The discourse surrounding the possible impeachment of Indonesian Vice President Gibran Rakabuming Raka raises a fundamental question: does the removal of a vice president automatically entail the removal of the president as well? This article argues that, from a constitutional standpoint, there is no provision requiring President Prabowo Subianto to be removed alongside Gibran should the latter be impeached. The phrase “and/or” in Article 7A of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia explicitly allows for the separation of these two legal subjects. Nevertheless, the article also acknowledges that the “single-ticket” logic circulating in public discourse rests on a political foundation that cannot simply be dismissed, even though that foundation differs in nature from a constitutional-law foundation.I. Introduction: The Background to the Debate
The question of impeaching Vice-President Gibran Rakabuming Raka came to the fore after the Forum of Retired Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) Personnel sent a formal proposal to the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) and the House of Representatives (DPR). The development drew a response from Indonesia's seventh president, Joko Widodo, who stated that any impeachment ought to be carried out as a “single package”, since the president and vice-president are elected together on one ticket.
That statement immediately sparked debate among constitutional law scholars. The question is simple yet fundamental: is impeachment genuinely bound by the same “single-ticket” logic that governs nomination and election? This article sets out to answer that question systematically, grounding its analysis in the constitutional text, Indonesia's constitutional practice, and the views of constitutional law experts that are already well established in both academic and public discourse.
II. The Principal Argument: Impeachment Can Proceed Separately
A. The Phrase “and/or” in Article 7A of the Constitution
The starting point for this argument lies in the wording of Article 7A of the 1945 Constitution, which provides that the president and/or the vice-president may be removed from office during their term by the People's Consultative Assembly upon a proposal from the House of Representatives. Grammatically and legally, the phrase “and/or” carries three possible meanings at once: removal may be imposed on the president alone, on the vice-president alone, or on both simultaneously. Such a choice of wording is no drafting accident; rather, it reflects a deliberate decision by the framers of the Constitution to build flexibility into the removal mechanism, so that it can be applied to whichever office-holder has actually committed the violation in question.
Mukhlish, in his work Konstitusionalitas Impeachment: Presiden dan Wakil Presiden di Indonesia (The Constitutionality of Impeachment: The President and Vice-President in Indonesia), offers a comprehensive account of the constitutionality of impeachment in post-amendment Indonesian constitutional law, including the position of the Constitutional Court within that process. In a similar vein, Jimly Asshiddiqie, across various writings on constitutional law, has argued that the phrase “and/or” was a conscious choice by the framers intended to provide flexibility in the removal mechanism, rather than a mere linguistic variation devoid of legal significance.
B. An Identical Procedure, Applied Separately
Article 7B of the Constitution sets out a removal procedure that is, in essence, identical for both the president and the vice-president: it begins with a proposal from the House of Representatives, proceeds to an examination by the Constitutional Court of the alleged legal violation, and concludes with a decision by the People's Consultative Assembly. What deserves particular emphasis is that not a single clause in Article 7B states that proceedings against the vice-president must be accompanied by, or must result in, proceedings against the president.
In Chapters III and IV of his book, Mukhlish specifically sets out the position of the Constitutional Court within the judicial power system and examines the constitutionality of impeaching the president and/or the vice-president in Indonesia. This discussion is reinforced by an article in Jurnal Konstitusi (Constitution Journal) entitled “The Independence of the Constitutional Court in the Process of Impeaching the President and/or Vice-President”, which affirms that the Constitutional Court bears a constitutional obligation to rule on the House of Representatives' opinion regarding the removal of the president and/or the vice-president, without requiring that both be processed simultaneously.
C. Constitutional Practice: The Precedent of a Vice-President's Resignation
Indonesia's constitutional history has in fact already produced a precedent showing that a vice-president can relinquish office independently, without affecting the president's position. In 1956, Vice-President Mohammad Hatta resigned from office owing to a divergence of political vision with President Sukarno. President Sukarno nonetheless remained in office until 1967, well beyond the point of Hatta's resignation. This precedent stands as empirical evidence that the separation between the offices of president and vice-president is not merely a theoretical construct, but something that has genuinely occurred in the practice of Indonesian statecraft.
Dr Febriansyah Ramadhan, a lecturer in constitutional law at the Faculty of Law, Universitas Pendidikan Nasional, raised this historical precedent in his opinion piece “Menjernihkan Jabatan Wakil Presiden” (“Clarifying the Office of the Vice-President”), published by Hukumonline in 2025, as a basis for the argument that the vice-presidency can come to an end independently of the presidency.
