Indonesia Joins BOP

When examining the arguments supporting President Prabowo Subianto's decision for Indonesia to join the Board of Peace initiated by Donald Trump, one must look at the strategic pragmatism that underpins Indonesia's current foreign policy. Proponents argue that by securing a seat at this high-level table, Indonesia moves from being a mere observer of Middle Eastern diplomacy to an active architect of the transition process, particularly regarding the sovereignty of Palestine. This involvement allows Jakarta to ensure that the "two-state solution" remains a non-negotiable pillar of any peace plan, leveraging its unique position as the world's largest Muslim-majority democracy to mediate between Western interests and the aspirations of the Palestinian people.

Furthermore, supporters suggest that the Board of Peace serves as a vital conduit for Indonesia to demonstrate its leadership within the Global South by influencing the distribution of humanitarian aid and the subsequent reconstruction of Gaza. Rather than viewing the financial commitment as a burden, the administration frames it as a necessary investment in global stability that enhances Indonesia’s international prestige and strengthens its bilateral relationship with the United States. By participating in this framework, Indonesia aims to prevent the marginalisation of Palestinian interests, ensuring that any roadmap for peace is not dictated solely by regional powers but is balanced by a nation committed to the constitutional mandate of global justice and permanent peace.

The Charter of the Board of Peace (BoP), signed by President Prabowo Subianto on 22 January 2026, in Davos, establishes a new international framework designed to oversee the stabilization and reconstruction of Gaza. At its core, the charter defines the Board as an agile multilateral body tasked with implementing a 20-point roadmap for peace, focusing specifically on the transition from active conflict to long-term governance and physical rebuilding. It grants the organization the authority to mobilize global resources, enforce accountability for reconstruction funds, and supervise a technocratic administration for Gaza, known as the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG).

A distinctive and somewhat controversial feature of the charter is the concentration of authority in the role of the Chairman, a position explicitly held by Donald Trump. The document stipulates that the Chairman possesses the sole power to invite new member states, set the organization's agenda, and nominate successors, with no term limits for the role. Furthermore, while the charter encourages broad participation, it introduces a tiered membership system where nations can secure a permanent seat by contributing $1 billion to a central fund; otherwise, members serve renewable three-year terms at the Chairman's discretion.

For Indonesia, the charter serves as a legal basis to participate in the International Stabilization Force (ISF) and ensure that the "two-state solution" is integrated into the Board’s operational mandates. By signing the document, President Prabowo has positioned Indonesia as a founding member with the right to influence the "second phase" of the peace plan—moving from a ceasefire to demilitarization and large-scale infrastructure development. The charter explicitly states its intent to complement, and in some views bypass, traditional bureaucratic international institutions, aiming instead for what it describes as "pragmatic judgment and common-sense solutions" to end decades of regional suffering.

The 20-point roadmap, which serves as the operational backbone of the Board of Peace (BoP), is structured into several critical phases aimed at ending the Gaza conflict and establishing a new regional order. The initial phases focus on an immediate and permanent ceasefire, the total release of all hostages and prisoners, and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from urban centres. This is followed by a transition to demilitarisation and the deployment of the International Stabilization Force (ISF), where Indonesia is expected to play a significant role. The roadmap then shifts towards large-scale infrastructure development—led by Jared Kushner’s master plan—which envisions transforming Gaza into a hub for coastal tourism and free trade, with the ambitious goal of raising its GDP to $10 billion by 2035 through the creation of 500,000 new jobs and $25 billion in targeted investments.

However, the domestic reaction within Indonesia to the $1 billion (approximately Rp16.9 trillion) permanent membership clause has been intensely polarised, sparking a heated national debate about the cost of diplomatic "prestige." While the government, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance, has clarified that the contribution is technically "voluntary" and remains under internal review, critics and academics from institutions such as Gadjah Mada University (UGM) have labelled the move a "foreign policy blunder." They argue that such a staggering sum would be better spent on domestic infrastructure, such as building thousands of new classrooms or health centres, rather than being committed to a transactional, Trump-led body that some fear could bypass established United Nations mechanisms.

