Pertamax and The Paradox of Indonesia's Energy Policy

Every time the government or PT Pertamina (Persero) announces (it should be, but in recent years, it has been done secretly in the middle of the night along with thieves looting people's homes) an increase in the price of fuel (Bahan Bakar Minyak / BBM), the public response is almost invariably the same: waves of criticism on social media, long queues at petrol station forecourts, and demonstrations across the country. Yet this patterned, recurring response conceals a deeper question—is a fuel price increase merely a technical fiscal matter, or does it in fact reflect an ideological choice and the direction of a nation’s energy politics?

I. BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM

Pertamax, a petrol with a 92 octane rating, occupies a unique position within Indonesia’s energy policy architecture. Unlike Pertalite (RON 90) and Solar (diesel), which receive direct subsidies from the State Budget (Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara / APBN), Pertamax is classified as a non-subsidised fuel. Its retail price is therefore linked directly to global market mechanisms: international crude oil prices, the rupiah-to-US-dollar exchange rate, and distribution and operational costs.

Periodically, Pertamina adjusts the price of Pertamax with reference to the Mean of Platts Singapore (MOPS) formula, plus an alpha or profit margin. When global oil prices fluctuate violently—as occurred in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, the global energy crisis of 2021–2022, and the Russia–Ukraine geopolitical tensions—the price of Pertamax rises correspondingly.

Although Pertamax is unsubsidised, the impact of its price increases cannot be dismissed out of hand. Millions of motor vehicles in Indonesia—particularly in urban areas—consume Pertamax daily. Pertamax users are predominantly urban middle-class motorists who own vehicles with fuel-injection engines, which require higher-octane petrol to maintain engine performance and efficiency.

On the fiscal front, the government faces a far from simple dilemma. Energy subsidies—particularly for Pertalite, Solar, and 3-kilogram LPG canisters—place an enormous burden on the state budget. In years when global oil prices are elevated, subsidy expenditure can reach hundreds of trillions of rupiah, threatening the balance of the APBN and the government’s capacity to fund other development programmes. In this context, increases in the price of non-subsidised fuels such as Pertamax are frequently positioned as part of a broader fiscal rationalisation strategy.

“When the price of Pertamax rises, it is not merely a number on a petrol station forecourt that changes. What changes is the social equilibrium, the economic burden on households, and public trust in the government.”

This essay seeks to dissect the complexities of the impact of Pertamax price increases through five analytical lenses: an ideological perspective that interrogates the role of the state versus the market; a political perspective that examines governmental legitimacy and stability; an economic perspective that analyses the impact on purchasing power and the state budget; a social perspective that unpacks inequality and public responses; and a cultural perspective that highlights the values, identities, and collective narratives embedded in energy consumption.

II. THE IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

2.1. The State as Protector or the Market as Arbiter?

The most fundamental debate underlying fuel pricing policy is an authentically ideological question: to what extent should the state intervene in regulating energy prices? At one pole lies an interventionist view, which holds that energy is an essential public good and that the state is therefore obliged to ensure its accessibility to all citizens. At the other, the free-market perspective argues that state interference creates distortions, inefficiencies, and an unsustainable fiscal burden.

Indonesia, in its historical and constitutional context, has in fact already formulated an answer to this question. Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution explicitly states that the land, waters, and natural resources contained therein are controlled by the state and used for the greatest possible welfare of the people. The phrase “controlled by the state” does not mean outright ownership or monopoly, but rather that the state possesses the authority to regulate, supervise, and direct the exploitation of natural resources — including energy—in the public interest.

In practice, however, the implementation of this constitutional mandate frequently comes into conflict with the pressures of global economic liberalisation. Indonesia’s membership of various free trade agreements and its need to attract foreign investment have impelled the government to progressively reduce its intervention in price mechanisms. The fuel deregulation policies that commenced during the Reform Era (Reformasi) represent the clearest expression of this ideological shift.

2.2. Energy Justice: Who Is Protected?

From the perspective of energy justice, Indonesia’s two-tier fuel pricing policy—subsidised Pertalite and Solar on the one hand, non-subsidised Pertamax on the other—contains a genuine paradox. On the one side, Pertalite and Solar subsidies are nominally intended to protect lower-income households. On the other, a body of research indicates that the bulk of the benefits from fuel subsidies are in fact enjoyed by upper-middle-class households, which own considerably more motor vehicles.

