Protests have long served as a fundamental mechanism for expressing grievances against authority, with their earliest causes rooted in systemic inequalities and abuses of power. The initial triggers often stem from economic exploitation, political oppression, or social injustices that leave ordinary people with no recourse but collective action. Historical records reveal that such demonstrations emerged as early as the 13th century in England, where barons rebelled against King John's tyrannical rule, culminating in the Magna Carta—a charter that curbed monarchical power and enshrined principles of limited governance.In medieval Europe, feudal oppression sparked the first documented large-scale protests, as subjugated peasants and nobles united to demand rights against arbitrary royal edicts. The French Revolution of 1789 marked a pivotal escalation, ignited by crippling taxes, food shortages, and absolute monarchy, leading to the storming of the Bastille as a symbolic trigger for demands of liberty, equality, and fraternity. These events established protesting as a catalyst for democratic reforms, influencing subsequent movements worldwide.
Indonesia boasts a rich tradition of protest predating modern democracy, with "tapa pepe"—public fasting or exposure in palace squares—used during the Majapahit and Surakarta eras to petition rulers non-violently for justice, recognised as a legitimate right rather than rebellion. Post-independence, triggers like the 1966 student protests arose from hyperinflation, political instability after G30S/PKI, and Sukarno's refusal to heed Tritura demands for lower prices and PKI dissolution. Later, the 1998 riots were precipitated by economic collapse, soaring prices, and Soeharto's authoritarianism, exacerbated by the Trisakti shootings.
The initial protests in Iran, erupting on 28 December 2025, stemmed primarily from a catastrophic economic collapse, with the Iranian rial plummeting to its all-time low of 1.42 million rials per US dollar. This triggered immediate outrage among merchants and shop owners in Tehran, who shut down businesses in protest against soaring living costs, eroded purchasing power, and government indifference to their plight, rapidly spreading to cities like Isfahan, Shiraz, and Mashhad. Underlying factors exacerbated the spark, including regional tensions from Israel's June 2025 attacks and broader political frustrations, fuelling anti-government chants for freedom.
The economic triggers fuelling Iran's unrest centre on the Iranian rial's unprecedented collapse, which plummeted to a record low of approximately 1.45 million rials per US dollar by late December 2025, rendering imports prohibitively expensive and destabilising markets for traders reliant on stable exchange rates. Compounding this, hyperinflation has ravaged household budgets, with consumer prices surging 42.4 per cent in 2025 according to IMF estimates and unlikely to dip below 40 per cent in 2026; food prices alone jumped 72 per cent year-on-year by December, transforming staples like meat into luxuries amid widespread hunger affecting millions.
Iran's inflation crisis in 2025 has disproportionately afflicted the food and beverages sector, where prices surged by 64 to 66 per cent year-on-year, with rice doubling in cost, meat, dairy, and eggs rising 48.6 per cent, cooking oil climbing 40 per cent, and fish increasing 52.3 per cent, thereby transforming everyday meals into unaffordable burdens for ordinary families. Tobacco faced a 57 per cent hike, rendering cigarettes and related products even more prohibitive amid broader consumer squeezes. Clothing and footwear prices escalated 42.6 per cent, largely due to reliance on devalued imported textiles and materials that crippled bazaar craftsmen and small-scale producers.The housing and utilities sector endured a 35.8 per cent inflation rate, driven by electricity, gas, and water costs ballooning 78.3 per cent against chronic shortages and rationing that left households in perpetual distress. Transport emerged as another casualty, with elevated inflation fuelled by tiered gasoline price hikes that exacerbated fuel scarcity and mobility challenges for commuters and businesses alike.The Iranian rial's catastrophic devaluation stems primarily from a toxic confluence of crippling Western sanctions, which have choked off oil exports and foreign reserves since the US withdrawal from the nuclear deal, compounded by rampant corruption, fiscal mismanagement, and the regime's insistence on prioritising military expenditures—including proxy wars in the region—over domestic economic stabilisation. This vulnerability intensified after the 2025 Israel-Iran conflict, where retaliatory strikes disrupted oil infrastructure and supply chains, slashing revenues by an estimated 30 per cent and accelerating capital flight as investors fled amid fears of escalation. While direct war has not engulfed Iran proper, these hostilities acted as a decisive accelerant, overlaying structural woes like a ballooning budget deficit of 1,800 trillion tomans and money-printing by the Central Bank to fund deficits, which flooded the market with liquidity and ignited hyperinflation.
