Job Hoarding, Nation Draining (1)

There once was a high-ranking Indonesian official known affectionately—or perhaps fearfully—as “Mr. Thousand Titles.” His name appeared in so many ministries, boardrooms, and ceremonial WhatsApp groups that some began to suspect he had cloned himself, or at least had a twin hiding somewhere in a  filing cabinet.

One day, two meetings were scheduled at exactly the same time: one at a ministry, discussing a new regulatory framework that could potentially affect millions of citizens; the other at a state-owned cement company, discussing performance bonuses and buffet options. Faced with this impossible choice, the official calmly dispatched two trusted aides with specific instructions:

"Read the room. If the mood is tense, tell them I’m abroad. If the catering is decent, text me immediately—I’ll teleport in."

He once mistakenly walked into the wrong meeting—a quiet farewell for a retiring logistics clerk. Rather than excuse himself, he remained seated, nodded sagely, and, when prompted, gave an impromptu speech:

"Retirement," he said solemnly, "is not the end of one’s journey. It is merely a gateway—to advisory roles, to board appointments, to… well, whatever pays decently without requiring attendance."

Everyone applauded. No one had the heart to tell him it wasn’t a job interview.

He became so prolific at multitasking that his official calendar needed a loading screen. At one point, Google Calendar asked: “Are you sure this is humanly possible?”

When news broke that the government would begin auditing overlapping roles, he chuckled over his espresso and quipped,

"If they audit all my jobs, I dare say the audit office will need to hire extra staff. Possibly… me."

In theory, “dual appointments” or “holding multiple offices” or “dual roles”, refers to the practice wherein a single individual occupies more than one official position at the same time, typically within government, state-owned enterprises, or public institutions. This can involve, for instance, a deputy minister also serving as a commissioner in a state-owned company, or a civil servant holding a supervisory role in a regulatory agency while still maintaining their original bureaucratic post.

Theoretically, dual appointments raise significant concerns in political science and public administration. They are often associated with blurred lines of responsibility, conflicts of interest, diminished accountability, and an over-concentration of power in the hands of a few. While some argue that such practices may promote policy coherence or expedite decision-making, critics suggest they erode democratic checks and balances and reduce overall institutional efficiency.

This phenomenon is closely linked to role conflict, institutional capture, and bureaucratic overload in British and American academic discourse. It represents a tension between efficiency and integrity—where having “one foot in every camp” might sound strategic, but often results in poor governance.

In Bureaucracy and Democracy: Accountability and Performance (2020, CQ Press), Steven J. Balla and William T. Gormley explore how public institutions function and how their effectiveness can be compromised when officials hold multiple roles. The book highlights that modern bureaucracies are bound by a principle known as bounded rationality, which implies that decision-makers, including civil servants and public officials, operate under limitations of time, information, and capacity. When one person holds more than one official position, these limitations become more severe. Decisions may be rushed, incomplete, or influenced by conflicting interests due to the overload of responsibilities.
Moreover, the authors draw on principal-agent theory, which explains how elected leaders (the principals) rely on appointed officials (the agents) to implement policies. When an agent holds several roles at once, it becomes harder for the principal to monitor them effectively, resulting in blurred lines of responsibility and weakened accountability. This muddling of duties also opens the door to interest group pressures, whereby an official with multiple posts may be lobbied by several competing factions. Their decisions, then, may no longer serve the public interest, but rather the interests of those who have the loudest voices or deepest pockets.
In addition, the book discusses how public administration today functions within complex governance networks. Holding multiple roles may place an individual at the centre of these overlapping networks, allowing them to wield considerable influence. However, this also disperses responsibility, making it more difficult to determine who is ultimately accountable for a given decision or policy outcome.
In essence, the more hats a public official wears, the less clear it becomes whose head they are actually on. What might seem like an efficient use of talent and loyalty could in fact lead to inefficiency, conflict of interest, and a lack of democratic oversight.

Balla and Gormley delve into the complexities that arise when public officials hold multiple roles, leading to role conflict and overlapping authority. Such scenarios can significantly impact institutional performance and democratic oversight.
Role conflict occurs when an individual is expected to fulfill multiple responsibilities that may have conflicting objectives or demands. For instance, a public official serving both as a policy implementer and a regulator might face situations where the goals of one role contradict the other. This duality can lead to compromised decision-making, as the official may struggle to balance the competing interests inherent in each position.
Overlapping authority refers to situations where multiple officials or agencies have jurisdiction over the same policy areas or functions. This can result in confusion, duplication of efforts, and inefficiencies, as well as challenges in pinpointing accountability. When responsibilities are not clearly delineated, it becomes difficult to determine who is answerable for specific outcomes, thereby weakening democratic oversight.
The authors highlight that such structural complexities can erode the effectiveness of public institutions. When roles and authorities overlap without clear boundaries, it not only hampers performance but also undermines the mechanisms that ensure officials are held accountable to the public.