Meanwhile, the middle class who consciously choose Pertamax—whether because their vehicles’ engine specifications require higher-octane petrol, or out of environmental and efficiency considerations—bear the full cost of global oil price volatility. They receive no subsidy protection, yet nor are they sufficiently affluent to absorb price increases without financial consequence.

This situation raises a deeper ideological question: is social justice in energy policy adequately measured by the availability of cheap fuel for particular groups, or must it encompass a more comprehensive principle concerning who bears the cost of the externalities of fossil fuel consumption?

III. THE POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE

3.1. Governmental Legitimacy Amid Rising Prices

Politically, a fuel price increase is amongst the most high-risk decisions any government can take. Indonesian history records that such increases have almost invariably triggered significant socio-political upheaval. Student and labour protests, falling public trust indices, and heightened opposition sentiment are consequences that can be expected to follow virtually every price announcement.

This occurs because fuel has become a form of “social contract” between the state and its citizens. The public, regardless of market logic and fiscal rationality, holds the expectation that the state—as steward of natural resources—ought to be capable of providing energy at affordable prices. When that expectation is violated, the reaction is not merely an economic grievance but a deeper political disillusionment.

Interestingly, different governments have adopted markedly different political communication strategies when confronting fuel price increases. The Soeharto era foregrounded a narrative of sacrifice for national development. The early Reform Era tended to be more defensive and reactive. The administration of Joko Widodo, particularly at the time of the September 2022 fuel price increases, attempted to frame the rises as “difficult but responsible choices”, whilst simultaneously announcing a social protection compensation package worth Rp 24.17 trillion.

3.2. Political Stability and Opportunities for the Opposition

Price increases for Pertamax have consistently been exploited by opposition groups as ammunition for criticism of the government. The narratives constructed typically revolve around two accusations: first, that the government has failed to manage the economy competently, such that fuel prices continue to rise; and second, that the government is more aligned with the interests of corporations and the global market than with those of the people.

In the age of digital democracy, this dynamic has grown considerably more complex. Social media accelerates the spread of negative sentiment and enables the rapid mobilisation of large numbers of people. Hashtags criticising fuel policy effortlessly become trending topics, generating genuine political pressure even if they do not always reflect the majority of public opinion.

“In modern democracy, public perception of policy is as important as the substance of the policy itself. A government that fails to manage the narrative will encounter political resistance far greater than the actual economic impact warrants.”

Political stability is also bound up with the government’s capacity to build supporting coalitions. When the price of Pertamax rises, transport business associations, logistics associations, and trade unions typically become the most vociferous critics. The government’s ability to manage the interests of these groups is a decisive factor in determining how far a price increase will destabilise the political landscape.

3.3. The Narrative of National Energy Policy

How the government frames Pertamax price increases within a broader national energy policy narrative is also a crucial political dimension. Successful governments are those able to connect short-term, painful policies to a convincing long-term vision—for instance, an energy transition, renewable energy development, or a more precisely targeted subsidy reform programme.

The challenge, however, is that energy transition narratives are frequently too abstract and long-term to dampen public disappointment that is immediate and concrete. When Pertamax prices rise today, promises about solar panels and electric vehicles in the future feel far too distant to offer much consolation.

IV. THE ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE

4.1. The Impact on Inflation and Purchasing Power

From a macroeconomic standpoint, Pertamax price increases carry both direct and indirect consequences for the national rate of inflation. The direct impact is felt in the transport component of the Consumer Price Index (CPI), whilst the indirect impact is wider and more sustained—affecting the entire supply chain that depends on fuel as a production input.

Transport is the most sensitive sector. Freight vehicles, ride-hailing services, motorcycle taxis (ojek), and various other modes of commercial transport immediately revise their fares when fuel prices rise. These fare adjustments then ripple through to the prices of consumer goods, since virtually every product that reaches the consumer passes through a distribution process dependent upon fuel.

Bank Indonesia, as the monetary authority, must tread carefully in responding to fuel-price-driven inflation. On the one hand, rising inflation calls for a tighter monetary policy stance. On the other hand, excessive monetary tightening risks slowing economic growth. This is the classic dilemma confronted by central banks in developing nations when faced with supply-side inflation.

