The Fox and the Sick Lion (2)

"The Lion inquired, 'How do Authoritarian Regimes gain power?' The Fox replied, 'From 1946 to 2010, 250 new authoritarian regimes came to power. About half of the time (46 percent), these regimes toppled pre-existing authoritarian regimes; just over a quarter of the time (29 percent), they toppled democracies; and the rest of the time, they came to power at the time of independence.

Research identifies seven general ways in which authoritarian regimes gain power: a dynastic family takeover, a coup, an insurgency, a popular uprising, an authoritarianization (i.e., incumbent takeover), a rule change that alters the composition of the ruling group, or a foreign power’s imposition.

The Lion inquired, 'What tools do Authoritarian Regimes use to survive in Office?' The Fox replied, 'All governments confront the difficult task of holding on to office. This is particularly the case for authoritarian governments, which lack electoral legitimacy to defend their positions of power and must contend with the omnipresent threat of overthrow. To address this challenge, authoritarian regimes have two broad tools that they use to defend their rule: repression and co-optation.

Repression is a defining feature of authoritarian rule. It is defined as 'actual or threatened use of physical sanctions against an individual or organization, within the territorial jurisdiction of the state, for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well as deterring specific activities.' In democracies, governments that repress heavily can be unseated; in authoritarian regimes, by contrast, such acts typically go unpunished. For this reason, authoritarian regimes use repression far more than their democratic counterparts do as a method for maintaining control.

The reason authoritarian regimes repress is to try to lessen perceived threats to their rule. The idea is that by removing their challengers, silencing them, or preventing them from organizing, it will be easier for such regimes to maintain control. Of course, if doing this were so easy, no authoritarian regime would ever encounter a viable opposition group. Repression can be expensive to execute and requires a government with the capacity to do so. Moreover, it can backfire.

The use of indiscriminate repression has the potential to elicit a backlash against the regime, strengthening opposition to it and triggering popular unrest. Though authoritarian regimes have to rely on repression to some extent to deal with inevitable opposition to their rule, they must be careful in terms of how they do so.

Repression comes in many forms, which can be grouped into two broad types: high-intensity repression and low-intensity repression. These types of repression, differ both in terms of the target of the repressive act and the type of violence used.

High-intensity repression refers to overt acts of violence, which typically target well-recognized individuals or groups. Examples include mass killings of protestors and assassinations of opposition leaders. The government’s killing of hundreds of student demonstrators in Tiananmen Square in China in 1989 qualifies as high-intensity repression, as does the murder of protestors in Uzbekistan in 2005 at the hands of security services. High-intensity repression is easily observable, both for domestic and international audiences, and difficult for authoritarian governments to fully cover up.

Low-intensity repression, by contrast, is subtler in nature and often has a broader target (i.e., the opposition in general). Examples include surveillance of opposition activities, the use of lawsuits against opponents, and short-term detainments of activists and journalists. China’s use of sophisticated methods for monitoring the Internet to spy on its citizens classifies as low-intensity repression; Singapore’s practice of using defamation lawsuits to silence its opponents does as well. Lowintensity repression is less likely to attract attention not only because it is understated, but also because it is often a series of small, individual incidents as opposed to a single, large-scale event. Further complicating matters, the government may outsource it and make other groups (such as paramilitary organizations) do the dirty work.

Low-intensity repression is perhaps more difficult to measure than high-intensity repression, because it is so subtle and varied in form. There are myriad ways in which governments can carry out low-intensity repression, depending on levels of creativity. Measures of low-intensity repression, for this reason, typically focus on one specific method. The most common way that researchers have measured it, is by looking at empowerment rights restrictions, which are government efforts to limit (e.g., arrest, sanction, or ban) expression, association, assembly, and beliefs.

All authoritarian regimes repress to some degree, but some more than others and in different ways. For example, among post‒World War II dictatorships, every single regime has restricted empowerment rights in one way or another and all but three have violated physical integrity rights at some point while in office.

That said, there are systematic differences in repressive activities across authoritarian regimes based on type. Specifically, personalist dictatorships rely more heavily on repression of empowerment rights than do other forms of authoritarianism, while military dictatorships are the most likely authoritarian regime type to repress physical integrity rights. Importantly, the evidence suggests that dominant-party dictatorships are the least repressive form of dictatorship, taking both types of repression into consideration.

The literature asserts that dominant-party dictatorships repress less than other dictatorships do because they feature more of the characteristics of democracies thought to reduce repression, primarily the incorporation of a greater slice of the population in the political process. Because dominant-party dictatorships are more likely to provide an arena in which public expression about the regime can take place, they have other means of influencing citizens at their disposal beyond coercion.

The purpose of repression is to help governments maintain power, yet there is surprisingly little research on whether this tactic actually works. As one scholar wrote in 2007, 'One explanation for state repression is that authorities use it to stay in power, but the literature contains not one systematic investigation of this proposition.' Part of the challenge in investigating this relationship, is disentangling whether it is repression that increases the regime’s strength or vice versa. It could very well be true that those dictatorships that are powerful enough to repress in the first place are going to be the most long-lasting.'

