Buzzer Politics in Indonesia (1)

The phenomenon of political buzzers has emerged as one of the most significant threats to democratic integrity in the digital age. Buzzers—individuals or networks paid to disseminate particular political narratives on a mass scale across social media—operate by exploiting the architecture of digital platforms in order to manipulate public opinion. This essay analyses the dangers of buzzers in politics from two principal perspectives: first, a global perspective grounded in comparative and theoretical research findings; and second, the particular case of Indonesia, which has become one of the foremost epicentres of this phenomenon in South-East Asia. Drawing upon a body of peer-reviewed scholarship, this essay argues that buzzers are not merely a communicative nuisance but a systemic threat that corrupts public epistemology, deepens social polarisation, and undermines the foundational institutions of democratic governance.

THE PERILS OF POLITICAL BUZZERS:

THREATS TO DEMOCRACY AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE

A Global Perspective and the Particular Case of Indonesia

I. INTRODUCTION

Amidst the transformation of political communication accelerated by the digital platform revolution, a new class of actors has emerged whose principal function is to shape public perception on behalf of particular interests. Amongst the most controversial of these actors is the political buzzer—an organised network of accounts and individuals deployed to amplify, distort, or drown out specific narratives in digital public spaces. This is no longer a marginal concern; it has become a strategic instrument in the contest for power across numerous countries, not least Indonesia.

In the context of Indonesian political life, the term 'buzzer' refers to individuals or groups—whether real persons or automated accounts (bots)—who operate in a coordinated, remunerated fashion to propagate political messages on behalf of a given client. The term carries strongly pejorative connotations precisely because it involves the manipulation of public opinion through inorganic, non-transparent means, frequently accompanied by the deliberate spread of disinformation.

Research conducted by the Oxford Internet Institute found that organised computational influence operations had been detected in more than 81 countries by 2020, a dramatic increase from 28 countries in 2017. Indonesia featured prominently on this list, particularly in the period surrounding electoral cycles. This finding confirms that buzzers are not an isolated local peculiarity but a global phenomenon following recognisable patterns across diverse political contexts.

This essay is structured as follows: first, a theoretical framework concerning buzzers and the manipulation of public opinion; second, the dangers of buzzers from a global perspective; third, an in-depth analysis of the Indonesian case; and fourth, implications for policy and democracy. Each argument is supported by references to relevant scholarly literature, including Computational Propaganda by Samuel Woolley and Philip N. Howard, Voxpol research, and the work of Indonesian and Indonesia-focused scholars such as Ross Tapsell and others.

II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: BUZZERS, COMPUTATIONAL PROPAGANDA, AND THE MANIPULATION OF OPINION

2.1 Defining the Political Buzzer

In the academic literature, the political buzzer is intimately related to the broader concept of 'astroturfing'—the practice of fabricating the appearance of organic public support for a political position, when that support is in reality manufactured and contrived. This concept was first brought to wider scholarly attention by Beder (1998) in her work on the public relations industry and corporate propaganda.

Woolley and Howard (2019), in their edited volume Computational Propaganda: Political Parties, Politicians, and Political Manipulation on Social Media, define computational propaganda as the use of algorithms, automation, and big data to manipulate public opinion. Buzzers represent the human-centred component of this ecosystem, operating alongside bots (automated accounts) to produce a more convincing effect, since human interaction is considerably harder for platforms to detect.

In Indonesia, research by Ika Idris and Inayah Rohmaniyah (2021) conceptualises buzzers as 'cyber troops' operating within a structured ecosystem of political communication: there are clients (politicians or parties), brokers (digital consultants), and operational foot soldiers (the buzzers themselves). This structure reflects what Bradshaw and Howard (2019) term 'organised social media manipulation' in their annual report, The Global Disinformation Order: 2019 Global Inventory of Organised Social Media Manipulation.

