Is Social Justice Just? (1)

In a country where dignity is supposedly a constitutional right, some local governments in Indonesia have taken it upon themselves to slap the label “Poor Family” on the homes of social aid recipients—as if poverty were a contagious condition that must be flagged for public safety. It’s not enough that these families struggle daily with economic hardship; now they must endure the indignity of being publicly branded, like defective merchandise in a warehouse clearance.

This bureaucratic theatre masquerades as transparency. Officials claim it helps ensure aid reaches the right people. But what it really does is outsource shame—turning poverty into a spectacle, and governance into a game of moral tagging. It’s as if the state, having failed to eradicate poverty, decided to colour-code it instead.

And let’s not forget the irony: the Constitution mandates the government to protect the poor, not parade them. Article 34 of the Indonesian Constitution states that “the poor and abandoned children shall be cared for by the state.” Not labelled. Not humiliated. Not turned into walking caution signs.

So why do these sticker campaigns persist? Because they’re cheap, visible, and politically convenient. They create the illusion of action without the burden of reform. They let officials say, “Look, we’re doing something,” while doing very little to address structural inequality.

It can be said that in his work The Concept of Justice: Is Social Justice Just? (2011, Continuum), Thomas Patrick Burke places the question “Is social justice truly just?” at the centre of his discussion, and he answers it negatively. Burke undertakes a careful conceptual distinction between two types of justice: “ordinary justice” and “social justice.” He claims that ordinary justice involves individual actions guided by free will, personal responsibility, and the relationship between a person’s intentions and moral norms. In contrast, social justice, as it became widely understood in the twentieth century, focuses more on societal conditions—such as distribution, equality, and institutional arrangements—rather than the specific actions of responsible individuals. Because of this, Burke argues that many claims of social injustice do not meet the rigorous requirements of true justice, as they fail to identify accountable actors whose deeds could be judged as just or unjust. Consequently, he urges readers to return to the traditional understanding of ordinary justice and to be sceptical of the modern discourse of social justice, which he believes has obscured the real meaning of being just.

When asked directly whether social justice is just, Burke’s answer is no. He concludes that the forms of social justice commonly understood today—relating to distribution, social conditions, and institutions—do not qualify as justice in the proper sense according to the standards of individual responsibility. One review even summarises his view as: “social justice, as the term is currently used, is inherently unjust.” Burke’s critique does not merely question whether social justice can be just; he explicitly rejects the idea that modern social justice can be considered true justice.

Nevertheless, his answer depends on the definitions he adopts for “justice” and “social justice.” Burke uses a relatively traditional understanding centred on individual action, free will, and responsibility, and he regards much of modern social justice discourse as a deviation from this conception. If one approaches the subject from a broader perspective—such as Islamic or contemporary political philosophy—that includes societal conditions, distribution, and structural arrangements, then Burke’s critique may seem limited or contestable. This book is primarily a work of political philosophy and normative critique, rather than an extensive empirical analysis of all variants of social justice. Therefore, if the question is “Are all social justice initiatives truly just?”, Burke’s position is more about the problematic nature of the concepts employed than a claim that all social justice efforts are inherently wrong.

If we take Burke’s argument seriously—that social justice, as commonly understood, is not truly just—then making it “just” would require a fundamental rethinking of how we define and apply justice in social contexts. According to Burke’s framework, justice is not primarily about abstract conditions or outcomes; it is about the actions of accountable individuals. Therefore, for social justice to become genuinely just, it would need to connect societal reforms to clear responsibilities and moral accountability for specific actors. Policies and social programs should be evaluated not only by their outcomes, such as redistribution or equality metrics, but by whether the individuals implementing and enforcing them are acting in ways that are ethically responsible and aligned with moral norms. In essence, social justice would need to shift from being outcome-focused to being action-focused, ensuring that real human choices and responsibilities are central to every initiative. Only then could it be considered truly just in the sense Burke advocates.

Social justice refers to the fair and equitable distribution of wealth, opportunities, and privileges within a society. It embodies the belief that every individual deserves equal access to basic human rights such as education, healthcare, and employment, regardless of their background, gender, ethnicity, or social class. The idea is not merely about charity or compassion, but about creating systemic fairness—ensuring that institutions, laws, and policies do not favour the powerful or the privileged at the expense of the marginalised. Social justice, therefore, seeks to correct historical imbalances and dismantle barriers that perpetuate inequality. It calls upon both individuals and governments to act ethically and responsibly, so that society can progress together on the foundation of dignity and inclusion.