The Grand Bazaar's closure in late December 2025 underscored how imported goods across all categories—from machinery to consumer durables—suffer from the rial's collapse, inflating costs by multiples and sparking trader strikes that ripple through construction (down 12.9 per cent) and industry (shrinking 3.4 per cent). These dynamics not only erode purchasing power but also amplify social unrest, as low-income families ration meals and prioritise survival over other expenditures.
The Iranian government has adopted a multifaceted response to the ongoing demonstrations sparked by economic collapse, blending conciliatory rhetoric, administrative changes, and escalating security measures as of early January 2026. President Masoud Pezeshkian publicly acknowledged the protests' legitimacy, directing the interior minister to engage representatives of demonstrators for dialogue and pledging accountability for economic hardships, while accepting the central bank governor's resignation and appointing a successor to stabilise the rial. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and other officials framed external influences like Israel and the US as agitators, yet authorities initially avoided a full crackdown, keeping internet access open and media coverage permissive.
Security forces began with restraint, using tear gas and non-lethal munitions, but transitioned to live ammunition amid clashes, resulting in at least nine deaths—including protesters, a militia member, and reported injuries—particularly in western cities with Lur ethnic majorities. Arbitrary arrests reached dozens, with closures of schools, banks, and institutions attributed to weather but suspected as protest curbs; universities dismissed security managers for mishandling student unrest.
Iran urged the UN to condemn US President Donald Trump's "reckless threats" of intervention, with officials like Ali Larijani warning of regional chaos from foreign meddling, while affirming rights to "decisive" self-defence. This approach contrasts past brutal suppressions deemed crimes against humanity, suggesting a calculated mix of reformist gestures and force to contain unrest now in its sixth day across over 20 areas.
Tehran has witnessed the largest protests overall, with merchants and students shutting down bazaars and campuses amid economic fury, while violence escalated most severely in Azna (Lorestan province) and Lordegan (Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari province), where clashes yielded multiple fatalities among protesters and security forces. Fasa in south-central Iran saw intense confrontations at government buildings, contributing to the reported nine deaths nationwide, predominantly in Lur-majority western areas now in the protests' sixth day.Economic and political observers have characterised the Iranian protests since late December 2025 as a potent fusion of acute financial desperation and deepening political alienation, with analysts from institutions like King's College London and the Foundation for Defense of Democracies noting their distinction from prior unrest through merchant-led strikes, pro-monarchy chants such as "Pahlavi will return," and slogans prioritising national welfare over regional proxies like Gaza and Lebanon. While regime-aligned media concedes the legitimacy of grievances amid 42.5-48.6 per cent inflation and rial devaluation, experts caution that Revolutionary Guards retain a monopoly on violence, rendering immediate collapse improbable despite eroding legitimacy among traditional bazaari supporters and expanding participation from students and rural groups.Observers predict sustained turbulence rather than imminent downfall, attributing longevity to infrastructural failures like energy and water shortages that broaden the protest base, compounded by international isolation and Trump's hinted strikes on nuclear sites; SpecialEurasia warns of resource-driven migration fuelling volatility, yet Critical Threats highlights budgetary tax hikes as exacerbating public pressure without structural reform. No consensus foresees governmental overthrow in the near term, with Middle East specialist Andreas Krieg dismissing diaspora hopes as fantasy absent Supreme Leader Khamenei's nuclear compromise, though persistent defiance could force executive-security rifts if dialogue falters.The current unrest in Iran, marked by widespread protests over economic collapse, environmental neglect, and political repression, is primarily a domestic crisis. Yet, it cannot be viewed in isolation. Iran has long positioned itself as a regional power, projecting influence through alliances and proxy networks in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen. When its internal stability falters, this inevitably reverberates across the region.