The distinction between a digital consultant and a political consultant lies primarily in their focus and expertise. A digital consultant is concerned with guiding organisations through the complexities of digital transformation, which may involve advising on IT infrastructure, cybersecurity, online marketing, and the integration of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence. Their role is to ensure that businesses remain competitive and resilient in an increasingly digital economy. By contrast, a political consultant is dedicated to shaping electoral strategies, managing campaigns, crafting political messaging, and influencing public opinion. Their expertise is rooted in political science, communications, and the psychology of voter behaviour rather than in technological systems.

It is certainly possible for a political consultant to assume the role of a digital consultant, particularly in the context of digital campaigning. Modern politics is inseparable from digital platforms, and consultants who specialise in elections often employ social media analytics, targeted advertising, and online reputation management as part of their toolkit. However, while there is overlap, the breadth of digital consultancy in corporate or governmental contexts extends far beyond electoral politics, requiring technical and business acumen that not all political consultants possess.

On the international stage, firms such as Accenture, Deloitte, and McKinsey are widely recognised for their digital consulting services, offering comprehensive strategies for digital transformation across industries. In the realm of political consulting, Precision Strategies in the United States and Eurasia Group, which operates globally, are prominent examples, known for their sophisticated campaign management and geopolitical risk analysis. Within Indonesia, companies such as BINAR Tech Consulting and Arfadia have established themselves as leaders in digital consultancy, focusing on AI-driven solutions and digital marketing. Meanwhile, political consultancy in Indonesia is represented by firms such as Wamesa Consulting and Aristoteles Consults, which provide campaign strategy, public policy advice, and media management tailored to the local political landscape.

Political consultants today cannot afford to ignore the digital sphere, and many have integrated digital strategies into the very heart of their practice. In electoral contexts, this often means using social media platforms not merely as channels of communication but as tools for micro‑targeting specific voter groups. Consultants employ data analytics to identify voter preferences, track sentiment, and adjust messaging in real time. Online advertising, influencer partnerships, and coordinated digital campaigns are now as central to political consultancy as traditional canvassing or television appearances once were. In addition, consultants increasingly manage candidates’ online reputations, ensuring that narratives circulating on Twitter, TikTok, or Instagram align with broader campaign goals. In short, digital strategies have transformed political consultancy into a hybrid discipline that blends political science with digital marketing and technological expertise.

When comparing international practices with those in Indonesia, several differences emerge. Internationally, particularly in the United States and Europe, political consultancy has become highly professionalised, with firms such as Precision Strategies or GMMB offering sophisticated services that combine polling, media strategy, and digital campaigning. These firms often operate with large teams of specialists, including data scientists, behavioural psychologists, and digital marketers, reflecting the scale and resources of global campaigns. In Indonesia, by contrast, political consultancy tends to be more personalised and closely tied to local networks. Firms such as Wamesa Consulting or Aristoteles Consults focus on building grassroots connections, navigating local political cultures, and managing relationships with media outlets. While digital strategies are increasingly important in Indonesia—especially given the country’s high social media usage—the approach often blends modern digital tools with traditional methods of persuasion, such as community engagement and patronage networks. This hybrid model reflects Indonesia’s unique political landscape, where digital campaigning must resonate with both urban, tech‑savvy voters and rural communities with different expectations of political communication.

2.2 Information Ecology Theory and Epistemic Pollution

The dangers posed by buzzers may be usefully apprehended through the lens of information ecology theory. Floridi (2014), in The Fourth Revolution: How the Infosphere Is Reshaping Human Reality, argues that we inhabit an 'infosphere'—an informational environment that fundamentally shapes how we understand reality. When the infosphere is contaminated by false narratives and deliberate manipulation, the capacity of human beings to make rational decisions—including political decisions—is gravely degraded.

This argument is reinforced by Wardle and Derakhshan (2017), who, in their influential report for the Council of Europe, Information Disorder: Toward an Interdisciplinary Framework for Research and Policy Making, distinguish between three categories of information disorder: misinformation (error without malicious intent), disinformation (error with malicious intent), and malinformation (accurate information deployed to cause harm). Buzzers operate across all three categories simultaneously, rendering them potent agents of epistemic disorder.