4.2. The Knock-On Effect: From Logistics to Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises

One of the most significant yet frequently overlooked impacts of Pertamax price increases is the knock-on effect on Micro, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (MSMEs, or UMKMs in Indonesian). MSMEs are the backbone of the Indonesian economy, contributing more than 60 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and absorbing more than 97 per cent of the workforce.

MSMEs in the food and beverage sector, for instance, face simultaneous increases in raw material costs and distribution expenses. Small traders (warung) that use refrigerated motorcycles to transport ice or fresh produce must bear higher operating costs. Catering businesses, grocery shops, and market traders face pressure from two directions: costs are rising whilst consumer purchasing power is being eroded.

The capacity of MSMEs to absorb these cost increases is far more limited than that of large corporations, which can achieve economies of scale, negotiate long-term contracts, or even hedge against commodity price fluctuations. As a consequence, fuel price increases frequently impose a disproportionately heavier burden on small business operators.

4.3. Implications for the State Budget

From a fiscal perspective, Pertamax price increases have an ambivalent relevance for the state budget. On the one side, state revenues from oil and gas taxation and non-tax state revenue (PNBP) will increase as prices rise. On the other, the inflationary pressures generated may compel the government to increase allocations for social protection and direct cash transfers.

Of greater strategic importance is how Pertamax price increases are positioned within the context of broader energy subsidy reform. If such increases are accompanied by a restructuring of subsidy schemes towards more precisely targeted delivery—for example, through direct cash transfers to vulnerable groups—the net fiscal impact could be substantially positive.

However, Indonesia continues to face significant challenges in respect of its subsidy recipient database. Subsidy programmes that are poorly targeted not only squander state resources but also create long-term moral hazard and economic inefficiency. Without comprehensive subsidy system reform, Pertamax price increases merely relocate the fiscal problem rather than resolve it.

V. THE SOCIAL PERSPECTIVE

5.1. An Added Burden on the Urban Middle Class

Indonesia’s urban middle class occupies a paradoxical position: too affluent to qualify for subsidies, yet not wealthy enough to absorb price increases without consequence. They are the principal users of Pertamax—both because their vehicles’ engine specifications require higher-octane fuel and because they were concerned for efficiency and environmental responsibility.

When Pertamax prices rise, the consequences for the middle class are cumulative. Daily transport costs increase, basic necessities become more expensive, and the room for saving or investment narrows further. In a context where Indonesia’s middle class remains highly vulnerable—many having only recently graduated from the “near-poor” category—this pressure can have a significant impact on their social mobility.

This phenomenon is also reflected in changing consumption behaviour. Research indicates that a proportion of Pertamax users switch to Pertalite when the price differential widens significantly, despite the attendant risks of reduced engine efficiency and increased vehicle emissions. Others begin to consider greater use of public transport or vehicle-sharing arrangements in order to reduce costs.

5.2. Inequality and Social Resentment

One of the most subtle yet potentially explosive social impacts of Pertamax price increases is the potential widening of social inequality and horizontal resentment. When Pertalite subsidies are maintained whilst Pertamax prices are raised, an increasingly clear demarcation emerges between the “subsidised group” and the “group paying market prices.”

At the community level, this distinction can deepen existing social fault lines. Moreover, debates about who is “entitled” to subsidies are frequently laden with assumptions about class, lifestyle, and social propriety that are not always accurate or fair.

“Inequality is not merely a matter of income differentials; it is also a question of who bears risk and uncertainty. In the fuel context, Pertamax users absorb the volatility of global oil prices, whilst Pertalite users are shielded by subsidies whose financing comes from taxes paid by all citizens—including Pertamax users themselves.”

5.3. Public Response and Adaptation

Indonesian society has demonstrated a considerable capacity for adaptation when confronted with fuel price increases. Responses range widely: from formal protests through demonstrations and petitions, to pragmatic adjustments in everyday behaviour.

Several commonly observed adaptation patterns include the following:

• Switching to lower-octane fuel, albeit with the risk of reduced engine efficiency

• Increased use of public transport or ride-hailing services for particular journeys

• Journey consolidation—combining several errands into a single trip

• Growing interest in electric vehicles as a long-term alternative

• The formation of carpooling communities and vehicle-sharing arrangements

Viewed positively, these adaptations may in the long run drive more sustainable behavioural change. However, access to these alternatives is not evenly distributed—not everyone lives in an area served by an adequate public transport network, and not everyone is in a position to switch to an electric vehicle.

