Two rustic fellows—though their brains are far from being stuck in the mud of mediocrity and they’re certainly not idling away their time—Bagong and Gareng, are engaged in a spirited exchange. Gareng, ever the conversational trailblazer, kicks things off by declaring, "The 1998 Reformasi in Indonesia gave rise to several important demands related to the roles of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) and the Indonesian National Police (Polri).
One of the main demands was to separate Polri from the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI). Before the reform, Polri was part of ABRI, which led to a lack of professionalism in law enforcement. This demand aimed to make Polri an independent and professional institution focused on its role as a law enforcement agency.
There was also a demand to amend the 1945 Constitution, with hopes that limitations on presidential and ministerial terms could be clearly regulated. This aimed to prevent the recurrence of prolonged power, as experienced during Suharto's era.
The reform also included demilitarizing Polri, transforming it from a military institution into a civilian law enforcement agency. This was intended to ensure that Polri would not be involved in practical politics and would focus more on policing duties.
The demand for upholding the rule of law became crucial, given that laws were often not applied fairly during the New Order era. The reform aimed to ensure that all parties, including high-ranking officials, were subject to the law. Overall, the demands of the 1998 reform reflected society's desire to build a more democratic, transparent, and accountable system of governance and law enforcement in Indonesia.
Bagong commented, "After the 1998 Reformasi in Indonesia, is there a tendency for TNI and Polri to dominate public positions again, such as with the Police and TNI Bill?"
Gareng replied, "After the 1998 Reformasi, there have been concerns regarding the tendency of TNI and Polri to dominate public positions again, particularly with discussions surrounding revisions to the Police Law.
There are indications that over 2,500 active TNI personnel currently hold civil positions, exceeding limits set by Law No. 34 of 2004 concerning TNI. This raises concerns about a return to military dominance in civil governance.
The proposed revision of the TNI Law could remove restrictions on agencies and ministries that can be filled by active personnel, allowing them to serve in various ministries according to presidential policy. This is seen as potentially reviving the dual function of ABRI that has been prohibited.
The Coalition for Civil Society for Security Sector Reform has strongly criticized these changes, stating that they could threaten democracy and legitimize a return to dual military roles in politics and civil governance.
Since Reformasi, there has been a prohibition against TNI and Polri engaging in practical politics, aimed at preventing a repeat of authoritarian history. However, with current legislative proposals, concerns about violations of democratic principles have resurfaced.
While there have been efforts to separate military roles from civil governance post-Reformasi, current situations indicate potential risks for TNI and Polri's return to dominance within Indonesia's government structure.
Before the separation, TNI and Polri were part of ABRI (Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia), with a dual function in defence and governance. The separation aimed to professionalize both institutions by limiting TNI to defence and Polri to domestic security.
There are ongoing debates about revising laws that might allow active TNI or Polri personnel to occupy civil service roles, raising fears of a return to pre-reform practices where military influence dominates civilian governance. While the separation has clarified their roles, effective collaboration remains a challenge for Indonesia's defence and security systems.
The Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) and the National Police (Polri) face several significant challenges in maintaining national defence and security. The TNI and Polri have distinct responsibilities, but their roles can overlap, especially in areas like counter-terrorism and internal security. This can lead to conflicts over jurisdiction and authority, complicating effective collaboration
There is often a reluctance to share information between agencies due to differing interests and priorities, which hampers coordination efforts. This sectoral ego can result in fragmented responses to security threats.
The unification of defence and security functions in the National Security Bill has created ambiguity regarding the roles of TNI and Polri. This lack of clarity can lead to friction and ineffective responses to security challenges
The involvement of both TNI and Polri in domestic security requires clearer regulations to delineate their responsibilities, particularly during crises or emergencies. Overlapping activities between TNI, Polri, and other agencies can lead to budget inefficiencies, where resources are wasted on redundant operations. This affects the overall effectiveness of national security initiatives. Poor coordination between intelligence agencies, such as the State Intelligence Agency (BIN) and Polri's Criminal Intelligence Unit, results in fragmented information that hinders timely threat detection and response. Overlapping mandates can lead to operational conflicts, particularly in areas like cyber intelligence, where both agencies may have competing interests
Both TNI and Polri must continuously adapt to evolving threats such as cybercrime, terrorism, and transnational crime. This requires ongoing training, resource allocation, and strategic planning to remain effective. Both institutions need to foster public trust through transparency and accountability in their operations. Engaging with communities is essential for effective policing and defense strategies
While TNI and Polri have distinct roles in maintaining Indonesia's national defense and security, challenges related to coordination, legal frameworks, resource allocation, intelligence operations, evolving threats, and public trust significantly impact their effectiveness. Addressing these challenges requires comprehensive reforms and a commitment to collaboration between both institutions.
There is a tendency for 'revolving door politics' in the case of TNI and Polri positions in Indonesia, particularly with the government's plans allowing active members of TNI and Polri to hold civil service positions.
The government is drafting regulations that would allow active TNI and Polri personnel to fill positions in various civil agencies, such as in the fields of politics and national security. This is reminiscent of the dual function of ABRI during the New Order era when the military and police dominated civil bureaucracy.
