirituality and moral exhortation frequently praise such acts, and cultural expressions of communal solidarity often emphasise voluntary charity. However, the widespread presence of voluntary giving does not imply the absence or marginalisation of zakat. The two forms of charity co-existed: one obligatory and institutional, the other voluntary and expansive.

If, alternatively, popularity is understood as cultural visibility in everyday discourse, it is conceivable that the technical legal framework of zakat — with its specified conditions, categories, and calculations — was less frequently invoked in ordinary conversation than the broader ethical call to generosity. Yet this distinction between legal precision and moral exhortation does not translate into a diminished status for zakat within Islamic theology or law. Its obligatory character and institutional prominence remained firmly established.

Across classical and contemporary scholarship alike, there exists consistent agreement that zakat is obligatory for eligible Muslims and constitutes one of the Five Pillars of Islam. The Qur’an and the prophetic practice establish this beyond dispute. Voluntary giving such as ṣadaqah is highly meritorious and strongly encouraged, but it supplements rather than replaces zakat. The prevalence of informal charity has never been interpreted by recognised scholars as overriding or weakening zakat’s doctrinal standing.

In historical reality, therefore, zakat was neither unknown nor socially marginal in a manner that would undermine its religious or civic function. It was institutionalised early as a mandatory duty, enforced by political authority, administered through appointed collectors, and consistently affirmed by jurists as central to Muslim communal life. At the same time, voluntary generosity has always formed an important dimension of Islamic piety and social cohesion. The fact that spontaneous charity may have been more visible in daily interactions does not alter the well-documented legal obligation and institutional centrality of zakat within Islamic history.

In offering a measured defence of the Minister’s remarks, on one side, it is important to situate his statements within the broader framework of Islamic ethical teaching. His central concern appears to have been the stagnation of Muslim philanthropic culture at the minimum legal threshold of 2.5 per cent, rather than any attempt to diminish the doctrinal status of zakat. When interpreted in this light, his argument may be understood as a call to revive the expansive moral imagination of Islamic generosity — an appeal to exceed the minimum rather than to abandon it.

The distinction between legal sufficiency and moral excellence has long been recognised in Islamic thought. Zakat establishes a floor, not a ceiling. By emphasising instruments such as sadaqah, infak, hibah, and waqf, the Minister was arguably drawing attention to dimensions of economic ethics that are voluntary, creative, and responsive to contemporary social realities. In societies facing widening inequality and complex structural poverty, reliance upon a fixed statutory percentage alone may indeed be insufficient to address communal needs comprehensively.

Furthermore, rhetorical provocation, though risky, can sometimes serve as a catalyst for renewed public discussion. The controversy generated by his wording has compelled broader engagement with the meaning of zakat, its relationship to voluntary charity, and the scope of Islamic social finance. In that sense, the debate itself may yield constructive outcomes by encouraging deeper literacy regarding Islamic economic principles.

It is also worth noting that the Minister publicly reaffirmed zakat’s status as a pillar of Islam and expressed regret for any misunderstanding. This response demonstrates an acknowledgment of the sensitivity surrounding religious language and a willingness to clarify intent. In plural and digitally mediated societies, moments of miscommunication are not uncommon; what matters is whether leaders respond with transparency and corrective explanation.

Ultimately, his broader thesis — that Muslims should not confine their generosity to the minimum legal requirement — aligns with the Qur’anic ethos of iḥsān, or excellence beyond obligation. If understood charitably, his remarks can be read as an exhortation towards a more dynamic, participatory, and socially conscious model of Islamic philanthropy. Such a perspective does not negate zakat; rather, it seeks to situate it within a wider moral economy that aspires not merely to compliance, but to transformative generosity.

On the other hand, in offering a measured critique of the Minister’s remarks, it is necessary to distinguish between intention and effect. Even if the stated intention was to encourage broader philanthropy beyond the minimum zakat threshold, the rhetorical choice to describe zakat as “not popular” and to employ language such as “leave zakat” was, at best, injudicious. Zakat is not merely one charitable instrument among others; it is a foundational pillar of Islamic worship and social order. To frame it in terms that appear to diminish its prominence risks unsettling well-established theological boundaries, particularly in a religious culture where language carries normative weight.

One of the immediate negative consequences of the statement was public confusion. In a digital environment shaped by short clips and rapid dissemination, ambiguous phrasing can quickly detach from its original context. When a senior religious authority appears to relativise a pillar of Islam, even rhetorically, the resulting uncertainty can erode public trust in institutional religious guidance. Clarifications issued after the fact, however sincere, rarely travel as widely as the initial controversy.

A further concern lies in the potential theological implications. Although the Minister later reaffirmed zakat as a fardhu ‘ain obligation, the initial wording may inadvertently provide discursive space for those who already seek to downplay mandatory religious duties in favour of purely voluntary expressions of faith. In societies where religious literacy varies significantly, rhetorical imprecision at the highest levels of authority can blur distinctions between obligation and recommendation, thereby weakening normative clarity.

There is also an institutional dimension to consider. Ministries of Religious Affairs function not only as administrative bodies but as custodians of doctrinal stability in the public sphere. When official statements generate avoidable controversy, it may strain relations between the state and independent religious scholars, as well as with bodies such as the Majelis Ulama Indonesia. The need for public correction can create an impression of internal inconsistency or insufficient theological consultation.

Moreover, the episode illustrates a broader communicative challenge in contemporary governance: complex theological arguments do not easily translate into soundbites. Attempting to reframe philanthropic culture through provocative language may attract attention, but it also amplifies the risk of misinterpretation. In matters touching upon core religious obligations, prudence and precision are not merely stylistic virtues; they are essential safeguards against misunderstanding.

In summary, while the stated objective of encouraging Muslims to expand charitable engagement beyond the minimum zakat requirement may be defensible as a policy aspiration, the rhetorical strategy employed proved counterproductive. The controversy demonstrates how language, particularly when issued from high religious office, can generate theological ambiguity, public distrust, and institutional friction. Such consequences underline the importance of disciplined articulation when addressing doctrines that occupy a central and uncontested place in Islamic belief and practice.

[Bahasa]