VI. THE CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE

6.1. A Culture of Private Vehicle Ownership: The Structural Root of Dependency

To understand why the impact of Pertamax price increases is felt so keenly in Indonesia, it is necessary to examine the cultural roots of the country’s energy consumption patterns. Indonesia is one of the largest automotive markets in South-East Asia, with a motor vehicle fleet that continues to grow year on year. Ownership of a private vehicle—particularly a motorcycle—has become a kind of minimum standard of living in many urban areas.

This phenomenon is not solely the product of individual choice; it is the consequence of urban planning policies and infrastructure development that, over several decades, have consistently prioritised roads over public transport. Indonesian cities, particularly those outside the Jabodetabek agglomeration, were built on the assumption that their residents would use private vehicles. Without a vehicle, everyday mobility becomes severely restricted.

As a result, motor vehicle ownership is no longer merely a lifestyle choice but a functional necessity that cannot easily be negotiated away. In this context, fuel price increases do not merely affect one’s wallet; they strike at the very foundations of daily mobility and productivity.

6.2. Pertamax as a Status Symbol and Marker of Social Identity

Beyond its technical function, Pertamax also carries a symbolic dimension that cannot be overlooked. Within Indonesia’s fuel hierarchy, Pertamax — and even more so Pertamax Turbo or Pertamina Dex — is frequently perceived as a more “upmarket” or “prestigious” choice than Pertalite. Choosing Pertamax is regarded as a marker of financial capability, quality consciousness, or concern for the condition of one’s engine.

This perception is not merely an external projection; it has also been actively constructed through Pertamina’s marketing strategy, which promotes Pertamax as the fuel for high-quality vehicles. Pertamax advertisements habitually project images of luxury, smooth motoring, and well-maintained engines—reinforcing the association between fuel choice and social status.

When Pertamax prices rise, users who have chosen this fuel as part of their social identity face a cultural dilemma: to continue using Pertamax in order to maintain their social image, or to switch to Pertalite at the risk of being perceived as having “come down in the world.” This dynamic may sound trivial, yet it reflects how deeply social values can be embedded in everyday consumption decisions.

6.3. Media Narratives and the Framing of Popular Culture

The manner in which media and popular culture frame the issue of Pertamax price increases is also an important cultural dimension. Two dominant frames recur in Indonesian media coverage and public discourse.

The first is the “crisis” frame: price increases are portrayed as indicators of economic policy failure, public suffering, and governmental incompetence. This frame predominates in media outlets that adopt a critical stance towards the government and frequently gives rise to dramatic narratives about the impact of the rises.

The second is the “routine” frame: as price increases recur, segments of the public and media begin to treat them as ordinary events requiring no extraordinary reaction. “Fuel has gone up again” becomes a kind of routine that generates a well-established cycle of complaint and adaptation.

What is striking is how memes, humour, and viral content on social media have become a paradoxically expressive medium—at once serious and comic. Such content reflects the manner in which Indonesian society processes socio-economic pressure through cultural creativity and horizontal solidarity, whilst simultaneously revealing how deeply the fuel issue has become embedded in the popular consciousness.

VII. REFLECTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Having navigated five distinct analytical perspectives—ideological, political, economic, social, and cultural — we arrive at a conclusion that is paradoxical yet important: a Pertamax price increase is not merely a technical commodity price adjustment. It is a multidimensional event that reflects and reproduces fundamental choices about how this country wishes to be governed and in whose interests.

From an ideological perspective, every decision about the price of Pertamax contains an implicit answer to questions about the role of the state in the economy, the meaning of social justice, and intergenerational responsibility for environmental sustainability. From a political perspective, fuel price increases constitute a serious test of governmental legitimacy and the state’s capacity to manage public expectations.

Economically, the impact of Pertamax price increases resonates far beyond merely a rise in an individual’s petrol expenditure—it affects inflation, purchasing power, the viability of MSMEs, and the fiscal balance of the state. Socially, it reinforces existing fault lines of inequality and tests society’s adaptive capacity. Culturally, it touches identity, values, and the way in which society understands itself in relation to the state and the market.

More important than the question of whether a Pertamax price increase is right or wrong is a more fundamental question: does Indonesia possess a coherent, equitable, and sustainable national energy vision? A vision that is not merely reactive to global oil price fluctuations, but proactive in building an energy infrastructure that reduces dependence on fossil fuels, promotes the transition to renewable energy, and ensures that the burdens and benefits of that transition are borne equitably by all sections of society.