Many observers and activists view this move as a regression in reform, which should have eliminated the dual roles of TNI and Polri in politics. They are concerned that this will pave the way for military and police dominance in political life, potentially threatening democratic principles.
The involvement of active TNI and Polri members in civil service roles could make them political tools for a new regime, which may lead to a revival of authoritarian practices similar to those of the past.
After the reform era in Indonesia, there have been several instances where members of the TNI (Indonesian National Armed Forces) and Polri (National Police) have held civilian positions, despite ongoing controversies surrounding this practice.
Active members of TNI and Polri have been allowed to serve as acting regional heads. This has occurred due to the large number of vacant regional leadership positions ahead of the 2024 elections.
The appointment of Major General Novi Helmy Prasetya as President and Director of Perum Bulog (a state-owned logistics company) was criticized for violating Law No. 34 of 2004 on TNI, which prohibits active military personnel from holding civilian positions. This case sparked criticism from various groups who argued that it was inconsistent with existing regulations.
The appointment of Major General Novi Helmy Prasetya as President and Director of Perum Bulog (a state-owned logistics company) was criticized for violating Law No. 34 of 2004 on TNI, which prohibits active military personnel from holding civilian positions. This case sparked criticism from various groups who argued that it was inconsistent with existing regulations.
TNI personnel have also been involved in various government programs, such as forest area enforcement and free nutritious meal initiatives. These examples show that despite formal restrictions, the practice of placing active TNI members in civilian roles continues.
Some TNI members with specific educational backgrounds, such as graduates from Institut Pertanian Bogor (IPB), have been placed in ministries like the Ministry of Agriculture. However, such placements are expected to be selective and based on relevant expertise.
Although regulations stipulate that TNI members can only hold civilian positions after retiring or resigning from active duty, instances of active personnel being appointed to civilian roles still occur. This has raised concerns about a potential return to the dual-function doctrine of ABRI (military's role in defense and governance) and the possibility of military dominance in government.
Critics argue that appointing TNI members to civilian positions must be done cautiously and selectively to avoid undermining military professionalism and democratic principles. While regulations aim to limit the involvement of active TNI and Polri members in civilian roles, these practices continue to happen and remain a subject of debate within Indonesian society.
TNI personnel have also been involved in various government programs, such as forest area enforcement and free nutritious meal initiatives. These examples show that despite formal restrictions, the practice of placing active TNI members in civilian roles continues.
Some TNI members with specific educational backgrounds, such as graduates from Institut Pertanian Bogor (IPB), have been placed in ministries like the Ministry of Agriculture. However, such placements are expected to be selective and based on relevant expertise.
Although regulations stipulate that TNI members can only hold civilian positions after retiring or resigning from active duty, instances of active personnel being appointed to civilian roles still occur. This has raised concerns about a potential return to the dual-function doctrine of ABRI (military's role in defense and governance) and the possibility of military dominance in government.
Critics argue that appointing TNI members to civilian positions must be done cautiously and selectively to avoid undermining military professionalism and democratic principles.
While regulations aim to limit the involvement of active TNI and Polri members in civilian roles, these practices continue to happen and remain a subject of debate within Indonesian society.
The government's policy significantly impacts the careers of TNI (Indonesian National Armed Forces) and Polri (National Police) members, particularly regarding their involvement in civilian positions. The government is drafting regulations that allow TNI and Polri personnel to fill civil servant positions (ASN) and vice versa. This reciprocal policy aims to utilize the best talents from both sectors for civilian purposes, which may lead to expanded career opportunities for military and police personnel The government plans to implement more flexible recruitment procedures for ASN positions, which may include stricter selection criteria for TNI and Polri members applying for these roles. This flexibility could enhance career pathways for those transitioning from military or police service into civilian roles
Current laws restrict active TNI and Polri members from holding civilian positions unless they retire. However, recent discussions around policy reforms have raised concerns about potential violations of these laws, leading to debates about the appropriateness of allowing active personnel to occupy civilian roles
The proposed policies may undermine the meritocratic system within civilian positions by prioritizing military and police personnel over qualified civilians. This could demotivate long-serving civil servants and create a perception of favoritism towards TNI and Polri members
Recent controversies, such as corruption cases involving active military officers in civilian roles, have prompted calls for evaluations of their appointments. This scrutiny aims to ensure accountability and improve the meritocracy system within government positions, which could affect the career trajectories of TNI and Polri members involved in civil service
The expansion of roles that active TNI and Polri members can hold raises concerns about a return to the dual-function doctrine of ABRI (military's role in governance). This could lead to conflicts of interest and ethical dilemmas, impacting their professional integrity and public trust
While government policies may open new career opportunities for TNI and Polri members in civilian roles, they also pose significant challenges related to legal compliance, meritocracy, accountability, and ethical standards within Indonesia's governance framework.
"What are the ethical concerns related to TNI and Polri members holding dual positions?" asked Gareng. Bagong replied, "The ethical concerns related to TNI (Indonesian National Armed Forces) and Polri (National Police) members holding dual positions are significant and multifaceted.
