Environmental Ethics: Rethinking Our Place in a Burning World (9)

In his scholarly text, In Nature's Interest? Biological Interests, Adontology, and Environmental Ethics, Gary E. Varner masterfully navigates the middle ground between anthropocentrism and radical biocentrism by defending a theory of "biocentric individualist" environmental ethics. He argues that all living things have interests—not necessarily because they possess conscious desires, but because they have biological functions that can be fulfilled or frustrated. By grounding his philosophy in the concept of "biological interests," Varner provides a rational framework for granting moral standing to non-conscious entities like plants, while still maintaining a hierarchy that allows for practical human decision-making.

Varner meticulously constructs a bridge between individualistic ethics and environmental holism by redefining the concept of "interests" through a biological lens. He posits that an entity possesses interests if it has a "biological function" that can be promoted or hindered, an argument which effectively extends moral standing to all living organisms, including plants, without requiring them to possess conscious desires or feelings. While many environmental holists argue for the intrinsic value of entire ecosystems or species as collective wholes, Varner maintains an individualist stance, suggesting that our moral obligations are ultimately owed to the individual constituents of those systems. However, he cleverly reconciles this individualism with environmentalist goals by arguing that the preservation of holistic structures—such as biodiversity and ecosystemic health—is a necessary condition for the flourishing of the individual organisms within them. Consequently, Varner provides a robust philosophical justification for environmental protection that satisfies the demands of ecological holism while remaining firmly rooted in a rational, interest-based individualist framework.

Varner introduces a hierarchical framework to resolve moral conflicts by distinguishing between "categorical desires" and "merely biological interests." He argues that while all living things possess biological interests, human beings often have "ground projects"—deeply held, long-term goals that provide a sense of meaning and identity to their lives. These categorical desires are considered more morally significant because their frustration would fundamentally undermine the individual's reason for living. In contrast, the biological interests of a plant or a non-sentient organism, while valid, do not carry the same psychological or existential weight. By applying his "Priority Rules," Varner suggests that we are morally permitted to prioritise a human's categorical interests over the basic biological interests of non-human entities, provided that the human interest is truly essential to a ground project. This nuanced approach allows Varner to maintain a biocentric respect for all life while offering a pragmatic solution for the inevitable clashes between human civilisation and the natural world.

In applying Varner’s "Priority Rules" to the dilemma of constructing a hospital on a site inhabited by an endangered plant species, we must weigh the different levels of interest involved. Varner would argue that the hospital represents a "ground project" for the human community because it facilitates the preservation of human life and health, which are necessary conditions for individuals to pursue their categorical desires. Under his hierarchical system, the "General Priority Rule" suggests that the satisfaction of a categorical desire or a ground project should take precedence over the "merely biological interests" of non-sentient organisms, such as the endangered plants. Therefore, if the hospital cannot be built elsewhere and its existence is vital to the community's well-being, Varner's framework would morally permit the destruction of the plants to serve the higher-level human interest. However, he would also insist that we have a "prima facie" duty to minimise the harm, perhaps by relocating the plants or choosing a design that limits the ecological footprint, ensuring that the hierarchy does not become a license for wanton environmental destruction.

 Varner presents a sharp yet measured critique of environmental holism, a perspective—popularised by the likes of Aldo Leopold and J. Baird Callicott—which asserts that our primary moral obligations are owed to entire ecosystems or species rather than the individuals within them. Varner argues that extreme holism risks descending into what critics term "environmental fascism," where the rights of individuals might be sacrificed for the collective good of the ecological system. He maintains that the fundamental units of moral concern are strictly individuals with biological functions, rather than abstract entities such as "ecosystems." Nevertheless, Varner does not entirely dismiss the goals of holists; instead, he seeks to demonstrate that holistic environmental objectives can be achieved through his framework of biocentric individualism. He contends that we ought to protect ecosystems not because the system itself possesses rights, but because systemic stability is an indispensable condition for the survival and the fulfilment of the interests of the individual organisms residing therein.

Varner directs his scrutiny towards the philosophical claim that ecological wholes, such as species or ecosystems, possess intrinsic value independent of the individuals that comprise them. His primary critique is rooted in the "interest theory" of moral standing, as he argues that for something to have moral significance, it must be able to have interests, which in turn requires it to have a biological "good of its own." Varner contends that while individual organisms have clear biological functions and goals, an ecosystem lacks the integrated, teleological unity required to possess interests in its own right; it is, instead, a complex web of competing individual interests. Furthermore, he warns against the "misanthropic" implications of radical holism, suggesting that if we prioritise the "integrity and stability" of the biotic community above all else, we risk endorsing ethically unacceptable sacrifices of individual lives—both human and animal—for the sake of a collective abstraction.