“Today’s rise in the price of Pertamax is not merely an economic figure. It is a harbinger of the collective choices we have made and will continue to make regarding the direction of development, social justice, and the legacy we leave to future generations.”

In the final analysis, the best response to Pertamax price increases is not mere protest or resignation, but a consistent demand upon the government to build an energy policy that is transparent, equitable, and far-sighted—one that does not merely calculate short-term fiscal costs and benefits, but also takes into account the social, ecological, and generational costs of every energy choice made.

Indonesia, with all its extraordinary natural resource wealth and vast renewable energy potential, possesses every means necessary to build a more independent, more equitable, and more sustainable energy system. What is required is the political courage to make difficult choices today for the sake of a better future for all its citizens.

REFERENCES AND SOURCES

The following represent key conceptual and empirical references pertinent to the themes addressed in this essay:

• Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS). Monthly Inflation Reports and Consumer Price Index. Jakarta: BPS.

• Bank Indonesia. Financial Stability Reviews and Indonesian Economic Reports. Jakarta: BI.

• Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (ESDM). Non-Subsidised Fuel Price Policy. Jakarta: Ministry of ESDM.

• PT Pertamina (Persero). Annual Reports and Fuel Price Adjustment Policies. Jakarta: Pertamina.

• Institute for Economic and Social Research (LPEM), University of Indonesia. Analysis of the Impact of Fuel Price Increases on Inflation and Poverty. Jakarta: LPEM UI.

• International Energy Agency (IEA). World Energy Outlook. Paris: IEA.

• Stiglitz, J. E. (2002). Globalisation and Its Discontents. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

• Sadli, M. (1993). Economic Problems and Government Policy in Indonesia. Jakarta: LP3ES.

• Winters, J. A. (2011). Oligarchy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

• Aspinall, E., & Mietzner, M. (Eds.) (2010). Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia. Singapore: ISEAS.

Bahasa

CHANGING THE GUARD AT THE NATIONAL NUTRITION AGENCY: A MOMENT OF REFORM OR MERELY A CHANGE OF FACE?

The Free Nutritious Meals Programme (Makan Bergizi Gratis, hereafter MBG) stands as one of the flagship initiatives of President Prabowo Subianto's administration, launched on 6 January 2025. Designed to serve millions of beneficiaries — from toddlers and school pupils across all levels of education to pregnant and breastfeeding women — the programme carries the commendable ambition of reducing stunting and malnutrition as part of the broader vision of a prosperous Indonesia by 2045. By June 2026, it had reportedly reached 62.9 million beneficiaries, a figure that, in sheer scale, commands respect.

Yet beneath these impressive numbers lies a series of serious problems that cannot be overlooked. On 2 June 2026, President Prabowo formally removed Dadan Hindayana from his post as Head of the Badan Gizi Nasional (BGN, the National Nutrition Agency) after eighteen months in office, replacing him with Nanik Sudaryati Deyang. This was no routine reshuffle. It constituted an open admission that something had gone fundamentally wrong in the management of the largest nutritional programme in Indonesia's history. The question that immediately follows is whether this change of leadership is sufficient to address the deep-seated structural problems at hand, or whether it amounts to little more than rearranging the furniture whilst the foundations remain unsound.

A Critical Appraisal of New Leadership at Indonesia's Badan Gizi Nasional

The Anatomy of Failure: Why Dadan Had to Go

The removal of Dadan Hindayana was grounded in an eighteen-month evaluation that identified three principal shortcomings: violations of standard operating procedures (SOPs), deficiencies in organisational governance, and a failure to maintain the food quality standards established by the BGN itself. None of these can be dismissed as minor technical oversights; collectively, they strike at the very heart of what a large-scale food distribution programme must get right.

The concrete evidence of these failures is sobering. Data from the Ministry of Health recorded 37,673 cases of food poisoning across 445 incidents as of May 2026, with 2,348 victims requiring hospitalisation. The Indonesian Education Monitoring Network (JPPI) reported an even higher cumulative figure of 21,254 poisoning cases from 2025 through to early 2026. In the city of Solo alone, 78 out of the operational nutrition service units (SPPG) were found to be non-compliant with technical guidelines — their facilities substandard, their physical construction deviating from specifications, and lacking dedicated spaces for nutrition supervisors.