Neighbouring states are watching closely. Iraq, with its own fragile political balance, could see heightened tensions if Iran’s grip weakens, particularly among Shia militias reliant on Tehran’s support. Lebanon, already mired in economic despair, may experience further polarisation if Hezbollah senses a decline in Iranian backing. Syria, still recovering from years of war, could face shifts in external patronage, while Yemen’s conflict might be recalibrated if Iran’s resources are diverted inward.
However, it is important to note that unrest does not automatically “spill over” in the form of identical protests. Each country has its own political, social, and economic dynamics. What Iran’s turmoil does is create a vacuum of confidence in its ability to sustain its regional posture. This may embolden rival powers such as Saudi Arabia or Turkey, while simultaneously inspiring opposition groups across the Middle East who see Tehran’s vulnerability as a sign that entrenched regimes are not invincible.
In short, Iran’s unrest is less a contagious uprising and more a destabilising tremor that shakes the geopolitical architecture of the Middle East. It weakens Iran’s capacity to project power, encourages rival states to reposition themselves, and provides symbolic fuel for discontent elsewhere. Whether this translates into concrete unrest in other countries depends on local conditions, but the psychological and strategic impact is undeniable.
Although Indonesia is geographically distant from Iran, the likelihood of similar unrest emerging depends less on proximity and more on domestic conditions. Iran’s turmoil is rooted in a combination of economic collapse, political repression, and generational frustration. Indonesia, by contrast, has a different political and social fabric. It is a democracy with regular elections, a vibrant civil society, and a relatively resilient economy compared to Iran’s heavily sanctioned and centralised system.
That said, Indonesia is not immune to unrest. Rising inequality, corruption, environmental degradation, and generational disillusionment could all serve as catalysts for protest. The difference lies in the channels available for expression: Indonesians can vote, organise, and criticise more openly than Iranians, which tends to diffuse tension before it escalates into systemic upheaval. Moreover, Indonesia’s pluralism and decentralised governance provide multiple outlets for grievances, reducing the risk of a nationwide explosion of unrest.
The recent waves of protest in Iran, especially those associated with the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement, have been marked by the visible and decisive presence of Generation Z. This demographic, born in the mid-1990s through the early 2000s, has grown up in a digital environment that allows them to bypass traditional state-controlled media and instead rely on social platforms to coordinate, communicate, and broadcast their dissent. Unlike earlier generations, who often faced severe limitations in spreading information, Gen Z Iranians have harnessed the immediacy of TikTok, Instagram, Twitter, and Telegram to share footage of demonstrations, police brutality, and acts of defiance, thereby ensuring that their voices resonate both domestically and internationally.
Their role is not merely technological but also cultural. Gen Z in Iran has been shaped by globalised aesthetics, music, and memes, which they remix into their activism, making their protests visually striking and emotionally compelling. This generation is also less bound by the ideological frameworks that constrained their parents; they are more sceptical of authority, more willing to challenge entrenched norms, and more connected to global youth movements. The courage of young women in particular has become emblematic, as they defy compulsory hijab laws and confront security forces with remarkable resilience.
At the same time, the dominance of Gen Z in these protests reflects a broader generational divide. Older Iranians often sympathise but remain cautious, while the younger cohort, facing bleak economic prospects and limited freedoms, feels it has little to lose. In this sense, the protests are not only political but existential, a declaration by a generation that refuses to accept the suffocating status quo. The Iranian regime recognises this and has responded with intensified repression, yet the persistence of youth-led activism demonstrates that Gen Z has become the driving force of Iran’s democratic aspirations.
In short, while Indonesia may experience protests or social movements, they are unlikely to mirror Iran’s crisis in scale or nature. The structural differences in governance, economy, and political freedoms act as buffers. What Indonesia can learn from Iran is the importance of addressing economic inequality, environmental neglect, and youth frustration before they accumulate into a broader crisis.