III. THE DANGERS OF BUZZERS: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

3.1 The Erosion of Public Trust in Institutions

One of the most fundamental dangers posed by buzzers is the erosion of public trust in democratic institutions: the media, electoral bodies, government, and even the scientific community. The Edelman Trust Barometer (2022) reported that trust in the mainstream media had fallen to the lowest point in the survey's history, with only 42 per cent of global respondents expressing confidence in media organisations. Researchers have attributed this decline in significant part to the proliferation of disinformation propagated by actors such as buzzers.

Vosoughi, Roy, and Aral (2018), in a landmark study published in the journal Science, demonstrated that false news spreads six times faster than accurate reporting on Twitter. Their study encompassed the analysis of more than 126,000 rumours disseminated by three million users between 2006 and 2017. These findings are directly pertinent to the modus operandi of buzzers: they exploit the algorithmic tendency of platforms to prioritise emotionally provocative content, and deliberately fabricated stories more readily satisfy this criterion.

 

3.2 Polarisation and Social Fragmentation

Buzzers actively exacerbate political polarisation by exploiting and deepening existing ideological divisions within society. Sunstein (2017), in #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media, argues that social media creates 'echo chambers'—spaces in which individuals are exposed only to views consonant with their pre-existing beliefs. Buzzers intensify this effect by actively pushing divisive content into these filter bubbles.

Pariser (2011), in The Filter Bubble: What the Internet Is Hiding from You, had already cautioned that the algorithmic personalisation of digital platforms produces epistemic isolation. Buzzers exploit and compound this dynamic: by targeting specific population segments with tailored messaging (microtargeting), they do not merely deepen existing divisions but actively manufacture new fault lines within the body politic.

The case study of the United States in the 2016 Presidential Election, and the role of Russia's Internet Research Agency (IRA) in the coordinated dissemination of divisive content, has been extensively documented by the Mueller Report (2019) and the Senate Intelligence Committee. This operation demonstrated how buzzers and foreign influence operations can exploit pre-existing social vulnerabilities to maximise polarisation—not necessarily to support any particular candidate, but to corrode social cohesion as an end in itself.

 

3.3 Threats to Free and Fair Elections

The phrase free and fair elections refers to a democratic process in which citizens are able to cast their votes without intimidation, coercion, or manipulation, and where the procedures of the election are transparent, impartial, and equitable. It embodies the principle that every individual has an equal right to participate in choosing their representatives, and that the counting and reporting of votes must be conducted honestly so that the outcome reflects the genuine will of the people. In essence, it is the guarantee that democracy is not merely symbolic but operational, ensuring legitimacy for those who govern.

Historically, the idea of free and fair elections emerged from struggles against authoritarianism and exclusion. In the nineteenth century, movements for universal suffrage in Europe and North America laid the groundwork for the principle that elections should be open to all citizens rather than restricted to elites. Following the devastation of the Second World War, the concept was enshrined in international law through the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, which declared that the authority of government must derive from the will of the people expressed in genuine elections. During the wave of decolonisation in Asia and Africa, the United Nations often supervised referenda and elections to ensure that newly independent states were founded on legitimate democratic processes. Later, in the late twentieth century, the collapse of authoritarian regimes in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and parts of Asia reinforced the global expectation that elections must be conducted freely and fairly.

In contemporary practice, however, the phrase remains aspirational as much as descriptive. While many countries hold regular elections, not all meet the standards of freedom and fairness. Issues such as voter suppression, gerrymandering, disinformation campaigns, and manipulation of electoral commissions continue to challenge the integrity of democratic processes. Nevertheless, the principle of free and fair elections remains central to international norms and is upheld by organisations such as the United Nations and the Organisation for Security and Co‑operation in Europe, which monitor elections to safeguard their legitimacy.

The international phrase free and fair elections carries a meaning that is very close to the Indonesian expression pemilu yang jujur dan adil. Both emphasise the principle that elections must take place without intimidation, manipulation, or fraud, and that procedures must be transparent and equitable for all citizens. Their ultimate purpose is the same: to ensure the legitimacy of government through a democratic process that genuinely reflects the will of the people.