These failures echo well-established findings in the academic literature on government-run food programmes. Bhutta et al. (2013), writing in The Lancet, argue unequivocally that nutritional interventions will falter in the absence of rigorous quality oversight and consistent food safety standards. Similarly, Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler (2004), in their seminal framework on transformative social protection, caution that programmes focused solely on quantitative reach — how many people are covered — whilst neglecting the quality of the service provided, risk producing outcomes that are ultimately counterproductive to the very welfare they seek to promote.

Nanik S. Deyang: Assets and Expectations

Nanik Sudaryati Deyang is no stranger to the BGN. She served as Deputy Head for Public Communication and Investigation from 17 September 2025 — approximately nine months before her appointment as head — and her tenure in that role was not confined to administrative routine. She was actively engaged in field monitoring, budget efficiency reviews, and the closure of substandard production kitchens. It is this track record, more than anything else, that provides the most credible basis for cautious optimism about her leadership.

Her academic credentials — a first degree in Biology from Universitas Jenderal Soedirman and a Master's in Forestry from Universitas Gadjah Mada — offer a grounding in the life sciences, even if they do not directly encompass clinical nutrition. Her earlier role as Deputy Head of the Body for Accelerating Poverty Alleviation (2024–2025) and her continued involvement with the GSN Foundation, which focuses on empowering women, children, and the poor, suggest a genuine familiarity with the programme's target groups.

Nanik also brings a quality that many career technocrats lack: the investigative instinct of a seasoned journalist. As a former editor-in-chief of Femme magazine and a commissioner of several media companies, she is trained to identify problems, shape narratives, and manage crises under public scrutiny. At a time when the MBG is beset by negative press coverage and protests from various quarters, these communication and investigative capabilities may prove to be genuine assets.

From the perspective of leadership theory, the political trust vested in Nanik by the President — she was a loyal member of the Prabowo-Sandi campaign team in 2019 and serves as Vice Chair of the GSN Foundation — can be read as conferring sufficient political capital to take decisive action when needed. Burns (1978), in his foundational work on transformational leadership, emphasises that meaningful institutional change requires a leader who possesses not only moral vision but also the full confidence of the highest authority. On that criterion, Nanik would appear to be reasonably well-placed.

The Challenges Ahead: Not a Question of Willingness, but of Systems

Optimism, however, must be tempered by a clear-eyed assessment of the scale of the challenges awaiting the new head. The first and most urgent is the ongoing crisis of food poisoning. The figure of 37,673 victims is not merely a statistic; it is evidence of a systemic failure across the food safety chain — from production kitchens and distribution logistics through to the point of service. Arresting this failure requires far more than vocal leadership: it demands comprehensive SOP reform and real-time audit mechanisms that are genuinely operational rather than merely nominal.

The second challenge is the absence of adequate legal foundations. As of June 2026, the Presidential Regulation (Perpres) governing the MBG's operational framework had still not been issued, despite the programme having been in operation for more than ten months. The House of Representatives has repeatedly pressed the government for regulatory clarity. Without a Perpres, the division of responsibilities between institutions remains ambiguous, accountability is diffuse, and the BGN is exposed to legitimate legal challenges. This is not a problem that Nanik can resolve on her own; it demands political will from the government as a whole.

The third challenge concerns the management of an enormous budget. The MBG has been allocated between IDR 335 trillion and IDR 400 trillion for 2026 — a 96 per cent increase on the previous year — to serve a target of 82.9 million beneficiaries. The sheer scale of these resources creates fertile ground for inefficiency and misappropriation. Reports by BBC Indonesia have drawn attention to more than a hundred partner foundations affiliated with individuals close to government officials, the marginal participation of local small and medium enterprises, and the opacity surrounding the remuneration of workers officially classified as volunteers. These are warning signs that demand urgent attention.

Sidel and Jones (2019) have written perceptively on this risk in the context of developing countries, describing the phenomenon of "elite capture" — a condition in which the benefits of social programmes are diverted towards those already in positions of power rather than reaching the intended recipients. This risk becomes substantially more pronounced when independent oversight mechanisms are weak or poorly functioning.

The fourth challenge is the complexity entailed by operating at such an extraordinary scale. Overseeing a programme that reaches 62.9 million people across Indonesia — including the most remote and underdeveloped regions known as daerah 3T — is a logistical undertaking of remarkable difficulty. An institution whose capacity has not yet fully matured cannot simply be propelled forward by the energy and good intentions of a new leader. What is required is planned and systematic institutional strengthening.