Varner meticulously distinguishes between a living organism and an ecosystem by examining the nature of their internal coordination and the origins of their "functions." He argues that an individual organism is a tightly integrated system where the component parts (organs and cells) have evolved to work together for the survival and reproduction of the whole, a process known as "natural selection" acting at the individual level. In contrast, an ecosystem is a loose assemblage of various species whose interactions are often competitive or predatory, meaning the "system" does not have a singular biological purpose or a "good of its own" in the same way a single plant or animal does. For Varner, because an ecosystem lacks this teleological unity—it is merely a collection of individuals pursuing their own separate ends—it cannot possess "interests" and therefore cannot be a direct object of moral concern, unlike the individual organisms that inhabit it.

Varner employs the theory of natural selection to provide an objective, scientific foundation for his concept of biological interests, moving away from subjective desires. He posits that an entity has a biological interest in X if X is a function for which the entity’s traits were selected by evolutionary processes. By this logic, a plant has an interest in photosynthesis not because it "wants" sunlight, but because its ancestors survived through that specific biological mechanism, thereby "programming" the current organism to function in that way. This allows Varner to argue that interests are not exclusive to conscious beings; rather, they are "aims-without-a-subject" that exist because natural selection has designed organisms to operate toward certain survival-oriented ends.

Varner draws a sharp distinction between biological organisms and man-made artefacts by examining the origins of their respective functions through the lens of natural selection. He argues that while a machine, such as a heart monitor, has a specific function, this function is "derivative" because it was intentionally designed by a human creator to serve human purposes. In contrast, the functions of a biological organism are "non-derivative" because they were shaped by natural selection for the benefit of the organism’s own survival and reproduction. Therefore, because a machine’s "good" is entirely dependent on human intent, it does not possess an independent "good of its own" or genuine interests, which leads Varner to conclude that machines lack moral standing while even the simplest biological entities possess it.

So, according to Varner, the "Earth" or the "environment" as a collective whole does not have moral standing because it lacks a unified biological interest; therefore, our direct moral duties are owed specifically to the individual living beings—the plants, animals, and humans—that inhabit the planet. He suggests that we protect the "Earth" not as an end in itself, but as a vital support system that allows these individual organisms to fulfil their biological functions and "ground projects." In essence, his philosophy promotes a "holism of result" rather than a "holism of principle," meaning that while his primary concern is for individuals, the practical outcome of his theory still demands the rigorous protection of the entire planet's ecological integrity to ensure the well-being of its residents.

From Gary Varner’s philosophical perspective, the slogan "Save Our Earth" is technically imprecise because it implies that the planet as a holistic, inanimate entity possesses its own moral interests, whereas Varner maintains that only individual living beings have a "good of their own." He would argue that "Save the Beings on Earth" is a far more accurate reflection of our moral obligations, as it correctly identifies the individual organisms—from humans and orangutans to the smallest ferns—as the true possessors of biological interests that we are duty-bound to protect. However, Varner would acknowledge that "saving the Earth" serves as a vital instrumental strategy, because protecting the planet’s integrity is the only way to ensure the survival of the diverse life-support systems upon which every individual's "ground projects" and biological flourishing depend. Therefore, while his primary moral concern is always for the individual resident rather than the planetary house, he would conclude that saving the Earth is the most effective practical method for saving the millions of individual beings that reside within it.

In addressing the conflict between nomadic tribes and the protection of endangered wilderness, Varner’s framework would prioritise the "categorical interests" of the tribespeople because their nomadic way of life constitutes a profound "ground project" that defines their identity and gives their existence meaning. He would argue that while the individual plants and animals in the wilderness possess significant biological interests, these cannot typically override a human interest that is essential to a community's survival and cultural integrity. However, Varner would insist on applying the "Principle of Inclusiveness" to seek a "minimax" solution, whereby the tribes are encouraged to co-manage the land in a manner that satisfies their essential needs while minimising the frustration of the biological interests of the endangered species. Ultimately, his priority rules suggest that we should only restrict such fundamental human projects if the environmental destruction is so absolute that it threatens the very life-support systems upon which both humans and wildlife depend for their continued existence.

Varner’s framework naturally comes into direct conflict with radical environmentalists and proponents of "Deep Ecology" who argue that non-living entities, such as mountains, rivers, or entire landscapes, should possess their own inherent rights. From Varner's perspective, because a river or a mountain lacks biological cells, a reproductive history shaped by natural selection, and a teleological "good of its own," it simply cannot have interests; thus, it is philosophically impossible for such entities to be victims of moral injustice in their own right. While a radical holist might claim that a river has a "right to flow," Varner would argue that the river’s value is purely instrumental or systemic—it is worth protecting only because the individual fish, plants, and human communities depend on it for their survival and the fulfilment of their own biological interests. Consequently, while both parties might agree on the practical need to prevent pollution, their fundamental justifications differ: one sees the river as a person-like entity with rights, while Varner sees it as a crucial life-support machine for the individual organisms he truly values.

