Job Hoarding, Nation Draining (2)

Dual appointments tend to emerge most prominently during political transition or consolidation periods—typically after elections, cabinet reshuffles, or when a new regime seeks to secure its power base. These instances often occur when loyalty becomes a currency more valuable than expertise, and when political leaders need to reward supporters with prestigious or strategic posts across different sectors. In some cases, it is a response to a limited pool of trusted allies, where the same individuals are appointed to multiple roles to ensure “stability” or “alignment” across ministries, state-owned enterprises, and regulatory bodies.

Geographically, this phenomenon is not unique to Indonesia; however, it is particularly observable in countries where institutions are still maturing and democratic norms are not yet deeply entrenched. In such environments, formal checks and balances may exist on paper, but enforcement tends to be weak, allowing political elites to accumulate posts with minimal resistance. In Indonesia, dual appointments are commonly found in central government institutions—especially ministries, state-owned enterprises (BUMN), and regulatory authorities—where influence and access to budgetary power are most concentrated.

In many political systems, particularly those still consolidating democratic norms, the culture of patronage and political reward remains deeply entrenched. In Indonesia, this tradition manifests through a system where strategic public posts are often allocated not strictly on the basis of merit or competence, but as tokens of loyalty and instruments of political debt repayment. This practice is rooted in the idea that political support, especially during high-stakes events like general elections, must be compensated with tangible rewards. As such, those who have played instrumental roles in helping a candidate or party secure power—whether through campaign work, funding, or behind-the-scenes influence—are frequently rewarded with influential positions in ministries, state-owned enterprises, or regulatory bodies.

This form of appointment, often dubbed "political patronage," reflects a logic of reciprocal obligation: power is gained collectively, and must therefore be shared among those who contributed. The result, however, is a governance landscape where technical qualifications can be sidelined in favour of political reliability. Loyalty becomes the principal currency, and positions of authority are used not merely for public service, but as tools for consolidating political alliances, controlling resources, and extending influence. While such practices may ensure short-term stability for those in power, they often undermine the quality of public administration and weaken public trust in institutions, particularly when appointments are viewed as rewards rather than as merit-based selections.

David E. Lewis’s The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic Performance (2008) offers a comprehensive analysis of how political leaders often prioritise loyalty over competence when making appointments to key public positions. Although the book focuses on the United States, its insights resonate strongly with the Indonesian context, particularly in explaining how dual appointments—or rangkap jabatan—can emerge as part of a broader strategy to consolidate control and reward political allies. Lewis’s empirical research demonstrates how this trade-off between political loyalty and bureaucratic expertise tends to reduce institutional efficiency and erode public accountability.

Another relevant work is Jon S. T. Quah’s Curbing Corruption in Asian Countries: An Impossible Dream? (2011), which provides comparative case studies from across Asia, including Indonesia. The book discusses how systemic corruption and the legacy of patron-client relationships contribute to overlapping roles in public offices. Quah argues that the intertwining of personal loyalty and institutional authority weakens good governance and allows practices like dual appointments to flourish under the guise of political pragmatism.

Taken together, these works highlight how the problem of rangkap jabatan is not just a question of administrative inefficiency but reflects deeper issues of political culture, institutional weakness, and the persistence of patronage-driven governance.

The phenomenon of officials holding multiple positions in Indonesia is a deeply complex issue, rooted in various structural factors, political culture, and power dynamics. Several key elements contribute to its persistence.

Patronage and political reciprocity play a significant role in determining appointments to strategic public positions. These roles are often awarded not solely on the basis of competence, but rather as a form of reward for political loyalty. Officials who have contributed to electoral victories or demonstrated unwavering allegiance to those in power frequently receive additional posts as tokens of appreciation or incentives for continued fidelity.

The centralisation of power also fosters this practice, as holding multiple positions is perceived as a symbol of authority and influence. In a bureaucratic system that still retains feudalistic tendencies, the accumulation of titles grants wider access to budgets, resources, and political networks, reinforcing one’s standing within the hierarchy.

Economic motives and access to funds further encourage office-holding multiplicity. Each official role typically comes with perks, allowances, and operational budgets, all of which can be leveraged for personal or political advantage. By occupying several positions concurrently, officials can tap into multiple financial streams, heightening their capacity to manoeuvre resources to suit their interests.