The Lion inquired, 'What is Co-Optation and what is its purpose?' The Fox replied, 'Authoritarian regimes also use co-optation to maintain power, though they vary considerably in the extent to which they rely on it and how. Co-optation is defined as the intentional extension of benefits to potential challengers in exchange for their loyalty. A classic example is the maintenance of clientele networks, which distribute goods and services to select individuals in return for their political support. The purpose of co-optation is to persuade other key actors not to exercise their 'power to obstruct.'

There are a number of reasons why co-optation is a useful strategy for dictatorships. First, it can deter defections from both the inner circle and lower-level regime supporters. If regime allies do well under the current regime, they should be less likely to withdraw support for it. This assessment seems obvious, but it is magnified by the very real possibility that such individuals will fare worse under the regime’s successor. In this way, co-optation gives regime allies a vested interest in the regime’s survival and creates a powerful motive for them to support its continuation.

Co-optation is also effective because it can divide potential opponents to the regime over whether to 'accept' the benefit the regime is offering. This protects the regime by making opposition coordination more difficult. For example, allowing opposition political parties to compete in elections is one form of co-optation. Though this is a perk for aspiring politicians, it also has the potential to fracture the opposition given that some may prefer to boycott the election instead.

Another reason co-optation is a valuable survival strategy is that it can decrease the likelihood that small episodes of unrest, which are common but rarely destabilizing in dictatorships, will gain momentum. If broad swaths of the population are disgruntled, such minor events have greater potential to steamroll into threatening mass opposition movements. Spreading spoils to choice sectors of the population, however, can prevent this from occurring by reducing overall levels of societal dissatisfaction.

It is important to note, however, that co-optation is not risk free. By giving potential regime opponents something they value, co-optation can empower the very individuals the regime seeks to appease. Though the targets of co-optation are supposed to remain loyal in exchange for the benefits they receive, there is always the risk that they will leverage such resources to jump ship. Once individuals have received the transfer, there is nothing to guarantee they will not use it to develop and strengthen their own coalitions. Co-optation can therefore be risky for dictatorships because its targets can potentially leverage received benefits toward undermining the regime.

Most scholars agree that authoritarian regimes rely on some combination of co-optation and repression as part of their survival strategy. Less is known, however, about how they balance their use of these tactics. Though research in this area is limited, there is evidence of an inverse relationship in some domains. Specifically, institutional co-optation leads to decreased reliance on the repression of empowerment rights. When dictatorships feature multiple political parties and a legislature, it is easier for them to identify their most threatening opponents, both by helping them monitor the popularity of regime officials (who could potentially defect) and by drawing potential opposition members out of hiding and into state institutions. Because the regime has better information about the specific individuals who pose the greatest threat to its survival, it can simply target these individuals in its use of repression and relax restrictions on speech and assembly rights, which often generate popular opposition. As Vladimir Milov, an opposition leader in Russia, stated, 'They [dictators] stay away from too much pressure on the general public. They prefer a very focused repression against a few people who are active in proclaiming opposition feeling.'

The Lion inquired, 'How do Authoritarian Regimes fall?' The Fox replied, 'From 1946 to 2014, 239 authoritarian regimes fell from power. Research identifies seven ways in which they have done so (six of which roughly mirror the seven ways they have historically seized power): a coup, an election, a popular uprising, an insurgency, a rule change that alters the composition of the ruling group, a foreign power’s imposition, and state dissolution.

Coup is the most common means through which dictatorships collapse, representing a third (33 percent) of all authoritarian regime failures. An example is the 1971 coup General Idi Amin led in Uganda that toppled the dictatorship of Milton Obote. Though many Ugandans rejoiced at the news of Obote’s ouster, Amin’s behavior soon thereafter gave pause to such optimism, including his dissolution of parliament and murder of hundreds of military officers allied with Obote’s region.

The second most frequent way that authoritarian regimes fall is via elections, which make up about a quarter (28 percent) of all authoritarian regime failures. When dictatorships leave power through elections, it is because incumbents either did not run, having already decided to step down; or they ran in elections, lost, and subsequently honored the results. As an example, the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua stepped down in 1990 after losing competitive elections that year. Though there were initial concerns that the Sandinistas would not accept the opposition’s surprise victory, incumbent President Daniel Ortega stated soon afterward that he would 'obey the popular mandate coming out of the vote.'

Popular uprising is the third typical way that authoritarian regimes collapse, accounting for 18 percent of all authoritarian regime failures. An example may be found in the 1979 Iranian revolution, in which months of violent mass protests ultimately forced the Shah to flee to Egypt and led to calls for the return of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini from his exile in France. Soon after returning to Iran, Khomeini declared the country an Islamic republic and set the stage for the establishment of the theocratic regime that governs Iran to this day. Though popular uprising is a common mode of authoritarian regime collapse, it is important to note the infrequency with which such events are successful. For example, only about 10 percent of all major anti-government revolts in authoritarian regimes actually topple them.

