War : Survivors, Memory, and Moral Responsibility (29)

The historical relationship between the Arab world and the Western bloc following the Second World War is a sophisticated tapestry of strategic pragmatism, often referred to as Realpolitik, rather than a simple narrative of total alignment or betrayal. Following 1945, the Middle East emerged as a vital Cold War frontier, prompting the United States to cultivate deep ties with conservative monarchies such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Pahlavi-era Iran. These alliances were primarily forged to provide a bulwark against Soviet expansionism and the rise of radical, secular Arab nationalism, which many traditional monarchies viewed as a direct threat to their own survival.

However, the notion that these pro-Western states never defended fellow Muslim nations is historically incomplete. While these governments often prioritised regime security and economic stability—largely tied to the global oil trade—they frequently experienced significant friction with their Western partners when regional or religious interests were at stake. The most prominent example of this tension is the Arab-Israeli conflict. Despite their reliance on American military hardware and security guarantees, pro-Western Arab states led a massive oil embargo against the United States in 1973 to protest Western support for Israel. This demonstrated that there were clear limits to their Western alignment when the issue of Palestinian or Islamic solidarity became a domestic political necessity.

Furthermore, the decisions of these states were often driven by internal regional rivalries rather than a desire to please the West. For instance, during the 1990-1991 Gulf War, nations like Saudi Arabia and Egypt joined a US-led coalition against Iraq not merely out of Western loyalty, but because Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait posed an existential threat to the regional status quo. In such cases, the "pro-Western" stance was actually a calculated move to preserve their own sovereignty against a powerful neighbour.

While certain Arab nations have maintained enduring partnerships with the United States to counter threats—most notably the regional influence of Iran after 1979—they have consistently had to perform a delicate balancing act. They sought to reap the benefits of Western military and economic cooperation while simultaneously attempting to uphold their legitimacy as leaders within the Islamic world. Consequently, their actions were rarely a result of blind obedience to the West, but rather a complex response to the competing pressures of national interest, regional power struggles, and religious identity.

The landscape of the Middle East following the Second World War was defined by a stark division between newly independent states seeking Western patronage and those that pursued a more revolutionary, anti-imperialist path. Several monarchies established or solidified their pro-Western stance during this era, primarily to secure military protection and economic development through the burgeoning oil industry. Saudi Arabia remains the most enduring example, having formalised its strategic partnership with the United States through the 1945 meeting between King Abdulaziz and President Roosevelt. Similarly, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan maintained deep ties with the British and later the Americans to ensure its survival amidst regional instability. Kuwait, upon gaining independence in 1961, also aligned itself firmly with Western interests, a relationship that became a cornerstone of its national security strategy.

Conversely, the period was marked by the violent displacement of regimes that were perceived as being too closely aligned with Western "imperial" powers or that resisted the rising tide of Arab Nationalism and Socialism. The Kingdom of Iraq is perhaps the most significant casualty; in 1958, the pro-British monarchy was brutally overthrown in a military coup led by Abd al-Karim Qasim, shifting the country from a Western ally to a state often aligned with Soviet interests. In Egypt, the 1952 Revolution led by Gamal Abdel Nasser ousted the pro-British King Farouk, transforming the nation into a champion of Pan-Arabism that frequently clashed with Western powers, most notably during the Suez Crisis. Similarly, the Kingdom of Libya under King Idris was overthrown in 1969 by Muammar Gaddafi, who immediately dismantled Western military bases and nationalised oil interests.

These transitions underscore the volatile nature of post-war Arab politics, where alignment with the West often provided regime security but simultaneously invited domestic resentment and revolutionary fervour. The overthrow of these pro-Western administrations was rarely just about foreign policy; it was a rejection of the perceived subservience to former colonial masters in favour of a more assertive, albeit often authoritarian, national identity.

The geopolitical strategy of pro-Western Arab states regarding the triad of Iran, the United States, and Israel is defined by a complex hierarchy of threats, where Iran is increasingly viewed as the primary existential challenge. For many decades, the central pillar of Middle Eastern diplomacy was the Arab-Israeli conflict; however, following the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, a profound paradigm shift occurred. Conservative Sunni monarchies, particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, began to perceive Iran’s "export of the revolution" and its support for Shia proxies—such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen—as a far more immediate threat to their domestic stability and territorial integrity than the state of Israel. This shared apprehension has led to an unprecedented, albeit often quiet, realignment of regional interests.