Finally, there remains the question of technical competence. Nanik is not a nutritionist, not a medical professional, and has no prior experience managing a food programme of comparable scale. In a programme whose central concern is the health and safety of millions of children, dependence on a capable and well-resourced technical team is not optional — it is essential. As Marini et al. (2017) demonstrate in their analysis of school nutrition programmes in developing countries, the effectiveness of nutritional interventions is determined above all by the quality of evidence-based monitoring and evaluation systems, not by the general management or communications abilities of the leadership at the top.

Is a Change of Leadership Sufficient?

The critical question that must be confronted is this: does the root cause of the MBG's problems lie in its leadership, or in the design of the programme itself? If the principal failing has been a lack of rigour in enforcing SOPs, then Nanik — with her record of closing non-compliant kitchens and her investigative disposition — does represent a logical source of hope. But if the problems are structural in nature — weak regulation, inadequate institutional capacity, and entrenched conflicts of interest — then changing the head of the agency is, at best, a sticking plaster applied to a deeper wound.

The Indonesian Child Protection Commission (KPAI) has framed this correctly: what is needed is not merely a change of personnel but a thorough overhaul of governance. The Centre for Indonesian Policy Studies (CIPS) has gone further, calling for a fundamental re-evaluation of the programme in light of the mounting poisoning cases that have endangered the very groups it was designed to protect.

Nanik Sudaryati Deyang inherits her position under far from favourable circumstances. She takes on a programme that is simultaneously ambitious and troubled, burdened with a vast budget, intense public scrutiny, and expectations that considerably exceed the institutional capacity available to meet them. The political trust she enjoys from the President is a valuable asset, but it is not sufficient on its own. What is more urgently required is systemic reform: the enactment of the MBG's Perpres, the strengthening of independent audit mechanisms, the consistent enforcement of food safety standards, and a genuine openness to evaluation grounded in scientific evidence.

Conclusion

The Free Nutritious Meals Programme represents a laudable intention in need of substantially better execution. The replacement of the BGN's head in June 2026 is an event that admits of two interpretations: either it signals the government's genuine readiness to put its house in order, or it represents an attempt to find a scapegoat without addressing the underlying causes of dysfunction. This moment will carry real meaning only if it is followed by structural reform of genuine substance.

Nanik S. Deyang possesses sufficient assets to serve as an effective agent of change — insider knowledge of the BGN's operations, the President's confidence, and a sharp investigative sensibility. Yet she must also recognise that the challenges before her exceed what any individual can resolve alone. The long-term success of the MBG is not primarily a question of who leads the BGN; it is a question of whether the entire policy ecosystem — regulation, oversight, budgetary management, and technical human resources — can be reformed in a systematic and accountable manner, in the service of the Indonesian children who remain the programme's ultimate purpose.

References

Foreign References

Bhutta, Z. A., Das, J. K., Rizvi, A., Gaffey, M. F., Walker, N., Horton, S., ... & Black, R. E. (2013). Evidence-based interventions for improvement of maternal and child nutrition: What can be done and at what cost? The Lancet, 382(9890), 452–477. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(13)60646-6

Burns, J. M. (1978). Leadership. Harper & Row.

Devereux, S., & Sabates-Wheeler, R. (2004). Transformative social protection. IDS Working Paper 232. Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex.

Marini, A., Rokx, C., & Gallagher, P. (2017). Standing tall: Peru's success in overcoming its stunting crisis. World Bank Group. https://doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-1205-9

Sidel, M., & Jones, B. (2019). Elite capture and civil society in Southeast Asia: Rethinking social protection programs. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 50(1), 45–67. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022463418000929

World Food Programme. (2020). State of school feeding worldwide 2020. World Food Programme. https://www.wfp.org/publications/state-school-feeding-worldwide-2020

Indonesian References

Badan Gizi Nasional. (2026). Progres kinerja BGN per 1 Juni 2026. Kompas TV Nasional. https://www.kompas.tv/nasional/672561/progres-kinerja-bgn-per-1-juni-2026

BBC Indonesia. (2026, February). Dapur MBG bermasalah: Pengelolaan dan konflik kepentingan [MBG kitchens problematic: Management and conflicts of interest]. BBC Indonesia. https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/articles/czxgx1rx2pxo