Together, coup, elections, and popular uprising comprise the bulk (79 percent) of authoritarian regime modes of exit. Most of the rest occur through an insurgency or a rule change that alters the composition of the ruling group (8 percent and 7 percent, respectively). Examples of insurgencies come from Cuba, where in 1959 insurgent forces led by Fidel Castro defeated the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista after six years of fighting, and Somalia, where in 1991 rebel forces toppled strongman ruler Siad Barre, ushering in a period of more than two decades during which no single group exerted control over a majority of the country’s territory.

Importantly, while coup, elections, and popular uprising still make up the bulk (71 percent) of all authoritarian regime exits in the post-1990 period, their relative frequencies are markedly different. Elections have displaced coups as the most common way in which dictatorships end: 39 percent of all authoritarian regime failures currently occur via electoral processes. Most of these transitions lead to democratization, which is not surprising given that they usually occur because authoritarian incumbents allow them to. This is largely due to the increase in democratizations worldwide that occurred in the aftermath of the Cold War.

Sometimes authoritarian regimes collapse and democracy comes next, but other times they fall and a new authoritarian regime emerges instead or, even worse, no regime at all. This is important to emphasize for two reasons.

First, if we are interested in understanding the factors that influence authoritarian regime failure broadly speaking, but identify democratization as the only end result, this can lead to misleading conclusions. Analyses of authoritarian regime failure that solely look at democratization will be unable to recognize those factors that affect transitions to new dictatorship but not transitions to democracy. For example, research shows that violent protests increase the chance of authoritarian regime collapse because they raise the risk that a dictatorship will transition to a new dictatorship. Violent protests do not, however, affect the chance of democratization, specifically. If we just look at the effect of violent protests on democratic transitions, we will see little relationship and erroneously conclude that such events do not destabilize authoritarian regimes.

Second, if we are interested in identifying the factors that shape democratization but assume that all authoritarian regimes end in democracy, we run into the opposite problem. We risk conflating those things that influence transitions to new dictatorship with those that influence transitions to democracy. They may in some instances affect both, but we cannot assume so. The policy implications here are fairly obvious. Foreign pressures may hasten the downfall of a notorious authoritarian regime, but a democratic successor is by no means assured.'

The Lion inquired, 'What is Democratization?' The Fox replied, 'Democratization is the process of transitioning from some other political system type—nearly always dictatorship—to one that is democratic in nature. Determining when democratization occurs, therefore, requires an operating definition of what makes a country democratic.

There are a multitude of ways of defining democracy, but the definition used here is procedural. In this sense, democracy is a political system in which citizens select their government in electoral contests that are free and fair. Holding elections is a necessary component of democratic rule, but not a sufficient one. After all, most countries in the world hold regular elections. To qualify as a democracy, electoral contests must be both free and fair, such that most adult citizens are able to vote, there is real competition for the most important political posts, and citizens are truly presented a choice in terms of who will represent them, among other criteria.

Some definitions of democracy incorporate not only electoral competitiveness, but also whether the government represents the interests of the citizenry and is accountable to them. Certainly, many agree that representation and accountability are desirable from a normative perspective, but they do not guarantee democracy. Many authoritarian regimes are able to perform well in these areas, without actually giving their citizens any real say in who will represent them. This is a problem that procedural definitions are able to avert.

The terms 'democratization' and 'political liberalization' are often used interchangeably, but they refer to distinct processes. Political liberalization is defined as 'any change in a political system that makes that politics of that system more participatory and/or competitive.' Such changes can occur as part of a transition to democracy, but they often do not. For example, we frequently see political liberalization in well-established authoritarian regimes, such as when Mobutu introduced multiparty electoral competition in the Democratic Republic of Congo (then Zaire) in 1990, but continued to govern in virtually the same fashion until his ouster in 1997. We also see political liberalization in longtime democracies, such as when the United States extended suffrage to 18- to 20-year-old citizens via a 1971 amendment to its constitution. Political liberalization can occur in a variety of political contexts, only some of which are manifestations of transition to democracy. Democratization implies political liberalization, but political liberalization may or may not imply democratization.'

The Lion then said, 'Well, I've heard enough of your talk. Now, it's your turn to walk into the cave.' The Fox said, 'I beg your Majesty’s pardon, but I noticed the track of the animals that have already come to you; and while I see many hoof-marks going in, I see none coming out. Until the animals that have entered your cave come out again I prefer to remain in the open air.'

After that, instead of going into the cave, the Fox walked away singing,

Yes, and how many years can a mountain exist

Before it is washed to the sea?

Yes, and how many years can some people exist

Before they're allowed to be free?

Yes, and how many times can a man turn his head

And pretend that he just doesn't see?

The answer, my friend, is blowin' in the wind

The answer is blowin' in the wind *)

Then, the Fox, gone with the wind."

The Moon concluded, "Now, the truth of the matter was, that the sickness of the Lion was only a sham to draw the beasts into his den, the more easily to devour them. And Allah knows best."

Citations & References:
- Erica Frantz, Authoritarianism - What Everyone Needs to Know, Oxford University Press
- Samuel Croxall, D.D., Fables of Aesop and Others, Simon Probasco
*) "Blowin' in the Wind" written by Bob Dylan

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