Weak enforcement and lax regulatory oversight exacerbate the problem. Although certain laws, such as the State Civil Apparatus Act, the Ministerial Affairs Act, and various regulations governing state-owned enterprises, formally prohibit officials from holding multiple offices, their implementation is often inconsistent or circumvented through administrative loopholes. Institutions tasked with oversight, including the Corruption Eradication Commission, the Ombudsman, and the Supreme Audit Agency, rarely take decisive action unless there is substantial public pressure.

Conflict of interest, which would be considered a serious violation in countries with robust governance systems, is frequently dismissed in Indonesia as either inconsequential or, paradoxically, a form of bureaucratic “efficiency.” Such a mindset undermines institutional integrity and the effectiveness of governance structures, allowing personal affiliations and financial incentives to override public service obligations.

Furthermore, the absence of clear, universally applicable restrictions allows officials to exploit inconsistencies in regulatory frameworks. Rules governing multiple office-holding vary depending on one’s position, whether as a civil servant, minister, commissioner of a state-owned enterprise, or regional leader. The lack of harmonised legislation enables officials to occupy numerous roles simultaneously without overtly violating explicit legal provisions.

The weakness of political parties from an ideological standpoint contributes to this issue as well. Many parties function more as power distribution agencies rather than institutions dedicated to leadership development. As a result, individuals deemed loyal are rewarded with multiple positions, regardless of their actual capabilities or expertise.

Concrete examples of this phenomenon abound. Numerous ministers concurrently serve as commissioners in state-owned enterprises, a situation that poses significant risks of conflict of interest. Similarly, regional officials frequently take on roles as leaders of sports organisations, political parties, and even commissioners in local government-owned companies, further entrenching the practice.

This intricate web of patronage, political symbolism, financial motives, weak regulation, and opportunistic party structures continues to perpetuate the culture of multi-office holding, shaping Indonesia’s governance landscape in ways that prioritise power consolidation over institutional integrity.

One of the key reasons behind the prevalence of dual appointments in Indonesia is the centralisation of power within the executive branch and among elite political actors. In a system where authority is heavily concentrated at the top, proximity to power becomes not only desirable but also strategically advantageous. Holding multiple roles allows individuals to extend their influence across sectors, tighten control over resources, and reinforce political alliances. This practice is often rationalised as a means of “ensuring coordination” or “streamlining decision-making,” but in practice, it frequently results in administrative inefficiencies and weakened institutional independence.

Equally significant is the role of status symbolism in Indonesian political culture. Positions of authority are not merely functional—they are also powerful markers of prestige, honour, and social hierarchy. To hold a public office is to be seen, to be respected, and often, to be feared. The more titles one accumulates, the more one's social and political capital grows. In such a system, rangkap jabatan becomes a form of currency—an outward display of one's closeness to the centre of power and one’s indispensability to the system. Rather than being viewed as a conflict of interest or a governance risk, it is often seen as a badge of honour.

This entanglement of power centralisation and status obsession means that even modest reforms struggle to gain traction. The dual roles serve not only bureaucratic functions but also symbolic ones, reinforcing the myth that power must be visible, accumulated, and never shared too widely.

Another significant reason for the persistence of dual appointments in Indonesia lies in the economic incentives attached to public office. Holding a government position often comes with not only a stable income but also a variety of allowances, perks, and indirect benefits. When individuals are appointed to multiple roles, these financial advantages are multiplied—sometimes exponentially. The motivation, therefore, is not solely about serving the public interest, but also about maximising personal gain under the pretext of public service.

Furthermore, access to institutional budgets is a powerful motivator. Being in a strategic role means having influence over how funds are allocated, which projects receive priority, and which networks benefit from the distribution of resources. This creates fertile ground for rent-seeking behaviour, patronage, and, in some cases, corrupt practices. When the same individual occupies multiple posts, it centralises control over budgetary flows and reduces checks and balances. In such a scenario, transparency becomes an afterthought, and accountability is diluted by overlapping lines of authority.

Hence, for many public officials, holding multiple posts is not just a question of prestige or duty—it is a calculated economic strategy. The dual roles provide both symbolic status and material advantage, creating a self-reinforcing cycle where power, money, and access are all intimately linked.