Conversely, supporters of the decision, including some religious organisations like PBNU, maintain that the investment is a strategic necessity to ensure Indonesia has a decisive voice in the future of the Palestinian state. They argue that by paying for a permanent seat, Indonesia avoids being a "temporary observer" and instead gains the leverage required to safeguard the two-state solution against purely commercial interests. This "pragmatic diplomacy" suggests that the financial cost is a secondary concern compared to the risk of being excluded from the most influential peace-making forum of the decade, even as the public remains cautious about the lack of transparency surrounding the ultimate source of these funds.

Analyzing the $1 billion (approximately Rp16.9 trillion) commitment to the Board of Peace reveals a staggering shift in Indonesia's fiscal approach to diplomacy. To put this figure into perspective, it is nearly 40 times larger than Indonesia’s typical annual foreign aid budget. In 2024, for instance, the Indonesian Agency for International Development (Indonesian AID) targeted a total grant distribution of only Rp413 billion (around $25 million). This traditional budget is primarily used for small-to-medium scale projects such as the Indonesian Aid Scholarship, health infrastructure in Papua New Guinea, and humanitarian aid for Gaza and Afghanistan.

The financial disparity is best understood through the following comparisons:

• Scale of Commitment: The $1 billion "entry fee" for a permanent seat on the Board of Peace is equivalent to the cumulative total of Indonesia's standard foreign aid spending for several decades.
• Source of Funding: While traditional foreign aid is managed through the Ministry of Finance's endowment fund (LDKPI), the BoP contribution is reportedly being sourced from the Ministry of Defence’s 2026 budget, which stands at Rp187.1 trillion. This effectively reclassifies the payment as a "national security" expense rather than a standard development grant.
• Percentage of National Expenditure: The $1 billion sum represents roughly 0.4% to 0.5% of the entire 2026 State Budget (RAPBN) of Rp3,786.5 trillion. While this may seem small in the context of the whole economy, it represents a massive portion of Indonesia's "discretionary" international spending.

Critics point out that this single commitment dwarfs other major social programmes; for context, it is roughly one-twentieth of the total Rp335 trillion allocated for President Prabowo's flagship "Free Nutritious Meals" programme in 2026. Proponents, however, argue that this expenditure is a "strategic pivot." They contend that Indonesia is evolving from a recipient of aid (having received roughly $1.15 billion in Official Development Assistance as recently as 2023) into a significant global donor capable of buying influence in the world's most exclusive geopolitical circles.

When evaluating the potential Return on Investment (ROI) for Indonesia regarding infrastructure contracts in Gaza, one must consider the $1 billion membership fee as a strategic entry cost into a reconstruction market that is projected to exceed $25 billion. Proponents of this move suggest that Indonesia’s status as a founding member of the Board of Peace provides its State-Owned Enterprises, such as WIKA and Waskita Karya, with a vital "preferred bidder" status for the most significant redevelopment projects. This is particularly relevant as Indonesia seeks to export its expertise in coastal engineering and large-scale housing projects, effectively positioning Gaza as a new international market to offset the winding down of major domestic projects like the new capital city, IKN.

Beyond the immediate balance sheet, the ROI is also framed in terms of geopolitical leverage and the "Influence Premium" that comes with a seat on the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza. By ensuring that Indonesian firms are involved in building the proposed deep-water ports and smart-grid utilities, the government aims to recover the initial $1 billion outlay through corporate tax revenues and the employment of thousands of skilled Indonesian workers abroad. If Indonesia manages to secure even a modest 5% share of the total reconstruction contracts, the resulting $1.25 billion in revenue would technically see the membership fee recouped, while simultaneously establishing Jakarta as a major player in the Mediterranean economic sphere.

However, this financial optimism is tempered by substantial risks, as infrastructure investments in a volatile conflict zone are inherently "sunk costs" that could be obliterated should the ceasefire fail. There is also a legitimate concern that the most lucrative high-technology contracts might be ring-fenced for American or Israeli firms, potentially leaving Indonesian companies with lower-margin civil works. Ultimately, the true ROI will depend on whether Indonesia can transform its diplomatic presence into a tangible economic foothold, balancing the pursuit of profit with the political necessity of ensuring that the reconstruction serves the genuine needs of the Palestinian population rather than merely acting as a real estate venture.