In Jobs for the Boys: Patronage and the State in Comparative Perspective (2012, Harvard University Press), Merilee S. Grindle examines how political patronage operates by placing loyal individuals into multiple state positions. She argues that such practices, often termed "job stacking" or "office hoarding," undermine meritocracy and transparency, particularly in developing democracies.
Grindle observes that patronage systems, while frequently criticised as corrupt and inefficient, persist because they offer political leaders flexibility to achieve various objectives. By appointing loyalists to multiple positions, leaders can consolidate power, ensure policy compliance, and reward supporters. However, this concentration of roles often leads to conflicts of interest and diminishes the effectiveness of public institutions.
The practice of job stacking erodes merit-based recruitment by prioritising loyalty over competence. It creates an environment where appointments are made based on personal connections rather than qualifications, leading to a lack of transparency and accountability. In developing democracies, where institutional checks may be weaker, such practices can entrench elite dominance and hinder democratic progress.
Grindle's analysis highlights the challenges of transitioning from patronage-based systems to meritocratic civil services. She notes that reforms are often met with resistance from those benefiting from the status quo, making the path to transparent and efficient governance complex and protracted.

In The Oxford Handbook of Public Accountability (2014, Oxford University Press), edited by Mark Bovens, Robert E. Goodin, and Thomas Schillemans, the complexities arising from overlapping roles—such as dual appointments—are examined in depth. Such arrangements can significantly complicate public accountability by introducing conflicts of interest, institutional overload, and role duplication.
The handbook discusses how individuals holding multiple positions may face conflicting demands from different accountability forums. For instance, a public official serving both as a regulator and a policy implementer might receive divergent expectations from various stakeholders, leading to decision-making dilemmas. This scenario aligns with the concept of "multiple accountabilities," where the pressure to satisfy numerous, and sometimes conflicting, accountability demands can hinder effective governance.
Moreover, the accumulation of roles can lead to institutional overload. When officials are stretched across multiple responsibilities, their capacity to perform each role effectively diminishes. This not only affects individual performance but can also strain the institutions they serve, leading to inefficiencies and reduced public trust.
Role duplication further exacerbates these issues. When multiple individuals or entities share similar responsibilities, it can create confusion regarding who is accountable for specific outcomes. This ambiguity can dilute accountability, making it challenging to hold any single actor responsible for failures or shortcomings.

In The Politics of Presidential Appointments (2008, Princeton University Press), David E. Lewis argues that appointing individuals to multiple roles within the federal government—especially based on political loyalty rather than administrative expertise—has far-reaching consequences for the performance of agencies and the integrity of democratic governance. According to Lewis, when a single person holds several official posts, the likelihood of role overload increases dramatically, leading to a decline in effective oversight, reduced capacity to implement policies, and blurred lines of accountability.
Lewis's empirical analysis shows that agencies led by politically appointed individuals—particularly those placed in multiple roles—tend to underperform when compared to those led by career professionals. These appointments often result in misalignment between political objectives and institutional goals. The pursuit of political loyalty can override the need for managerial competence, which, in turn, undermines public trust and erodes institutional stability.
In essence, Lewis presents a stark trade-off: when administrations prioritise loyalty over expertise, they may gain short-term control but at the cost of long-term bureaucratic effectiveness. These dual-role figures often act more as political agents than stewards of public interest, making them less responsive to professional standards and more beholden to partisan agendas.

In The Federal Appointments Process: A Constitutional and Historical Analysis by Michael J. Gerhardt (2001, Duke University Press), the author explores how overlapping appointments within the American federal system have been strategically used to consolidate executive power. Gerhardt argues that when a single individual holds multiple roles—particularly those that straddle lines between advisory, administrative, and regulatory duties—it centralises influence within the executive branch, allowing a president or administration to bypass traditional checks and balances.
These overlapping roles often arise in contexts where appointments are made during congressional recesses or where “acting” officials occupy posts without formal Senate confirmation. While legally permissible under certain conditions, Gerhardt highlights how such practices blur constitutional accountability. By stacking offices with loyalists or those ideologically aligned with the executive, presidents may avoid scrutiny, reduce institutional resistance, and effectively tighten their grip over policy implementation.
Moreover, Gerhardt points to several legal controversies surrounding this tactic. When appointees serve across multiple domains—sometimes even creating informal influence networks—the line between lawful delegation and unconstitutional aggrandisement becomes perilously thin. Courts have occasionally intervened, especially when appointees are perceived to undermine the spirit, if not the letter, of the Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
Thus, according to Gerhardt, the proliferation of overlapping roles not only challenges the legal framework meant to ensure democratic accountability but also threatens to erode institutional integrity over time.

In Public Administration in Perspective: Theory and Practice Through Multiple Lenses (2010, Routledge), David John Farmer delves into the intricate challenges that arise when individuals occupy multiple positions within governmental structures. He posits that such dual appointments can lead to significant role conflicts, where the responsibilities and expectations of one position may clash with those of another. This overlap not only complicates decision-making processes but also blurs the lines of accountability, making it difficult to ascertain where one role ends and another begins.
Farmer employs a multifaceted analytical approach, examining public administration through various lenses—including political, ethical, and organisational perspectives. This pluralistic methodology reveals that dual appointments can undermine the foundational principles of public service, such as impartiality, transparency, and efficiency. For instance, an individual serving simultaneously as a policy advisor and a regulatory official may face conflicting obligations, leading to decisions that favour one role at the expense of the other.
Furthermore, Farmer highlights that such overlapping roles can foster environments susceptible to the "multiple principal problem," where an agent (the individual with dual roles) is accountable to multiple principals (superiors or stakeholders) with divergent interests. This scenario exacerbates the potential for inefficiencies and ethical dilemmas, as the agent navigates competing directives and expectations.

[Part 2]

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