Nevertheless, there is a subtle difference in emphasis between the two terms. Free and fair elections usually highlight the broader dimension of political freedom: freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom of the press, and equal access for all candidates. In other words, “free” stresses the openness of the political space, while “fair” underscores procedural justice. In Indonesia, the phrase pemilu yang jujur dan adil places greater weight on the integrity of the voting and counting process, as well as the honesty of electoral officials. The word “jujur” points to morality and integrity, whereas “adil” stresses equality of treatment among participants.

The consequence of this difference in emphasis lies in how elections are monitored and evaluated. If the focus is solely on “honest and fair” in the procedural sense, then broader political freedoms—such as press liberty or the right to organise—may receive less attention. Conversely, if the focus is only on “free and fair” without stressing moral integrity, then technical manipulation or administrative fraud may escape scrutiny. For this reason, combining both perspectives is essential to ensure that elections are not only procedurally valid but also substantively democratic. The difference in emphasis between the international phrase free and fair elections and the Indonesian expression pemilu yang jujur dan adil lies in the nuances of language and the priorities each seeks to highlight.

In the phrase free and fair elections, the word free underscores the broader political freedoms that must exist for an election to be meaningful. This includes freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom of the press, and equal access for all candidates to compete. The word fair then stresses procedural justice, ensuring that the rules are applied impartially, transparently, and without discrimination. Taken together, the phrase points to an open democratic ecosystem in which both rights and procedures are safeguarded.

By contrast, the Indonesian term pemilu yang jujur dan adil places greater emphasis on the integrity and morality of the electoral process. The word jujur highlights honesty in the conduct of elections, particularly in the counting of votes and the sincerity of officials in applying the rules. The word adil stresses equality of treatment for participants, such as equal access to media coverage and impartial behaviour from state institutions. The focus here is more on the ethical and procedural integrity of the election itself, rather than on the wider political freedoms that surround it.

The consequence of this difference in emphasis is that evaluation of elections may vary. If the focus is solely on “honest and fair” procedures, broader freedoms such as press liberty or the right to organise politically may receive less attention. Conversely, if the focus is only on “free and fair” conditions, the moral integrity of election officials and the honesty of vote counting may be overlooked. For this reason, combining both perspectives is essential to ensure that elections are not only procedurally valid but also substantively democratic.

Buzzers represent a direct threat to the integrity of electoral processes. Norris (2014), in Why Electoral Integrity Matters, insists that free and fair elections require, amongst other conditions, an informational environment that is not manipulated—one in which voters can form preferences based on accurate information. Buzzers systematically undermine this precondition.

The Freedom House report Freedom on the Net 2021 found that the online manipulation of content by paid or state-organised actors had occurred in 56 of the 70 countries surveyed. This reflects the phenomenon which Runciman (2018), in How Democracy Ends, identifies as one of the greatest threats to contemporary democracy: no longer the military coup, but the hollowing out of democracy from within through the manipulation of information and the corruption of its institutions.

 

3.4 Digital Violence and the Silencing of Critical Voices

The dangers posed by buzzers are not confined to the epistemic and electoral dimensions; they also manifest in the form of digital violence. Buzzers are frequently deployed to conduct coordinated attacks against critical voices—journalists, activists, academics, and political opponents—through campaigns of online intimidation, doxxing (the forcible disclosure of personal data), and mass harassment.

The report The Chilling Effect: Online Abuse and Self-Censorship of UK Journalists by Reporters Without Borders (2020) demonstrated how organised online intimidation produces a pervasive chilling effect: victims tend to engage in self-censorship in order to forestall further attacks. When buzzers are employed systematically to silence critical voices, the space for democratic deliberation—which requires the free exchange of ideas—contracts significantly.