Varner profoundly elaborates upon the core argument that distinguishes his theory from other environmental ethicists by focusing on what it truly means to "have an interest." He argues that interests ought not to be restricted solely to beings with consciousness or mental desires, but should instead encompass objective biological functions. Varner asserts that an organism has a biological interest in X if X is a function that natural selection has determined for that organism, meaning that the fulfilment of said function contributes to the organism's own "good" regardless of whether it "feels" it or not. Consequently, he provides a robust philosophical foundation for acknowledging that plants and single-celled organisms possess an equivalent moral standing in terms of possessing biological interests, as they too have survival-oriented goals that have been evolutionarily programmed.

Varner introduces the "Principle of Inclusiveness" as a foundational moral rule, asserting that we ought to satisfy the interests of all living beings whenever possible. This principle solidifies his biocentric stance, yet he acknowledges that in a world of limited resources, interests will inevitably collide, necessitating a rational method for "Establishing Priorities among Interests." To resolve these conflicts, Varner distinguishes between "categorical interests," which are linked to a person's life-defining ground projects, and "merely biological interests," such as those of a plant or a non-sentient animal. He argues that it is morally justifiable to prioritise a categorical interest over a biological one, provided that doing so is necessary to maintain the integrity of a human’s meaningful life. By doing so, Varner creates a tiered ethical system that values all life but provides a practical "Priority Rule" to guide human decision-making when faced with the difficult choice between human progress and the survival of other organisms.

Varner’s "Hierarchy of Interests" is structured to provide a clear, logical progression from the most basic needs to the most complex human aspirations. At the foundation are "Merely Biological Interests," which are shared by all living things, such as a plant’s need for sunlight or an animal’s need for oxygen to maintain its biological functions. Above these are "Preference Interests," which belong to sentient beings capable of desiring specific outcomes or avoiding pain. At the pinnacle, Varner places "Categorical Interests," which are unique to beings capable of having "ground projects"—long-term, self-defining goals that give a person a reason to keep living. The hierarchy functions through his "Priority Rules": the General Priority Rule states that categorical interests normally trump merely biological interests, while the Specificity Rule suggests that when interests are of the same level, we should aim to satisfy as many as possible without undermining the fundamental ground projects of the individuals involved.

Varner posits that every individual organism with biological interests possesses a non-zero moral weight, which implies that we have a prima facie duty to avoid thwarting the interests of any living thing. This principle serves as the egalitarian foundation of his theory, suggesting that no life is inherently "outside" the moral community; however, Varner immediately recognises that such an inclusive view would lead to practical paralysis without a method for "Establishing Priorities among Interests." He resolves this by introducing his "Priority Rules," most notably the "General Priority Rule," which states that it is permissible to sacrifice the "merely biological interests" of non-sentient beings to satisfy the "categorical interests" of humans. By distinguishing between interests that are essential to a meaningful life (ground projects) and those that are simply about biological survival, Varner creates a structured ethical hierarchy that allows for human flourishing while still demanding that we justify any harm inflicted upon the natural world.

Varner draws a vital distinction between "categorical interests" and "merely peripheral desires" to ensure that his priority rules do not grant humans a blank cheque to destroy nature for trivial reasons. He defines a categorical interest as a desire that is so central to an individual's "ground project"—the overarching goals that give their life meaning—that if it were frustrated, the individual would no longer find their life worth living. In contrast, a peripheral desire is a passing whim or a luxury, such as the desire to wear fur or to drive a fuel-inefficient car for status, which does not fundamentally define one's identity. According to Varner, while we may prioritise a human's categorical interest over the life of a plant or animal, we are not permitted to sacrifice the biological interests of non-human entities simply to satisfy a human's peripheral desires, thereby placing a significant moral check on human consumption and vanity.

Varner applies the distinction between categorical and peripheral interests to provide a powerful critique of modern industrial practices, particularly factory farming. He argues that for the vast majority of people in developed societies, eating meat is a "peripheral desire" rather than a "categorical interest," as a healthy and meaningful life can easily be sustained on a vegetarian diet. Since the biological interests of sentient animals (avoiding pain) and their basic interest in continued existence are significant, sacrificing them merely to satisfy a human's culinary preference—a fleeting pleasure—is morally indefensible under his framework. Conversely, in the case of traditional subsistence hunting, where a community's survival and entire cultural identity (their "ground project") depend on the hunt, Varner’s "Priority Rules" might permit the taking of animal life, as the human interest involved has shifted from a mere whim to a categorical necessity for their way of life.