The decision for Indonesia to join the Board of Peace (BoP) presents a stark contrast between strategic diplomatic ambition and significant fiscal and ethical risks. Proponents of the move argue that the primary advantage lies in Indonesia's ability to "join to shape" the future of Gaza, moving from a position of rhetorical support to one of concrete operational influence. By securing a seat at this smaller, more agile table, Indonesia can directly advocate for the "two-state solution," ensure that humanitarian corridors remain open, and provide a much-needed Global South perspective within a Western-dominated framework. Furthermore, the $1 billion contribution is framed by the government as a direct investment in the reconstruction of Gaza rather than a mere administrative fee, potentially opening doors for Indonesian state-owned enterprises to lead major infrastructure projects. This proactive stance is also seen as a pragmatic way to strengthen ties with the United States under the Trump administration, potentially shielding Indonesia from punitive trade tariffs or political marginalisation.

However, the decision has faced fierce criticism from academics and civil society, who argue that the potential losses far outweigh the perceived gains. Critics contend that paying $1 billion—an amount nearly 40 times larger than Indonesia’s annual foreign aid budget—to join a body chaired by a figure as polarising as Donald Trump is a "foreign policy blunder" that prioritises international prestige over domestic welfare. There are grave concerns that this payment, likely sourced from the state budget (APBN), could force emergency cuts to essential public services like education and healthcare, while offering no guarantee of a tangible return on investment. Furthermore, many argue that the BoP undermines established multilateral institutions like the United Nations and risks sanitising a peace plan that lacks Palestinian consent and fails to explicitly guarantee a sovereign Palestinian state.

Ethically, the move is viewed by some as a betrayal of Indonesia’s constitutional mandate to oppose colonialism, as it involves joining a transactional, US-led structure that some fear is a "real estate project" disguised as a peace mission. The $1 billion "price tag" for permanent membership is particularly controversial, with former diplomats pointing out that it is vastly disproportionate to Indonesia's other international commitments and could erode the nation's reputation as an independent and active mediator. Ultimately, while the government sees a "historic opportunity" to lead in Gaza's rehabilitation and protect its economic interests, opponents see a dangerous gamble that could leave Indonesia financially strained and morally compromised on the global stage.

The international response to the $1 billion permanent membership fee for the Board of Peace has been deeply fractured, characterised by a sharp divide between "middle powers" seeking strategic influence and traditional Western allies who view the requirement with significant scepticism. Many established powers, most notably France and Canada, have openly dismissed the fee as an attempt to transform international diplomacy into a "pay-to-play" scheme that could undermine the United Nations Security Council. French President Emmanuel Macron notably declined the invitation, citing concerns that the Board’s charter threatens to supplant the UN’s role in global security. This stance reportedly led to threats of increased tariffs on French exports from the Trump administration.

In North America, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney initially expressed a willingness to participate but adamantly ruled out any financial payment for a seat, asserting that Canada would not "buy" its way into diplomatic forums. This refusal led to a public falling-out, with President Trump ultimately withdrawing Canada's invitation entirely after Carney’s critical remarks at the World Economic Forum in Davos about "great power bullying." Similarly, major Asian powers like Japan and South Korea have maintained a cautious, "wait-and-see" approach, expressing doubt about the legitimacy of a body that requires such a substantial financial commitment while lacking broad multilateral consensus.

Conversely, the initiative has found traction among a specific group of nations that view the $1 billion fee as a necessary investment to secure a "preferred" status in the post-war reconstruction of Gaza. Nations such as Hungary, under Viktor Orbán, and Vietnam were among the first to accept the terms, seeing an opportunity to align themselves closely with the United States' executive power and gain priority for their respective state-owned industries. Middle Eastern powers, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, have also joined, though many have issued qualifying statements to clarify that their participation is strictly limited to the humanitarian and administrative aspects of Gaza's recovery, rather than an endorsement of a new global order. For these countries, the financial outlay is often rationalised as a strategic "insurance policy" to ensure their voices remain dominant in regional affairs during a period of intense geopolitical realignment.