IV. THE INDONESIAN CASE: BUZZERS AS A STRUCTURAL PHENOMENON

4.1 Context and the Historical Development of Buzzers in Indonesia

Indonesia is the country with the fourth-largest social media user base in the world, with more than 167 million active users (We Are Social, 2023). This mass penetration of digital platforms, combined with uneven levels of media literacy and weak regulatory frameworks, has created conditions exceptionally conducive to buzzer activity.

Tapsell (2017), in Media Power in Indonesia: Oligarchs, Citizens and the Digital Revolution, charts how Indonesia's media oligarchy not only dominates mainstream media but has also invested in the digital media ecosystem, including buzzer networks. This creates a situation in which information manipulation operates simultaneously at two levels: through the editorial biases of mass media outlets owned by powerful interests, and through the covert operations of buzzers on social media.

Research by Lim (2017), in her article Freedom to Hate: Social Media, Algorithmic Enclaves, and the Rise of Tribal Nationalism in Indonesia published in the journal Critical Asian Studies, demonstrates how Indonesian social media has become an arena of cultural conflict and sectarian nationalism, greatly exacerbated by the presence of buzzers. Lim identifies the 2016–2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election (Pilkada DKI) as an inflexion point at which the use of buzzers and the spread of hoaxes reached an unprecedented scale.

This finding is reinforced by Fossati and Kawamura (2020), who show how religious narratives are instrumentalised through digital channels—including buzzers and messaging apps like WhatsApp—to influence electoral choices. This process not only impacts the outcome of the regional elections but also leaves a deep imprint on the social cohesion of Jakarta and, more broadly, Indonesian society.

Religion in Indonesia has increasingly been instrumentalised through digital channels, with social media buzzers and messaging apps such as WhatsApp amplifying religious narratives for political ends. Scholars such as Fossati, Kawamura, and Mietzner highlight how these practices deepen polarisation, manipulate identity politics, and erode democratic trust.

The digital era has transformed how religion is communicated and politicised in Indonesia. Platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp have become fertile ground for the mobilisation of religious identity. Buzzers—paid or coordinated online accounts—play a central role in amplifying religiously charged messages, often framing political competition in moral or theological terms. This instrumentalisation is not merely spontaneous but systematically organised to shape public opinion and delegitimise opponents.

Messaging apps like WhatsApp are particularly powerful because of their closed, intimate networks, which make content appear more trustworthy. Religious narratives, whether sermons, memes, or doctored news, circulate rapidly in these groups, reinforcing communal identities and creating echo chambers. Fossati and Kawamura argue that this dynamic has allowed political actors to exploit religious sentiment, embedding it into everyday digital interactions.

Scholarly Perspectives

Fossati and Kawamura describe how political elites deploy “authoritarian innovations” by harnessing social media campaigns, including religious rhetoric, to suppress critics and justify policies. This often involves mobilising conservative religious discourses to delegitimise pluralist voices.

Mietzner emphasises that under Jokowi’s presidency, the state both resisted and co‑opted religious mobilisation. While pluralism was promoted, the government also relied on digital campaigns—sometimes infused with religious narratives—to consolidate authority, contributing to democratic backsliding.

Research on buzzer culture shows that religion is instrumentalised as part of identity politics, creating polarisation and normalising toxic practices. Buzzers construct false consensus around religious issues, shaping perceptions of legitimacy and morality in politics.

Consequences

The instrumentalisation of religion through digital channels has several profound effects:

• Polarisation: Religious narratives sharpen divisions between communities, often framing politics as a struggle between “true believers” and “enemies of faith.”
• Manipulation of Identity: Digital campaigns construct and reinforce religious identities, making them central to political loyalty.
• Erosion of Trust: When religion is used as a political weapon, democratic institutions lose credibility, and citizens become more susceptible to misinformation.
• Social Conflict: Amplification of religious issues online contributes to horizontal tensions, threatening social harmony and pluralism.

In short, the work of Fossati, Kawamura, and Mietzner demonstrates that religion in Indonesia’s digital sphere is not merely a matter of faith but a political instrument, wielded through buzzers and messaging apps to consolidate power and shape democratic discourse.

[Part 2]

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