In this context, the United States serves as the indispensable security guarantor for these Arab nations. Despite occasional diplomatic friction and concerns over American "pivoting" away from the Middle East, pro-Western Arab states remain deeply reliant on US military presence, intelligence sharing, and advanced weaponry to deter Iranian hegemony. The relationship is symbiotic: the US provides a protective umbrella and ensures the free flow of energy through the Strait of Hormuz, while Arab states offer strategic basing and cooperation in counter-terrorism efforts. Whenever tensions with Iran escalate, such as during maritime disputes or drone strikes on oil infrastructure, these nations consistently look to Washington to project power and maintain a regional balance that prevents Iranian dominance.

Most strikingly, the perception of Iran as a common enemy has fundamentally altered the Arab approach to Israel. This has culminated in the Abraham Accords, where several Arab nations formalised diplomatic ties with Israel, effectively de-linking the Palestinian issue from their broader strategic security needs. From their perspective, Israel is no longer viewed solely as an adversary but as a potent regional partner with a shared interest in containing Iranian influence and technological advancement. While the "Arab Street" remains sympathetic to the Palestinian cause, the ruling elites of pro-Western states increasingly view security cooperation with Israel and the US as a pragmatic necessity to counter-balance the "Shia Crescent" led by Tehran. Consequently, the contemporary regional dynamic is less about the old Arab-Israeli divide and more about a coalition of status-quo powers, backed by the US, standing against an Iranian-led "Axis of Resistance."

While the regional landscape is often dominated by Western-aligned monarchies, there exists a significant contingent of Arab nations that maintain a decidedly non-Western or anti-Western orientation, often characterised as the "Axis of Resistance" or the "Revisionist States." These nations typically reject American hegemony and the post-Cold War security architecture, choosing instead to foster deep strategic partnerships with rivals of the West, such as Russia and China. Syria remains the most prominent example of this stance; under the Ba'athist government of Bashar al-Assad, Damascus has maintained a decades-long alliance with Moscow and Tehran, viewing Western influence as an imperialist encroachment upon Arab sovereignty. For Syria, the presence of US troops on its soil and Western-led sanctions are seen as direct hostile acts, further cementing its position as a primary adversary of the Western bloc in the Levant.

Algeria also occupies a unique and fiercely independent position within the Arab world, rooted in its traumatic and revolutionary struggle against French colonial rule. Although it maintains functional economic ties with Europe—particularly regarding natural gas exports—its military and ideological sympathies have historically leaned towards the East. Algiers consistently avoids joining Western-led security alliances, maintains a robust military relationship with Russia, and remains a staunch critic of any perceived Western interference in the internal affairs of North African or Arab states. This non-aligned, yet often anti-Western, posture allows Algeria to project its own regional power without the perceived subservience that comes with being a formal US treaty ally.

In more recent years, the political landscape in Iraq and Lebanon has become increasingly bifurcated, with powerful domestic factions—most notably those aligned with Iran—working to diminish Western influence. In Iraq, while the official government maintains a delicate and often precarious relationship with Washington, there is a powerful and vocal parliamentary and paramilitary movement that demands the total withdrawal of US forces. Similarly, in Lebanon, the immense political and military weight of Hezbollah ensures that the state cannot fully align with Western objectives, especially regarding Israel and regional security. These nations represent a "grey zone" where the struggle between pro-Western aspirations and anti-Western revolutionary sentiment creates a state of perpetual geopolitical tension, ensuring that the Arab world remains far from a monolithic bloc under Western sway.

The geopolitical posture of the non-Western aligned Arab states towards the triad of Iran, the United States, and Israel is diametrically opposed to that of the Gulf monarchies, as these nations generally view Iran as a vital strategic partner or a "brotherly" revolutionary force rather than a regional threat. For the Syrian government and powerful political-military factions within Iraq and Lebanon, Iran represents the primary counterweight to Western influence and Israeli military dominance. This "Axis of Resistance" shares a common ideological framework that prioritises regional autonomy and the expulsion of American military footprints from the Middle East. Consequently, rather than seeking to contain Tehran, these actors often coordinate their security policies with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), viewing Iran’s technological and military support as essential for their own domestic survival and regional leverage.

Regarding the United States, these nations and factions adopt a posture of profound scepticism or outright hostility, perceiving Washington not as a security guarantor, but as an imperialist power whose primary aim is to protect Israeli interests and destabilise independent Arab states. In Damascus, the American presence is viewed as an illegal occupation, while in Baghdad, nationalist and pro-Iran parliamentary blocs consistently frame the US military mission as a violation of national sovereignty. This adversarial relationship with the United States is further exacerbated by the use of economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation, which forces these states to lean even more heavily into the orbits of Tehran and Moscow to bypass Western-led financial systems.