From a political perspective, social justice concerns how public institutions, laws and governance frameworks allocate rights, duties and resources among citizens. It asks: Do the political rules enable fair participation, equal voice, and meaningful access to decision-making? As one summary puts it, social justice involves “the fair treatment and equitable status of all individuals and social groups within a state or society”. In political ideology debates, social justice also becomes a terrain of contestation: for progressive politics, it may mean redistribution, representation and recognition; for others, it may be viewed with suspicion as imposing uniform outcomes rather than equal opportunity.

Economically, the concept of social justice demands that the economic order does not simply reward only the powerful or already privileged, but that it affords individuals the capability to participate productively, share in the benefits of economic output, and enjoy decent standards of life. The focus is on both distributive justice (who gets what) and participatory justice (who has a say in how the economy works). For instance, the Center for Economic & Social Justice defines social justice as the virtue guiding institutions to give human persons the freedom to develop and the opportunity to contribute – while controlling distortions such as monopolies or exclusion. Moreover, scholarly works such as Rethinking Economic Policy for Social Justice: The Radical Potential of Human Rights (Balakrishnan, Heintz & Elson 2016) explore how economic policy reframed through human-rights lenses can promote social justice. On the social dimension, social justice pays attention to how individuals and groups relate within society — how opportunities, social mobility, status, life chances, and social inclusion (or exclusion) are distributed. In this sense, social justice is concerned with correcting historic and systemic barriers: for example, gender or racial discrimination, underserved communities, marginalisation, and ensuring that the voice of vulnerable groups is recognised. Politically and socially, this means designing laws, practices and norms that reduce barriers to full citizenship, voice and dignity.

From a cultural perspective, social justice speaks to recognition, respect, and the honouring of diverse identities, cultures and values within a society. It emphasises not only that individuals have equal chances in the marketplace or politics, but that their cultural backgrounds, world-views and rights to self-determination are respected. In this context, the book Cultural Rights and Justice: Sustainable Development, the Arts and the Body by John Clammer (2019) explores how cultural dimensions of justice (such as recognition of diverse artistic expressions, ways of life, body politics) are integral to a holistic vision of social justice. 

“Social justice” from these combined lenses suggests that a just society is one in which ideological commitments favour equality and dignity; political institutions guarantee participation and rights; the economy enables fair opportunity and distribution; social relations allow inclusion and mobility; and cultural frameworks respect diversity and identity. It does not simply mean equalising outcomes in a mechanical sense, but restructuring systems so that fairness, dignity and participation become real for every person.

The scope of social justice is broad, encompassing various areas where fairness, equality, and dignity must be upheld in both public and private life. Generally, scholars identify at least five key domains: economic, political, legal, social, and cultural justice — though some also include environmental and digital dimensions as modern extensions.

Economically, social justice deals with how wealth, income, and opportunities are distributed within a society. It asks whether workers receive fair wages, whether poverty is structurally addressed, and whether access to education and healthcare allows upward mobility. A concrete example would be progressive taxation systems and minimum-wage laws — such as those used in Scandinavian countries — designed to reduce the gap between rich and poor.

Politically, social justice ensures that all citizens can participate meaningfully in decision-making, regardless of their social background. This involves voting rights, freedom of speech, access to political representation, and protection from discrimination. For instance, the civil rights movement in the United States, led by Martin Luther King Jr., was a political expression of social justice — demanding equal rights for Black Americans within democratic institutions.

Legally, social justice is reflected in how the law treats individuals. It demands equal protection before the law and fair access to justice, without privilege for the rich or powerful. A concrete case would be legal aid programmes that provide free or subsidised lawyers for those who cannot afford them, ensuring justice is not sold to the highest bidder.

Socially, it involves reducing inequalities caused by gender, race, disability, or social status. This means tackling discrimination in schools, workplaces, and public spaces. An example is the enforcement of equal pay acts and anti-discrimination laws, which promote inclusivity and protect vulnerable groups from exploitation.

Culturally, social justice ensures that all communities—regardless of religion, ethnicity, or tradition—are respected and represented. It is about recognising the right to cultural expression and preserving heritage without domination by majority groups. A clear example is the protection of indigenous peoples’ cultural rights, such as language preservation and land recognition in countries like Canada or New Zealand.

In modern times, the scope of social justice also extends to environmental and digital areas. Environmental justice links fairness with sustainability—ensuring that no community bears disproportionate environmental damage, as seen in movements opposing toxic waste dumping in poor neighbourhoods. Digital justice, on the other hand, deals with fair access to technology and data privacy, challenging the monopoly of large tech corporations.

In essence, the scope of social justice stretches across every field where human dignity meets systemic inequality. It is both a principle and a practice—seeking to make fairness not just a moral slogan, but a living reality in law, economy, society, and culture.