D. The Views of Contemporary Constitutional Law Scholars
A number of contemporary constitutional law experts likewise maintain that the impeachment of a vice-president can proceed separately from that of the president. Zainal Arifin Mochtar, Professor of Constitutional Law at Universitas Gadjah Mada, has stated in various public remarks that the impeachment process for a vice-president can run independently, depending on prevailing legal and political dynamics. A similar view was expressed by Professor Siti Zuhro, a Principal Researcher formerly with LIPI and now under BRIN, who told national media that the “single-ticket” logic is only relevant in the context of elections, not in the context of impeachment.
III. The Counter-Argument: The “Single-Package” LogicAn Inseparable Pair of Candidates
The argument against separating impeachment proceedings typically rests on the fact that the president and vice-president are elected as a single pair of candidates in one round of voting. The reasoning runs as follows: if one member of that pair is found to have committed a serious violation, the mandate the electorate conferred upon the pair as a whole is thereby tainted, and removal should therefore extend to both. This is precisely the view expressed by Indonesia's seventh president, Joko Widodo, when he stated that the president and vice-president were elected as a single package, not separately.
IV. Analysis: Why the “Single-Package” Logic Is Not Constitutionally Sound
On closer examination, the “single-package” logic, when applied to impeachment, is mistaken because it conflates two mechanisms that are fundamentally different in character: the electoral mechanism and the accountability mechanism. Joint election as a single ticket is an instrument of electoral democracy, whose function is to determine the pair of leaders who will govern together. Impeachment, by contrast, is an instrument of constitutional law whose function is to enforce accountability for legal violations or disgraceful conduct committed by an individual office-holder. The two instruments differ entirely in their legal basis, purpose and procedure, and it is therefore not appropriate to impose the logic governing one instrument upon the other.
Articles 7A and 7B of the Constitution expressly separate the legal subjects who may be impeached, through their use of the phrase “and/or”. Had the framers of the Constitution intended impeachment always to proceed as a single package, the wording used would surely have been “the President and the Vice-President”, without the “or” option, as is customary in the drafting of norms intended to be cumulative in effect. The deliberate inclusion of an option for separation should instead be read as a clear expression of constitutional intent, rather than a mere linguistic oversight.
Furthermore, where a vice-president commits a legal violation that does not involve the president at all, there is no constitutional basis whatsoever for impeaching the president as well. Forcing the president's removal in such a situation would run directly counter to the principle of due process of law and the presumption of innocence, since an individual ought only to be held legally accountable for their own conduct, not for the conduct of another person, even one bound to them within the same governing pair.
V. Conclusion
On the basis of the foregoing analysis, it may be concluded that, as a matter of constitutional law, the impeachment of Vice-President Gibran Rakabuming Raka would not automatically entail the impeachment of President Prabowo Subianto. Articles 7A and 7B of the Constitution create room for the separation of legal subjects through the phrase “and/or”, and the procedure for impeaching a vice-president can, in principle, proceed independently, as has previously occurred in Indonesia's constitutional history and as is supported by well-established doctrine in constitutional law.
That said, in political terms, the actual composition of the House of Representatives and the patronage relationship between the president and vice-president remain decisive factors in whether any attempt to impeach Gibran would genuinely proceed. Although a separate impeachment is legally possible, its political realisation depends heavily on the political will of the president and his supporting coalition — meaning that the legal path and the political path in this matter ought to be understood as two distinct, if closely intertwined, domains.
Books
Mukhlish. Konstitusionalitas Impeachment: Presiden dan Wakil Presiden di Indonesia. Malang: Setara Press, 2016. ISBN: 978-602-1642-80-1.
Soimin. Impeachment Presiden dan Wakil Presiden di Indonesia. Yogyakarta: UII Press, 2009.
Irham, Muhammad. Teori dan Konsep Pemakzulan Presiden dalam Sistem Presidensial. Depok: Rajagrafindo Persada, 2026.
Legislation
Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia of 1945, Articles 7A and 7B.
Law No. 24 of 2003 concerning the Constitutional Court, Articles 80–85.
Articles and Other Sources
Ramadhan, Febriansyah. “Menjernihkan Jabatan Wakil Presiden.” Hukumonline, 2025.
CNN Indonesia. “Jokowi soal Usulan Pemakzulan Gibran: Presiden dan Wapres Itu Sepaket.” 6 June 2025.
Jurnal Konstitusi. “Independensi Mahkamah Konstitusi dalam Proses Pemakzulan Presiden dan/atau Wakil Presiden.” Mahkamah Konstitusi RI.
Author's note: This article is an initial concept piece that could be developed further through empirical research into current political conditions..