Bisnis.com. (2026, 2 June). Ini alasan Prabowo ganti Dadan Hindayana sebagai Kepala BGN [The reasons behind Prabowo's replacement of Dadan Hindayana as BGN Head]. Bisnis.com. https://kabar24.bisnis.com/read/20260602/15/1977954/ini-alasan-prabowo-ganti-dadan-hindayana-sebagai-kepala-bgn

CNN Indonesia. (2026, 2 June). Profil Nanik S. Deyang, Kepala BGN baru pengganti Dadan Hindayana [Profile: Nanik S. Deyang, the new BGN Head replacing Dadan Hindayana]. CNN Indonesia. https://www.cnnindonesia.com/ekonomi/20260602202013-92-1364655/

Databoks Katadata. (2026). RAPBN 2026: Anggaran Makan Bergizi Gratis Rp335 triliun [State Budget 2026: Free Nutritious Meals allocation IDR 335 trillion]. Katadata. https://databoks.katadata.co.id/ekonomi-makro/statistik/689c504a56ce6/

Hukumonline. (2026). Menanti janji pemerintah untuk segera terbitkan Perpres tata kelola MBG [Awaiting the government's promise to issue the MBG governance Presidential Regulation]. Hukumonline. https://www.hukumonline.com/berita/a/menanti-janji-pemerintah-untuk-segera-terbitkan-perpres-tata-kelola-mbg-lt68f1f9d05cd8b/

Kompas. (2026, 3 June). Dadan Hindayana dicopot, pemerintah rombak kepemimpinan BGN: Kualitas makanan jadi sorotan [Dadan Hindayana removed, government overhauls BGN leadership: Food quality under scrutiny]. Kompas. https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2026/06/03/05473131/

Kompas. (2026, 2 June). Profil Nanik S. Deyang yang diangkat jadi Kepala BGN gantikan posisi Dadan [Profile: Nanik S. Deyang appointed as BGN Head to replace Dadan]. Kompas. https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2026/06/02/21360211/

Kompas Regional. (2026, 12 May). Kemenkes catat 37.000 korban keracunan program Makan Bergizi Gratis hingga Mei 2026 [Ministry of Health records 37,000 poisoning victims under the Free Nutritious Meals Programme through May 2026]. Kompas. https://regional.kompas.com/read/2026/05/12/184946778/

Kontan Nasional. (2026). Dapur MBG bermasalah: Pengawasan harus ketat karena kelola anggaran sangat besar [MBG kitchens problematic: Oversight must be strict given the enormous budget managed]. Kontan. https://nasional.kontan.co.id/news/dapur-mbg-bermasalah-pengawasan-harus-ketat

Kumparan. (2026, 2 June). Alasan Prabowo copot Dadan dari Kepala BGN: Hasil evaluasi SOP dan tata kelola [Reasons for Prabowo removing Dadan as BGN Head: SOP and governance evaluation findings]. Kumparan. https://kumparan.com/news/alasan-prabowo-copot-dadan-dari-kepala-bgn-hasil-evaluasi-sop-dan-tata-kelola-27WIAr8CXQ7

Liputan6. (2026, 2 June). Alasan Dadan Hindayana dicopot dari Kepala BGN [The reasons for Dadan Hindayana's removal from the BGN Headship]. Liputan6. https://www.liputan6.com/news/read/7589777/

Suara.com. (2026, 3 June). Nanik S. Deyang: Pendidikannya apa? Resmi gantikan Dadan sebagai Kepala BGN [Nanik S. Deyang: What is her educational background? Officially replaces Dadan as BGN Head]. Suara.com. https://www.suara.com/lifestyle/2026/06/03/074313/

Tempo. (2026, June). KPAI desak perbaikan tata kelola MBG usai Kepala BGN dicopot [KPAI urges improvement of MBG governance following BGN Head's removal]. Tempo. https://www.tempo.co/politik/kpai-desak-perbaikan-tata-kelola-mbg-usai-kepala-bgn-dicopot-2217678

Tempo. (2026). Mengapa program Makan Bergizi Gratis perlu dihentikan? [Why the Free Nutritious Meals Programme should be halted]. Tempo. https://www.tempo.co/ekonomi/mengapa-program-makan-bergizi-gratis-perlu-dihentikan--2071906

Wikipedia Indonesia. (2026). Makan Bergizi Gratis. Wikipedia. https://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Makan_Bergizi_Gratis

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