The protection of human rights, access to healthcare, education, the provision of employment opportunities, and the availability of affordable housing for citizens are indeed concrete expressions of social justice. Social justice, at its core, is about ensuring fairness, equity, and dignity within society. When governments or institutions guarantee these basic needs, they are actively reducing systemic inequalities and providing everyone, regardless of background, with a fair chance to live a dignified life.

The argument is that social justice is not merely an abstract ideal but a practical framework for action. Human rights protection ensures that individuals are shielded from abuse, discrimination, or exploitation, which is essential for creating equal opportunities. Access to healthcare and education directly addresses disparities in life outcomes and socio-economic mobility. At the same time, employment opportunities and affordable housing provide the material stability necessary for full participation in society. In other words, these measures translate the philosophical principles of fairness and equity into tangible benefits for individuals and communities.

Critics might argue that social justice extends beyond these services and also involves deeper systemic changes, such as reforming political institutions, achieving cultural recognition, and promoting environmental justice. Nonetheless, even within the narrower interpretation, these elements—human rights, healthcare, education, employment, and housing—are foundational pillars and measurable expressions of social justice in practice.

Social justice is guided by several fundamental principles that underpin its application in law, policy, and society. While different scholars may emphasise slightly different aspects, the core principles are widely recognised as follows:

First, equality—every individual should have the same rights, opportunities, and protections, regardless of race, gender, class, religion, or other characteristics. This principle addresses structural and systemic disparities that prevent fair participation.

Second, equity—recognising that not everyone starts from the same place, policies and actions should be tailored to provide additional support where needed to ensure fair outcomes. Unlike equality, which treats everyone the same, equity seeks to level the playing field.

Third, human dignity—every person has intrinsic worth and should be treated with respect, not as a means to an end. This principle underlies efforts to protect human rights, social inclusion, and access to basic necessities.

Fourth, participation—individuals and communities should have a voice in decisions that affect their lives. Social justice is not just about top-down redistribution but about empowering people to shape policies, governance, and societal norms.

Fifth, solidarity—members of society have a shared responsibility to support one another, particularly those who are disadvantaged. This principle encourages collective action and social cohesion.

Finally, the rule of law and accountability—justice requires transparent institutions, legal frameworks, and mechanisms to ensure that rights are protected and obligations are enforced. Without accountability, social justice cannot be reliably achieved.

These principles guide both theoretical discussions and practical initiatives of social justice, shaping policies in healthcare, education, labour, housing, and civil rights worldwide.

David Miller, in his influential book Principles of Social Justice (1999, Harvard University Press), argues that social justice cannot be achieved through a single universal rule. Instead, it requires the careful balancing of several moral principles — namely, need, merit, equality, solidarity, and social membership. Each of these principles reflects a distinct moral concern, and together, they form the ethical foundation of a fair and cohesive society.

The principle of need demands that goods and resources be distributed according to people’s genuine necessities. Society, in this sense, should ensure that no one is left behind or deprived of the essentials required to live a dignified life. In Indonesia, this principle finds expression in state welfare programmes such as the Kartu Indonesia Sehat (KIS) and the Program Keluarga Harapan (PKH), which provide healthcare and cash assistance to underprivileged families.

The principle of merit, on the other hand, emphasises that individuals deserve recognition and reward according to their contributions, efforts, and talents. This principle encourages hard work and self-development, ensuring that achievement and effort are valued. A tangible example can be found in Indonesia’s LPDP scholarship scheme and merit-based promotions in the civil service, both of which reward competence and dedication to public service.

The principle of equality ensures that every individual enjoys equal rights and opportunities, both legally and substantively. Miller differentiates between formal equality—treating everyone the same—and substantive equality, which seeks to correct structural inequalities. In Indonesia, gender equality initiatives and policies expanding access to education in rural areas embody this principle by giving all citizens a fair chance to improve their lives.

The principle of solidarity goes beyond individual rights to stress mutual care and social responsibility. It reminds citizens that a just society requires empathy, cooperation, and collective strength. In the Indonesian context, the age-old tradition of gotong royong beautifully illustrates this spirit of solidarity, as communities unite to help one another in times of disaster or need.

Finally, the principle of social membership asserts that social justice operates most meaningfully within a community or nation whose members share a sense of belonging and mutual obligation. Miller argues that justice is deeply rooted in social bonds rather than abstract cosmopolitan ideals. Indonesia’s philosophical foundations—Pancasila and Bhinneka Tunggal Ika—clearly mirror this notion, nurturing unity amidst diversity while fostering fairness for all citizens.

Taken together, these five principles present social justice as a living moral framework—one that blends compassion, fairness, and responsibility. They remind us that justice is not simply a legal construct, but a social project that thrives when people care for one another and act for the common good.

[Part 2]

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