The stance towards Israel remains the most rigid element of their foreign policy, as these states continue to define themselves through their active or ideological opposition to the Zionist state. Unlike the signatories of the Abraham Accords, nations like Syria and the dominant political blocs in Lebanon and Iraq reject any normalisation of ties, maintaining that Israel is a colonial entity and the principal source of regional instability. This hostility toward Israel is inextricably linked to their support for Iran; they perceive Tehran’s regional network as the only credible military deterrent against Israeli expansionism. Therefore, the contemporary dynamic for this bloc is defined by a commitment to a "unified front" where the security of Damascus, the influence of Hezbollah in Beirut, and the power of the Popular Mobilisation Forces in Iraq are all seen as interconnected components of a broader struggle against Western and Israeli hegemony.

Within the complex tapestry of Middle Eastern geopolitics, several Arab nations have carved out a distinct niche by adopting a policy of active neutrality or strategic non-alignment, deliberately avoiding the binary choice between Western patronage and the anti-Western "Axis of Resistance." Oman is perhaps the most quintessential example of this diplomatic philosophy; for decades, Muscat has functioned as the "Switzerland of the Middle East," maintaining cordial relations with the United States and the United Kingdom while simultaneously serving as a vital back-channel for communications with Iran. This neutral stance is not merely a passive avoidance of conflict but a proactive foreign policy aimed at regional mediation, allowing Oman to facilitate historic negotiations, such as those leading to the original Iran nuclear deal, without being perceived as a puppet of any external power.

Qatar also operates within a unique space that defies simple categorisation, employing a sophisticated brand of "omni-directional" diplomacy. While the nation hosts the largest American military base in the region at Al-Udeid, it simultaneously maintains robust economic ties with Iran—with whom it shares the world’s largest natural gas field—and provides a platform for various political movements that are often at odds with Western interests. This dual approach allows Doha to act as an indispensable intermediary in some of the world's most intractable disputes, ranging from Taliban-US negotiations to prisoner swaps between Western powers and Iran. By positioning itself as a neutral ground where adversaries can meet, Qatar ensures its own security and global relevance through diplomatic utility rather than rigid military alliance.

Furthermore, nations such as Tunisia and, to a certain extent, Mauritania often lean towards a neutralist posture, primarily focusing on domestic stability and Mediterranean cooperation rather than entangling themselves in the broader ideological struggles of the Mashreq (the eastern Arab world). These states generally seek to maintain balanced partnerships with both the European Union and the wider Arab world, resisting the pressure to join confrontational blocs. This "middle path" allows neutral Arab states to preserve their sovereignty and economic interests in an increasingly multipolar world, proving that in a region often defined by fierce rivalries, there is significant strategic value in being a bridge rather than a fortress.

The concept of "the West" is frequently conflated with a monolithic adherence to American foreign policy; however, the internal dynamics of the Western bloc reveal a more nuanced spectrum of strategic autonomy and occasional defiance. While almost all Western nations maintain fundamental security ties with the United States through frameworks such as NATO, several states have historically pursued a "Gaullist" or independent path that prioritises European or national interests over Washington’s global agenda. France is the pre-eminent historical example of this tradition; under President Charles de Gaulle, France famously withdrew from NATO’s integrated military command in 1966 and developed its own independent nuclear deterrent, the force de frappe, specifically to avoid being subsumed into an American-led bipolar world order. Even today, Paris frequently advocates for "European strategic autonomy," arguing that Europe should not merely be a "junior partner" to the United States but a distinct pole in a multipolar world.

Similarly, nations such as Ireland, Austria, and Switzerland—while culturally and economically integral to the Western world—maintain official policies of military neutrality. These states are not members of NATO and have historically resisted being drawn into American-led military interventions, such as the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Their "non-pro-American" stance is not necessarily born of hostility, but rather a constitutional commitment to acting as impartial mediators in international disputes. This allows them to host international organisations and facilitate diplomacy in a way that formal US allies cannot, effectively distancing their national security identities from the strategic directives of the White House.