One of the core reasons dual appointments persist in Indonesia is the systemic weakness in institutional oversight and the inconsistent enforcement of existing rules. While regulations technically exist to prevent conflicts of interest and the accumulation of excessive power, they are often either too vague, poorly implemented, or simply ignored. The bodies responsible for monitoring such violations—be they parliamentary commissions, anti-corruption agencies, or internal audit offices—are frequently underfunded, politically compromised, or lack the teeth to act decisively.

In this kind of environment, impunity becomes the norm. Officials who hold multiple positions often face little to no consequence, especially if they enjoy protection from political patrons or are deemed loyal to those in power. As a result, the risks of violating ethical codes or governance norms are outweighed by the benefits of increased control and resources.

Moreover, public outcry or media scrutiny tends to be episodic—loud when a scandal breaks, but quickly fading as the news cycle moves on. Without sustained pressure, the political will to reform is weak. In essence, the system rewards silence and punishes disruption, allowing dual appointments to flourish in plain sight.

A critical factor contributing to the prevalence of dual appointments in Indonesia is the widespread normalisation of conflicts of interest. In many bureaucratic and political circles, holding multiple roles—despite the obvious overlap in duties and the potential for compromised decision-making—is rarely viewed as problematic. Instead of being treated as a threat to institutional integrity, it is often framed as a sign of competence or loyalty.

This casual attitude stems partly from the absence of a strong ethical culture within public administration. Codes of conduct do exist, but they are seldom internalised or enforced. As a result, decisions that clearly favour personal networks or private interests are tolerated, or even expected. Dual office-holding becomes a way to consolidate influence, distribute favours, and maintain control, rather than an issue of accountability or public trust.

What’s more, the language around conflict of interest in Indonesia is often abstract and devoid of consequence. Unlike in more robust systems where even perceived conflicts can trigger resignations, here they are brushed aside with vague justifications or technical loopholes. This lack of seriousness diminishes the very concept of ethical governance and erodes public confidence in institutions.

One of the fundamental reasons why dual appointments continue to thrive in Indonesia is the absence of clear, strict, and uniformly enforced limits on holding multiple public offices. The existing regulations are often fragmented, ambiguous, or inconsistently applied across different institutions and levels of government. This creates a legal grey area where individuals and institutions can interpret the rules to their advantage.

Without a robust framework that unequivocally defines what is allowed and what is not, officials are left to navigate a patchwork of guidelines that lack teeth. This inconsistency not only makes enforcement difficult but also allows loopholes that are easily exploited. For instance, one agency might prohibit overlapping roles explicitly, while another might turn a blind eye, creating a mismatch that officials can exploit by juggling titles and responsibilities in different places.

Moreover, the absence of a universally accepted standard sends a signal that dual appointments are tolerable or even normal, eroding the culture of good governance. It also places the burden of interpretation on individual ethics rather than on firm institutional boundaries, which is a precarious foundation for public administration. When limits are vague and enforcement selective, it breeds uncertainty, confusion, and ultimately enables the persistence of overlapping roles without meaningful accountability.

One of the underlying causes of the persistence of dual appointments in Indonesia is the weakness of political parties in terms of clear and strong ideological foundations. Many political parties tend to prioritise personal gain, patronage, and power consolidation over coherent policy platforms or principled governance. This ideological ambiguity means parties are more likely to reward loyalty and political favours than to enforce standards of meritocracy or accountability within their ranks.

Without a solid ideological compass, parties struggle to hold their members accountable or to promote a culture of professionalism. Instead, appointments—whether to legislative seats, executive positions, or public agencies—are often made based on political expediency, coalition-building, or rewarding election support. This creates a fertile ground for politicians and officials to accumulate multiple roles as a way of securing influence and resources.

Furthermore, when political parties are not driven by clear ideological values, their internal discipline weakens, and the line between public service and personal or factional interest blurs. Dual appointments then become a tool not just for individuals, but for parties themselves, to maintain control and reward networks, perpetuating a cycle that undermines good governance and institutional integrity.

As of June 2025, at least five Deputy Ministers in Indonesia are known to be concurrently holding positions as commissioners or supervisory board members in state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This practice has sparked widespread criticism and concern, especially from civil society groups, legal scholars, and anti-corruption watchdogs. It is seen not only as ethically questionable but also as potentially unconstitutional and detrimental to the quality of public service and governance.