The question of whether the Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR RI) will continue to act as a "rubber stamp" or adopt a critical stance regarding the Board of Peace remains contingent on the shifting dynamics of the Grand Coalition supporting the Prabowo-Gibran administration and intensifying public pressure. Although the parliament is traditionally perceived as merely formalising executive decisions, the sheer scale of the $1 billion contribution and the potential erosion of legal sovereignty through the "Full Jurisdictional Immunity" clause provide compelling reasons for the House not to simply acquiesce.

Several key factors will determine the DPR’s trajectory in this matter. Firstly, there is the potential for internal friction within the coalition regarding budgetary priorities. While most parties support President Prabowo’s strategic vision, members of relevant commissions (particularly Commissions I and XI) face pressure from constituents questioning why Rp 15.7 trillion is being allocated abroad amidst high domestic subsidy requirements. Should the opposition or certain factions within the coalition feel that this policy might damage their electability among voters concerned with economic issues, they may utilise sharp Hearing Meetings (RDP) to demand transparency, effectively slowing the ratification process without directly opposing the President.

Secondly, the DPR has an institutional interest in maintaining its constitutional dignity against the "No-Reservation" and international legal immunity clauses. If the House passes this agreement without scrutiny, they effectively surrender their own oversight rights regarding the future use of state funds. To avoid the "rubber stamp" label, the DPR is likely to adopt an "elegant" middle ground; they may not reject membership of the Board of Peace outright, but could issue strictly worded Reservations or Declarations within the Ratification Law. This move allows them to support the President’s diplomatic vision while appearing to the public as critical guardians of the Constitution.

Finally, the role of public opinion and the media will be decisive in emboldening the DPR. If civil society movements succeed in mass mobilisation or massive digital campaigns, the House will likely become more vocal to demonstrate that they are responsive to the people’s aspirations. In this scenario, the DPR might use the "Right of Interpellation" not to dismantle the policy, but as a political bargaining chip to ensure the government secures involvement for local businesses (SOEs or private firms) in the Gaza reconstruction projects, thereby making the $1 billion fee more politically and economically palatable.

The Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR) is expected to employ a multi-layered oversight strategy to monitor the proposed $1 billion expenditure, primarily through the rigorous exercise of its "budgetary" and "supervisory" functions. Commission I, which oversees foreign affairs and defence, is likely to take the lead by summoning the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defence to provide a detailed justification for the "national security" reclassification of these funds. This parliamentary scrutiny would focus on ensuring that such a massive allocation does not violate the State Budget Law, particularly as it bypasses the traditional endowment fund mechanisms usually managed by the Ministry of Finance. Members of Parliament have already signaled their intent to form a Special Committee (Pansus) specifically to audit the source of the funds, aiming to prevent any disruption to essential domestic subsidies or flagship social programmes.

In addition to departmental hearings, the DPR is anticipated to coordinate closely with the Audit Board of Indonesia (BPK) to perform a "Special Purpose Audit" on the transparency of the payment process to the Board of Peace. This mechanism is crucial for determining whether the $1 billion constitutes a one-off grant or a long-term capital investment, as the latter would require a separate legislative approval for State Equity Participation (PMN). By demanding a clear legal framework for how the "Return on Investment" will be measured, the DPR aims to hold the executive branch accountable for the actual delivery of infrastructure contracts to Indonesian firms, ensuring the money does not simply vanish into a foreign administrative fund without tangible benefits for the Indonesian economy.

Furthermore, the opposition benches are likely to push for a "Right of Inquiry" (Hak Angket) if the government fails to provide a transparent roadmap for the $1 billion disbursement, especially given the "no-reservation" clause in the Board of Peace Charter, which limits Indonesia’s ability to opt out of future financial calls. This political mechanism would allow the DPR to investigate whether the commitment aligns with Indonesia's "Independent and Active" foreign policy doctrine or if it creates an undue dependency on a specific foreign administration’s agenda. Ultimately, the effectiveness of this oversight will depend on whether the DPR can maintain a bipartisan consensus to protect the national interest, or if the debate becomes a purely partisan battleground regarding President Prabowo's strategic pivot towards the Trump-led peace initiative.

[Bahasa]