In discussing "therapeutic hunting," Varner provides a fascinating synthesis of his individualist ethics and environmental necessity, particularly in cases of overpopulation. He argues that when a species, such as deer, lacks natural predators and expands beyond the "carrying capacity" of its environment, it begins to destroy the very habitat upon which all individuals in that ecosystem depend. In this scenario, Varner suggests that controlled hunting can be morally justified because allowing the population to continue growing would lead to mass starvation and the collapse of biological interests for thousands of other organisms. He frames this not as a duty to the "ecosystem" as a holistic entity, but as a "minimax" solution—a way to minimise the total number of frustrated biological interests—thereby allowing the culling of some individuals to ensure the survival and flourishing of the remaining majority.

Varner summarises his arguments by challenging what he identifies as the "Two Dogmas of Environmental Ethics". The first dogma he critiques is the prevailing belief that environmental ethics must be fundamentally holistic to be effective; Varner refutes this by demonstrating that his biocentric individualism can achieve the same conservationist goals without necessitating the sacrifice of individual moral value. The second dogma he opposes is the notion that environmental values are inherently irreconcilable with human interests; instead, Varner argues that by correctly understanding "biological interests" and "ground projects", we can construct a rational framework where the protection of nature becomes an integral part of a meaningful human life. He concludes that although his theory is rooted in the individual, there exists a "convergence hypothesis" wherein the most sensible policies for a biocentric individualist will closely mirror those advocated by more radical environmentalists, thereby creating a practical unity in the effort to preserve the planet.

In the context of protecting endangered species, Varner’s perspective provides a highly pragmatic yet ethical foundation. To him, a species does not possess moral rights because a species is an abstract category, not a breathing individual. Varner argues that every member of an endangered species has a biological interest in survival. When a population dwindles, the instrumental value of each individual becomes increasingly critical. Allowing one member of an endangered species to perish not only harms that individual but also threatens the "life-support system" (the ecosystem) for countless other organisms.

Although Varner disagrees with radical activists who claim "species have a right to exist," he agrees with the outcome. He employs the "Convergence Hypothesis": a holist protects a species for its intrinsic value, whereas Varner protects it because its extinction would destabilise the environment, ultimately harming the biological interests of thousands of other living individuals, including humans.

If a conflict arises between economic development (a peripheral human desire) and the habitat of an endangered species, Varner would defend the species. However, if the development pertains to essential "ground projects" (such as basic health or water access), his framework allows for a rational evaluation of priorities without resorting to "environmental fascism."

Now, let's imagine a vast, ancient rainforest. A large corporation wants to clear 1,000 hectares to plant palm oil trees. This project will create jobs, but it will also destroy the homes of thousands of individual orangutans, birds, and rare tropical plants.

The Corporate View: "This is for progress! We will generate profit and provide cheap cooking oil for millions (Peripheral Desires)."

The Radical Holist: "The Forest has a soul! We must protect the 'Wilderness' as a sacred whole, regardless of human needs."

Varner’s Intervention: Varner walks into the forest and looks at an individual orangutan and a single fern. He says: "Both this orangutan and this fern have Biological Interests. The orangutan has a biological 'good' in finding fruit and nesting; the fern has a 'good' in photosynthesising and spreading spores. Because they have these interests, they have moral standing. We cannot simply crush them for 'cheap cooking oil' or 'corporate profit,' because those are merely Peripheral Desires—they aren't essential to a meaningful human life."

However, if a local community of indigenous people needs a small portion of that land to grow crops to avoid starvation, Varner changes his tone: "Now, staying alive and maintaining your cultural identity is a Categorical Interest (a Ground Project). In this specific clash, the human need to survive may trump the fern’s interest in existing. But," he adds sternly, "we must still use the Principle of Inclusiveness. This means we must satisfy the interests of the orangutans and plants as much as possible—perhaps by creating wildlife corridors or limiting the clearing—because their lives still count in the moral ledger."

The central takeaway from Gary Varner’s work is the compelling argument that a robust environmental ethic can be established without abandoning the importance of the individual or resorting to radical holism. By grounding moral standing in "biological interests" rather than mere sentience, Varner teaches us that every living organism possesses an objective good that we are prima facie obligated to respect. Furthermore, his distinction between "categorical interests," which define a meaningful human life, and "peripheral desires" provides a rational framework for making difficult ethical choices; it justifies the preservation of nature against trivial human whims while still allowing for human flourishing when fundamental needs are at stake. Ultimately, his "convergence hypothesis" offers a hopeful message of practical unity, suggesting that whether we value the individual or the entire ecosystem, the most rational course of action consistently leads us toward the rigorous protection of the natural world.

[Part 10]
[Part 8]

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