Among the individuals involved is the Deputy Minister of State-Owned Enterprises, who also serves as a Commissioner at Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI), one of the country's largest public banks. Similarly, the Deputy Minister of Finance has been appointed as Vice President Commissioner at PT PLN (Persero), the state electricity company. Another example is the Deputy Minister of Defence, who is simultaneously holding a commissioner role at PT Len Industri, a state-owned company in the defence sector. In addition, also serving as Deputy Minister at the Ministry of SOEs, holds a commissioner post at PLN, while the Deputy Minister of Agriculture, is acting as the Chair of the Supervisory Board of BULOG, the government logistics agency.

This pattern of dual appointments has raised alarm because it conflicts with a ruling from the Constitutional Court of Indonesia (MK) issued in Decision No. 80/PUU-XXII/2019. The ruling clearly prohibits public officials, including Ministers and potentially their Deputies, from occupying concurrent positions in either state-owned or private companies. The underlying concern is that such arrangements open the door to conflicts of interest and weaken the integrity of public service, especially in the oversight and decision-making processes within these enterprises.

Public criticism has largely focused on the potential erosion of institutional credibility and effectiveness. Observers argue that the dual roles may distract these officials from their primary responsibilities and compromise their ability to maintain impartiality in managing state assets. Moreover, many believe that this practice undermines the spirit of the rule of law and creates an atmosphere where ethical governance is seen as optional rather than essential.

In response to these developments, the Indonesia Law and Democracy Studies (ILDES) organisation has initiated a judicial review, seeking a constitutional interpretation that extends the ban on concurrent positions to Deputy Ministers as well. Their petition challenges the wording of Article 23 of the Ministry of State Law, urging the Constitutional Court to interpret the term "Minister" as inclusive of both Ministers and their Deputies, thereby preventing Deputy Ministers from simultaneously serving as commissioners in SOEs.

Ultimately, this issue reflects deeper structural and cultural problems in Indonesian governance, where political patronage, lack of regulatory enforcement, and blurred ethical boundaries continue to persist. Without meaningful reform and stricter enforcement of existing regulations, such practices are likely to continue, to the detriment of good governance and public trust.

If the practice of deputy ministers holding multiple positions in state-owned enterprises continues unchecked, several negative consequences may unfold, both in the short and long term. In the immediate future, we are likely to witness a further decline in public trust toward the government. Citizens may grow increasingly cynical, believing that political power is less about public service and more about privilege and personal gain. This cynicism can weaken civic engagement, discourage talented individuals from entering public service, and foster a culture of resignation, where people no longer expect integrity or accountability from their leaders.

Moreover, in the short term, the dual roles of deputy ministers can cause serious conflicts of interest. When individuals are expected to both supervise and be part of the very entities they’re supposed to regulate, objectivity and fairness are compromised. Strategic decisions within BUMNs may no longer be made based on performance or national interest, but rather on political allegiances and personal relationships. This undermines meritocracy and can reduce the overall efficiency and innovation within these enterprises.

In the long term, if this practice becomes institutionalised or normalised, it risks entrenching a system of political patronage that is extremely difficult to dismantle. Public offices could be seen less as positions of responsibility and more as stepping stones to lucrative board seats. Such a culture weakens democratic institutions and makes corruption harder to detect, as conflicts of interest become part of the expected norm. Over time, this could result in widespread inefficiency, loss of competitiveness of BUMNs, and systemic barriers for reforms. It may also discourage foreign investment, as investors grow wary of opaque governance and questionable business practices.

Ultimately, a government that allows its top officials to wear too many hats sends a dangerous message: that power is to be leveraged, not entrusted. And when that becomes the rule rather than the exception, the state risks becoming a playground for the few, rather than a platform for the many.

In conclusion, the phenomenon of holding multiple public offices simultaneously in Indonesia is a complex issue deeply rooted in systemic challenges. It is not merely a question of individual ambition or incompetence, but rather a symptom of broader structural weaknesses, including ambiguous regulations, weak ideological foundations of political parties, and a culture that often overlooks conflicts of interest. Addressing this issue requires a multifaceted approach, combining clear and enforceable legal frameworks with stronger political will to promote meritocracy and transparency. Only by confronting these underlying factors can Indonesia hope to build a more accountable, effective, and trustworthy public administration that truly serves its people rather than perpetuating cycles of patronage and power consolidation.

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