In the contemporary era, the rise of "illiberal" or populist movements within the West has further complicated the transatlantic alliance. Nations like Hungary, under the leadership of Viktor Orbán, have frequently broken ranks with the US and the broader European Union on critical issues, such as relations with Russia and China. Budapest often pursues a policy of "Eastern Opening," seeking to balance its Western institutional memberships with pragmatic, and sometimes supportive, ties to Washington’s primary geopolitical rivals. This suggests that the "West" is increasingly a collection of states with diverging interests, where the degree of "pro-Americanism" is constantly being renegotiated based on domestic politics and the perceived decline of unipolar American influence.

Within the Western political sphere, the consensus on Israel is far from uniform, manifesting instead as a spectrum ranging from stalwart military alliance to profound diplomatic friction. There is a significant cohort of Western nations that maintain a policy of "critical engagement"—states that do not necessarily support Israel’s geopolitical objectives, particularly concerning the occupation of Palestinian territories, yet stop well short of outright hostility. Ireland and Luxembourg are perhaps the most vocal proponents of this cautious stance; while they recognise Israel’s right to exist and maintain functional diplomatic and economic ties, they are frequently the sharpest critics of Israeli settlement policy within the European Union. For these nations, support is conditional upon adherence to international law, and they often lead the push for Palestinian statehood recognition, viewing their role as a moral arbiter rather than a strategic ally of the Israeli state.

Conversely, the notion of a Western country being "anti-Israel" or "hostile" is complicated by the distinction between a state's official diplomatic position and its increasingly adversarial political climate. While no Western government officially calls for the destruction of Israel, certain nations have adopted measures that Israel perceives as deeply hostile. Norway and Spain, for instance, have recently moved towards a more confrontational diplomatic posture by formally recognising the State of Palestine, a move that Jerusalem interpreted as a direct affront to its national security interests. Furthermore, the Belgian and Irish parliaments have seen significant legislative movements aimed at banning goods produced in Israeli settlements, representing a form of economic pressure that borders on a "soft-hostility" rarely seen among traditional Western allies like the United States or Germany.

In the most extreme cases of diplomatic breakdown, countries such as Iceland have historically experienced periods of intense friction; in 2015, the Reykjavik City Council famously passed a resolution to boycott all Israeli goods, although this was later rescinded following international pressure. While these actions do not constitute a state of war, they signal a growing "de-alignment" where the shared values of the post-war Western order are being re-evaluated through the lens of human rights and decolonisation. Consequently, the "West" can no longer be viewed as a reliable diplomatic monolith for Israel; instead, it is a fractured landscape where historical guilt—prevalent in Germany and Austria—clashes with a modern, progressive commitment to international law that is increasingly prevalent in the Nordic and Mediterranean regions.

The overarching conclusion to be drawn from this extensive historical and geopolitical survey is that neither "the Arab world" nor "the West" functions as a monolithic bloc, but rather as a fluid collection of sovereign states driven by the pragmatic dictates of Realpolitik. Since the end of the Second World War, the alignment of these nations has been shaped less by shared cultural or religious identities and more by the cold calculations of national security, regime survival, and economic interest. While the United States has successfully maintained a network of conservative Arab allies to secure energy flows and contain Iranian influence, this partnership has never been absolute; even the most pro-Western monarchies have demonstrated a capacity for defiance when their regional legitimacy or domestic stability was threatened, particularly regarding the Palestinian cause.

Conversely, the emergence of a "Revisionist" or anti-Western axis—comprising states like Syria and various non-state actors—highlights a profound ideological schism within the Middle East that transcends simple religious divides. These nations view Western intervention not as a stabilizing force but as an imperialist encroachment, leading them to forge deep strategic bonds with Moscow and Tehran. This internal Arab rivalry often supersedes the historical animosity toward Israel, as evidenced by the recent trend of normalisation among status-quo powers who now view Iran as a more immediate existential threat. The presence of neutral intermediaries like Oman and Qatar further complicates this binary, proving that there is significant diplomatic currency in maintaining a "middle path" that bridges the gap between global superpowers and regional adversaries.

Ultimately, the traditional post-war international order is undergoing a period of significant "de-alignment" and fragmentation. The Western world itself is no longer a unified diplomatic front, with nations like France asserting strategic autonomy and others like Ireland or Spain adopting increasingly critical, and at times adversarial, postures toward Israel based on international law. This suggests that the future of global politics will be defined by a shift away from rigid, permanent alliances toward a more multipolar and transactional landscape. In this new era, nations across both the Arab and Western worlds are increasingly likely to prioritise their specific strategic needs over the collective directives of any single superpower, leading to a world that is far more complex, unpredictable, and ideologically diverse than the era that immediately followed 1945.

[Part 30]
[Part 28]

Bahasa