Holding dual positions can create conflicts of interest, as individuals may face situations where their responsibilities in one role could compromise their duties in another. For instance, a TNI or Polri member serving as a commissioner in a state-owned enterprise (SOE) may have to make decisions that benefit the SOE but conflict with their obligations to uphold the law and public interest.
The phenomenon of dual office holding can lead to ethical misconduct, particularly in the form of "soft corruption." This occurs when individuals leverage their positions for personal gain or to favour certain interests, undermining public trust in government institutions. The presence of active-duty military or police personnel in civilian roles may perpetuate patronage systems that limit opportunities for more qualified candidates.
Soft corruption' refers to subtle corrupt practices that do not involve direct financial transactions but compromise ethical standards and integrity. It often manifests through behaviours such as favouritism, undue influence, or excessive hospitality that create an environment conducive to corruption without overtly violating laws. Unlike 'hard corruption,' which typically involves clear bribery or embezzlement, soft corruption may involve actions that facilitate favourable treatment or preferential access without explicit exchanges of money. In many cases, soft corruption is normalized within organizational cultures, making it difficult to identify and combat. This can include practices like hosting lavish events for stakeholders or providing excessive gifts, which may pressure recipients to reciprocate in ways that favour the giver.
Soft corruption can significantly influence government policies. When government officials engage in soft corruption, they may prioritize benefits for family members, friends, or business associates over the general public. This can lead to unfair policies that do not serve the broader interests of society.
Policies shaped by personal connections or pressure from specific groups may lack objective analysis or valid data. This can result in ineffective decisions that fail to address societal needs.
Soft corruption often manifests in public procurement processes, where officials award contracts to specific companies in exchange for political support or favours. This can lead to low-quality projects and wasteful spending.
Soft corruption can reduce transparency in decision-making processes, making it difficult for citizens to access information about government policies and projects. This undermines accountability among public officials.
Officials involved in soft corruption may focus more on their personal interests or the interests of specific groups rather than addressing the needs of the broader population. This can shift policy priorities away from critical issues affecting public welfare.
In some countries, soft corruption has been observed in infrastructure development policies, where projects are awarded to contractors based on personal relationships rather than technical qualifications or competitive pricing.
So, soft corruption can have detrimental effects on government policies by creating unfairness, lowering the quality of decisions, reducing transparency, and prioritizing personal interests over public welfare. Combating this practice is essential to ensure that government policies genuinely reflect the needs and aspirations of society.
In Indonesia, several real-life examples illustrate the concept of 'soft corruption,' where corrupt practices occur without direct financial transactions but instead involve unethical behaviours and favouritism.
Companies often face demands for irregular fees or concessions based on personal relationships when obtaining licenses and permits. This practice creates an environment where officials expect gifts or special treatment in exchange for facilitating business operations, reflecting soft corruption in bureaucratic processes. The justice sector in Indonesia has been plagued by soft corruption, where judges and court officials may accept unofficial payments to influence decisions or expedite cases. This undermines the rule of law and public confidence in judicial integrity.
Surveys indicate that nearly half of civil servants admit to having received bribes. This widespread acceptance of corrupt practices reflects a culture where soft corruption is normalized, impacting the effectiveness and integrity of public services.
Instances, where political figures engage in corrupt practices to secure electoral advantages, illustrate soft corruption. For example, former Chief Justice was arrested for accepting bribes to influence local election disputes, highlighting how political power can be misused without direct financial transactions.
These examples demonstrate how soft corruption permeates various sectors in Indonesia, affecting governance, public trust, and the overall integrity of institutions. The normalization of such practices poses significant challenges to efforts aimed at combating corruption and promoting transparency within the country.
Dual roles can compromise the professionalism and performance of TNI and Polri members. Balancing responsibilities across multiple positions can hinder their ability to devote adequate time and attention to each role, potentially leading to subpar performance in both military/police duties and civilian responsibilities
The practice of holding dual positions often violates existing laws, such as Law No. 34 of 2004 on TNI and Law No. 2 of 2002 on Polri, which stipulate that active members can only hold civilian positions after retiring. This legal inconsistency raises ethical questions about accountability and adherence to the rule of law
The involvement of active-duty TNI and Polri members in civilian roles can erode public trust in these institutions. Citizens may perceive such appointments as indicative of a return to past practices where military influence over civilian governance was prevalent, reminiscent of the New Order era. This perception can hinder efforts to promote transparency and accountability within government.
Allowing TNI and Polri members to hold dual positions poses risks to democratic governance by blurring the lines between military/police functions and civilian oversight. This could lead to a militarization of civil governance, which threatens democratic principles and civil liberties
So, the ethical concerns surrounding TNI and Polri members holding dual positions encompass conflicts of interest, potential corruption, compromised professionalism, legal violations, diminished public trust, and threats to democratic governance. Addressing these issues is crucial for maintaining integrity within Indonesia's security and governance frameworks."
"What are the risks of a country being controlled by its own police and military?" asked Gareng.
Bagong replied, "We'll discuss it in the episode!"
